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. REPORT OF COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE.
OFFICE CoMMISSARY GENERAL OF SuBSISTENCE,

TVashington City, D. C., October 20, 1865.
SIR: In compliance with the special instructions of the War Department of
October 7, addressed to chiefs of bureaus, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Subsistence department during the past
year:
r.rhe subsistence stores required for distribution to the several armies in the
field have during the year been purchased, as was done during the earlier years
of the war, in the principal markets of the northern States. The facilities and
cost of transportation to the various points where they were required for issue,
the relative prices in the different markets, and a due regard to the general commercial interests of the country, have governed this department in apportioning
these purchases among the several market centres of the country. New Orleans, gradually resuming a healthy commercial condition, already enables this
department-and in further aid of such resumption-to obtain in that market a
considerable portion of the supplies required for distribution from that point.
Although the present general condition of the southern States is not such as to
afford a large amount of supplies for the troops on duty therein, still the officers
of this department are able in some parts of those States to enter into contracts
for beef cattle and slaughtered beef, as also to some extent to purchase therein
other articles rrhe principal purchasing officers of the Subsistence department
have performed their duties with great fid elity to the interests of the country
and with much mercantile ability, and also, as I am frequently assured, to the
general satisfaction of the commercial men of the country with whom they have
transacted the business of this department.
So far as has been practicable, subsistence stores have been obtained by advertising for and receiving sealed proposals for their delivery. During the past
six months four hnndred and two such advertisements have been received and
placed on file in this office.
The principal commissaries immediately responsible for the subsistence of the
several armies in the field have performed the important and often difficult duties
of receiving, protecting, and distributing the supplies forwarded to them with
commendable efficiency and success. rl'hey have also, by great energy, been
able, to a considerable extent, to subsist the troops upon the resources of the
country in which the armies were operating or through which they were passing.
It is believed that during the entire war no campaign, contemplated movement, or expedition has ' failed on account of the inability of the Subsistence department to meet its proper requirements. It is also believed that the troops,
wherever stationed or operating, have, with rare exceptions, been supplied with
rations in good and wholesome condition.
While the Subsistence department has furnished a constant, timely, and adequate supply of subsistence for the several large armies occupying widely different fields of operations, as also for the troops at all the separate positions occupied throughout the entire country, it is due to the Quartermaster's department that its vast labors in the transportation of these supplies be recognized
as having been performed with a readiness and efficiency worthy of the highest
commendation. As a single item indicating the amount of these labors, I instance the fact that during the year 1863 the Quartermaster's department
shipped from the port of New York an average of seven thousand packages of
subsistence stores per day for every working day of the year, and for the year
18tH six thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven packages per day.
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The rmdden close of the war, and the consequent immediate muster-out of a·
large part of the army, unavoidably left on hand in some of the depots an excessive supply of subsistence stores. This excess has been sent to other points,
where stores were required, instead of meeting such requirements by fnrther
purchases. By this course a considerable part of these supplies have been, or
will be, economically disposed of. Surplus and damaged stores are in process
of being disposed of by sale. A considerable quantity of hard bread, surplus
or too old for issue to troops, remains to be disposed of. A Slifficient quantity
of this and other surplus articles have been held back from an earlier sale with
the view of meeting, in an economical manner, the urgent wants of those people,
white and colored, who have, by the events of the war, been reduced to a suffering condition; to whom it has been deemed an act of charity, due from the
government, to make limited issues of food.
I have the honor to report that, under your orders of June 29, 1865, directing the discontinuance of the whiskey ration, and the sale of the whiskey on
hand, the issue of that article was at once stopped. The sale has already taken
place at many points, and will soon be completed.
During the past year, as in the previous years of the war, a very considerable income has been derived from the sale of the hides, tallow, and other parts
of beef-cattle not isl';uable as beef to the troops. The total amount of such
sales has not been ascertained. At the Washington and Alexandria depots
alone they amount to $344,468 982- for the year ending 30th of September,
1865, and to $1,377,875 93 during the four years ending at that date.
Under the able and judicious management of Brevet Brigadier General
William Hoffman, United States army, Commissary General of Prisoners, the
prisoners of war, held under his charge at thirty-two forts, prison barracks,
camps, and hospitals, have been well and humanely subsisted, having received
a sufficient portion and variety of the ration to insure health, leaving in the
hands of the several issuing commissaries, as "savings,'' that portion of the
1·ation not deemed necessary for persons living in entire idleness. The pecuniary value of these " savings " has constituted a--_ pri::;on fund, available, under
the instructions of the commissary general of prisoners, for the purchase of articles necessary for the prison barracks and hospitals, and for meeting other
necessary expenses 0f the prisoners. · General Hoffman has already, under your
instructions, transferred to the Subsistence department a" savings" credit of the
amount of $1,507,359 01, and reports that there remains yet to be transferred
an amount not less than $337,766 98, making a total amount of $1,845, I ~!5 99.
The discharge of volunteer forces, and the consequent reduction of the expenses of this department, will enable it to meet all demands without exhauf:tting the appropriation for the current fiscal year.
The current work of this bureau is, habitually, up to date. The examination of the money and property accounts is nearly as close up to date as it is
ptacticable to Lave it. It would, however, facilitate the prompt examination of
the money and property accounts of the officers of the Subsistence department,
if the law permitted the former, as well as the latter, to be sent, by the officers
rendering them, direct to this bureau for its administrative action before going
to the accounting officers of the treasury. I do not doubt that the Third Auditor
is of the same opinion.
Under section 3 of the act of July 4, 1864, authorizing the claims of loyal
citizens in States not in rebellion for subsistence actually furnished to the army
of the United States, and receipted for by the proper officer receiving the same,
or which may have been taken by Buch offi.cerB without giving such receipt, to
be submitted to the Commissary General of Subsistence, and making it his duty
to cause each claim to be examined, there have been submitted as follows:
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Whole number of claims submitted, 1,4 70.
Number approved for payment...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number disallowed._.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number awaiting explanations, &c...............................
Number awaitiug examination...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

893
50
413

650
357
1,470

With your approval, it is proposed to ascertain and exhibit, in a tabular form,
the totnl quantity of each article of subsistence stores purchased for use of the
army during each year of the war, from 1861 to 1865, inclusive. Such a state··
ment. would form an in-t eresting addition to the mercantile statistics of the country.
Under the act of :March 3, 1865, for the better organization of the Subsistence department, authorizing, during the continuance of the t·ebcllion, the selection and assignment of commissaries of subsistence of the volunteer and rrgular service to gP,ographical military divisions, to separate armies in the fielfl, to
military departments, to principal subsistence depots, and to the office of the
Commissary General of Subsistence as assistants, with the rank, pay, and emol
aments of a eolonel of the Subsistence department, there have been so selected
and as:::igned nine commissaries of subsistence; one from the regular service,
and eight from the volunteer service. 'l'here have also been selected and
assigned, under authority of the same act, to inspection or other speeial duty,
two commissaries of subsistence with the rank of lieutenant colonel; one from
the volunteer, and the other from the regular service. Also, to divisions, two
commissaries of subsistence with the rank of major; both from the volunteer
service.
During the past year two vacancies have occurred in the regular service of
the Subsistence department; one by the brief sickness and death, after much
zealous and efficient field service, of Major John Kellogg, and the other by
resignation of Captain Edward R. Hopkins, a valuable officer. Both of these
vacancies were filled by selections and appointments from the volunteer branch
of the Snbsistence department.
r:I'he Subsistence departmEnt, at the commencement of the war, contained but
twelve officers of all grades; it had reached tl1is number by small additions,
authorized by law, from time to time, as the army was increased and the territory occupied by it extended; the several aJditi.:ms subsequent to the act of
April 14, 1818, by which a Commissary General of Subsistence was originally
authorized, being as follows : by the act of March 2, 1820, two commissaries;
by the act of July 5, 1838, five commissaries; by the act of September 20,
1850, tour commissaries. Since the commencement of the rebellion there have
been added as follow~::~: by the act of August 3, 1861, twelve commissaries; by
the act of February 9, 18C3, (ive commissaries; making a total of twenty-nine
officers of all grades. A further increase is not recommended until it shall be
made to appear that the present number of officers is inadequate to the service
required of the department.
'l'he officers of this department, regulars and volunteers, have, with but few
exceptions, performfd their duties with signal fidelity and success. Some of
them have been held from serving with troops in the field, much against their
choice and ambition.
rro the able senior Assistant Commigsarv General of Subsistence, and to the other
officers on duty in this bureau, is largely~ due the credit of the general goocl condition of the affairs of the Subsistence department which I am enabled to report.
I have the honor to be, very rei3pectfully, your obedient servant,

A. B. EATON,
Ron.

ED\YIN

Comm1·ssary General Subsistence.
1\f. STANTO~, Secretary if TVar.
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REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL.
WAR DEPARTIVIENT, SuRGEuN GENERAL's OFFICE,

lVashington, D. 0., October 20, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to gubmit the following statement of finances and gene~
ral transactions of the Medical department for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1865:
RECEIPTS.

Balance in the treasury July 1, 1864 .......•.............
$914, 135 10
Balance in the hands of the disbursiug· officers ......... ~ .. .
324,061 65
Balance remaining of appropriation for artificial limbs for soldiers
and seamen, per act of July 16, 1862, chap. 182, sec. 6 ....
4,265 00
Annual appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1865, by
act of June 15, 1864, chap. 124, sec. 1 ................ . 8,930, 640 00
Deficiency appropriation for the current fiscal year, by act of
March 2, 1865, chap. 73, sec. 8 ................... . ... _ 3,251,000 00
Annual appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1866, by
act of :March 3, 1865, chap. 81, sec. 1, required for disbursement during the present fiscal year, and placed to the
credit of the lVIedicai department for that purpose March 22,
1865 .......... --- ................................ . 6,000,000 00
Amount drawn from appropriation made by joint resolution of
April 29, 1864, to cover expenditures for medical attendance
and medicine for hundred-days volunteers .............. .
300, 000 00
Amount refunded by the Subsistence depart~ent for board of
64,293 40
sick and wounded soldiers in private hospitals .......... .
Amount refunded for medical attendance and supplies furnished
prisoners of war. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ .
140,506 08
Amount received for subsistence of officers in hospitals ..... .
286,281 04
Amount disallowed in account of Eben. Swift, United States
army, for June, 1863, and refunded from appropriation for pay
of volunteers .................... . ................. .
17,762 91
Proceeds of sales of condemned and unserviceable hospital property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... .
59,671 41
12,352 25
Proceeds of sales of ice not required for hospital use ....... .
Value of books and surgical instruments sold to medical officers
8, 311 30
and private physicians . ............................ .
Received for hospital property sold to the Quarte1 master's department ....................................... .... .
7,003 61
554 73
Received for medicines, &c., issued to refugees and freedmen ..
Recovered for hospital property lost or damaged in transpor534 45
tation ............................................ .
Recovered of Acting Assistant Surgeon J. S. Geitner, United
1,000 00
States army, for property and moneys illegally disposed of
Amount received for care of patients belonging to the United
States navy ....................................... .
283 00
446 20
Amount received from all other sources .................. .
Total credits for the year ........................ 20, 323, 102 13
Amount over-expended by disbursing officers...... . . . . . . . .
166, 578 34

20,489,680 47
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DISBURSEMENTS DTJRINU TH 1:<: YEAR.

For medical and hospital supplies ........... ~ ............ $ 15,
For pay of private physicians..... . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . 1,
l!-,or pay of ho spital employes... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For expenses of purveying depots ...... . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For care of sick sold iers in private hospitals.... . . . . . . . . . . .
*For artificial limbs for soldiers and seamen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expenses of hospitals for officers..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miscellaneous expenses of the Medical department.... . . . . . .
Balance in the treasury June 30, 1865......

204, 497
865, 82 L
949, 462
683, 830
240, 4 76
126, 538
243, 876
13, 996

20
82
46
33
11
00
37
94

19,328,499 23
1, 161, 181 24
20,489,680 47

=======-===========
The ample provision for sick and wounded existing at the date of my last
annual report was increased during the ensuing months until a maximum of (204)
two hundred and four general hospitals, wit4 a capacity of ( 136,894) one hundred and thirty-six thousand eight hundred and ninety-four beds, was reached.
l!~ield hospitals, hospital transports and cars, ambulance corps, and the purveying depots, were kept in condition to meet all possible l'equirements, and General Sherman's army was met at Savannah by four first-class sea-going steamers,
thoroughly equipped as hospital transports, with extra stores and supplies for
five thousand beds, should it have become necessary to establish large hospital;:;
upon his line of operations.
Upon the receipt of General Orders No. 77, dated War Department, Adjutant
General office, April 28, 1865, immediate measures were taken to reduce the expenses of this department. Of the (201) two hundred and one general hospitals
open on January 1, 1865, (170) one hundred and seventy have been discontinued.
Three of the four sea-going hospital transports have been discharged; the fourth
is now constantly engaged in the transfer of sick and wounded from southern
ports to the general hospitals in New York harbor. All of the river hospital
boats have been turned over to the Quartermaster's department, and but a single
hospital train is retained in the southwest.
The vast amount of medicines and hospital supplies becoming surplus through
the reduction of the army have been carefully collected at prominent points,
and are being disposed of at public auction, most of the articles bringing their
full value, and in some instances, their cost price.
Since April, 1861, there have been appointed ( 547) five hundred and fortyseven surgeons and assistant surgeons of volunteers; mustered into service (2, 109)
two thousand one hundred and nine volunteer regimental surgeons, and (3,882)
three thousand eight hundred and eighty-two volunteer regimental assistant surgeons; employed as acting staff surgeons (75) seventy-five; as acting assistant
surgeons (5,532) five thousand five hundred and thirty-two.
As far as returns have been received, during the war (34) thirty-four officers
of the medical staff have been killed or died of wounds received in action, (24)
twenty-four wounded, and ( 188) one hundred and eighty-eight have died from
disease or accident incurred in the service; (1) one died in a rebel prison, (6) six
of yellow fever. A completed record will increase this number.
Two hundred and fourteen (214) surgeons and assistant surgeons of volunteers, reported as supernumerary, have been mustered out.
*Furnished during the year-artificial legs 1,388; arms 1, 121.
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In compliance with the act of Congress, hospital chaplains have been reported
for muster-out when the hospitals to which they were attached have been discontinued. Of the two hundred and sixty-five (265) appointed during the wa,r,
twenty-nine (29) are still in commission.
rrlle business of this office has been largely increased by the necessity for
immediate examination and settlement of the accounts of staff and regimental
medical officers mustered out of service, while the number of applications from
the Pension bureau for " official evidence of cause of death " now averages
one thousand five hundred and fifty (1550) a month, the number received and
acted upon in the last fiscal year being over nineteen thousand ( 19,000); other
official inquiries, requiring reference to records and hospital registers, are very
numerous.
rrhe returns of sick and wounded show that of white troops one million fiftyseven thousand four hundred and twenty- three ( 1,057,423) cases have been
treated in general hospitals alone from 1861 to July 1, 1865, of which the mortality rate was 8 per cent. In addition to the alphabetical registers of dead, not
yet fully completed, the recorcls of the Medical department contain thirty
thousand (30,000) special reports of the more important forms of surgieal injuries,
of disease, and of operations. 'These reports, with statistical data, and a pathological collection, numbering seven thousand six hundred and thirty ( 7,630)
specimens, furnish a mass of valuable information which is being rapidly arranged and tabulated as a medical and surgical history of the war, for the publication of the first volumes of which an appropriation will be asked.
In this connexion, and as illustrating more in detail the importance of this
work, th~ army medical museum assumes the highest value. By its array of
indisputable facts, supported and enriched by full reports, it supplies instruction
otherwise unattainable, and preserves for future application the dearly-bought
experience of four years of war. Apart from its great usefulness, it is also an
honorable record of the skill and services of those medical officers whose ,contributions constitute its value, and whose incentive to these self-imposed labors
has been the desire to elevate their profession. A small appropriation has been
asked to continue and extend this collection.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865, an army medical board was
appointed to meet in Cincinnati, Ohio, on the 18th day of October, 1864, for the
examination of candidates for the medical st3ff of the army, and of assistant surgeons of that corps for promotion. Nine applicants for admission into the medical staff were invited to present themselves before this board. Of this number,
two were fully examined and approved; one withdrew before his examinations
were concluded; two were rejected as unqualified, and four failed to appear. Six
aesistaut surgeons were examined for promotion and found qualified. Two assistant surgeons were reported for re-examination. Of the approved candidates,
two have been appointed assistant surgeons.
Boards have been in session at New York, Washington, D. C., Hilton Head,
S. 0., New Orleans, La., Memphis, Tenn., Little Rock, Ark., and Cincinnati,
Ohio, for the examination of candidates for appointment in the volunteer medical
staff. One hundred and fifty-two candidates were invited before these boards,
fifty-eight of whom passed satisfactory examinations and were appointed accordingly. The remainder were rejected, failed to appear, or withdrew before examination was completed. These boards were discontinued in J nne, 1865.
The casualties 1n this corps since June 30, 1864, are as follows : appointed,
9(); promoted, 40; restored, 2; resigned, 32; declined, 1; died, 7; dismissed, 3; discharged, 3; dropped, 1; mustered out, 19; cancelled, 7.
Boards for the examination of candidates for appointment as medical officers
to colored troops have been in session permanently at Boston, New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and at euch other points from time
to time as the necessities of the service demanded.
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In nearly all sections of the country the health of the troops has been fully
equal to that of the preceding years, though military movements of unprecedented magnitude have been pushed to successful termination without regard to
seasons. An epidemic of yellow fever prevailed at Newbern, N. 0., in Septem·
ber, October and November, 1864, causing two hundred and seventy-eight (278)
deaths among the troops stationed there, of whom five hundred and seventy-one
( 571) were attacked. The released or exchanged prisoners arriving at Wilmington, N. C., from rebel prisons suffm;ed from an epidemic of typhoid fever, which,
however, was arrested by strict attention to hygienic rules and prompt transfer
to northern hospitals. With these exceptions no serious epidemics have appeared,
and it is interesting to note that quarantine regulations strictly enforced by military authority have proven, during the occupation of southern seaports and
cities by our troops, to be an absolute protection against the importation of contagious or infectious diseases. In view of the apprehensions entertained in regarrl to the Asiatic cholera, now devastating the shores of the Mediterranean,
this becomes a significant fact.
For recommendations of measures tending to the greater efficiency of the
Medical department, you are respectfully referred to the special report from this
office, called for by circular dated War Department, Adjutant General's office,
October 7, 1865.
In conclusion, I desire to bear testimony to the ability, courage and zeal manifested throughout the war by the officers of the Medical department under all
circumstances and upon all occasions. With hardly an exception they have been
actuated by the highest motives of national and professional pride, and the number who have been killed and wounded bears most honorable testimony to their
devotion to duty on the field of battle.
To the medical directors of armies in the field and of military geographical departments especial praise is due fo:r the successful execution of their arduous and
responsible duties.
I am, sir,very respectfully, your obedient servat,
JOS. K. BARNES, Surgeon General,
•
BTP'Vet Major Gen'l, U. S. Army.
Hon. E. M.

STANTON,

Sec'r etary

of War.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE PAY DEPARTMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY FOR THE FISCAL YEARENDING JUNE 30, 1865.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

Paymaster General's Office, Washington, October 31,1865.
Sm : I have the honor to submit a report of the offcial transactions of the
Pay department of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865.
rrhe tabular statements herewith presented exhibit the details from which the
following statement in gross is made :
Balance in hands of paymasters and unissued requisitions in
· treasury at beginning of fiscal year (July 1, 1864) ........ $86,039,808 87
Received from the treasury during the fiscal year (including
unissued requisitions in treasury on June 30, 1865).... . . . . 337,200,000 00
Received by paymasters from other sources, exclusive of sums
transferred among themselves ........ c................
6,815,137 50
Total to be accounted for.. . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . • 430,054:,946 37
57w
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Accounted for as follows :
Disbursements to the regular army....................... $7,839,225 47
Disbursements to the Military Academy...... . . . . . . . . . . . .
153,099 11
Disbursements to the volunteers ......................... 300,738,635 95
Total disbursement ............................. 308,730,960 53
Amount of unissued requisitions in the treasury on June 30,
1865 . - ... - - .................. -. -- ........ -. . . . . . . 65,900,000 00
Balance actually in hands of paymasters on June 30, 1866... 55,423,985 84
430,054,946 37
This large amount in the bands of paymasters at the end of the fiscal year
was an unavoidable necessity from the fact tbat at that precise period of time
the department was everyvvhere throughout the country under the greatestpresmre
of payments to mustered-out troops, and money in large sums had to be kept
thus distributed.
}-,rom the above it will be seen that the sum actually disbursed during the fiscal year and in process of disbursement at the"end thereof was $ 430,054,946 37.
Since the beginning of the current fiscal year, beside the above sums in the
hands of paymasters and the unissued requisitions stated, $94,000,000 have been
disbursed, and distributed for disbursement, making a total expenditure of
$524,054,946 37 during the last fiscal year? and the present one to this date.
Of this large sum more than one-half ($270,000,000) has been paid to disbanded volunteer troops mustered out of serviee.
From the early days of June to the present time, this department has made
fi"n al payment to more than eight hundred tlJOusand officers and men. r.I'he number paid cannot be definitely stated for the want of time for full official returns
to be received from the many various and distant points of payment throughout
the country, especially as these payments are still continuing. Enough, however, is known with certainty to establish the fact that the figures stated are not
in excess.
·
This is an extraordinary exhibit of work performed chiefly within the three
months of June, Jnly and August-two hundred and seventy millions of money
paid to eight hundred thousand individual men. When the manner of these
payment.; is observed, with a knowledge of the particularity required in each
case, the accounts varying in amounts, each to be separately computed in its
several items of pay, clothing, bounty, &c., with such stoppages as may be
chargeable deducted, the final amount stated and the signature of each officer
and man to be appended in duplicate to the receipt rolls, a just appreciation may
be fo::med of the stupendous labor involved. No similar work of like magnitude,
regarding its imment<ity both as to men and m?ney, and the small limit of time
in which it has been performed, has, it is believed, any parallel in the history of
armies.
'rhe troops for discharge were, under the orders from the Adjutant General's
office, transported to their respective State rendezvous as rapidly as the proper
officers of the various organizations could despatch the duty of mustering out.
This department engaged to prepare with funds officers at all the sixty
different places of designated rendezvous throughout the States, and to make
prompt payment in the shortest practicable time, on the arrival of each organization, so as substantially to avert delays, with all their evil consequences at the
places of rendezvous. How far this pledge on our part has been redeemed the
country can n.nswer. The facts of record in the War Department show no delays of moment occurring in any quarter i none, at least, chargeable to this depart-
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ment. The work is mainly accomplished, satisfactorily accomplished, beyond
the most sanguine anticipations of those who could understand and properly
measure the vastness of the undertaking.
For this result the country is indebted largely to the zeal, intelligence, and
sleepless industry of a corps of experienced paymasters who signalized themselves
in this the closing act of their military staff service by a faithfulness and devotion
which reflects the highest honor upon _them as a body, and as individual officers. 'ro them, under the skilful management of their supervising district
chiefs, this department owes its success; and.I take occasion, as the head of
the department, in this public official communication, to render to them the homage of my grateful acknowledgments. The credit is theirs, for without their experience and cordial co-operative efforts, not all the powers of the government
combined could have wronght so favorable a solution of a difficult problem.
It becomes my duty also to notice here, in most favorable terms, the valued services of the officers and clerks connected immediately with this office.
'l_1hey appreciated the emergency, and bent themselves to the difficult work,
which, for a time, pressed upon the office with almost overwhelming weight.
With paymentR simultaneously progressing at sixty different points, widely
separated, with the necessity of keeping each one supplied with funds from day to
day, and a necessity also that each should have no more than required for immediate
disbursement-drawing from the treasury at the rate of $20,000,000 per week,
and compelled to make close estimate and careful watch of its daily distribution,
so that the demand at each given point should be surely supplied, and yet no
more than supplied; telegrams and letters continually pouring in, noting the
movement and destination of troops, and repeati.ng these notices to the proper
points of rendezvous; applications and appeals constantly arriving, requiring
immediate answers; new questions arising and referred to this office for instructions, &c.-kept our thoughts, our pens, our press, and the telegraph in constant requisition by day and by night. Mid all this I am happy to bear testimony
that every one labored with cheerful alacrity-in some im;tances, indeed, during
the heated season, even beyond their strength. It may be said of these, as I have
said of the paymasters in the field, but for their willing efforts, rendered with selfdenying devotion, the work could not have been a success.
The unstinted facilities extended, sir, by your authority and orders, in the
free use of the military telegraph, the printing press, and all other agencies that
could be profitably applied to the end, together with the liberal confidence
which you were pleased to repose in this office, leaving to it an almost unrestricted Jiscretion to manage, without hindrance, its own details; your concurrence
in, and support of, itt~ acts and orders-these reveal the vital secret of a result
so favorable.
I cannot close this branch of my subject without a grateful expression of indebtedness to the officers of the Treasury Department for the courteous and zealous attention with which, during the trying exigency, they always entertained
the importunate demands of this office. vVhat often seemed as hopeless impossibilities obstructing the financial path, were, by their fervent efforts, readily
dispelled, and thus all our requisitions were met with most satisfactory
promptness.
At the date of my last annual report, besides the small number of officers·
constituting the pay department of the regular army, (and which is without
casualty or change since,) there were in the service 409 additional paymasters, contingent appointments under the law of July, 1838. Afterwards, up
to March 3, thirty-eight others were appointed and confirmed, making a
totalof ........................................................ 447
Accounted as follows:
Resig·ned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 89
Commission declined. . . . . . . . . . • • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
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Dismissed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Appointments cancelled................................ . . . . . . 21
Dropped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Died of disease. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
Lost at sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Killed by guerillas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Died while prisoner of war. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
J\l[usteredout .............................................. 111
rrotal casualties- - - - - ... - - - ... - . - - - - ..
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237

Remaining in service ........................• ~ _........... 210
This reduction may still continue, following with even pace, as their services
can be spared and their accounts be rendered, the progress of the reduction of
the army.
The sudden disbandment of our volunteer hosts, besides their final payment
on the ordinary forms of muster-out rolls and other discharge papers, has devolved
upon this department an inordinate accumulation of" referred claims" transmitted
for adjustment and payment. These have arisen from various causes, but chiefly
fi·om the inability of the officers charged with the execution of the muster-out papers to reach a complete history as to pay, clothing, bounty, &c., of large numbers of enlisted men, so as to enable a final settlement at the time of discharge.
r_ro all such certificates of discharge are furnished, upon which are indorsed the
fact of non-payment, and the holders are directed to forward the same, as the
basis of their claim, to the Paymaster General for adjustment.
Such magnitude has this demand attained, that it has been found necessary
to organize a special division of paymasters as an attachment of this bureau, to
take exclusive cognizance of this class of claims.
This "division of referred claims" is now composed of a chief supervising
paymaster of much intelligence, judgment, and experience, with twelve other
paymasters, also competent officers of experience, and a corps of sixty-four active
clerks. The peculiar labors of this division could not be near so well performed
under any other organization, having, as this does, enlightened paymasters to
supervise every branch of the work, each being responsible for his own.
J:Gvery claim sent to this divil::lion requires for its elucidation a careful and
laborious search through all the previous rolls on file in this and the Second
Auditor's office, besides constant reference to the Adjutant General's office, to
trace out through the past records all the facts touching the case, the charges,
stoppages, forfeitures, &c., that it may be stated with accuracy the balance due
the claimant. 'l'his done, vouchers iu form covering that balance are filled out
and transmitted to the claimant for his signature, which 1:eturned to the paymaster,· the latter remits a check for the amount. From this it will be seen
how tedious is the work of this divi8ion, what careful industry it demands, and
how inevitable an~ the delays complaiued of by impatient claimants .
The clerical force of this bureau is without material change since the date of
my last annual report.
For months past, in anticip'ltion of an early permanent reduction of that force,
I have refrained from recommending new appointments to fill such vacancies as .
have occurred by resignations and other casualties.
'l'his course, I apprehend, may continue without injury or material inconvenience to the public service. Such, however, is the ~mdden accumulation of
the busin ess of the bureau, by reason of the present influx, for examination, of
rolls and other classes of vouchers, resulting from the recent and continued large
payments to disbanded troops already adverted to, that but a very slight reduction
in the number of clerks employed will be practicable for some months to come.
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I need hardly urge the unqualified conviction, that the compensation allowed by the government to this indispensable class of public agents is quite
inadequate in view of the present exorbitant cost of the necessaries of life.
The clerks of this bureau, as a body, are highly meritorious and deserving
public servants. None, I am sure, better than they, have by faithful industry
earned just title to favorable consideration. It becomes my duty, therefore,
respectfully, but urgently, to recommend a reasonable increase of the rates of
compensation now by law fixed for the clerks employed in this bureau. Especially is this demanded by every consideration of the public interest, of enlightened public economy, for the clerks of the higher grades, and for the chief
clerk. I feel sure I have only to prPsent this subject to your attention to insure your influence in the furtherance of a consummation so proper.
In another paper communicated to you, dated the 11th instant, I have had
the honor to submit, for your consideration, a plan for the better organization
and a permanent increaRe of the Pay department of the army, to which I respectfully invite your attention in connexion with this report.
The entire of the regular army and the volunteer forces of every description
retained in service, and not embraced in orders for muster out, have been paid,
or are provided for and in process of payment to the end of the last fiscal year,
(to lst July last.)
Many organizations have been paid to the later date of September 1.
All discharged troops have been paid in full, and all being discharged or under orders for discharge are provided for, and will be paid as fast as they arrive
at their respective places of rendezvous.
Paymasters are held in readiness to make another -payment to the troops who
shall be continued in the service, whenever the needful funds for that purpose
may be available.
In conclusion, I beg to present to your attention the following remarkable summary statement of the results in this department during the past four
years of war.
The total of money disbursed by the department from July 1, 1861, to the
pres·ent date, is one thousand and twenty-nine million two hundred and thirty-nine
thomsand (1,029,239,000) dollars.
'fotai defalcations in the department for same period, supposing that
nothing is made from sureties, (it is believed that more than
one-half will he collected from these sources).-- .... -.-- ... -... $541,000
Total expenses for disbursement, including pay and allowances to
paymasters and their clerks, mileage and travelling expenses, &c.,
an average of 350 paymasters and 400 clerks for the term of four
years and four months (a large average) ...... - ....... - - --. . 6A29.600
Total defalcations and expenses .... _.. -- ...... -......

6,970,600

=============
Thus it is seen that the total of every character of expense to the government
arising from the disbursement of the pay to the armies during the period st;tted
is less than seven-tenths of one per cent. of the sum disbursed..
Surely this is a cost most wonderfully cheap for the execution of duties so
important and responsible. It is much questioned if there is another instance
on record of public disbursement so cheaply performed.
Respectfully submitted:
B. W. BRICE,
Paymaster General U. S. A.
Hou. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Se .7etary if War.

Statement showing the amount in tlze hands rif eaclt qftlte disbursing f.!tficers qf tlte Pay department and unaccounted fm· on tl-te 1st if
July, 1864; tke amount remiited to each from tke treasury or turned O'lier by otlter agents during tlze fiscal year ending June 30,
1865; tke amount accounted for by accounts and vouchers qf expenditures or by tranife7· or replacement in tke treasury, and the
balance ·tema~·ning unaccounted for to be applied to payments in tlte first quarter if tlw next fiscal year.
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Hiram Leonard · ·--- ·
729, 783 13 3, 727, 736 66
Nathan W. Brown·-. 4, 714,013 45 30, 620, 082 04
'l'homas J. Le~lie- · .. · 6, 536, 365 17 75, 504, 308 07
Cary H. Fry-·······79, 798 51
503, 606 45
Franklin E. Hunt.... 2, 388, 027 41 4, 47. 2, 116 19
Samuel Woods.......
6, 661 11
4e2, 512 6o
Daniel McClure- .. --- 3, 098, 526 75 37, 589, 614 00
Thomas 1\f. Winston..
35, 488 46 8, 873, 043 18
Augustus H._ S~ward~· 189 21
402, 142 22
Robert A. Kmzte- · ·-43::>, 107 45 1, 506, 887 77
George L. F~:hinger.. 5, 780,826 79 6, 521,730 96
William S. Wallace - ·
1, 453 64 1, 725, 000 00
David 'faggart • • . • . • 1, 048, ~37 63 9, 660, 043 17
Adam D. Stewart.-··
28, 313 07 1, 089, 414 39
Henry C. Pratt.......
2, 767 24 2, 948, 396 68
Simeon FranciK - .. -..
16, 049 62
273, 400 81
.John A. Whitall -....
34,714 85
265, 396 38
Simeon Smith. .......
5,308 ~9 1,104,82106
Charl~s T. Lamed....
379 ::>7
831, 478 39
Edward Wright......
6, 906 98
821, 124 32
John l'. Brua ....... _
427 04
401, 925 77
Hodney Smith _........•........ -..
• 909, 5~9 40
J. D. l\1. Potter.......
21, 211 81 1, 640, 5::>2 71

4, 457, 519
35, 334, 095
82, 040, o73
583, 404
· 6, 860, 143
489,173
40, 688, 140
8, 908, 531
411, 331
1, 941, 995
12,302,557
1, 726, 453
10, 708, 280
1, 117, 727
2, 951, 163
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1,110,129
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1, 661, 7o4

0"'

.s
'0.;

Q)@

'O<l)

>l+'
<l)>:l

P.r:>
~-

~
ooC!l
<l)

+'0:1
l'l·~

:;::;>,

ool

13~

--d

~p:,
~13

.s~

'Col

~.;;;

~~
p.Ol
~:'::

t;.l~

.;£~

·s ~

<·~

J.......................................

_sa.,~

~~~

~2;g5
'0

....

~~i

"g
~

"g
ol

E~.9'0

p~

c

<a

~

13

ol

§$~ ~
~.£

·s ro

·a§

13

p.,

~~
A~

13 o...~~~ ~

oo'O'O ~

-: ~ ~~
>l "'P.,-<

~

§ ~g~

·;::;;;~>,IV
b<,o ,0 >l

~ .s '0..:;
""'"='<))~
0 Q).e: 0

,Q

ol

L\J

"'

'0

§

..<1·
~~

~

·;.s

M
"'d

<l)OO

<:>ol

;:ss

0

~~
,0~

oo'"d Woo
~ ~;[~
]~
.s C3 f!!
~ ~ §'.s
s'O~
0
<!j - - E-<
<11
P=<
~
1- - - - - - - ·- - - - - - ----- - - - - ~ '- <l)
::l<l)<:)

<:..0

0

~

r-3

+-l::;:lc,)M

<:)

J. . . . . .

0
"':l

r-3

~

$715 69

M

79 ......... _... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... _ 2, 87 1, 891 20 2, 871,891 20 1, 585, 628 59$1, 500, 000
8;5, o:JS 59
49
$578 53
$2, 948 93 ............ 28, 595, 992 83 28, 599, 520 29 6, 734, 575 20 5, 000, 000 1, 734, 575 20
241
61, 954 04
149, 20o 76 ...... , .... _ 61, 519, 227 85 61, 7:<0, 388 65 20, 310, 284 5918, 500, 000 1, 810, 284 59
96,
257, 929 85
256, 460 78 _..... . . . . . .
62, 791 44
577, 182 07
6, 222 89 . . . . . . . . . .
6, 222 89
601
4, 22ii 72 .••. __ .. .. ... _ ...•....... _ 4, 894, 390 08 4, 898, 616 80 1, 961, 526 80
500, 000 1, 461, 526 80
77
38, 862 34
375,729 69 ... . . . . . . . . .
60, 945 99
475,538 02
13,635 75 ......... _
13,635 75
75.............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 29, 981, 567 68 29, 981, 567 68 10, 706, 573 07 8, 000, 000 2, 706, 573 07
64' .•...... .. ... _...... _....... _.... . . . . . . . 3, 640, 140 34 3, o40, 140 34 5, 268, 391 30 . . . . . . . . . . 5, 268, 391 30
43J
321,217 65
18,825 03.. .. . . . . . . . .
71,288 75
411,231 43 .... _....................•........ _...
22. ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 442, 000 00 1, 442, 000 00
499, 995 22
400, 000
99, 995 22
75 .•••.... __ ....
49,946 22 .......•.... 12,098,865 63 10,148, Sll 85
15:3,745 90 .... .. . .. .
153,745 90
64
J, 910 56
342, 729 65 . . . • . . . . . • . . 1, 380, 134 24 1, 724, 774 45
1, 679 19 . . . . . . . . . .
1, 679 19
80
70, 592 78 2, 405, 519 41 _........... 7, 558, 724 76 19, 034, 836 95
673, 443 85 . . . . . . . . . .
673, 443 85
46
806, 619 30
153, 367 41 $153, 099 lJ.
4, 641 64 1, 117, 727 46 .••..... - .........••.•• _ .••..... -.- ...
92
127, 9:35 45 1, 054, 912 99 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 315, 490 32 2, 498, 338 7o
452, 825 16 _........ _
452, 825 J 6
4:3
24, 4~3 76
192, 309 61 . . . . . . . . . . . .
29 656 38
247, 389 75
42, 060 68 - ........ 42, 060 o8
23
65, 203 92
1RG, 590 83. .. . . . .. . . . .
37,518 58
289,313 33
10, 797 90 .. . .. ..... _
10,797 90
35
27,013 20
982,382 79 .. ••...••. ..
69,61613 1,079,0121?
31,117 23 ..........
31,117 23
96
2, 755 98
385, 41 '7 8!'1 ...•.•.•... _
272, 492 "/2
660, 66G 5o
171, Hll :38 . . . . . . . . . .
171, 191 38
30
60, Ofl2 44
705, 701 :!2.. . . . . . . . . .
5o, 999 12
822, 793 48
5, 237 82 ..........
5, 237 82
B1
1, 991 09
25:J, 633 36 . . . . • . . . . . . .
146, 728 36
402, 352 81 .... -- .................. _...... __ .... .
40
8, 967 89
672, 844 63 ........... _
51, 655 63
733, 468 15
176, 131 25 ......... _
176, 131 25
52 1, 250, 936 84
250, 211 04 ........... 123, 572 43 1, 624, 720 3 L
37, 044 21 . . . . . . . . . .
37, 044 21

00.

Total.. .......... 27,856, 9163'6197, 38o, 411 89 225, 237, 328 2f3,133, 212 34[-8. 439, 738 93

$8,382,122 10 $8, 31l2, 122 10
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Volunteers.
Daniel H. :McPhail . . . 2, 501. sa 66 7, 710, 588 7 ~
W~ll!am R. Gibson... 1, 45:3, .~Z~ ~~
~5
·w1ll1am P. Gould....
~-. ~s
4 14 6 606 86
10 0
Da"':id Taylo~ · · · · · · · ·
' ~6 09 30, 360' 971 50
Dwlght B::nu~stcr....
10&, ~61 83 2' 065' 4tl9 82
John II h.mzw a.....
7 , ;)
,
,
Will Ct~ruback . . . . . . . ~· 911, 5~2 78 23, ~~0, ~'!0 3tl
E E Paulding....... 1;), 427, 734 44 74, 6~7, ~38 87
,T~Het~h A. Nuues..... . .. .. . . . . . . .. .
3, 579,927 80
Thomas II. HalHey...
60, 460 79 1, 446, 039 14
1\Ialcolm McDowell b . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 860, 061 18
·william Patten.......
64, 931 9R 1, 278,225 95
Edwin D. Judd......
2, 8::l8 49 2, 343, 599 93
C. P. E. Johnson.....
53, 325 67 1, 680, 960 39
Thomas S. Allison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
675, 200 00
William Allen........ 22, 823, 451 07 51, 200, 737 19
John Coon c . .........
75, 900 57 1, 175, 500 00
Frederick Robie...... .. . .. .. . . . . . . . 1, 494, 995 56
William B. Rochester.
67, 180 29 1, 75tl, 050 9:"i
Edwin C. Morse...... . . . . . .. .. . . . . .
517, :248 50
Milton J. Stone . . . . . .
32, 975 12 1, 007, 537 08
Jonathan Ladd.......
13, 155 35
318, 000 00
Jacob A Camp......
28,.856 30 1, 364, 666 31
H. A. Hutchins . . . . . .
22, 296 05 1, 744, 502 63
H. P. Reese . . . . . . . . .
144, 421 53 4, 603, 530 44
Joseph A. Lawyer....
7:l, 530 18 2, 085,491 27
Roland G. Usher..... 3, 020, 569 67 8, 705, 136 39
. Coates Kinney . . . . . . .
38, 587 70 2, 216, 567 25
Henry L. King.......
1, 8:l7 72 2, 068, 307 46
George Marston......
62, 266 78
526, 4fl8 43
Robert Smith, (Ill.) d
6, 608 65
809, 298 4.5
Charles S. Jones.... .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 1, 560, 787 76
F. W. Crane.........
7, 576 99 1, 114, 678 15
J. H. McBlair... .. . . .
26,782 36
746,034 48
J. Ledyard Hodge...
37, 768 34 3, 492, 087 07
L. S. Hapgood.......
104, 360 62
360, 486 34
Alban V. Elliott......
62,416 45 7, 982, 362 77
11, 002 12 ............. .
Gem·ge P. Folsom e...
Anthony 'l'en Eyck . .
2, 736 02 2, 037~ 017 ~9
N. S. Bl"inton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
562, 000 00
James W. Carpenter!19, 546 70
418, 5~l7 03
H. P. Dixon.........
2, 953 50
306, 657 96
William Richardson g . ......... _... _
120, 008 76
James H. Phinney....
319, 937 5:3 1, 540, 000 00
C. S. Stevenoon......
4, 547 :11 3, 501,900 80
Samuel A. Safl"ord...
46~) 02
2, 4"8, 322 75
A. \V. Hendricks .... _
314,257 68
535, 049 65
Amos BinnC'y........
13, 018 OU 19, 4~13, 230 92
1'-:.olwrt I.. Wiliion .... _........ __ ... 1, 3fl(i, 439 8fi
W. II. Scott.........
:J, 59J 70 1,11-1,339 6:.1

f; +ig; §gi

10 212 400 41 ............................ -........... 8, 587, 300 41 8, 587, 300
7: 2:~s: 456 u
34, 914 57
114, 077 74 .. . .. . .. . .. . 7, 089, 463 so 7, 2:38, 456
1, 720, 178 86.............. 1, 484,260 51 . .. . .. .. .. ..
175,512 16 1, 659,772
4, 156, 671 64 ........ - .... - 4, 096, 575 90 - ............... -- .. --.... 4, 096, 575
30,465,161 59
9, 722 46
403,377 21 ............ 23,304,840 17 23,717,939
2, 142, 051 65
25,505 85
877, 7!!0 37............ 1,115, 181 37 2, 018,477
29, 452, 353 16 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
8 03 .. . .. .. .. .. . 29, 452, 345 13 29, 452, 353
90, 054, 973 31 ............. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78, 636, 272 081 78, 686, 2. 72
3, 579, 927 80
2, 571 24
461, 997 76 .. .. . .. .. .. . 3, 110, 552 56 3, 57:3, 121
l, 506, 499 9:3
7, 519 64 1, 100, 199 31 .. . . . .. .. . ..
347, 946 90 1, 455, 665
1, 860, 061 18 ............. 389, 518 67 .. . .. . .. . .. . 1, 470, 542 51 1, 860, 061
1, 343, 157 93
1, 717 74
508, 027 11 -...........
654, 659 10. ] , 164, 403
2, :146, 438 42
23, 129 37
554, 802 83 . .. .. . .. .. .. 1, 692, ] 84 461 2, 270, 116
1, 734,286 06
52,496 38 1, 226,045 57............
435,203 94 . 1, 713, 745
675, 200 00..............
463,632 03............
102,220 90
565, 852
74, 024, 188 26 ......... -.... .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . 62, 612, 882 65 62, 612, 882
1, 251, 400 57
7, 364 18
533, 090 52 . . . . . . . . . . . .
710, 779 93 ] • 251, 234
58, 590 53 1, 241, 572 74 -...........
120, 502 91 1, 420, 666
1, 494, 995 56
1, 822,231 24 ......... -.... 1, 613, 928 73............
199, 645 62 1, 813, 574
517, 248 50
2, 300 73
442, 969 73 . . . . . . . . . . . .
61, 81:3 49
507, 083
1, 040, 512 20 .. . .. .. .. .. .. .
430, 015 93 . .. .. . .. . .. .
610, 440 32 1, 040, 456
331,155 35- .... .. .. . .. . .
243,080 10. ..... ......
88,075 25
331,155
1, 393, 522 61
14,448 04 1, 27a, 473 01 . .. .. .. .. .. .
60,993 02 1, 348, 914
1, 766,798 68.............. 1, 619,817 01 .. .. . .. .. .. .
103,252 97 1, 723, 069
4, 747, 951 97
49, 591 ]5 1, 767, 520 66 . .. .. .. .. .. . 2, 788, 988 40 4, 606, l 00
2,159, 021 45
27, 029 98
726, 0/3 54 -........... 1, 404,851 2:3 2,157, 954
5, 975 lO
276, 102 13 . . .. .. .. .. .. 11, 302, 098 74 11, 584, 175
11, 725, 706 OG
2, 255, 154 -95
31, 671 28 1, 564, 280 84 - . . . . . . . . . . .
358, 853 04 1, 954, 805
2, 070, 145 18..............
647, 953 03............ 1, 268, 305 73 1, 9Hi, 258
58,095 95
21.6, 373 12. ...... .. ...
242,199 63
516,668
588,725 21
815, 907 1.0
13,017 25
788, 528 82............
14, 361 0:1
815, 907
862, 454 43 . .. . .. .. .. ..
698, 333 33 1, 560, 787
1, 560, 787 76 .. .. .. .. . . . .. .
1,122, 255 14
17,473 67
577, 614 87............
500, 078 66 1, 095, 167
772, 816 84 ............. 589, 170 05 . .. .. .. . .. ..
131, 942 94
721, 112
3, 529, 855 41 ............. - ...... - .. - .... -........... 3, 232,000 00 3, 232,000
464, 846 96..............
374,990 28 . .. .. .. .. . ..
69, 006 58
44:3, 996
8, 044, 779 22
6, 006 45
473,005 45 -........... 3, 046, 773 05 3, 525, 784
11, oo2 12..............
263 2o _.......... _
2, 747 43
3, oto
2, 039, 753 91
17, 634 02
495, 541 76 ........... - 1, 333, 557 60 1, 846. 7:33
562, 000 00 ......... --...
445, 227 41 . .. .. .. . .. ..
111, 424 48
556, 651
438, 083 7:3
10, 412 88
:325,..1279 93 -...........
102, 015 92
437, 708
309,611 46 ..............
189,576 10 ...... ......
120,035 36
309, 611
120, 008 76 ............. 10:), 015 40 . .. .. . .. .. ..
14, 993 36
120, 008
1, 859, 937 53
1, 551 62
151, 277 72 . .. .. . .. . .. .
733, 238 18
886, 067
3, 506,448 11
l, 151 55 1, 692,513 47. ........... 1, 774,:352 71 3, 468,017
2, 448, 791 77
11, 422 56 1, 512, 488 91 .. .. .. . .. .. .
540, 306 26 2, 064, 217
849, 307 3a .... _... _. _. . .
606, 806 29 _...........
232, 520 45
839, 32n
20, 228 51
19, 506, 248 92
446, 442 51 . .. . .. .. .. .. 14, 342, 768 40 14, 809, 4:39
1,3:5G,43~J 8G
4,817 2~1
728,6:33 8·2 ............
5~17,\176 0:3
1,:3:lJ,427
l, 117, 933 33
1~, 588 20
876, 320 98 .. .. .. . .. .. .
20:.J, 521 22 l, 091, 430
1

41

1, 625 100 0011 000 000

625 100 00

1l .... _.. ~ ........ ~ ... '........... ~ .... ..

67
60,406 19 ......... 60,406 19
90
60, 095 74 ......... 60, 095 74
84 6, 747,221 75 5, 000,000 1 747 221 75
59
123, 574 06 .. .. .. .. ..
• 123 574 06
16 ............................... '...... _
08 11, 368, 701 23 10, 000, 000 1, 368, 701 23
56
4, tl06 24 . .. .. .. . ..
4, 806 24
83
50, 834 08 -.........
50, 834 08
18 ......... - .................... " .. - .. ..
95
178, 753 98 . .. .. .. .. .
178, 753 98
66
76, 321 7ti .. .. . .. .. .
76, 321 76
89
20,540 17 ......... 20,540 17
93
109, 347 07..........
109, 347 07
65 11, 411, 305 61 7, 000, 000 4, 411, 305 61
63
165 94 . . . . . . . . . .
165 94
18
74, 329 38 . .. . .. .. ..
74, 329 38
35
8, 656 89..........
8, 656 89
95
10, 164 55 . . . . . . . . . .
10, 164 55
25
55 95 . .. .. . . ..
55 95
35- ................................... ..
07
44, 608 54 .. .. .. .. ..
44, 608 54
98
43, 728 70 .... . .. . ..
43, 728 70
21
141, 851 76 -.........
141, 851 76
75
1, 066 70 .. .. .. . ..
1, 066 70
97
141, 5:l0 09 . .. . .. .. ..
141, 530 09
J6
300, 349 79 . . . . . . . . . .
300, 349 79
76
153,886 42 . .. .. .. .. .
153,886 42
70
72,056 51..........
72,056 51
10.............. .... .. .. .. • ........... .
76 .................................... ..
20
27, 087 94 . . . . . . . . . .
27, 087 94
99
51, 703 85 .. .. .. .. . .
5 J' 703 85
00
297,855 41 .. .. . .. . ..
297,855 41
86
20, 850 10..........
20, 850 10
95 4, 518, 994 27.......... 4, 518, 994 27
69
7, 991 43 .... . .. .. .
7, 991 43
38
193, 020 53 . .. .. .. . ..
193, 020 53
89
5, 348 11 . .. .. .. .. .
5, 348 11
73
375 00 . .. .. .. . ..
375 00
46 ........................ .
76 .......... - ......................... ..
52
973, 870 Ol . .. .. .. .. .
973, 870 01
73
38,430 38 .... .. ....
38,430 38
73
:384, 574 04 -.........
384, 574 04
74
9, 980 59 _.........
9, 980 59
42 4, 696, 809 50 3, 000, 000 1, 696, 809 50
16
25,012 70 ..........
25,012 70
40
2G, 502 93 . . .. .. .. ..
26, 502 93
1
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J. 0. Culver.........
$50,937 92 $1,617,599 54
George Phelps _.... __
79, 388 32 1, 929, 574 72
Charles 'vV. CampbelL
2, 376 44 1, 581, 702 20
Charles F. Davies....
750, 679 60 2, 302, 377 22
MosesF.Webb......
6,61873 1,497,05311
George A. Mitchell . . .
3;27 62 1, 790, 984 31
Henry C. Whitney h..
149, 7\19 28 1, :J75, 738 55
Robert P. Dodge.....
16, 533 53 3, 731,321 38
V.C.Ilannai .. ......
2756 2,101,14582
Morgan L. Martin....
71,080 46
720,115 66
Charles J. Sprague.-.
2, 011 39
393, 245 64
William Smith---....
2, 78:3 68 1, 290, no 08
William G. Terrill. ........... - ... -854,046 70
0. S. Withe rill -......
19, 309 OJ 2, 318, 018 15
Martin L. Bundy-....
193, 517 49 3, 498, 241 35
J. A. I •. MorrelL . --... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 301, 970 16
Thomas B. Oakley ............ -.--. 1, 852, 843 35
Frank M. Etting -....
10, 146 78 19, 177, 154 43
'vVilliam H. Johnston.
10:1, 106 24 2, 556, 691 12
NicholaR Verlder ...... ----·----··-- - 1,427,676 05
Oliver Holman.- ... -.
4, 451 37 1, 534, 509 09
William Tillman-. . . .
29, 702 71 2, 767, 33:3 52
William Larnedj . . . .
120, 973 01
789, 257 67
Russell Errett........
28, 172 57 3, 305, 302 5:1
'l'homas 1\1:. Burt _....
57, 7:16 23 1, 092. 687 55
Prank Bridgeman....
98, 449 52 4, 252, 365 59
Julian 0. lliaKon k....
195 52.--.-- __ ... __ _
John W. Newell ____ .
158, 289 76 ~. 793, 815 61
Henry V. Sullivan l . .
30, 000 00
429, 846 19
'VilliamJ. Martin .... ····---------·
606,500 00
RobertS. Webb----······-----·--903,642 09
Alex. B. Williams .. _.
5, 037 57
110, 067 71
William M. Wiley. __ .
54, 363 23 4, 755, 616 24
.Alvin Walker m _. __ .
16,245 43
919,562 24
W. C. H. Sherman n..
14, 019 14 1, 468, 977 20

$529,747 63 $1, 667, 646 28
$891 18 . --- -- - -- .
$891 ] 8
$1' 668, 537 461
$10, 656 74 $1, 127. ~41 91 . ----- . ----55,456 05 2,007,91151
1,05153..........
1,05153
2, 008, 96:1 04
5, 873 62 1, 946, ;)81 84 . ----- --- -- 391,403 80 1, 480, 109 33
103, 969 31 . ---- .. --.
103, 969 31
11, 452 63 1, 077, 252 90 . ------- - - ..
1, 584, 078 64
3, 053, 056 82
1, 95 t 27
515, n59 88 ........... . 2, 535, 0:39 10 3, 052, 6::50 25
406 57 --.---- . --.
406 57
52, 770 59 1,498,5fi6 90
1, 503, 671 84
88 738 97 1, 357, 047 34 -.------.--.
5,114 94 ·-----·-··
5,114 94
9,42915..........
9,42915
891,558 22 1,781,882 78
1, 791, 311 !J3 . ---.-- '_--.--.
890, :124 56 ------.----.
1, 525, 537 831
4, 276 60
458, 715 97 . - .--------. 1, 062, 545 26 1, 525, 537 83 . - - .. -- - -- . - - - . - . - ... - - - . -- .. -- - - - . - ..
257, 015 02 "
936, 145 72 2, 490, 839 89 1, 257, 01.5 02$1, 000, 000
3, 747, 854 ))l
18, 163 90 1, 536, 530 27 . ----------:
571,448 15 2, 066, 228 89
34, 944 49
34, 944 49 . -- - - - - - - .
2, 101, 173 381
5, 171 36 1, 489, 609 38 . ----- . ----.
104, 212 56
4, 183 58 ---------.
4, 183 58
787, 012 54
791, 196 121
9, 094 88
673, 705 10 - --- -- . -- - -1, 933 58
362, 738 90
32, 518 13 ---------.
32, 518 13
395, 257 03
12, 828 77
347, 976 55 --- --------.
875,789 05 1, 149, 194 06
144, 299 70
144, 299 70 . -----.--.
1, 293, 493 76
1, 567 24
271, 837 77 . --.- .. ---- .
191, 450 63
102, 169 97
751,876 73
102, 169 97.---- .. -854, 046 70;
12, 001 97
548, 424 13 ------.----.
30,416 65..........
30,416 65
527, 865 94 2,306,910 51
2, 337, :327 16,
695 67 1, 778, 348 90 . ---- .. ----.
158, 198 71 . --------.
158, 198 71
3, 691, 758 84 . -- .. -- - - -- - - . 1, 056, 462 65 ------ ---.-- 2, 477, 097 48 3, 533, 560 13
22, 262 97 . - -.-----.
22, 262 97
8, 301, 970 16 . ---.-----.-..
415, 656 92 . ----------- 7, 864, 050 27 8, 279, 717 19
4, 045 36 . ---- .. --.
4, 045 36
309, 705 34 1, 848, 797 99
1, !?52, 843 35
14. 083 51 1, 525, 009 l4
492, 492 07
19,187,301211
91,05910
440,961861------·----· 13,162, 788 18 13, 694, 809 14 5, 492, 492 07 5, 000, 000
2-H, 804 25..........
241,804 25
2, 659, 797 361
37, 543 46
872, 618 99 . -----.-.--. 1, 507, 830 66 2,417,99311
91, 164 45 . --.-----.
91, 164 45
:397, 887 10 1, 336, 511 60
1, 427, 676 05 . ---.--------.
938, 624 50 . -----.--.-155, 38~ 13 . --- -- . -- .
494,423 08 1, 383, 572 33
155, 388 13
1, 538, 960 46 - -- - . -- - - - . - . 889, 144 25
8, 8~6 55 ---- . -- - -.
8, 866 55
2,797,0:36 23 ,
220,074 45
504,416 221·--·--·----- 2, 063, 679 01 2, 788, 169 68
16, 0(J9 00 . --------.
16, 069 00
894, 161 68
309, 1G3 29
910,230 68 ,
8,989 91
576,068 48 -----------·
3, 333, 475 101
30, 594 12 1, 658, 863 61
629,369 05 2,318,826 78 1,014,618 32 ·----·--·· 1,014,648 32
236, 666 39' · 1, 150, 423 80--- .. ---- .. --- ----.--- .. --------.---- 1, 150, 423 801
4, 194 81
909, 562 601.--- ... ----16, 754 75 . ----- - - -.
16, 754 75
4, 350, 815 11
15, 602 34 1, 409, 187 30 . -----.----- 2, 909, 210 72 4, 334, 060 36
195 52
195 52 - - -- - -- - - - - - - . - . -- -- - - - .. --- . -.--- . - - 195 52----------.--- ---.----- .. --465, 107 56 . --------.
465, 107 56
893,832 82 2, 486, 997 81
2, 952, 105 371
15, 820 28 1' 577, 344 71,.----------45a, 846 19
326 25
257, 124 33
202, 395 61
459, 846 19 .. -.--------- ... --- .. --- . --------.---73, 068 78
606, 500 00---.----.----.
5:33, 431 22
606, 500 00 . -- ---- - - - . - - - . ----.- - - . - - - .. -- - - - . - - .
69 582 82
15, 542 08 . --- . --. -.
15 542 08
888, 100 Ol
903, 642 09
1, 128 31
817, 388 881.. ---------.
ll5, 035 76
69 52 ---- ... - - .
' 69 52
25:907 81
115, 105 28 . ---------.--.
89, 127 95 . -----.----.
363,164 79 ·····----·
363,164 79
4,809,979 47i
46,109 62 1,008,478 80 ·----·------ 3, 392, 226 26 4,446,814 68
73,695 74
935, 807 671
168 46
861, 943 47
935, 807 67 - - - .. - - - -._ - - - . - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - .
57, 133 77 1, 482, 996 34 - - ••. - .• -- - ••• - -- - - - . - - . - - - . - .. - - ..• - 1, 482, 996 34
10, 689 46 1, 415, 173 11
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Luther T. Thu~tin . ..

184, 612 75

R. P. L. Baber .........•......... - .

~· ~5~; ~g~ ~~

' 348 017 00
•

John Allison........
1, 589 59
Robert Smythe .... _.:
44, 651 6~
~~;· gg~ ~g
James M. _Wilson.....
~~~ 19 2; 5~1; 508 79
1
J: W._ Sm1th · · · · · · · · · . __'__ ..... 9, 869
410, 074 44
James Manu .... -···· · · ·· 5 ~ 16 77
792 91
CharleH D?dge o .•. -..
18' ~49 02 6 793' 4S6 39
j'-;~nH~-lt{],:;~~~~::::: ...... .'.. . . . 1; 051; 27S 54
Hiram c Bull . . . . . . .
1, 641 51
507, S79 70
Ellery W. Eddy .... -.
17, 1_;:l3 75
291, 549 15
H. K. Lawrence......
26, 605 00 ............. .
s. B. A. Haynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 764, 317 41
JohnS. Cocke . . . . . . .
50, 000 00
105, 946 79
C. 111. Terrell.........
242, 47S 66 4 761, 258 02
Joshua H. Watts.....
140,406 55
'417, 989 72
D. Colden Ruggles p.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
120. 000 00
Edward C. Kemble...
1, 363 20
846, 877 04
WilliamS.Pope .....
2,01430 1,4Hi,S6045
Edmund J. Porter o.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
409,302 81
E. H. C. Hooper . . . . . .
2, 894 56
557, 670 56
Charles J F. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954, 602 50
0. M. Dorman........
· · 844 64
985, 293 63
J obn A. Sabin . . . . . . .
2, 44S 91 1 090, 525 92
William C. Jones.:...
219, 590 30 1; 965,920 16
Samuel C. Staples._..
3, 250 05
479, 048 23
George Pomeroy . . . . .
7, 819 49 1, 033, 694 26
T. H. Stanton .........•........... 1 299,1S3 90
J obu M. Austin . . . . . .
6, 311 16
' 685, 06S 56
Harris G. Rodgers....
11, 019 54
991, 947 00
James B. Sheridan . . .
106, 121 64
847, 190 04
Stephen A. Walker . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . .
730, 946 37
John S. Fillmore q...
126, 140 17
300, 328 19
Elihu Griffin. . . . . . • . .
895 48
920, 221 50
A. H. Boyden r....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
646, 286 64
Ge01·ge E. Glenn .. :.. . . . . •.. . . . . . . . 1, 526, 004 09
JeremiahFenno ........•....... . ... 2 2S6,988 17
Thomas K. Osgood. . .
3, 269 71 1; 024, 954 52
Albert H. Hoyt . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . ] , 935, 096 59
Henry McFarland....
40, 134 58 1, 310, 3S8 55
Simon R. MarBton .... ······:······· 1,214,82318
J. A. Brodhead.......
8;:>, 799 57 2, 053, 321 27
George Browne . . . . . .
59, 530 33 1, 504, 231 35
Stephen M. Crosby. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 1 692, 235 56
'William H. Jameson..
42, 462 67
'713, COO 00
J osbua Howard o . _. . . • • . . . . . . . . . . .
739 54
Nicholas Norcross....
190, 782 27 1, 2:?3, 663 28
Daniel E. Bishops .....•.... _......
87, 186 63
Irving T. Ba~Jard . . • .
15, 444 35 2, 092, 756 75
Alexander Dtven.....
2, 105 68
789, 955 24
James A. F1.1rrish . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 1, 113, 411 65

i·

1,682,765 96
13,043 60
595,213 31 ............ 1,072,993 25 1,681,25016
1,515 80 ···•······
1,515 80
1, 303, 938 96 . :- . . -.-.-.--. 1, 097, 050 77 . --- ... ---..
102, 090 15 1, 199, 140 92
104, 798 04 . ---- .. --.
104, 798 04
349, 60G 59
21, 907 69
236, 5tl1 03 . . . . . . . . . . . .
91, 117 87
349, 606 59 .... _.... _. _.... _.... _.. _.•..... _.....
2, l42, 015 42
3, 061 75 1, 2.'55, !J68 7? . ----.---...
806, 271 96 2, 065, 302 50
76, 712 92 - .. -.---..
76, 712 92
1;455,687 04..............
974,01122............
475,683 06 1,449,694 28
5,992 76 ... _______
5,992 76
2,553,324 98
10,196 01 1,10(),906 35 -------····· 1,130,520 21 2,247,622 57
305,702 41..........
305 702 41
9, 410, 074 44
54, 294 45 1, 030 537 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 23S, 624 7S 9, 323, 456 29
86, 618 15 .... _. . . . .
Sfj' 61S 15
S75, 309 6S
1, 04S 4S
651, 044 57 . -.- . - - .. - -223, 216 63
S75, 309 61il . - --.- .. - .. - - .. ---- - . - ... - - - . -. ~ .. - . - 6, 812, 035 41
191, 456 34 3, 718, 323 99 . -.-- .... --- 2, 216, 7S6 92 6, 126, 567 25
685, 468 16 ... -.-....
685, 468 16
1, 051, 278 54
336 00
657, 077 53 -. ----.-.-..
312, 409 25
969, S22 78
81, 455 76 . ---.-.--.
8l, 455 76
509, 521 21 . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
463, 2SO 97 . . . . . . . . . . . .
2, 373 16
465, 654 1:l
43, S67 OS . .. . . . . . . .
43, 807 OS
308, 6S2 90
7, 685 27
267, 523 42 . -- -.- -----.
1, 419 67
276, 62S 36
32, 054 54 . -- .... "- 32, 054 54
26, 605 00 . ---.-- ... - . - ... - .. -- .. - - - ......... ---- - . --. - -- .. - ..... -- .. " ..... - . .
26, 605 00 . --. - .... 26, 605 00
3, 023 69 1, 044, 422 9S . _..........
6S2, 2s2 91 1, 729, 729 58
34, 587 83 . . . . . . . . . .
34, 5S7 S3
1, 764, :n 7 41
155, 946 79 - ------ ... - . . .
lOS, 773 63 . -.- ... --- -.
47, 173 16
155, 946 79 . ---.-- - -- . - .. - ... --- - . - - . --. -- ..... - ..
5, 003, 736 6S
5, 746 6S 1, 769, 096 00 . -.- .. --.-.. 3, 147, 159 36 4, 922, 002 04
S1, 734 64 . ----.--..
Sl, 734 64
55S,39627
S2,12946
406,02092 ...•........
22,7S794
5l0,93S32
47,45795 .......•..
47,45795
120, 000 00 - -- .... - . - . - - . - -- .... - . - . - ... --- . - . -.-- .. -- ... - ....... - -- .... - .. - - . .
120, 000 00 _._--. --- .
120, 000 00
S4S, 240 24
90, 933 19
51S, 915 1S .. ------.-..
238, 391 S7
S4S, 240 24 . -- ..... -.- .... --.-.--- .. --.--.-- ... -.
1, 41S, S74 75 -.- .. -.- ... -.. 1, 016, 804 80 . -.--.--.-.399, 717 S2 1, 416, 522 62
2, 352 13 . --------2, 352 13
409,302 S1..............
296,400 04 ··········-112,902 77
409,302 81 .............. ········.·· ·------------560, 565 12
2, 031 37
496, 549 02 - ----- --.- . 32, 625 S5
531 206 24
29, 35S ss .. ---- . - - .
29, 35S S8
954,602 50
1,574 77
S66,623 54------······
20,27S 99
SS8,477 30
66,125 20 -----·····
66,125 20
9S6, 13S 27
181 50
874, 996 b5 .. -.-.-----.
110, 756 36
9S5, 934 71
203 56 . ---- ... -203 56
1,092,974 83
170 95 1,021,392 39 ········---·
71,41149 1,092,974 83 ·····-·--····· ----·-···· ···----·-·····
2,1S5,510 46 ----------···· 1,06S,279 92 -·-········· 1,106,S73 65 2,175,153 57
10,356 89 ··········
10,356 S9
482, 29S 28
20, 313 01
28S, 100 26 . -.-- ... --.14S 933 11
457, 346 38
24, 951 90 . ----.---.
24, 951 90
1,041,513 75
14,306 27
911,S79 21............
72,425 89
99S,6ll 37
42,902 38 -----·-···
42,902 38
1, 299, 1S3 90
12, 13S 06
942, 112 49 ... --.-----.
339, 451 S5 1, 293, 702 40
5, 4S1 50 .. -.-.--.5, 481 50
691, 379 72
s, 294 90
38S, 982 09 . --.-.----..
70, S62 33
4fiS, 139 32
223, 240 40 .. -.-----223, 240 40
1, 002, 966 54 . -- ....... -.-.
890, 2S4 21 .. -- .. ---.-.
S7, 792 59
978, 076 so
24, SS9 74 ... --.---24, 8S9 74
95:3,31168
17,71355
797,0116S ............
64,77S23
879,50346
73,S0822 ..........
73,80S22
730, 946 37-------.-.-.-392, 72S 7S . ---.-.----337, 473 45
730, 202 23
744 14 . ----.---744 14
503 51
341,17111 ·----------3,424 30
345,098 92
S1,369 44 ·······-··
Sl,369 44
426,468 36
921, 116 96 - . -.---- - - .. - .
529, 514 S4 . ----- ----..
391, 17S 7S
920, 693 62
423 36 . -.- - ... - 423 . 36
5, 939 94
31S, 17S 09 . . . . . . . . . . . .
322, 168 6 L
646, 286 64 .•... _....................••..........
646, 286 64
1, 526, 004 09 . --------.--.511, 493 22 -- ... - ... --978, 079 65 1, 4S9, 572 S7
36, 431 22 . ---- .. -..
3fi, 431 22
2, 286, 90S 17 - - ----. - ... - - . 1, 26:3, 692 19 ... --- - .. -..
963, 026 36 2, 226, 71S 55
60, 1S9 62 ..... - - -- 60, 189 62
1, 4SO 67
581, 619 24 . -.-.-......
445, 060 11 1, 028, 160 02
64 21 ... ---.-.64 21
1, 02S, 224 23
1,935,09659
4S,06936 1,3S3,1S752 ............
481,662451,912,91933
22,17726 ....... , ..
22,17726
1,350,52313
S,71060 1,301,613S5 ............
7,47973 1,3l7,8041S
32,71895 ..........
32,71S95
1,214,8231 S
3S,72S13
3:l6,5S97S ............
836,06694 1,2ll,384S5
3,43833 ..........
3,43S33
2, 1:19,120 S4
39,213 12 1, 414, 2S4 98 .... - .. -....
675, 795 34 2, 129, 293 44
9, S27 40.- ... ---..
9, S27 40
1, 563, 761 6S
314, 163 22
811, 664 75 . --- .. --.--.
399, 9S7 2:1 1, 525, 815 20
37, 946 48 . ----.-...
37, 946 4S
1, 692, 235 56
lS, 24S 95
SIO, 034 00 . . . . . . . . . . . .
798, 645 99 1, 626, 928 94
65, 306 62 .. . . . . . . . .
65, 306 G2
755, 462 67
705 58
570, 351 26 .. ---.-.....
!SO, 222 81
751, 279 65
4, 1S3 02 . .... -.--.
4, 183 02
739 54 - - - .. - - - . - . - - 717 92 . - - - - - .. - - . .
21 62
739 54 . - - ..... - .. - . . . . - - . - . - - . - - - .. - - - -- . - - 1,414,445 55···· --·- -····. 1, 030,054 53··-· ···--- -302,816 53 1, 332,871 06
S1, 574 49 ---- --··-.
Sl, 574 49
S7, 1S6 63 . -- ... -----...
76, 161 70 ... ---- .. -.11, 024 93
S7, 1S6 63 . -- .. -.--.-.- .. - .. -.-.-- . - ........ -- . .
2,108,20110
37,5016S 1,243,64922 ....••......
819,92554 2,101,07644
7,12466 ..........
7,1246fi
792, 060 92
7, S09 94
513, 142 S4 --------.--271, 10S 14
792, 060 92 --- ... .. - .. - .... -------- . -.-.-.--- ....
1,113,41165
1,34720
788,60470 ....••....•.
3J5,683SS 1,105,6357S
7,775S7..........
7,775S7•
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~ ~~c.c

P<

William l\L Flen'ling. ····---- _-____ .
W. W. Herrick .. ----$200, 958 90
... _. _~~ ~~~.: ~
. __ ----- _____ _
124 10
4, 101 57
63, 580 91
10, 878 48
58'1' 99

A. N. Nichold~ u.. --- __
Nathan 'l'bayer .. __ ..
A. D. Robinson .. ---..
Jacob Herbert . . . . . . .
Samuel Bell, jr .. ----.
John vV. Beazell.----J~o:sse C. Dickey. ____ .
'l'. D. Greenawalt.. __ .. __ .. __ . __ . __ _
David P. Heap .... __ .
5, 971 94
James Harper v ______
100, 373 03
John Keatly . - - . . . . . .
6, 986 20
W. B. Mendenhall. __ .... ·--- ___ . __ _
Edwin L. Moore . ---.
3, 101 08
William H. Nicholls .. ___ ,. ________ _
George J. Riche .. --..
6, :337 16
George N . .Smith w...
7, 789 06
JohnW.Walker.....
3277
Francis B. Warner.-10, 767 16
Robert C. ·walker.--.
307 58
ThomaH J. 'Wilson.--.
1, 247 36
John M. Doddridge . . ___ ,. ________ _
'Villi am A. Rucker ....... . . ---.-- ..
William G. Fullerton.
1, 078 30
J. W. Brig don . __ .. _... _... -. - ... - ..
0.
B a llard aoc ___ .
22, 834 92
Calvin Holmes .. _- .-_.
l, 811 23
U. H. Hutch•ns .. ____ .
107, 070 70
E. A. Osborne. ____ . __ . __ . ______ . __ .
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$880, 410
1, 784, 602
754, 079
2, 056, 684
754, 150
1, 585, 966
769, 832
912.454
2, 187: 831
2, 205, 586
1, 062, 6!31
1, 185, Sll
1, 292, 209
423, 595
1, 411, 442
671,190
555,308
729,456
2, 846, 426
610,000
935,064
994,752
1, 637, 837
3, 523, 353
1, 844, 685
1, 288, 115
870,000
2, 688, l 03
1, 4 16, 584
1, 497, 702
1, 468, 436
518, 927
4, 899, 630
1, 080, 729
821,902
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13
42
15
03
00
49
41
:30
55
82
00
08
00
58
87
73
25
52
92
00
00
44
78
47
70
16
00
04
20
25
75
32
80
09
38
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of each of the

$880, 410
1, 985, 561
758, 885
2, 056, 684
754, 150
1, 586, 090
773, 9:33
976, 035
2, 198, 710
2, 206, 174
1, 062, 651
1, 185, 811
1, 298, 180
523, 968
1, 418, 439
671, 190
558, 409
729,456
2, 852, 7ti4
617, 789
935, 086
1, 005, 519
1, 638, 145
3, 524, 600
1, 844, 6t'5
1, 288, 115
871, 078
2, 688, l 03
1, 4:39, 419
1, 499, 513
1, 575, 507
518, 927
4, 908, 355
1, 080, 729
822,318

13
32
89
03
00
59
98
21
03
81
00
08
94
61
07
73
33
52
OS

06
77
60
36
83
70
16
30
04
12
48
45
32
33
09
60

$1, 545 77
3, 655 03
- ---- - -- - - - - - 33, 448 73
.. ------ - - - - -3, 903 37
- - • - - - - - -- - - ..
45, 935 43
45, 442 58
--- ----- ---- ---- .. --------- - ----- - - - - - - 1, 320 38
4, 557 25
.... ---------9, 315 42
--.----- _._-109 4
49, 049 54
1, 369 53
- - •• - - - - - - - - - 13, 070 08
33, 525 02
81, 388 06
--.----------3, 055 92
-- - - -- -- - - - - - - - - .. - - - -- - - - 3, 664 93
7, 083 78
- --.---- - - - - - 337 00
- •• ----------30, 911 61
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$260, 907
704, 600
54,886
564, 014
558, 700
523, 704
66,350
95, 454
245,735
858, 857
7, 730
64, 850
257,424
378,806
124,234
19, 754
66,308
80, 683
193, 952
50, 668
605, 580
66, 046
599,231
442, 545
624,034
792,842
213, 594
2, 042, 218
1, 115, 092
614, 776
196, 975
61, 464
3, 714,017
143, 487
313,868
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67
36
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$865,842 05
~14,568 08 ..........
$14,568 Oi3
1,945,34137
40,219 95 ..........
40,219 95
758, 885 89 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - 1, 034, 684 03 1, 022, 000 00 ---- -- . - - - 1, 022, 000 00
754, 150 00 -------------- ---------- - •• ------- - --1, 468, 909 48
117, 181 11 ---------117, 181 11
768, 680 62
5, 253 36 --- - - - - -- 5, 253 36
976, 035 21 - - --- -- - - - - - - - ---- -- - - - - - - ---- -- - - - - - 2, 012, 667 07
186, 042 96 ---------186, 042 96
1, 825, 232 89
380, 941 92 ---- .. ---380, 941 92
217,398 61__________
217,398 61
845,252 39
1, 184, 65:3 6:3
1, 157 45 ---------1, 157 45
1, 296, 786 42
1, 454 52 - --- - . - - - 1, 454 52
523, 968 61 - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,344,06712
74,37195---------74,37195
649,096 51
22,094 22 _____ _,___
22,094 22
554,094 27
4,315 06 ________ _,
4,315 06
72, 163 93 ---------72, 163 9:3
657, 292 59
2, 633, 005 19
219, 75b 89 ---------.
219, 758 89
617,789 06-------------- ---------- ____________ _,
935, 096 77 - •• - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 246, 6:59 21 ---------246, 659 21
758, 860 39
1, 500, 273 69
137, 871 67 ---------137, 871 67
1:38, 9:'53 59 ---------138, 953 59
3, 385, 647 24
1, 812, 087 17
32, 598 53 --- - - - - - ..
32, 598 53
1, 288, 115 16 -------------- . ---- .. --- ---.---------.
871, 078 30 ---.---------- ------ . -- - --- . ------- --2, 176, 377 02
211, 726 02 --------- 211, 726 02
1, 409, 097 74
30, 321 38 ----- ... -30, 321 38
29 597 18
29, 597 18 ------- --1, 469, 816 30
1, 359, 429 00
216, 078 45 ---.-----216: 078 45
500, 042 23
18, 885 09 ---- -- .. ..
18, 885 09
4, 907, 1;)5 33
1, 200 00 -----. - --l, 200 00
1, 051, 367 55
29, 361 54 ----- - - --29, 361 54
822, 318 60 - ••• - ••••• - - ... - ••. - - •• - .•••.• -. -.- •••
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Edwin Beecher ....... ..........................
Mile8 S. Henry .......
53,491 23
James U. Holbrook ... -------------2, 395 21
Charles Newcomer ...
Richard H. Whiting .. . . . . . .. . 645. i7
James R. Mears ......
2, 078 91
Samuel E. Adams ....
500 00
"\Villinm E. Norris x ..
16,202 02
DanielL. Eaton ..... ·
75,
688 81
EliaB Merrill y- ..• • · · ·
W. Penn Clarke ..... - ...................
....
...
.............
D. D. S. Brown z . · · · ·
2, 515 29
Anson L. Brewer.····
Davis Alton aa .... · · · -------------J. E. Burbank .. ..... . ·-- ----------·
496 59
E. Stilman Bailey ....
Thomas L. Carnahan. ..................
238 82
Guy K.Cleavland ....
John P. McGrath ..... ......................
1, 031 32
George W. Dyer .....
Edward H. Gratiot ... ······-------1, 402 82
Samuel C. Harbert- . _
·william Holloway ...
7, 692 00
1, 728 7l
Andrew C. Hewey ...
Wilson S. Kennon .... .....................
Brantz Mayer ........
10, 102 06
Gideon W. Palmer bb - ...................
924 37
William S. Stryker: ..
1,17816
G. W. WilliatnB ......
7, 596 01
James W. Nicholls ...
Edward V. Preston o . .....................
George B. Ely .......
1, 581 26
Jacob Sallade ........ -------------William S. Lamb_ .... ......................
Robert A. Haggerty .. ···--·-------·
189 93
Anson Sperry ........
Eli VanValkenburg .. ........................
1, 687 13
N.l\LKnapp .........
William H . McAllister -------------I ,evi C. Ball .. .......
3, 192 05
Josiah F. Price .......
148 91
James L. Cramer ..... ...................
Edmond Gifford ...... .......................
George F. Carpenter. ...................
Benton McConnelL ... -------------·
Cha8. E. Curtice cc ... . ---··--------·
.Robert Smith, (Wis) ..
711 50
J>nnl's R. J~ofiand ... _
Daniel M. Adams .... .....................
Hiram S. Sleeper ..... .................
Joseph H. May born ..
998 32
John B. Lockwood ....•....•.....•.
........... w

.......

2 214,850
• 610,000
1 282,143
1: 251, 723
2, 106, 769
743, 937
2, 059, 156
500, 000
1, 304, 242
130, 624
924, 000
361, 054
1, 172, 513
353, 912
441, 441
1, 626, 112
976, 102
1, 401, 209
1, 378,177
1, 049, 689
2, 019, 811
1, 204, 478
525,204
649, 746
1, ] 78, 470
549, 917
226, 09:!
4, 655, 329
2, 211, 547
636,561
385, 030
l, 055, 097
838,275
849, 000
1, 270, 388
l, 331, 657
1, 561, 585
1, 211, 046
l, 278, 065
712,277
1, 626, 567
988, 384
1, 068, fi22
1, 737, 332
1, 517, 824
894, 663
2, 443, 114
978,790
682,922
300,330
3, 925, 404
1, 143, 035

89
00
59
79
66
46
55
00
24
91
00
70
46
23
00
00
!i2
23
80
64
57
33
86
63
00
51
10
64
47
12
38
45
38
00
16
40
72
72
10
00
60
44
11
58
32
45
14
98
31
57
73
00

2, 214, 850
663,491
1, 282, 143
1, 254, 119
2, 106, 769
744,582
2, 061, 235
500,500
1, 320, 444
206,313
924, ooo
361, 054
1, 175, 028
353,912
441, 441
1, 626, 608
976,102
1, 401, 448
1, 378, 177
1, 050, 720
2, 019, 811
1, 205, 881
532, 896
651, 475
l, 178,470
560,019
226,092
4, 656, 254
2, 212, 725
644, ]57
385,030
1, 056, 678
838, 275
849, 000
1, 270, 388
1, 331, 847
1, 561, 585
1, 212, 733
1, 278, 065
l,

~~~:

1, 715 61
89
23 ..........................
59 -------------·
3, 351 71
00
314 72
66
63 .........................
46 -------------1, 705 84
00
46, 059 60
26
72
22,427 93
ob
1, 950 11
70
5, 589 67
75 ---·---·-----·
23 -------------·
00
6, 574 21
59
923 11
478 87
52
05 ·------------·
80
27, 646 79
96
20,197 76
11, 414 31
57
5, 805 92
15
86 ..................
34 ....... ...... .........
00 ·····-------57
71, 883 03
10 ......................
01
55,309 28
35,627 62
63
13
428,452 80
38
84, 038 98
7l ..................
38 .......................
00
9,118 11
17, 129 14
16
3l .•...........
72
16, 064 57
85
3, 495 60
101.....•........

in ~~~- ·-·····94i ·77

~~~: ~~~ iii ...... :·.~:~.~~

1,
1, 737, 352
1, 517, 824
894, 663
2, 443, 825
978, 790
682, 922
300,330
3, 926, 403
1, 143, 035

581..••..........
1, 112 43
32
45 . ......................
64
1, 247 32
98
4, 030 24
31
523 50
57 -·-···-------·
245,18
05
2, 815 76
00

1, 179,794
314, 670
1, 056, 856
816, 102
1, 647, 481
589, 500
1, 037, 9:39
198, 801
1, 244, 591
176, 996
775,391
331, 628
723,399
294, 067
327,797
1, 142, 969
873, 745
1, 258, 917
1, 166, 142
991, 332
988,458
830,538
441, 136
594,208
626, 156
389, 079
181, 961
l, 159-, 879
1, 753, 191
157,336
236,168
971,402
655, 814
755,285
1, 062, 915
1, 098, 957
602,046
758, 121
1, 127, 272
559, 732
l, 505, 307
667,355
922,462
1, 332, 629
923, 399
307, 692
1, 556. 141
617,961
G66, 774
219, 533
1, 496, 791
495,997

17 .................
61 -----------21 .......................
10 .......................
20 ......................
74 . ...................
04 -----------97 . .....................
37 .......................
66 ....................
76 ......................
79 .. .....................
24 -----------64 .................
75 ...................
37 ------·----79 ···--------16 -·-·-------94 ------·-·--30 -----·-----09 ...................
55 -----------14 . .................
30 -----------22 ··----···-·83 -··--------50
82 .................
70 -----------61 .................
81 .. .................
53 . ...............
53 ..................
78 . .................
83 ....................
84 ...................
27 .. ...............
62 . ................
64 ...............
68 -·---···---95 ...............
43 ..................
54 ...................
58 . .................
84 ............
76 . ................
16 ------·----42 ............... ....
2§ -----------_________ .. __
61
16 .......................
22 .•.•••••••••

------·-----

.;.

714, 741
348,720
213, 102
426,885
437,021
78, 156
998, 236
300,492
22,796
6, 889
146,658
23,836
380,065
59, 844
69, 624
413, 023
100,835
124, 644
104, 574
26, 157
929,923
364, 190
91, 737
37,174
520, 176
59,825
44, 130
3, 433, 121
387,022
46, 157
64,822
57,489
182,460
84,530
164, 034
98,738
527,432
449, 516
94,517
151, 915
120, 466
312, 289
146,159
337,818
510,730
586,970
807, 83!'i
347, 559
13,365
80,796
2, 428, 376
617,529

62
82
91
19
68
80
60
19
52
13
13
24
51
59
66

84
10
10
12
43
72
58
19
37
62
66
60
58
35
51
59
29
85
29
23
52
52
63
43
51
79
79
57
21
51
69
18
93
11
96
71
30

1, 896, 251
663, 391
1, 269, 959
1, 246, 339
2, 084, 817
667, 657
2, 056, 175
500,500
1, 313, 447
206,313
924,000
361,054
1, 103, 464
353, 912
403, 996
1, 556, 916
975,060
1, 383, 561
1, 298, 363
1, 037, 687
1, 929, 796
1, 200, 535
532,873
631,382
1, 146, 332
520, 71:l8
226, 092
4, 648, 310
2, 175, 841
681,946
385,030
1, 028, 891
8:38,275
848, 9:l4
] ' 244, 079
1, 197, 696
1, 145, 543
1, 211, 133
1, 221, 790
711, 648
1, 626, 716
987,220
1, 068, 622
1, 670, 447
1, 435, 242
894, 663
2, 365, 523
969,551
680,662
300,330
3, 925, 413
1, 116, 342

40
318, 599 49
318,599 49 ---------43
99 80
99 eo ......... ........
12
12, 184 47 . ................
12, 184 47
00
7, 780 00 ---------7, 780 00
60
21,952 06 . ................
21,952 06
54
7fi, 925 09 --------- 76, 925 09
64
5, 059 82 ---------5, 059 82
00 -------------- .................. ---··-- --- ---49
6, 996 77 . ...............
6, 996 77
72 . ........................ .................. ......................
00 .. ..................... ............ . -------------70 -------------- ---------· ··-----------75
71,564 00 .................
71, 564 00
23 . ................... .............. -------------62
37, 444 38 ·--------37, 444 38
32
69, 692 27
69,692 27
76
1, 041 76
1, 041 76 ---------·
26
17,886 79 ------·-·17,886 79
85
79, 813 95
79,813 95 ------·--·
49
13, 033 47 ..............
13,033 47
12
90,015 45 . .............
90, 015 45
05
5, 346 10 ------·--·
5, 346 10
33
23 53 .. .......... .
23 53
67
20,092 67
20,092 67 .......... ...
84
32, 137 16 .................
32,137 H:i
52
39, 231 05
39,231 05 ---------10 ---··----··--· ............... - .... -.. -- - - .. - .. 68
7, 943 33 .. ...............
7, 943 33
67
36,883 96 .................
36, 883 96
92
12,210 21 ---------·
El, 210 .21
38 . ......................
-------------82
27, 786 89
27,786 89 . .............
38 - ....... - - . - - .
.. .................. . .
18
65 82
65 82 .. .............
26,308 96 ---------26,308 96
20
36
134, 150 D7 ............
134, 150 97
416,042 36
36
416, 042 36 --·------85
1, 600 00 . ............
1, 600 00
07
56,275 03
56,275 03 --------·19
3, 820 86
3, 820 86 ------·-··
51 .. .................... ............... ....................
88
1,163 56
1,163 56 .. .............
11 .. .................... .............. ......................
79
66, 904 79 .. .............
66, 904 79
78
82, 581 54
82, 581 54 .............
45 ---·------·--· ............. --···--·-----78,301 98 ---------·
78, 301 98
66
________ ,._
9, 239 39
59
9, 239 39
2, 259 41
90
2, 259 41 ---------·
57 - ...... - - - - - .. -- .. .............. ................. ......
990 00
05
990 00 . ................
26,692 72 ...•..•...
26,692 72
28
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Fenton F. Steven~
Joseph \Y. Dn•w .................. .
Levi St~rliug hh ...... .....•........
:Benjamin L. Hewitt ............... .
W. D. Wheeler ..... ..
$4, 222 66
Norris L. Yarnall?'1' . .
5, 235 68
John F. \YalLlen .................. .
Robert J. Stevens m. .
3, 026 85
Martin Evans . . . . . . . .
3, 545 45
Hiram F. Hale ................... ..
Oscar Adams .. .................... .
RobPrt JI. Howell....
393 96
Charlrs S. Moor~ . .... . ........... ..
Fr::mk L. Hay~ .~s ................. .
Freeland D. Herbert .
412 64
Henry Almi'tedt .................. ..
Frederic Kelly ....... .
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R. W. 1\feClanghry ................ .
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JohnS. Klein........
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562,562
2fi8, 583
]66, 649
1, 6:36, 146
106, 273
31, 554
61,272
84, fil(j
85,383
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Resigned May 27, 1865.

s R esigned May 12, 18G5.
t Resigned l\Iarch 15, 1865.

u Resigned January 9, 1865.
v Resigned September 16, 1864.
w Resigned May 15, 1865.
x H.eRigned March 9, 1865.
y ReHigned October 27, 1864.
z Resigned December 7, 1864.
n;a Resigned May l, 1865.
bb Resigned December 23, 1864.
cc Rt·signed Ft>brnary 18, 1865.
dd Resigned May 8, 1865.
ee Dismis~ed F ebruary 23, 1865.
jj'Mustered out June 30, 1865.
gg R esigned December 27, 1864.
-hh R esigned May 19, 1865.
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B. 1N. BRICE, Paymaster General, United States Army.
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NOTES TO THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

a Died June 22, 1865.
b Resigned February 25, 1865.
c Resigned March 29, 1865.
d Resigned April 9, 1863.
e Dismissed August 1, 1864.
fResigned June l, 1865.
g Resigned September 30, 1864.
k R esigned March 13, 1863.
i R esigne d April 28, 1865.
j Di ed July 24, 1864.
k Resigned August 3, 186~.
l Resigned February 8, 186''.
m Resigned May 29, 18G.5.
11 Re~ignecl April 27, 1865.
u Mustered out. Jnne 1, 186~.
p Died in reb el prison February 10, 1865.
'1 Died December 25, 1864.
•

t:rl
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SG,~~ ~895,02~ Em8,~83418 7,839,22547 300,m,635% ~~ ~~879,8s~ 897,~834 m,323,98~ =65,90o:OOO 55.'~~

PAYMASTER GENERAL's OFFICE, rVashington, October 31, ll:l65.

pj

ii Dismissed February 25, 1865.
jj R esigned Pebruary 23, 1865.
kk Resigned June 9, 1865.
lt 1{esigned May 10, 1865.
mm Resigned June 3, 1865.
nn Resign ed January 17, 1865.
oo Resigned May 20, 1865.
Jfp Resigned June 5, 1865.
qq Re~ignt>d June 8, 186:').
rr Resigned March 8 1865.
ss Resigned January 14, 1865.
tt R esigned April 25, 1865.
mt Muster~d out January 9, 1865.
ww Killed October 27, 1864.
xx Died October 28, 1864.
yy Resigned April 27, 1863.
zz Dischm·ged September 7, 1864.
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REPORT OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER.
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,

Washington, October 30, 1865.
SIR : I have the honor to present the following report upon the several
branches of the public service committed to the care of this department, for the
year ending on the 30th of June, 1865:
CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

Duties ifthe officers during t/~e year.-'rhe corps of engineers consisted of
eighty-five officers, the Military Academy, its officers and professors, and the
battalion of engineer soldiers, of five companies.
Of the eighty-five (85) officers of engineers embraced in the corps, fifty-four
(54) were on detached duty commanding army co~·ps, divisions, and other military organizations, on staff duty, ani!. as engineers and assistant engineers with
armies operating against the rebels, in command of the pontoon bridge service,
and in command of the troops of the engineer battalion; and thirty-one (31) on
duty superintending sea-coast defences, lake surveys, lake and sea-coast harbor
improvements, Military Academy, and assisting the Chief Engineer in connexion
with all these duties.
Every officer of the corps has been on continued and uninterrupted duty during the entire year, and four ( 4) of its members have died in service.
The loss in officers killed, and who have died in service from wounds and
other causes during the rebellion, is fourteen (14.)
'rwenty-one (21) of the members of the corps still remain on detached service, performing important duties growing out of the rebellion, which prevent
their returning to engineer duty.
The value and estimation in which the military talents and practical knowledge of the officers of the corps are held, have, by contributing to the command
of the armies, and for staff service, together with the loss of those who have
given their lives to the defence of their country, greatly reduced its numbers and
efficiency for the many duties devolving upon it. Many of those of highest
rank and experience are still on detached service, and the vacancies from casualties have necessarily been filled by junior members, recent distinguished graduates of the Military Academy.
Although the legal strength of the corps is sufficient to perform the proper
functions of its members, the present assignment of its officers renders it impracticable to meet the numerous demands upon the department.
•
For a comprehensive knowledge of the duties of the engineers, a recurrence
to the general objects of the campaign is necessary._ (See plans Nos.1 and 11.)
It will be recollected that, by descending the Shenandoah and ·crossing the
Potomac above Harper's Ferry, tbe rebel army, in 1864, threatened Washington, Baltimore, Pittsburg, and even Philadelphia, as also intermediate citiee.
\Vashington city had become the great depot for immense supplies for all arms
of service for months in advance. An extensiv~ ordnance depot, a navy yard,
the general hospitals, the archives of the nation, its executive and judiciary,
with the public edifices for all national purposes, was the rich prize, to gain
possession of which the rebel authorities directed their efforts, as well as to divert our armies from the attack on Richmond. At Antietam and South mountain they had been defeated and driven back into the valley of the Shenandoah.
Again they made a powerful effort, and were defeated at Gettysburg, and driven
across the Potomac and up the valley. In July, 1864, after the Lieutenant
58 w
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General had forced the rebel armies, concentrated under Lee, from Todd's tavern,
through Spottsylvania and Cool Arbor, into Richmond and Petersburg, they
made another effort to divert the Lieutenant General by detaching Early on another expedition down the valley of the Shenandoah and across the Potomac,
threatening Baltimore by moving on the Monocacy, where a small body of our
troops were repulsed, thus jeoparding both Baltimore and Washington. The
attention of the Lieutenant General was given to these efforts of his adversary to
divert him from his main object, the defeat and capture of Lee's army; and,
while withdrawing part of the garrison to re-enforce the armies operating against
Richmond, he bel d the command of his rear and Washington by being enabled
to transport from before Petersburg as large a force ::ts Lee could detach to operate in the valley and on Washington. Many thousands of wounded and sick
occupied the hospitals in Washington, and the troops fit for duty did not suffice
to man the armaments of the forts around the city. Th~ engineers had previously constructed a system of detached redoubts and forts around the city, on
a circuit of upwards of thirty-five (35) miles. Early, after his success at Monocacy, moved directly upon the defences of Washington, between the Potomac
and the Eastern Branch. (See plan No.1.) Colonel Alexander, of the corps of
engineers, was the only officer of the corps whose personal attention could be
given to these defences. Colonel Woodruff and Major Kurtz, of the corps of engineers, and assistants of the ChiefEngineer, were first ordered to these defences.
Subsequently all the officers on the sea-coast, north and east of this city, were
detached from their labors of constructing sea-coast batteries, (then threatened
by rebel iron-clads building in Europe, as another effort to divert our armies in
the field,) and were ordered to the defences of Baltimore and Washington-Major
Prime, Captain Robert, and Lieutenant J. A. Smith to the aid of Colonel Brewerton at Baltimore, and Colonel Macomb, Major Blunt, Major Casey, and Captain Tardy to the aid of Colonel Alexander at Washington. The rebel blow
was aimed at Washington. 'l_lhe wise foresight of the Secretary of War had
caused all the employes of the several bureaus of his department to be organized
and drilled as infantry troops. The necessity for the withdrawal of the 6th
army corps from Petersburg, and of the 19th from New Orleans, had also been
foreseen, and orders sent to them to proceed to this city ·to meet the blow that
was threateneel. The Veteran Reserves and convalescents from the hospitals
were also ordered to garrison the defences. Requisitions were made upon the
governors of States to furnish troops, but with little su~cess. 'l_lhe 6th and 19th
corps arrived at the most opportune moment. Early directed his efforts upon
Fort Stevens, but finding the garrison re-enforced, and even moving out of the
defences to meet him, he suddenly retreated across the Potomac and up the valley of the Shenandoah. 'l_lhe engineers were then ordered to their former
stations on the seaboard.
Early was pursued by Sheridan with his cavalry, and the troops that drove
him from Washington up the Shenandoah, defeating him and his re-enforcements,
and eventually annihilating his army. For this expedition Major Stewart, Captain Gillespie, and Lieutenant Meigs, of the corps of engineers, were assigned.
In the death of Lieutenant Meigs, while reconnoitring in the neighborhood of
Winchester, the corps lost one of its most meritorious and valued members.
Captain Gillespie accompanied Sheridan's expedition to the James river, destroying the rebel communications on that river and all others west and north of
Richmond, and finally joined the Lieutenant General before Petersburg.
With the investment of Petersburg commenced a series of laborious and difficult engineering operations by the army of the James and the army of the Potomac. 'rhe narratives collated from the reports of Colonel Michler and General Michie give the details of these operations. A reference to plan No. 12 will

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

915

explain the extent of the defences about Petersburg and Richmond, and the
labors of om engineers about Petersburg and the rebel defences on the north
side of the James river.
The rebels after being defeated by the army under Lieutenant General Grant
and driven from their intrenchments around Petersburg, extending to the Hatchie,
evacuated that city on the 2d April, 1865. The evacuation of Richmond followed on the 3d April, when the rebel army under Lee retreated, and was closely
pursued and pressed to Appomattox Court House, where it yielded to the supe·rior prowess and skill of the armies of the United States, on the 9th April, 1865·,
thus breaking up all semblance of rebBl authority, leaving Sherman to end it
by the capture of Johnston on the 23d April. A map of this campaign is in
progress, awaiting informatiou yet to be collected to pe:l'fect it as an historical
record of these ever-memorable military operations which resulted in restoring
the power and union of a nation.
After the evacuation of Richmond the rebel chief and his advisers, who devised this most unjust and unwarrantable scheme to destroy a nation, sought
safety in flight towards Georgia. Their movements had ooen foreseen, and were
provided for by a brilliant campaign of a cavalry force und•el' GenBral James H.
Wilson, (captain of the corps of engineers,) who posted his troops with great
discrimination and judgment, and succeeded in capturing the leader at Irwinton
on the lOth May, 1865.
From Atlanta the grand army of the West, commanded by Sherman, commenced moving for the sea-coast, while Thomas occupied Tennessee and Kentucky. The rebels under Hood on evacuating Atlanta eperated on Sherman's
previous line of march.
The labors of the engineers at Chattanooga under Colonel Merrill, and the
volunteer engineers, had rendered this important position as well as Knoxville
impregnable; and Hood retrograded towards the Tennessee river with a force so
far superior to 'I'homas's as to cause the latter to fall back gradually upon Nashville. The labors of the en~tineers in fortifying Franklin, on the Harpeth river,
did not suffice, with a single army corps under Schofield, to hold those intrenchments.
Our army fell back to~ ashville, where much labor and the skill of the engineers
had previously been bestowed in fortifying it by General Morton, Colonel Merrill, Captains Barlow and Burroughs, and other junior officers of the corps of
engineers, together with volunteer engineers. In September, 1864, Major Tower,
corps of engineers, (brevet major general of volunteers,) took charge of these
defences, and perceiving the great importance of Nashville as a depot of supplies as well as other important strategic advantages, commenced to add to and
perfect the fortifications, (see plan No. 4,) on which he continued unremittingly
until Hood's advance and investment of the place on the 15th and 16th December, 1864.
During the few days preceding Hood's arrival before Nashville, Thomas had
concentrated his several available army corps within the fortifications of Nashville, the plan of which is given on plate No. 4.
The importance of these defences was mainly in enabling Thomas to concentrate his army at a depot well stored with munitions of war, and to hold his
enemy, flushed with his successful march from Atlanta, in check until he was
ready to take the field.
The accompanying plan of the fortifications (No. 4) by General Tower and
annexed extracts from his report explain more fully the successes of this most
important advance of Thomas, resulting in the demolition and annihilation of the
rebel power in rrennessee.
During the same eventful period the fortifications that had been constructed
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by the engineers at Murfreesboro' were successfully held and defended by a part
of Thomas's army.
Colonel Merrill, captain engineers, with the volunteer engineers, bad during
the year given special attention to fortifying all the important points on the railroads in 'rennessee and part of Kentucky, while Lieutenant Colonel Simpson,
corps of engineers, bad fortified Cincinnati, Ohio, Covington and Newport,
Frankfort and Louisville, Kentucky, and the lines of the Louisville, Nashville,
and Kentucky Central railroads, thus covering 'rhomas's rear and defending his
lines of communication.
Such is a general outline of the labors of the engineers in Tennessee.
The march of the grand army of the West under Sherman (see plan No.3)
did not call for offensive or defensive fortifications.
The labors of the engineers, Captain Poe, (brevet brigadier general U. S. A.,)
Captain Reese, (brevet brigadier general U.S. A.,) Lieutenant Stickney, (brevet
major U.S. A.,) Lieutenant Ludlow, (brevet major U. S. A.,) and Lieutenant
Damrell, were most advantag·eously bestowed upon the roads and bridges, and
reconnoitring the enemy's movements and positions. (See annexed narratives.)
The pontoon trains under charge of these officers were indispensable to the
success of the army. They consisted of canvas boats, which proved serviceable for the march of this army from the Tennessee to its final disbandment in
Washington city in 1865. The advantages of these light trains, their frequent
use during the campaign proving their adaptation to our country, are fully developed in the narrative collated from Poe's and Reese's reports.
In September, 1863, Knoxville was captured by our force, and in November
of the same year Chattanooga was occupied by our army. At the latter point
Sherman concentrated his supplies, and moved in force ag·ainst the rebels, driv- '
ing them through Ringgold, Tunnel Hill, Dalton, Resaca, Allatoona, and Kenesaw, to Atlanta.
At this latter place the rebel army was strongly intrenched. The place was
first invested by our army on the north and east, when its strength being fully
ascertained, Sherman marched his army to the south, defeating the rebels at
Jonesboro' and Lovejoy's, thus investing it on the south and compelling Hood to
evacuate this stronghold.
The annexed narrative, collated from the report of Brevet Brigadier General
0. M. Poe, U. S. A., captain of engineers, gives the important incidents connected with its capture, and furnishes plans of the rebel defences. (See plan
No. 2; see narrative annexed.)
While these movements and successes of the armies under Thomas and Sherman were in progress, General Grant ordered a division of his army under General Terry to co-operate with the navy in the reduction of the defences of the
mouth of Cape Fear river in January, 1865.
Captain Comstock, of the corps of engineers, (lieutenant colonel, A. D. C.,
brevet brigadier general volunteers,) had charge of the engineer operations of
this expedition.
Fort Fisher, situated at and commanding the northern entrance of this river,
was found to be the key of the position. Plans Nos. 5 and 6 give the details
of the defences constructed by our army to cover its landing and its 1·ear while
operating on Fort Fisher.
A bombardment by the fleet, resulting in dismounting many of the guns on
the land front of the work, as well as cutting the electric wires for exploding
a formidable system of mines on the same front, preceded a" successful assault
by the troops under General Terry.
The accompanying plans Nos. 5 arid6,_with extracts from General Comstock's
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report, give the details" of the rebel fortifications and those thrown up by our
troops. (See General Comstock's report annexed,)
Later in the season General Can by concentrated the troops under his command
and moved to the attack of the city of Mobile, having the co-operation of the
navy. 'l'he labors of the engineers under Captain McAlester, (brevet major U.
S. A.,) Captain Palfrey, (brevet lieutenant colonel U. S. A.,) Lieutenant Burnham, (brevet major U. S. A.,) and others, were here called into requisition.
Blakely (see plan No. 7) was invested, batteries constructed and opened upon
the formidable rebel batteries covered by strong intrenchments, with abatis surrounding their entire position, with its flanks resting on the Blakely river.
Plan No. 7, with extracts from the report of Major McAlester, gives the details
of the operations, final assault and construction of the rebel defences on the 8th
April, 1865. (See McAlester's report, annexed.)
Spanish Fort was at the same time invested by our army, and the more formidable sitge operations of a first and second parallel with approaches and enfilading batteries became necessary, and resulted finally in the capture of the
rebel defences by assault, on the 8th and 9th of April, 1865. (See plan No.8.)
These defences and approaches are given in detail on plans Nos. 7 and 8.
which, with extracts from Major McAlester's report, will explain and illustrate
this well-designed and skilfully executed siege.
The fall of Blakely and Spanish ~"'ort caused the rebel army under Taylor,
Gardner, and Maury, to evacuate Mobile, and retreat to the North.
Plan No.9 gives the formidable rebel defences of the city of Mobile, surrounuing it with three lines of detached forts and connecting intrenchments,
with the flanks resting on .Mobile river. The skilful labors of the rebel engi
neers about this city were very extensive and the sys tern exceedingly strong.
The determination of the commanding general to turn these works, by first.
reducing Blakely and Spani::;h ~"""'ort proved successful, and the character of the
works as shown on the plan forcibly illustrates thA saving of lives aud treasure
in not first attempting to reduce these powerful defences.
Plan No. 10 gives the position of the entire and connected system of rebel
defences that succumbed to the skill and talent of Canby.
While these important operations were in progress in 'l'ennessee and Alabama,
Sherman, with the grand army of the vVest, and Lieutenant General Grant, with
the combined armies of the Potomac and the James, together with the garrison
of '\Vashington city, were simultaneously leading the national forces tO strike a
final blow to rebel power, and enforce the restoration of national authority from
the Atlantic to the Pacific.
(See plan No.3.) Sherman's army reached the sea-coast, by first capturing
Fort l\IcAllister, on the 13th December, 1864, by Hazen. The strong n·hel intrenchments at Savannah were then invested, and the rebel General Hardee driYen
from them across the Savannah river. rrhe department has as yet received no
plans of Fort McAllister or of the defences of Savannah. 'l'he labors of the
engineers of Sherman's army (:;ee Poe's narrative) were again bestowed princi
pally in reconnoitring the enemy's posi6ons, and manmuvring the canvas
pontoon trains to cross the army over the several rivers between Savannah and
the last water-course crossed in pursuit of rebels. 'l'he success of these bridg·e
trains is given in the extracts from Generals Poe's and Reese's reports. The
city of Charleston fell into our power on the 18th February, 1865, after its
evacuation by the rebels in consequence of Sherman's movements in its rear,
and c:utting off its supplies from the interior, while it was already blockaded by
our fleet, and invested by land by our army.
Schofielcl, after the reduction of the entire defences of Smithville, moved upon
Raleigh, and united bis force3 with those of Sherman. The engineer operations
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on this line were in reconnoitring and manamvring the pontoon bridge trains
for the passage of the rivers, under Lieutenant Stickney, (brevet major U.S. A.,)
of the corps of engineers. (See Stickney's narrative.) After obstinately contested combats at Averysborough and Bentonville, the rebel power under J obnston was finally overcome and subdued by the capture of his entirfj command
on the 23d April, 1865; after which, by easy marches, the grand army of the
West rEpaired to Washington city.
(See plans Nos. 1, 11, and J 2., The momentous campaign of the armies under the command of the Lieutenant General, with the purpose of capturing Richmond, and overthrowing the rebel authorities holding the semblance of Confederate power in that city, was commenced on the Rapidan in :May, 1864. The
battles of '! 'odd's Tavern, on the 7th May; of Spottsylvania, on the 14th and
19th, and passage of the North Anna, on the 24th; of Coal Arbor, on the 31st
May and 1st June; the march thence and passage of the James river on the
16th, 17th, and 18th, with the investment of Petersburg on the 3d July, 1864,
constitute a brilliant series of grand battles and manamvres that do not come
within the scope of engineer reports.
The annexed narrative and information from the report of Colonel Michler,
dated October, 1865, give more specifically the labors of the officers of the .engineer corps during the progress of this campaign.
SEA·COAST AND LAKE DEFENCES.

While most of the officers of the corps of engineers have been actively engaged in the field as heretofore stated, others have given their attention to the
important labor of sea-coast defences.
Against predatory expeditions of rebel cruisers and iron-armored vessels,
built in foreign ports claiming to be neutral, it was necessary to construct batteries to mount rifle artillery and smooth-bored ordnance of heavier calibres than
heretofore used. Colonel Macomb, Major Blunt, Major Casey, of the corps of
engineers, were employed in thus fortifying thirteen harbors on the eastern
coast. At the same time progress on the permanent sea-coast defences was continned at all the harbors from Ma.ine to Hampton roads, indusive, at Key West
and Tortugm~, and ,at San Francisco ; and repairing the permanent works on the
·G ulf of Mexico that were taken from the rebels, which had been more or less
injured by them and by our attacks, to restore them to the U uion. On the
northern and eastern works, as also on the California coast, the main obj ect has
been so to direct the operations as soonest to mount the contemplated armaments,
which, at this time, are required to be of such penetrating and crushing :power
as will in all probability insure the destruction of any iron-armored vessels that
c.an c.ombat them. The introduction of thf\se increased calibres and this power
of artillery has made it necessary to renew most of the gun platforms heretofore
constructed which were designed for no larger calibre than forty-two pounders.
At the present time no smaller gun is prepared for the sea-coast batteries than
one-hundred-pounder rifle guns, and ten to fifteen inch rifled and smooth-bored
guns.
The further construction of the sea-c.oast batteries bas been retarded by the
necessity which now exists of so covering part of our guns and gunners as to
render them secure against any advantage that an attacking power in ironarmored ships opposed to them shall possess. So far as we have yet progressed,
preparations for guns of large calibre have been perfected, and the guns mounted
to throw, collectiYely, one hundred and forty-seven thousand one hundred and
fifty pounds of metal' at a single discharge, which is an addition during the year
of forty thousand eix hundred and fifty-one pounds of metal that can be so
thrown against an enemy.
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Continuing to increase the armament on our sea-coast in the same ratio, for a
reasonable time, will render the harbor defences exceedingly difficult for any
maritime power to overcome, and, in combination with other auxiliary means of
defence, will carry the cost and time requisite to subdue them beyond the means
of foreign p€>wers, provided we hold our works in a perfect condition for both
land and sea attacks.
Boards of engineers have been detailed to consider what modifications are
necessary at each and every work along our sea-coast to adapt them to resist
the powerful armaments that European fleets, singly or combined, may be
enabled to bring across the Atlantic, over the bars of our ports and harbors, to
attack them.
The details of the operations during the year at the several works on the
Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Lake and Pacific coasts, derived mostly from thereports of the superintending engineers, are annexed.
PRISON DEPOTS.

rrhe prison depots also called for the labors of engineer officers. Point
Lookout, at the mouth of the Potomac, was subject to sudden attack from marauding parties and detached cavalry from armies operating against Baltimore
and Washington, which, with the immense body of prisoners, made it necessary to fortify the position against attempts to liberate them, by forts commanding both the interior and exterior. Major Stewart, assisted by Lieutenant
Cantwell, and afterwards Colonel Brewerton, constructed these defensive
works.
THE PRISON DEPOT AT JOHNSON'S ISLAND,

Cleveland harbor, Lake Erie, had to be defended against attempts of the
prisoners, and succor by water, from expeditions organized in the friendly ancl
neutral territories of Great Britain in Canada. Major Casey and Captain
rrardy were assigned to and performed this service, constructing a water
battery at the mouth of the harbor, against a force approaching by water, and
temporary field forts on Johnson's island.
SURVEYS, MAPS, AND TOPOGRAPHY.

The surveys for the armies in the field, embracing the topography of the
country passed over and particular sites occupied, have been referred to in
other parts of this report.
rrhe extent of the labors performed by the officers on duty in the bureau
l1as been the engraving, lithographing, photographing and issuing 24,591 sheets
for officers in the field and various branches of the service requiring this information, leaving still on hand a few copies of each publication for reference and
the calls of the War Department.
Tbe survey of the northwestern lakes has been in progress for several years,
to obtain for the commerce of the States whose industry is promoted by that
extended interior navigation the safety that a perfect and correct knowledge
of the shores and bottom alone can attain. It is being conducted under the
direction of Major Raynolds, of the corps of engineers, upon the same scientific
principles and with the same care and accuracy that has been bestowed upon
the coast survey and other national geodetic surveys. During the year two
maps have been prepared from the field-notes published and issued to the
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navigators of the lakes. One gives the west end of Lake Superior, and the
other the northeastern part of Lake Michigan. Three others have been prepared and are now ready for engraving, giving the Portage ·r iver and the bay
of L'Anse, on Lake Superior; and a third giving the north end of Green bay.
Twenty-eight hundred and twenty (2,820) sheets of the maps of the lake
surveys have been issued for commercial, harbor improvement, and military
purposee, during the year, making the whole number of maps called for and
issued since these surveys were commenced 27,411 sheets.
Special surveys have also been made during the year, maps issued and forwarded for the use of the department, of Niagara r'ver, Erie, Conneaut, Ashtabula, Grand river, Cleveland, Black river, Sandusky, St. Joseph's, Grand Haven, Chicago, Racine, and Sheboygan.
SURVEYS.

The principal labors of the parties engaged in these surveys during the year
are comprised in the measurement of 269~ miles of shore-line, 164~ square
miles of topography, 187 miles of soundings, and 1,200 square miles of offshore hydrography on 1,586 miles of lines of soundings, the measurement of a
base line of 4,173 feet in length, ilifference of longitude between several distant points by electric obs-ervations, and observations by flashing lights; also
astronomical observations for the latitude of eight points.
Recommendation.-These surveys are called for by numerous parties and
individuals, as well as by commercial men, for private as well as for public use.
It is indispensable that some rules and system be established to keep the issue
of these valuable maps within such limits as will insure the great objects of the
survey, the diffusion of this information to promote national industry, at the
same time to prevent them falling into the hands of persons collecting for otheT
purposes thar~ tlw public good.
I recommend that the department be therefore authorized to issue these maps,
after supplying the wants of the government, at the cost of paper and printing,
as is now and for years past has been authorized for distributing the Coast Survey
maps. This will prevent an improper use, and enable all persons capable of
using them to obtain copies.
The estimate for carrying on the werk for the next year is $184,604 42,
which exceeds the amount appropriated for last year s operations about $60,000.
It is proper to say that this increase of estimate does not contemplate any
advance in the wages of assistants, but is simply due to the increased cost of
materials and supplies.
On our Pacific coast Major WilHarnson, of the corps of engineers, has explored and reconnoitred parts of northern California and southern Oregon,
giving the topography of its roads, and continues observations for barometric
corre ction of altitudes, having also in view an investigation of the formula for
determining heights by this instrument. He has traversed and explored the
heights of the Nevada range in northern California, said to be 10,000 to 11,000
feet above the level of the sea, and the military roads between the coast and
this range of mountains to facilitate the military operations of the commanding
general. During the year he alEto examined the various sites on Admiralty
inlet and Pugets sound, that might hereafter become. useful for military purposes, and selected such as should be reserved from sale by the land office.
PRESERVATION AND REPAIR OF ATLA:.\TTIC HARBORS AND SEA-WALLS.

An appropriation was m'ade in 1864 for renewing the construction of the
sea-walls in Boston harbor to preserve the head-lands from further destruction
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by the ocean waves, and, as a consequence, injury to the harbor for commercial
use, while at the same time it preserves important sites that hereafter will be
occupied by batteries bearing on the channel leading to the city of Boston. "-rhe
following narratives of the operations on these islands are drawn from the report
of Colonel Graham, the superintending engineer. The same officer was charged
with the application of the appropriation of $100,000 for the preservation and
Tepair of the harbors on the Atlantic. The accompanying summary gives his
views on this subject in relation to the Susquehanna river below Havre-deGrace, dredging the Patapsco river, Portland Harbor breakwater, navigation of
the Hudson river below Troy, and Delaware breakwater. Colonel Graham reccommends additional appropriations for the Atlantic harbor improvements.
REPAIRS OF SEA-WALLS ON DEER AND LOVELL'S ISLANDS, IN BOSTON HARBOR.

Deer Island sea-wall.-The walls on this island are three in number, viz :
the north wall, middle wall, and south wall; respectively 1,743 feet, 839 feet, and
383 feet in length.
"-l_1here were six places averaging 60 feet each in length, where the backing
and flagstones of the platform had fallen in, and many places where large
blocks of stone had been forced out from the body of the walls into the sea.
In September, 1864, a violent storm from the northeast washed away the
clay backing from the north wall, to such an extent as to throw the cavities into
one of 300 feet in length, besides forcing twelve large stones from different parts
of the wall into the sea, and bulging the body of the wall both inward and outward, which weakened it so much, as to make it impossible for it to stand
another such shock. No time was lost in taking down the whole of the injured
portion and commencing the relaying it from the foundation, in hydraulic cement. Ninety feet lineal were rebuilt in this manner before the close of the working season. Much damage was done during the winter and spring storms.
During the summer to the close of the fiscal year, 50 feet lineal, in addition,
were taken down and rebuilt. A small balanc-e only remains on bani for this
work; and the estimate of the engineer in charge for its continuance is $25,359 86.
Sea-wall on LolJell's 1"sland.-This wall is for the protection of the northern
end of the island from abrasion by the action of the sea. It is 803 feet loi}g.
The smallness of the a!Jpropriation granted for the joint repairs of the walls
on this and Deer island rendered it impossible to do more on the former one
than to procure the materials for erecting the necessary buildings for carrying
on the work.
The estimated cost of repairing the sea-wall on this island is $43,891 68.
SEA-WALLS AT GREAT BREWSTER'S ISLAND, BOSTON HARBOR.

"-l'here are two walls, 372 and 340 feet in length respectively, on this island;
ana auclitional walls for its protection and to prevent serious injury to the ship
ehannel from the wash of large quantities of soil into it, to the extent of 1,550
feet lineal, are required.
During the winter a large number of tools were made at the blacktlmith's
shop on Great Brewster's island. Derricks were procured, a well was sunk, and
a rail track 800 feet long was graded for drawing stone and other heavy articles, and in addition 1,500 cubic yards of stone and gravel were collected preparatory to commencing operations in the spring, si:p.ce which time the work
has been s1eadily and satisfactorily progressing.
About $215,000 of the appropriation has been expended, leaving a balance of
$39,754 42 available for further prosecution of the work. ·
"-l'he engineer in charge estimates that additional funds will be required for
the continuance of this work, to the amount of $111,222 20.
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REPAIRING, ETC., HARBORS ON THE SEA-BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES.

Dredging channel qf Patapsco riverfrom Fort .f.I!IcHenry to tlle moutlt if said
Q"iver.-The absence of the dredges necessary to perform this work (they having been loaned to the Quartermaster and Navy departments for military purposes) rendered it impossible to make any progress with the work. The officer
in charge has visited and reported upon the existing obstructions, however, and
.t hey will be removed at as early a day as practicable.
Husquekanna river below Havre-de-Grace, Ma1·yland.-Upon inspection of
the channel at this place by the engineer in charge, obstructions to the navigation were found to exist for vessels drawing over six feet of water, but owing to
circumstances above cited, (the want of dredges,) no progress was made in their
removal.
Portland Harbor breakwater, Maine.-The engineer in charge reports that
the work of repairs on this breakwater has progressed satisfactorily, and recommends that it should be extended at once 400 feet further out. He estimates for
the further prosecutiQn of the repairs the sum of...... . . . . . .
$21,338 35
For extending the breakwater 400 feet. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83,772 70
Making a total of ...........•.....•..........•...•......

105,111 05

Improvement qf tlw navigation qfthe Hudson rive1· below T1·oy, N. Y.-Owing
to the want of dredges, no progress was made in this work during the last year.
It will be commenced at the earliest practicable moment.
Tlw Delaware breakwater.-A minute survey of this work wiU be required
before repairs can be commenced. 'rhe pressing duties of the officer to whom
this work was assigned prevented his giving it his attention in time for the commencement of the work. It will receive attention as soon as possible.
In addition to the abov-e-mentioned works, there are others whose repairs
should be attended to, but it is evident that the appropriation is utterly inadequate to the purpose.
REPAIRS AND COMPLETION OF SEA-WALL AT BUFFALO, N. Y.

A special appropriation for this object, of $37,500, was made in July, 1864,
and the work was commenced as soon as possible.
The operations during the year ending June 30, 1865, have consisted in repairing the breaches in the old wall, quarrying stone, and laying the foundations for the proposed extension of the sea-wall.
The total amount expended during the year was $8,494 92.
PRESERVATION AND REPAIR OF LAKE HARBORS.

A general appropriation of $250,000 under this head was made by Congress,
approved June 28, 1864, and after due consideration it was distributed among
the harbors most essential to the interests of commerce in proportion to their
imoortance.
Owing to the lapse of time since any repairs were made upon harbor improvements, (some fifteen or twenty years,) the works had fallen into decay, and in
many instances become entirely dilapidated; and under these circumstances,
especially when considering the utter inadequacy of the appropriation, the question of applying it to the most advantage was one of great difficulty.
Some of the most important harbor works had scarcely anything left to "re-
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pair or preserve," and in a strict construction of the act would have been cut
off from any benefit in the approp iation, while from others much of the old
work had to bEJ removed before anything new could be commenced. [t
will be evident, therefore, that although much has been done generally, the
amount of work at particular points must appear small.
'The following summary from the reports of the officers in charge will exhibit
the state of the works at the close of the year. Should it be the determination
of Congress to persevere with the repairs and preservation of these artificial
works to improve the navigation of the lake harbors, the department will be
prepared to give the sums recommended by the superintending engineers for
the different localities.
Repain qf pier 6lt Oswego harbo;, N. Y.-Major C. E. Blunt, corps of engineers, reports that operations for this object have been carried on during the
entire working season. The sinking of new cribs, repair and ballasting of old
ones, and replanking the outer surface of the pier, constitute the work done.
Similar repairs will eontinue to be necessary to a greater or less extent from
year to year.
'The amount expended during the year was $14,588 17. The sum still available from the appropriation made last year for repairs and preservation of lake
harbors will probably be sufficient for the coming year.
Genesee . River lwrbor, N. ¥.-Captain J. A. 'l'ardy, corps of engineers,
reports that preparations for repairing the west pier at this harbor were commenced in the fall of 1864, and during the year ending June 30, 1B65, the
amount expended was $11,141 43. By the close of the present working season the balance of the available funds will have been expended.
Ligltt-house pier, Buffalo, N. ¥.-Captain J. A. Tardy, corps of engineers,
Nports that nothing was done during the fall, owing to the lateness of the season. Active operations for repairs could not be commenced before July, 1865.
'l'his pier is very much out of repair. Piles on the harbor side and at the extremity need replacing. Stone-work is much injured and thrown out of place
by the action of the ice.
·
Har·b orqf Clticago, Illinois.- A special survey with a view to its improvement,
as well as to the preservation and repair of existing works at this point, was
made during the season. The officer in charge of the work, Colonel 'I'. J. Cram,
corps of engineers, however, could not, under the restrictions of the act making
the appropriation, apply any portion of it, and the city authorities appropriated
$7 5,000 to be expended in continuing the dredging of the ·direct channel through
the outer bar ·of the mouth of the harbor, which they had already opened to
some extent, and in extending the north pier 400 feet, under the plan approved
by this department and suggested by the officer in charge.
,
rrhis important harbor presents great engineering dafficulties to insure permanency to any system for its improvement that he~toforehas been devised. The
present system is designed to open a channel across a shoal that the continued
effort of nature is forming. While the present method of prolonging jetties, thus
extending the river channel across the shoal, has the effect of cutting a new and
deep channel across such shoal, such improvement has no effect in preventing,
in a limited period, the formation of another shoal across the opening of these
piers into what was originally deep water. Nor have they any effect in retardjng the causes of slfch formation. It is by checking the perpetually shifting
sands along the shores that we must arrest this perpetual injury to the harbors.
No place demands more care aud attention to this important subject than Chicago. Most of the other lake harbors are affected in this manner and from similar causes. 'The attention of the superintending engineers aud others interested
in this subject, so important to the commer-ce and trade of the lakes, will be

924

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF W.A.R.

drawn to some means of rendering the expenditures for these harbors more
durable.
Racine lwrbor, Wisconsin.-Co1one1 Cram reports that the work at this harbor has consisted in levelling back the sand heaps from back of the north pier,
in putting in new timbers and filling with stone the shore portion likely to be
breached, (north pier,) in repairing and filling with stone sixty feet of same pier
further out, in securing outer crib or pier-head in place, and preventing it being
overturned, and in replacing broken timbers of the pier-head of south pier.
The additional work contemplated for the remainder of the season will, it is
hoped, render the work at this harbor secure for several years to come.
Milwaukie harbor, Wisconsin.-Colonel Cram reports that the work accomplished at this harbor was as follows, viz: in replacing iron bands and bolts, repairing the timbers of the south pier-head, and in removing by dredging a lump
which had formed in the natural bed in the middle of the channel just at the
entrance.
With the additional work yet remaining to be done, the harbor will be in good
condition.
Sheboygan harbor, Wisconsin.-Colonel Cram reports that sufficient material
for the repairs at this harbor could not be accumulated to justify the commencement of the work until April, 1S65.
During the summer much of the work has been successfully done , a part of
it having to be put under water, and therefore difficult to accomplish. It is
contemplated to complete the work during the coming season.
St. Joseph's l~m·bor, Micl~igan.-Colonel Cram reports that therepairs at this
point, consisting of closing the breach in the nor th pier and removing the woodwork and filling it with stone to a level three feet above the water, were successfully accomplished with immediate beneficial results.
This harbor is a very important one, being the only harbor of refuge the
United States has ever expended money upon on the east shore of Lake Michigan, and should be fully repaired and improved.
Erie harbor, Pennsylvania.-Co1one1 Cram reports that the repairs of the
works at this place were completed, including the strengthening the low place
in the peninsula at the head of the bay.
Grand River lwrbor, Ohio.-Co1onel Cram reports that the breach in the
west pier of 150 feet in length has been completely repaired, leaving an additional 150 feet of the outer damaged and decayed part to be Tepaired next season. rrhe breach of 90 feet in length in the outer portion of the east pier, and
likewise a very considerable portion of the inner part of the old east pier, have
also been repaired, and nearly all the material t)1at will be required for the remainder of the repairs authorized has been delivered on the spot. The entrance
to the harbor has been very materially improved by what has already been
done, and it is probable that channel of nine feet over the outer bar will be
made by next spring.
.
Cleveland lzm·b01·, Ohio.-The work at this point has been much abused by
corporate authorities and private individuals, in the use of it for their own advantage; and as this abuse is, in spite of remonstrance, daily on the increase, it
is highly probable that the piers will in the end be entirely destroyed
In consequence of the officer in charge (Colonel Uram) not being able to get
entire possession of the east pier from the bands of those ~ho are using it for
private pecuniary advantage, no repairs have been put upon it.
The west pier and the pier-head have been very thoroughly repaired, and
both have been filled with stones, with the exct:ption of a part of the inner sustaining work put in to strengthen and preserve the old west pier. Before the
close of the present season, most or all of the filling will be in, and there will
remain no more to be done until next winter, when, taking advantage of the ice,
about seventy old piles will be pulled up.
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Ample depth of water now exists on the bar, which has been attained by the
city in large expenditures for dredging.
Black River harbor, 0/tio.-Oolonel Cram reports that during the season the
west pier has been repaired, and also all the under-water work of the east pier
has been successfully put in. Before the close of the season, it is anticipated
that all of the east pier will be completely built up and planked over to a point
necessary to stop the sand from running into the harbor.
Vermillion harbor, Ohio.-'rhe amount required to repair this harbor being
so large, it was not deemed advisable to commence it with the limited means at
the disposal of the department.
Sandusky harbor, Ol~io.-N o vestige of the old work could be found upon
inspection of this harbor, and as the act making the appropriation did not contemplate new works of improvement, it was not deemed proper to apply any
part of the appropriation.
Repairs if lwrborworks at Burlington, Vermont, and Plattsburg, New Ym·k,
Lake Clwmplain.-The sums of $13,000 and $2,000 respectively were allotted
from the appropriation for " repairs and preservation of lake harbors " to these
two points, to be expended in repairing the breakwaters, and at the latter place
to direct the repairs so as to admit of placing a small harbor light on the north
end of the breakwater. After examination on the spot, it was not judged expedient by Major Blunt, the engineer in charge, to commence work before the
falling stage of the lake in 1865. Nothing was consequently done before the
closing of the fiscal year.
Some dredging was reported as desirable by the engineer in charge near the
Plattsburg breakwater. It was not, however, judged expedient to have it done
at present.
'The outlay of money at Burlington to make the breakwater adequate to the
wants of the large and increasing business of the place would be so great, that
it is not thought expedient at present to ask for any further appropriation.
MILITARY ACADEMY.

During the past year sixty-eight cadets completed their studies and military
exercises at the academy, and were commissioned as lieutenants in the army.
This is the most numerous class that has ever graduated at the institution
since its organization in 1802.
For many years the number of graduates has not sufficed to fill the annual
vacancies in the army.
The number of officers in the several branches of the staff, and of regiments
now comprising the regular army, has greatly increased from time to time, while
the number of cadets authorized by law has remained unaltered since 1843.
The result is that neither the staff corps, nor regiments of artillery, cavalry, and
infantry, can be furnished with the numbers to perfect their company organizations, and military science and art cannot be disseminated throughout the
country in proportion to the increase of population and national interests to be
protected. The total number of cadets now at the academy is 235, and the total
number authorized by existing laws is 293. From various incidents to which
the appointments are subject, this ratio does not materially alter from year to
year.
'rhe average cost of the institution for the last twenty years has been
$160,711 83. 'rhe cost during the past academic year was $201,217. These
sums include the pay of cadets, officers, and professors, and all contingencies.
'rhe annual average appropriation for twenty years is $166,684 63, and for
the present year is $:257,505. Thi::~ excess arises from the increase of the pay
of cadets, and for increase cost of forage for artillery and cavalry horses, &c.
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Recommendation.-To meet the wants of the military service, and to diffuse
a knowledge of the science and art of war more extensively throughout our
widely extended domain, I recommend at this time an increase in the total number of cadets of two additional appointments from each State and Territory, and
the District of Columbia; thus making the number of appointments to be authorized under the law to be one from each congressional district and Territory
and the District of Columbia, ten from "at large " annually by the President's
selection, and two in addition from each State aud Territory and the District of
Columbia.
The difficulties that have been experienced for years past in training the minds
and bodies of the young gentlemen sent to the academy to prepare them for usefulness as members of the military profession, arise mainly from the qualifications of the candidates being so exceedingly limited. "\Vhile at the present time
it may not be expedient to increase the standard for admission, I do urgently
recommend that a selection from at least five candidates to be nominated for
each appointment may be authorized by law, when every section of the country
would more certainly have its due proportion of graduates entering the army
annually. Should this principle be authorized by law, the examination of the
candidates could be ordered in several sections of the country, at convenient
military posts, and thus save a great annual expense now incurred by partially
educating and returning deficient cadets to their distant homes, insure a much
greater proportion of members who could master the course of studies, and avoid
the numerous and frequent discharges from the academy for inability to acquire
the requisite information and proficiency for a graduate of this institution.
FINANCES.

During the year ending June 30, 1865, the expenditures
of the department for fortifications on the Atlantic, Gulf
of Mexico, Pacific coasts, and on the northern lakes, including bridge trains, intrenching tools,. and for all other
military purposes, amounted to .......•• ~ . . . . . . . . . . . .
:For civil works, as lake harbors, harbors on the Atlantic,
survey of the lakes, they amounted to................
And for the Military Academy, not includi>ng the pay of professors and cadets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Making a total annual expenditure of .............. .

$5, 17 4, 335 23

218, 400 00
86, 685 00
5,479,420 23

The accounts of the d1sburs1ng officers of the department have been regularly forwarded from month to month. These accounts had accumulated in
the department during the past four years beyond the means allotted to the
financial branch to examine, correct, and forwa.rd to the Treasury D epartment for final settlement.
During the year twelve hundred and three montl1ly accounts, amounting
to $11,834,308 35, have been thus examined and forwarded to the Auditor for
final settlement, and there remain on hand at this time three hundred and
ninety-eight monthly accounts to be examined, amounting to $4,492,964: 85.
At the rate of progress made during the past year in the examination of these
accounts, the work in a short time will be ln:ought up to the mouths in which
they are received from the officers. No defalcation or losses in any way exist
in the disbursements and. aceountC\b\lity o£ the officers d: the d.e\)attmen.t.
At the present time all property purchased for the armies in the fie1d, either
worn or of a perishable character, is being sold, and the avails will be returned
to the treasury. rrhe amount of sales to this date is $34,123 12. The resi-

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

due of this property is being stored in engineer depots for further use, at the
Jefferson Barracks depot, Missouri, and at the Willett's Point depot, ~ ew York,
under charge of engineer officers and troops of the engineer battalion.
'l'he property of the department in the hands of its agents is accounted for
quarterly, and the returns examined in this bureau.
The number of returns examined during the year is ......... _....... 220
And remaining to be examined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
Making the number of property returns rendered by officers . . . . . .

General, and
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RICH'D DELAFIELD,
Engineer U. S. A1·my.

Cl~iif

Ron. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Waslz,ington, D. C.

Narrative collated from the reports qf Colonel N. Michler.
FROM THE RAPIDAN TO PETERSBURG.

Accurate maps and topographical information of the country to be passed over
were much needed, and called for the earliest attention of the engineers (See
plan No. 11.) Reconnaissances had been made as far as the different fords of
the Rapidan, and the country was so far well known. The movements of the
army in November and December, 1863, between the Rapidan and Mine run,
had furnished some information that proved of great value. The experience
gained during the campaign of the army of the Potomac in May and June
1864, showed that the existing maps sufficed only for general information, and
furnished but little suitable for selecting the routes (}f columns, and were en·
tirely de:ficien tin details required for the manceuvre of troops in the field in the
face of an enemy. 'The country proved to be of the worst and most impracticable character; and although in one of the oldest States of the Union, it was
without any geographical information among its archives. It became evident
that this information would have to be obtained in anticipation of any forward
movement of the army. 'To accomplish this, Colonel Michler's party was kept
occupied day and night preparing maps, much needed, in the absence ofreliable
guides, for directing the columns, either as they moved on the routes, or manceuvred for position previous to attack. Major W eyss and Captain Paine, of
the volunteers, were the assistants of Colonel Michler, who had also seven civil
assistants and men detailed from the ranks. The labors of these assistants
commenced after crossing the Rapidan, progressed until the army arrived in
front of Petersburg, and continued on other :fields until October, 1864. Every
road within the lines of the army was examined and surveyed, and the work
pushed as far to the fr011t and on the flanks as practicable. Their notes were at
once photographed in the :field, and distributed for use. Revised editions of
these photographs were published as fast as any new information was procured.
In this way several editions of eleven maps were arranged and issued, comprising surveys covering an area of 730 square miles.
Other surveys were made
by means of odometers, on the headquarters train, over a distance of 179
miles; and others made with the cavalry expeditions under General Sheridan,
over an aggregate distance of 310 miles. These surveys were completed from
information obtained from captured maps. Six sheets were thus improved.
Ou the 9th July, 1864, an order was issued directing the operations of the
army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg, and
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that they be by regular approaches. This required a survey of the topography
of the country, and the positions of the lines of both armies. To this map constant reference was made during the siege. Over 1,300 miles of actual surveys
were made during the period now referred to. More than 1,200 maps were issued previous to crossing the Rapidan, and over 1,600 photographic sketches
between that date and the 30th July, 1864.
A brief synopsis follows of the duties assigned the officers of the corps of engineers in the order of events.
On the 3d May Lieutenant Mackenzie accompanied General Gregg's second cavalry division, remained with this command, after crossing the Rapidan, at Ely's
ford during the 4th and 5th May, and was in the action against the enemy's
cavalry at Todd's tavern. On the 6th May he returned to the engineer battalion. Lieutenant Howell accompanied the third cavalry division, and continued
with General Wilson until the 25th May, accompanying the division from Chancellorsville to Haxall's landing, on the James river, and was present in the engagements along the route thither and back. Colonel Michler crossed the Germania ford with General Meade, and was directed to reconnoitre the ground
along the Wilderness creek, and to the right of the position occupied by the
5th corps, across the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike. At the crossroad, between the latter and the plank road at Spotwood's, the enemy's cavalry was
encountered. A division of the 6th corps, and Ricketts's, were form ed in line
parallel to the latter road, and moved forward to the right of the 5th. During
the greater part of the 5th and the entire 6th May, Colonel Michler remained
with General Sedgwick. On the 6th May he made an examination of his front
and took part in the construction of an intrenched line, the right of which was
much exposed, several crossroads offering facilities for outflanking the position.
A series of determined and bloody assaults on both days opened the campaign,
the battle of the Wilderness ending on the evening of the 6th May by a fierce
attack about dark by the enemy on the right of the 6th corps. Colonel
Michler then guided the 6th corps to a new position, the left still resting on
the right of the 5th, the latter having slightly fallen back; the line was reformed, and extended across the Germania plank road, with the right resting near
Southerland's, beyond the Quarles mill. The movement of the corps commenced about midnight, and it was established in its new position by daylight.
On the night of the 7th May the army again advanced. Lieutenant Benyaurd,
of the corps of engineers, guided the 6th corps along the turnpike to Chancellorsville, thence by the plank road to Piney Branch church, and thence to the
intersection of the plank road with the Brock road, near Alsop's, Benyaurd
having previouslypassed over this road with Kilpatrick. He rema-ined with
the 6th corps.
The other engineer officers accompanied the commanding
general on the evening of the 7th May to Todd's tavern, at the intersection of
the Brock and Catharpen roads. At this point a severe caYalry fight, under
Gregg·, occurred duriug the afternoon. On the 8th May some severe skirmishing commenced between the advance of the 5th corps and the enemy, then falling back from the Wilderness towards Spottsylvania Court House. At daybreak Michler reconnoitred the country along the Brock road, and parallel to
the Po river, to select a position for the 2d corps, in the event of the enemy attempting to strike our flank. About noon he was ordered to remain with
Hancock for duty. During the day he reconnoitred to the west, along the
Catharpen road, as far as Corbin's bridge, across the Po. rrhe columns of the
enemy were distinctly seen moving southward. Towards evening he made a
strong demonstration, and was easily repulsed. On the 9th May the officers of
engineers, with part of the engineer battalion, assisted the different corps in
strengthening their positions by intrenchments. On the lOth May the engineers bridged the Po river for the passage of the 2d corps. Subsequently
lVIichler guided Gibbon's and Birney's divisions back across the river to a po-
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sition in rear and right of the 5th corps. Mackenzie was engaged the same
day in reconnoitring in front of the 6th corps, selecting, in company with
General Russe1l, the point of successful attack on the rebels by Upton's brigade.
On the 11th May Captain Mendell, corps of engineers, guided the 2d corps
forward to the left, preparatory to a general assault along the whole line, driving the enemy. Rain and muddy roads checked the contest. 'rhe next day,
the 12th May, the two armies fought from early dawn until darkness had for
hours fallen over the contending hosts. Fourteen hours' fighting had failed to
drive the rebel army from its strong position. During the afternoon of the 12th
Major Duane and Colonel Michler reconnoitred the ground between the right of
the 6th corps and the old Court House road, to select a line for a divit3ion of
.
the 5th corps to hold, to relieve the other divisions of this corps.
On the 13th May, Michler was ordered to examine the line in front of Hancock's corps, including the famou!'\ "salient," to ascertaiu what should be done
to strengthen it. In the course of the day he also examined the line of the
6th corps, to the right of the 2d. On the morning of the 14th, Michler
was directed, in company 1vith Duane, to cross the N y, and examine the line
taken up by tl!c 5th corps, and endeavor to locate the position of the enemy's
works around Spottsy lvania Court Honse, detached portions of which could be
seen from one or two commanding points. They had evidently been constructed some time previously, in anticipation of the present move. Soon afterwards :Michler reconnoitred, with his assistants, towards the Anderson House,
and located certain buildings in Spottsy lvania, and other sections of the works
around it. In the afternoon he accompanied Upton's command, of the 6th
corps, across the Ny, to the left of the 5th corps, occupying a commanEl:ing
position in front of Meyer's house, from which it was soon driven, but repossessed of it, on the other divisions of the 6th corps coming up. On the ll5th,
16th, and 17th, during a suspension of the contest by rain and impassable
roads, daily reconnoiss<inces were made of the enemy's position by the engineer
officers. On the 18th a general attack was made by our army without any decided suceess, and on the 19th movements W<Ore made to turn the enemy's right
flank, the enemy making a similar move on our right. On the evening of the
19th Michler, accompanied by Captain 'l'urn bull, of the corps of engineers, was
sent to report to Birney, who was holding the enemy in check on our right
flank, to g·ive him information of the nature of the ground. He remained all
night, examining ltis position preparatory to a renewal of the attack by daylight. On the night of the 20th l\fay the army moved by its flank, the 2d·
corps leading. Lieutenant Mackenzie was ordered to report to General Hancock,
and accompany his command, with which be continued until the North Anna
was reached, and during the operations on that river, and then returned to general headquarters, having reeonnoitred the successive lines taken by that command.
On the 21st May, Michler was sent across the Mattapony to ascertain the
existence of any fords above the bridge by which the 6th corps could cross
the Po, on the line of march from Anderson's (Smith's) mill. A reconnaissance
was also made towards Mud 'ravern, on the telegraph road. Information was
now gainecl that the enemy had abandoned Spottsylvania Court House, and was
moving south by the telegraph road towards the North Anna, to take up that
natnrally strong position.
'rhe movement of the army was continued on the 23d of May. The 2d and
5th corps were in the ad vance. Each forced a passage of the North Anna. On
the 24th l\Iay the whole army, except two divisions of the 9t.h corps, effected the
passage of that stream. On the morning of the 25th Michler inade a reconuoiesance of the whole line from Noel's station to the river. A log bridge had
been constructed in addition to the one at Quarles's; these, with the Chesterfield
and several pontoon bridges, afforded perfect facilities for crossing. The
59--w
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enemy was now found to be in strong position in front of Hanover Junction.
General preparations were made during the day to re-cross the whole army.
On the 26th Michler made an examination of all the bridges and crossings,
including the canvas pontoons laid during the day near the railroad bridge. On
the evening of the 26th the re-crossing of the river commenced and continued
the following day. Lieutenant Howell, Of the corps of engineers, guided the 9th
corps. On the afternoon of the 27th, Michler and Mackenzie examined the
roads leading from Rider's to Taylor's ford and Normand's ferry on the Pamunkey, and also to widow Nelson's ferry, to ascertain whether it wou]J be
possible to cross the river at the latter point, and the result proved satisfactory.
The crossing of the river at Hanover-town was seized the same day. By the
evening of the 28th the troops had all passed over the several pontoon bridges
thrown over the stream for this purpose. Apprehensive that the enemy might
:attack our army in detail while crossing the river, Major Duane and Colonel
Michler rode along the whole line to aid in forming it and see that it was continuous. Before dark a strong position had been occupied and many parts of it
intrenched, the left resting near the 'l'olopatomoy, and the right on Crump's
.·creek. Lieutenant Howell, of the corps of engineers, was sent ~n the morning
to examine the country in advance of the position, and was present during the
-fight that took place with the reconnoitring force.
On the 29th of May a grand !'econnoissance in force was ordered in the direction of Hanover Court House and Shady Grove church, and along each of the
intermediate roads. Lieutenant :Mackenzie accompanied the 5th corps, Lieutenant Howell the 9th, Captain Turnbull the 2d, Captain Mendell one division
of the 6th, while Colonel Michler joined another divil3ion of the same corps. On
the 30th Lieutenant Howell was ordered to join the 5th corps, and Lieutenant
Benyaurd the 6th. These officers, with Lieutenant Mackenzie, were constantly
engaged during this and the following day in making reconnaissances along
the Tolopatomoy and of the different lines taken up as the army changed position.
On the 1st of June Captain Mendell and Lieutenant Benyaurd were ordered
to fortify the position of the vVhite House to protect it against any sudden
cavalry attack, the dPpot having been moved from Port Royal to that place.
During the day, in company with Lieutenant Gillespie, of the engineers, and
several assistants, they examined the country southeast of Old Church tavern
to find several parallel roads over which to move the different columns simultaneously. The army was now in position at Cool Arbor. A general attack
·was made by the enemy along his entire front, which was repulsed. The morning of the 3d of June witnessed a most gallant assault by the army along its
entire front. It failed in its object of driving back the enemy across the Ohickahominy, both lines of battle being at the time parallel to that stream. Early
in the morning Michler was directed to make a reconnaissance along the 2d
corp's lines to ascertain its position and strength, and, later in the day, to examine the line of battle of the 18th corps and Birney's division of the 2d corps.
Never were two lines of battle more closely arrayed against each other, separated by distances varying from forty to one hundred yards, each awaiting in
silent and unwavering determination the fierce attack of the other, but neither
willing to take the initiative. Both contending forces had already experienced
most deadly repulses. No portion of the body could be exposed at any momP-nt. The unerring shot of the sharpshooter warned all against rising above
the hastily constructed intrenchments. All lay close to the ground, it being
necessary to crawl on hands and knees to reach the line.
Having carefully examined the position of the works with Captain Farquhar,
of the corps of engineers, Colonel Michler reported to the commanding general
the impossibility of successfully storming the position of the enemy in front of
that corps in consequence of its great strength, and there being no suitable
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place in the rear to mass the troops for the attack. Already three desperate
attempts had been made to force the position, and each was repulsed with very
heavy loss. 'l~he army was directed to intrench its line and render it as strong
as possible. .Major Morton, of the corps of engineers, took charge of the works
in front of the 9th corps. Lieutenant Howell, with a company of the engineer
battalion, was sent to the 6th corps to construct batteries and covered ways, and
Lieutenant R. S. Mackenzie, with a company of the same command, attended
to the same duty in front of the 2d corps, where he remained until the lOth
of June, when he was transferred to the command of the 2d Connecticut artillery. The two armies remained closely confronting each other from the 4th
to the 9th of June, during which period our left had been extended to cover
Bottom's bridge. On the 7th of ,June Captain 'Turnbull joined General Sheridan's cavalry corps on an expedition towards Gordonsville. He reported again
to his commander after an extended and important tour under Sheridan at
Petersburg, and then only to remain a short time, being assigned to duty at
Baltimore, then threatened by the rebels.
On the 9th .Tune Michler was ordered to select a new line in rear of the intrenched position then occupied by the army, to be held temporarily by two
divisions, to enable the troops to retire without being molested and to cover
the movement towards the east and along the east bank of the Chickahominy.
The ground selected by the engineers lay between Elder's swamp and Allen's
mill pond, almost directly in front of Cool Arbor. On the morning of the lOth
the construction of the batteries and connecting parapets commenced, Captain
Gillespie directing one portion and Lieutenant Benyanrd the other, and work
was finished on the following morning. Captain Mendell with Lieutenant
Howell made a reconnoissance to Windsor Shades, on the Chickahominy, to as~
certain the practicability of crossing the supply train at that point, and reported
unfavorably.
On the night of the 12th June the withdrawal of the troops from the hotly
contested field so long occupied by them was effected, and the several columns
set in motion.
On the 13th, by din~ction of the commanding general, Colonel Michler proceeded in advance of the army of the Potomac to the James river to reconnoitre
the ground from Swynyard's, overlooking Herring creek and Harrison's landing, and thence over Gun's Hills run and Queen's creek towards the mouth of
Kellovan's creek. 'l'his examination had in view the selection of a line of battle to be taken up to protect the passage of the army over the James river.
The line selected covered Swynyard's and Wilcox's landing, the left resting on
Herring creek, and crossed the upper part of Wynoke neck or peninsula, at
the Stluthern point of which it had been ordered that a pontoon bridge should
be thrown. The 2d corps reached the position by dark and commenced to intrench, which work was subsequently suspended. On the morning of the 14th
June steamers commenced ferrying the 2d corps across the Ja.mes from Wilcox's landing to Wind-mill Point. 'I'he engineer officers were all engaged endeavoring to find direct roads leading from the Comt-house across Queen's creek,
down W ynoke neck, but soon discovered it was only fordable on the main road.
It was ascertained that approaches were being constructed at the landing under
the direction of General Weitzel by the engineers of the army of the James,
preparatory to building the pontoon bridge, not sufficient material for completing
it having yet been received at the point. Upon Major Duane's arrival General
"\Veitzel turned over the entire charge of the matter to him, and the bridge was
thrown under Duane's direction. At daybreak of the 15th June ColonellVlichler
was ordered to select a short line to be held by the Gth corps to cover the crossing
of the remainder of the army and the supply train. In orCler to leave sufficient
space to park the latter, he selected a commanding ridge running westwardly
from 'l'yler's mill, the right to rest on Tyler's creek, impassable below the mill;
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and the left on the James river below the mouth of Queen's creek. The battalion of engineers commenced at 4 p. m. to construct the pontoon bridge at
Wynoke landing, a'n d finished it at 11 p.m. It consisted of 101 wooden pontoons. A part of the army having crossed the James, the first attack on Petersburg was made on the evening of this day, ·when the outer line of the
enemy's works was captured by troops that moved by wat _r from the 'White
House. On the 16th June the staff of the commanding general crossed the
James on the pontoon bridge. Just before dark an assault was made along the
whole line at Petersburg by the troops then in position against the enemy's second position. On the 17th and 18th the attacking columns renewed their desperate efforts against the enemy'~ front, at times reaching and mounti ng his
parapets and then compelled to retire after desperate fighting and heavy loss.
On the right, possession of the ground at Page't;, near the Appomattox, was
gained and held, the enemy's line at that point being within a few hundreJ
yards of Petersburg.
At thiB time the reconnaissances and surveys of our lines in front of that city
and of its environs commenced. Major Weyss, of the volunteers, had the immediate charge of the principal field party.
'l"he engineer corps was called upon on the 17th to mourn the loss of one of
its most accomplished officers. Whilst reconnoitring the position in fl'ont of the
9th corps for the purpose of selecting the ground upon which to form a division
in line of battle preparatory to the assault on that day, l\f:1jor Morton expoBed
himself to the unerring shot of one of the rebel sharpshooters ; he was killed instantly, the ball penetrating his left breast. Major Morton had served with the
army of the Potomac but a Bhort time, having joined on the banks of the North
Anna; he was, immediately on his arrival, a8signed to the 9th corps andremained with it until his death, performing excellent service. His great desire
to excel in his profession, added to an energetic and impulsive nature, had led
him on several pr~vious occasions to expose himself. He laid down on the battle-field a useful, active, and brave life in the cause of his country, and deeply
has the army, especially the corps to which he had been so long aml ably attached, been called to grieve his sudden death. Captain Harwood, Uuited
States e_ngincers, having reported for duty on the 27th, was, a day or two
after, temporarily assigned to the 9th corps.
On the 19th and 20th the two opposing armies remained comparatively
quiet, each willing to rest after their late exhausting labors. During these four
days Lieutenants Howell and Benyaurd wme engaged on the right of the line,
and Captain Gmespie on the left. During the three following ones (the 21st,
:22d, and 23d) the army resumed, after the brief suspension referred to, active
operations tending towards outflanking the enemy on his right, severing hiR
lines of communication towards the south and endeavoring to reach the Weldon
railroad. 'l'he several officers of engineers accompanied these movements. An
intrenched line was finally taken up and held, running nearly south from the
Appomattox along the front of Petersburg to the Jerusalem plank road, and then
almost parallel to that road, with the left refused and again crossing it near the
\Villiams hoU3e,
On the 24th, accompanied by Captain Mendell and Lieutenant Howell, Colonel
Michler made a reconnai ssance of the country between the A very house and the
Blackwater swamp, for the purpose of selecting a line to fall back upon in the
event of withdrawing a part of the army for other purposes; the crossings of the
swamp were also carefully searched and its character examined in regard to
forming an obstacle to passage of artillery and infantry. On the 29th the Appomattox was also examined in reference to the facilities for bridging it. Surveys were daily being made of the different lines taken up, and reconnaissances
were extended over the adjacent country.
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Lirutenant Howell was temporarily, during the 28 th, 29th, and 30th, on duty
with the 6th corps, and Lieutenant Benyaurd, for the last few days of June,
whh the 9th Corps. Captain Gillespie was engaged also at this time with the
different corps in examining and rectifying their lines.
During the month of July the officers of engineers were principally occupied
in superintending the various operations of thP.ir profes·sion-such as the preparation of siege material, the construction of redoul>ts, batteries, parallels, and
boyaux, together with conducting the necessary surveys, and preparing complete plans and maps of the environs of the city and its approaches, incident to
offensive movements against the fortified position taken up by the enemy in
front of Petersburg. No regular siege was intended, as it would be impossible,
with the small army brought before it, to invest it completely ; the lineal contour is too great to attempt to cut off all communications with the town, or to
prevent re-enforcem~nts from being thrown into it. To take the place some
favorable position must be selected at which to assault the works, and burst
through and occupy the interior; and, to accomplish this, a preponderance of
metal must be brought to bear upon the immediate point of attack to silence the
enemy'.:; guns, and to open the way for an attacking column specially chosen
for the occasion.
On the 3d of July the major general commanding addressed a communication to the chief of artillery and chief engineer to know "whether any offensive
operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable." '.rhe commanding
general of the ninth corps had authorized Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, commanding the 48th regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, to drive a gallery for a
mine to blow up one of the enemy's batteries in his front; and the above officers
were also directed to examine the place and ascertain whether the assault could
be advantageously made, should the operation prove snccessful. 'rhe result of
their investigation is set forth in the following extract from the reply made on the
6th, in compliance with the instructions received by them: "The enemy's front
has been very much strengthened. It c.onsists of a system of redoubts conn.ected
by infantry parapett:. 'l'he ground in front is obstruc.ted by abatis, stakes,
and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable Regular approac.hes
must, therefore, Le resorted to. It is probable the siege will be a very long one,
inasmuch as, soon as one line of works is c.arried, another equally strong will be
found. behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained, whic.h looks
into the town." The front of attack decided upon was a sa1ient of the enemy's
line on or near the Jerusalem plank road. On the 9th of ,July orders were issued by the commanding general that "the operations of this army against the
intrenched position of the enemy defending PeterHbnrg will he by regular approaches on the fronts opposed to General Burnside's and General \Van·en's
corps;" and on the following day a plan of conducting the siege was submitted.
On the llth the project, being in c.onformity with his views, was approved and
adopted, and it was ordered that the work be commenced at once.
Lieutenan t Lydecker, who reported late in June, took an active part in the
construction of the works refern:'d to. Captain Farquhar had c.harge of those in
front of the 18th corps. On learning the plan adopted, Colonel Michler directed
his principal assistant, l\fajor W eyss, to commence on the 9th a triangulation of
the front of Petersburg, and to take the immediate charge of the surveying
party; the work was extended from the south of the Jerusalem plank road as
far uorth as City Point. By this triangulation, performed under the fire of the
enemy's batteries and sharpshooters, the different spires and certain prominent
buildings iu Petersburg were accurately located; and, with a copy of the map of
that city and the Appomattox river prepared by the Coal:lt Survey, the two were
combined, and thereby an exact and connected map of the locality of our siege
operations was obtaiucd,covering the ground occupitd.by both armies. On the 9th
the troops of the 6th corps were ordered toW ashington city, then threatened by
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the rebels; on the following day Colonel Michler was directed to select a line
refused from the position occupied by the 6th corps, extending from the redoubt,
(now called Fort Prescott, then in course of construction,) on the Jerusalem
plank road, towards the Blackwater swamp. Lieutenant Lydecker accompanied Michler during the reconnoissance, and was subsequently directed to trace
the line, and place in position the troops ordered to hold it. The site for a new
redoubt was chosen between the Norfolk railroad and the swamp, and its construction placed under the direction of Captain Harwood, who had been relieved
from duty with the 9th corps the same dtly. On the 14th, orders were issued to have the old works of the enemy demolished; this had been his advanced position, and the first to be taken by assault; the redoubts and batteries,
in fact the whole intrenched line, had been well planned and constructed at a
much earlier period in view of the probability of a demonstration being made
against Petersburg; the site selected was a most commanding one, the natural ·
lay of the open fields in front forming a perfect glacis. Towards the close of the
month everything was in readiness to explode the mine which had been in course
of construction in front of the 9th corps. In company with Colonel Spaulding and Lieutenant Benyaurd, Colonel Michler had the great gratification of
l)enetrating the gallery and it's lateral branches, and of examining in detail its
construction, the mode of ventilation, and the arrangement of the chambers.
Lieut. Colonel Pleasants, who kindly offered to accompany the party and explain the nature of his labors, prepared a highly interesting report, giving a
succinct account of the manner of driving the gallery and its lateral branches ;
the nature of the soil encountered ; the construction and dimensions of the
chambers; the charging and tamping, with other interesting facts connected
with the history of the mine from its first inception to its completion. ':l"'he
main gallery was f.il0.8 feet, and ea,ch of the lateral galleries 37.5 feet; radius
of crater 25 feet. The work commenced June 25, and finished July 23.
The different engineering operations, which had been pushed forward night
and day, were fast progressing towards completion; the several batteries, constructed with the utmost care and in the highest order of professional skill, had
received their armaments of guns and mortars, and only waited the moment
to play a conspicuous part in whatever steps might be taken, either offensive or
defensive. On the 26th the 2d corps received marching· orders, and crossed the
Appomattox and James to Deep Bottom to co-operate with the army ·of the
James; Lieutenant Howell was directed to accompany the movement, and
remained with the command until it returned on the night of the 29th to par·
ticipate in the arrangements f(n··the grand assault upon the enemy's work. Instructions were issued on that day, by the commanding general, for the guidance of all in the contemplated attack; and, in accordance with these, engineer
officers were assigned to duty with each corps.
On the morning of the 30th the mine was exploded, although not at the appointed hour. ':l"'he result proved it a decided success ; for in its crater were
swallowed up several guns, a large number of men-an entire regiment-besides destroying a part of the enemy's line. The dimensions of the crater
proved to be two hundred feet long and fifty feet wide, the explosion charge
being eight thousand pounds. The grand assault w~ made, and. the attacking
column reached the enemy's line; it failed, though, to accomplish its purpose.
Orders were issued to discontinue operations during the day.
'.rhis report does not intend to furnish more than a general outline of the various duties performed by the different officers of the engineer corps who were
during the campaign connected with the army of the Potomac. As far as it has
been in Col. Michler's power he has endeavored to portray faithfully the extent of their labors; many omissions may have been made in enumerating· them,
but these may be rectified in a subsequent and more detailed account of that
most interesting period.
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Colonel :Michler states that he has not deemed it proper or right to dwell upon
the exact character of the duties performed by the senior engineer,l\1ajor ,James
C. Duane, only casually having mentioned them in a few cases where they accompanied each other on different reconnaissances. He hopes that Major Duane's
health will soon permit him to prepare an accurate statement of the engineering
operations performed by him and under his direction. Until then he hopes
what has now been presented will prove acceptable. Believing it would afford Major Duane great pleasure, Col. Michler respectfully requests the favorable attention of the major general commanding to the important services rendered by the officers of both the regular and volunteer engineers. ~rhey
labored faithfully and earnestly to attend to the respective duties assigned
them, and, it is believed, with great credit and honor to themselves and to that
arm of the service to which they belong. It is hoped a proper acknowledgment will be made them for the active part taken by them during that most
trying period from the crossing of the Rapidan to the assault on Petersburg.( See plans Nos. 11 and 12.)
Upon the explosion of the mine and failure of the assault the troops engaged
were directed on the following day to resume their previous positions to a great
extent, some few chauges being ordered for the purpose of reducing their fronts
and establiRhing reaerves for ulterior movements. The plan of the siege by
regular approaches having been abandoned, Colonel Michler was directed at the
same time to "make such a dispoRition of the lines then occupied by the corps
as would enable them to be held by a diminished force," and therefore determined
to select an interior line, to consist of some few detached enclosed works, subsequently to be connected by lines of infantry parapets. The first line selected
was one lying on very commanding· ground, and extending from the present
Fort Sedgwick to the Rushmore Nome, immediately opposite Fort Clifton, one
of the enemy's works on the Appomattox, at the head of navigation for large
sea-going vessels, passing near the A very, Friends, Dunn, and Jordan houses ;
this being considered too far to the rear of the tben advanced position, and apparently yielding too much ground, for the poflsession of which such desperate
fighting bad taken place, he finally chose an intermediate one, and sites for
Forts Rice, Mickle, Morton, Haskell, Steadman, and McGilvery were selected,
and the intervening batteries and lines located. It had also been decided to
enlarge and strengthen the lunette, the site of which is now occupied by Fort
Sedgwick. By direction of Lieutenant General Grant the supervision of the
line in front of the 18th corps had also been placed under his direction.
':rhe construction of these different works was pushed rapidly forward by night,
under the immediate charge of Captains Gillespie and Harwood and Lieutenants Howell, Benyaurd, and Lydecker, as much so as the sparsity of officers,
the extreme heat of the weather, and the heavy and constant artillery fire of
the enemy would permit.
Several officers of the corps of eng·ineers, including Captains Mendell, Turnbull, and .Farquhar, had been ordered away from the army on other duty, and
some of the lieutenants were absent on sick leave. By the 20th of August the
works were so near completion as to be in readiness for the contemplated movement on the Petersburg and Weldon railroad. After the successful ad vance and
holding of that most important thoroughfare, he was directed to select positions
for large works on or near that road for the protection of the left flank of the
army, and also to connect them by a system of redoubts with Fort Sedgwick.
On the 26th of August, in connexion with the disposition of troops then made,
orders were given him to "proceed at once to the construction of the redoubts
proposed for the left of 1be line on theW eldon railroad, and of the works at the
Burnt Chimney and the Strong house," now designated Forts Dushane, Wads-worth, Howard, and Alex. Hays.
'l'be construction of these works and intermediate batteries, connected by infantry parapets, was immediately commenced, under the more immediate charge
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of Lieutenants Howell, Benyaurd, and Lydecker, and was afterwards turned
over to Captains Folwell and McDonnell, 50th New York volunteer engineers.
Owing to the bad condition of the roads during the late move, the commanding
general directed that a line should be selected for a military railroad from the
depot at City Point to the intersection of the Weldon railroad, at or near the
Yellow Tavern, for the more certain and rapid transportation of supplies. The
laying of this road was placed in charge of the construction corps of the chief
quartermaster of the armies operating against Richmond. The soil contains a
great quantity of sand, and at times becomes almost impa::;sable.
By the 7th of September the interior portions of the works last referred to
were well advanced, sufficiently so to be occupied in case of an attack by the
enemy, and obstructions, consisting of wire entanglements, abatis, fraises, and
slashing generally of the timber along the entire front, had been prepared. Many
miles of corduroy roads and bridges had been built by the 50th New York
volunteer engineers for the convenience of and more direct communication between the different corps of the army.
During the first few days of September be also selected sites for different
works, and traced a line from the bastion work (Fort Dushane,) on the W e>ldon railroad, to the rear of the camps of the armies operating against Petersburg, its left resting on the Blackwater swamp, near Fort Bross; these were
designed to guard against any movement of the enemy on the three large and
important thoroughfares, the Jerusalem plank, the Norfolk stage, and Halifax
roads·. The several redoubts then laid out and commenced were subseq ueutly
named Davison 7 McMahon, Stevenson, Blaisdell, and Kelly.
In his report for the week ending on the 17th of September he reported that
along every portion of the line, from the Appomattox river, below Petersburg,
to the Weldon railroad, and thence back to the Blackwater swamp, work was
progressing rapidly; the length of the line at that time was over sixteen miles, and
along it had been constructed, or were in course of construction nineteen forts
and redoubts, and forty-one batteries ; in addition to the labor on these works,
including the ob:-;tructions in their front, bomb-proofs, magazines, and drainage
in the interior, nearly two thousand yarcls of roads and one-third of the covered
ways had been "corduroyed," and six thousand seven hundred square feet of
substantial bridging built; ~he old intrenched lines were also being levelled.
These labors were continued during the following week, the officers and men of
the regular battalion of engineers, and of the 60th New York volunteer engineers,
having the construction of them. At the same time Lis attention, under instructions from the commanding general, was directed to the examination of
the country in reference to a defensive line from Blackwater swamp, near Prince
George Court House, north towards Old Court lwuse, or Bailey's creek, the
latter a deep impassable stream, emptyiug within a few miles of that point into
the James river.
'l'his line, in connexion with that already in course of constrnction, completed the chain of works from the Appomattox, below Petersburg, to the \ iVeldon railroad, and thence back to the James river, adding nine miles to its length,
making twenty-five miles in all, the flanks resting on the two rivers, and with
them entirely encircling the army of the Potomac. (See plan No. 12.)
The sites of five works were traced, and work commenced upon three of
them. At the same time he was directed to confer with Lieutenant Colonel
Benham, corps of engineers, (brigadier general volun te.ers,) in command of the
immediate defences of City Point, in regard to a short line extending from the
Court House on Bailey's creek, north towards the Appomattox, to cover and protect against any sudclen attack of cavalry the depot at that point.
On the 21st a circular from headquarters army of the Potomac directed that
"the armaments and garrisons de~ignatrd for the forts be reg·arded as permanent, to be moved only when specially directed."
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By the 26th the military railroad was completed, opened for travel, and
placed in charge of the provost marshal general of the army.
On the 28th, in company with the chief of artillery, he made a general inspection of the whole line, and found the work progressing most satisfactorily.
During the e"\ ening of the same day orders were issued for certain dispositions
and arrangements of the troops to be made, and that the whole army should be
in readiness to move before daylight on the following morning. The corps
commanders ·were directed to "hold in view the contingency of the withdrawal
of their troops from the rifle-pits connecting the enclosed work s, leaving the
line from the Appomattox to Fort Davison to be held by the redoubts and
enclosed batteries, and the further contingency of withdrawing entirely from
the intrenchments."
In consequence of this projected movement, instructions were immediately
given to the officers of engineers to ~us pend all operations on the different fieldworks in course of construction, and to !1old their commands and the pontoon
trains in n·adiness to obey fur ther iw;tructions.
'l'he active operations of the army were successfully advanced some few
miles to the left or west of the Weldon railro ad during the 29th and 30th of
September and 1st an:.1 2c1 of October, causing a corresponding exten:iion of
the l ines. On the morning of the latter, after the r C'pnlse of the enemy in his
fi11al attack, it having been determined to hold on to the posititm, lte was ordered
to select a new line to connect th e advanced point near the Pegram honse with
Fort Wadsworth, and locate the necessary intermediate works; the tracing, profiling and con:-truction ot' them W<IS immediately commenced.
Before daylight on the morn : n .~ of the 4th, by directirm of the comm:mding
general, he made a reeontJr Jif:lsance for the purpose of selecling a line 1o be refused from the left flank towards the rear, and to be connected with l!"""'~ort Dusha11e.
'l'he sites of sever,; lnew redoubts were established, the connecting liues traced,
and with large details their construction immediately commenced.
By tl1is extension to tlte west of the Weldon railroad, eleven additional enclosed works, Keene, Urmston, Cawakey, Fisher, Welch, Gregg, Cummings,
Sampson, Emory, Seibert <md Clark, and several batteries, were link(· d with the
already formidabl(~ cordott that ~urrounded the army. 'l'he length of this portion of the line is nParly seven miles, making a continuous stretch of twenty-three
rni:es of earth-work frum the right on the r\ ppcJmattox to the left on the Blackwater swamp. Adding to this the section from the latter to the James river,
the line measur1· s more than thirty-twn miles, comprising· thirty-six forts and
fifty batteries. In addition to these, there were eight other enclosed works
along the jnner line of the defence of City Point.
T'he incredibly short time in whieh those to the west of the J erusalem plankroad were built, surprisc-d the officers of our own army. T'he sites of the works
were oJJly sel( ctcd on the 2d and 'Hh of the month; still the weekly report of
the 8th states that they were already nearly completed.
To the officers of the corps of enginerrs then present, under his orders,
H:uwood. Gillespie, Howell, Benyanrd, Lydeckcr and Phillips, and to 1h' ;Se of
the 50th New York volunteer engineers, under the immediate command of Lieutenaut Colonel J. Spaulding, and to the men of their respective detachments,
mnRt be given the credit for the immense amount of work accomplished.
The works were well constructed and finished, and the infantry parapets are
as strong as\ hey could be made to answer a useful purpose. The artificial strength
of the line was to a g-reat extent increased by the naturally strong position chosen
to resist any attack or assault by the ~nemy.
Oll the 4th of the same month, notwithstanding the few officers of the corps that
remained on duty, he was compelled to send Lieutenant Phillips to report to
General Benham to assist in constructing tl1e line in front of City Point; the
latter was about three miles in length, compri;:;ing eight small redoubts.
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On the 12th, the commanding general directed Colonel Michler to make an
examination of that part of the line extending between Forts Hays and Fisher,
to ascertain whether said line could be shortened, and to furnish a written report
for Lieutenant General Grant's information. As no particular advantage could be
gained and a considerable amount of work would be required, he reported unfavorably.
The weekly report, dated October 22, informs the general-in-chief, "that
the wh ole line occupied Ly the army of the Potomac was entirely constructed aud
in a defensible condition; some minor details still required attention; additional
obstacles, palisades, and fraises in connexion with the abatis and wi re entanglements had been rapidly pushed forward every night to strengthen it" In consequence of reports that the enemy were drivi11g galleries at different puints to
undermine several works, he directed shafts to be sunk within them and listening galleries to be run out as precautionary measures, although no indications
were found to exist after a most careful personal examination.
On the 16th, accompanied by Captain Gillespie and Lieutenant Benyaurd,
he examined critically the ground between Fort McGilvery and a point opposite
Fort Clifton. to ascertain the strength fjf the enemy's position, and whether any
new works were in course of construction, as well as to decide upon the 'p ossibility
of forcing a passage of the river and severing his communication by rail with
Richmond.
On the 20th, by directiiln of the commanding general, he visited City Point
in company with the Medical Director of the army for the purpose of selecting
the ground for a general field hospital. Au advantageous place was found on
the bluff overlooking the James, between the railroad and Bailey's creek. Beside the convenience of locality, it possessed the advantage of retirement and
security, as well as that of health. Fine springs burst forth here and there from
the banks sufficient to supply every want.
'l'he names of the different works of the line to the west of the Weldon
railroad, and of that in front of City Point, were selected from among those of
the many distinguished officers who were killed in action during the recent campaigns, nobly fighting their country's battles,-and so given in plan No. 12.
On the morning of the 24th of October two new redoubts were ordered to be
thrown up at points he had previously selected-the one between the Norfolk
road and the A very hom;e, the other near the l!~riends' house-from both of
which positions command was had over the main line of works. These were
sufficiently far advanced for the movement ordered to commence on the afternoon of the 26th. The latter, in which the greater part of,t.he army participated,
continued through the 27th and 28th, extending west across Hatcher's run, and
reaching along and south of it as fur as the Boydton plank-road, where the
latter crosses the stream at Burgess's mill.
During the afternoon of the last day the different commands retllrnecl to their
old camps. The engineer troops were then engaged along the entire line, in repairing damages, adding obstructione, driving galleries, and in every conceivable
way rendering the line as strong as possible.
On the 7th of November he was directed by the major general commanding
the army of the Potomac "to furnish General Beuham, C'ommanding defences
of City Point, with the project of the line of intre1tchmcnts from Prince
George Cuurt House to Old Court House, and also to indicate what was necessary to be done to connect the right of that line with the rear intrenchments
resting on the Blackwater."
In consequence of a contemplated movement, he h 1d been compelled to
suspend work upon that section of the defensive line, and its construction was
sub~equently turned over to the above-named officer.
By the 12th of the same month, the lines being completed, both as regards
their external and internal arrangements, the following extract from Special
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Orders No. 306, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, of the same date, was
issued for the information of all concerned :
"The attention of corps commanders is called to the necessity of preserving
in good order the intrenchments front and rear, with the abatis, slashings and
other defences.
*
*
* * * * *
*
*
*
" The chief engineer officer will inspect the lines, both front and rear, from time
to t ime, and report to these headquarters any failure to keep the sarrie in good
order, or any destruction of the defences."
From this time forward the engineer troops were principally occupied dudng
the winter in attending to the needed repairs of the forts and batteries, in keeping in order the several corduroy roads, in overhauling and placing in good CO'ldition the pontoon trains, in constructing huts for winter quarters, and in building stabling for the large number of animals required for the transportation of
the tool and bridge trains.
'rhe temporary quiet of the army was again interrupted for several days. On
the 6th of December, by direction of the cOIHmanding general, an engineer officer, with a battalion of engineer troops and one hundred and fifty feet of canvas bridgi11g, was directed to accompany the 5th corps during the movement of
the latter south along the Weldon railroad, and subsequently all, both regular
and volunteer, were called upon to be under arms to take part in the same operation. Orders were issued at the same time that all camps located, as well as
huts, corrals, or other structures erected in the vicinity of the lines of defence,
either in front or rear, which, in the judgment of the engineer, interfered with
the proper defence of the works, should be immediately removed. Preparations
were also made to move, if necessary, all surplus property and the sick in hospitals to within the lines of City Point. Arrangemen ts in regard to the further
disposition of troops were directed in the event of a general move; those not
previously designated for holdin~ the intrenched lines to be formed into a movable column, under the immediate orders of the commanding officer of the
2d corps. All work not necessary for the defence of the position held by the
army was ::mspended. The movement had scn.rcely commenced when, in consequence of severe storms of rain, accompanied with sleet, the army >vas :finally
compelled to return to its old position, some considerable damage having been
effected along the line of the railroad.
Comparative quiet again reigned throughout the army, with the exception of
the att(~ mpt of the er1emy's iron-clads to come down the James river on the 24th
of January: 1865, until the 4th of February, when a movement of the cavalry
was ordered for the following day, to be supported by the 5th and 2d corps.
The cavalry successfully captured a ~mall train of the enemy on the Boydton
plank-road, and entered Dinwiddie Court House.
In consequence of the destruction of a bridge over Hatcher's run, the 5th
corps was detained for several hours in crossing, and the former, not being supported, fell back. A severe attack was made upon the 2d corps, but was
Iepulsed, and little more was effected on that day. On the following morning
(6th) the 5th corps was ordered to pass the stream at the crossing on the
Vaughan road and take up position to the left of the 2d, the cavalry protecting its flank.
Some :::evere :fighting took place during the day. Early on the same morning
he had been sent to select a line between Fort Sampson and Armstrong's mill,
and choose sites for works to hold and command the crossing at the latter place
and the one on the Vaughan road. On the 7th orders were issued to intrench
the line, but on the following day were so modified as to cause the line to be
run direct from Fort Sampson to the Vaughan road crossing. 'l'he length of
this addition to the intrenched line s nearly four miles, making the front line
from the Appomattox to Hatcher'::3 run :fifteen miles of continuous earthworks.
Heavy storms of rain and sleet again disturbed this movement.
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With the exception of the attack on Fort Steadman on the 26th of March, and
its temporary occupancy by the enemy, no event of importance occurred until
the inauguration of the campaign on the 28th of the same month. The distance from Battery No. 10, adjoining Fort Steadman, to the point of the enemy's
line, (Colquit's salient,) immediately opposite, is only six hundred and thirteen
feet between the main works, the shortel't distance between the two at
any point, excepting at E1liott's salient, (the locality of the mine.) The picketlines of the two armies were only four hundred and thirty-five feet apart, those
of the enemy only a few feet in front of his main works; one of the advanced
Union pickets was only separated two hundred and five feet from his opposite
neighbor, a narrow boyau leading to his pit from the main line. Without the
. exercise of the most un •iring vigilance on the part of the picket and the garrison, any sudden dash at the first early dawn <;f the morning might prove momentarily successful; but a position so well flauked by adjacent batteries, and
commanded by others in its rear, proved so untenable as to cause the enemy to
be most severely punished for his temerity, and to compel him to relinquish the
object of an attack for which no reasonable explanation can be made.
Before proceeding further, he calls attention to the topographical department
of the army of the Potomac.
Owing to the limited degree of information which could be obtained, either
from published maps or inquiries made of the inhabitants-the lat ter generally
being averse and in most cases unable from ignorance to impart it, even in relation to the particular localities in which they lived-his assistants had a laborious although an interesting duty. r:I'hey have not only been constantly engaged
in following up every movem~nt, and in most cases acting as guides to the different columns of troops, thereby obtaining a most reliable kn11wledge of the
country by actual experience, but have 1ern compelled to anticipate the geographical wants of a large army ever in motion by constant and careful re
searches.
In order to be able to furnish the necessary data upon which to base .the different military combinations, and thereby being made responsible to a great extent for the information upon which the commanding general was able to hypothecate a reasonable degree of success in the execution of his plans, the
department had necessarily to be ever active and always exact.
The engineer bureau has been furnished from time to time with the many
maps supplied the officers of armies operating against Richmond and Petersburg, including those of the campaigns from the Rapidan to the Appomattox;
that of the carefully surveyed plan of the lines occupied during the siege of
Petersburg; the several sheets representing the country adjacent to the latter
city, and alt-o about Richmond, compri8ing the several lines of the enemy for
the de!'ence of the capital; and also copies of those prepared in anticipation,
and upon which were based the movements which terminated so successfully
and glorionsly the last grand campaign of April, 1865.
On the 27th of March certain movements of the several corps of the army of
the Potomac were ordered to eommence at an early honr of the ~9th. On the
28th the instructions of the previous day were somewhat modified, but at the
appointed time the several columns were in motion.
A pontoon train accompanied the .§th corps to enable it to cross Hatclwr's
TUn, and subsequently remained there for the passage of the general trains.
The 2d corps, which had been replaced by a portion of the 24th along
the intrenched line heretofore occupied by it, crossed by the bridge on the
Vaughan road. The cavalry passed over by a bridge still further down, at
Malone's crossing, and moved towards Dinwiddie Court House.
In gaining their position but little opposition was encountered; one division
of the lith had a spirited engagement on the Quaker road, and handsomely repulsed the enemy.
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On the 30th, the 2d and 5th corps advanced their lines to beyond the junction
of the Quaker and Boydton plank road, driving the enemy into his main
works; the two lines were within easy artillery range; the right of the 2d
now rested on Hatcher's run, near the Crow house; a division of the 24th
corps crossed the rnn and connected the right of the 2d with the t ete de pont
on the Vaughan road; both lines were intrenched.
During the night previous and throughout the whole of this day the rain
poured down in torrents. The roads bad become impassable for wagons and artillery and the engineer troops were engaged in corduroying them and in rebuilding bridges over Hatcher's and Gravelly runs.
'rhe w.a gon-train stuck fast in the mud. The cavalry had to be sent back by
divisions to the terminus of the military railroad to replenish their supplies of
rations, the wagons not being able to come up to them.
Dming the night of the 30th the 2d corps extended its front to the left,
along the Boydton plank road, resting its flank on Gravelly run. On the morning of the following day an un successful effort was made by the !5th corps to
drive th e enemy from the "'.,.bite O o~ k road; subsequently, upon being re-enforced,
the attack was renewed, and possession gained of that road.
~l_1owards evening the cavalry had repulsed and held in check, in fi·ont of
Dinwiddie Court House, a superior force of the enemy. Dnring the night of that
day, the 31st, the 5th corps was se nt to the assistance of the cavalry. From
the commencement of the movement he had accompanied the commanding
general over different parts of the field, in readiness to execute such instructions
as might be given, and on the 1st of April, by his direction, rode along and inspected the lin es from Hatcher'~:< run toward the west. The evening of that day
witn essed a most brilliant engagement on the left, in which both the cavalry and
the 5th corps participated, the enemy along that immediate front l1aving been
completely routed.
'l'his gloriot1s news was communicated throughout th e army, and ord ers were
issued that a simultaneous attack should be made at different points along tl1e
entire length if tlzc intrenched line at four o'clock on the following morning.
'l'ho grand assault of the 2d of April was mad e, and the exterior line of the
enemy's works penetrated and possession gained of the larger portion of them.
The enemy having been pie1ccd at his centre and divided, one portion was
driven within an interior line of works immediately encircling the city, and the
other moved off from the White Oak along the Claiborne road, n1pidly pur8ued
by a division of the 2d corps. The line of the army extended at noon of
that day from the Appomattox, above Petersburg, to the Appomattox below, the
two flanks resting on the river.
Colonel :Michler was at that time ordered to rectify this line if necessary, and
later in the day io select a site for a pontoon bridge across the river, and positions for batteries to command the crossing and protect passage of the army in
the event of the retreat of the enemy.
.
Ear1y ou the morning of the 3d it was ascertained that the enemy l•ad evacuated the city of Petersburg, and orders of march were immediately is13ued to
the different corps to follow in pursuit. The roads were found in wretched condition, and a great deal of corduroying and bridging had to be done. About noon
on the 5th he was ordered to proceed in advance of the 2d and 6th corps to
report to General Sheridan, who had arrived with the cavalry and 5th corps
at Jetersville on the previous evening, to consult with him in regard to the
position to be taken by the army in auticipation of an expected attclck by the
enemy, it being reported that his whole force was concentrating at Amelia Court
House. Hi8 line of retreat towards Danville had been cnt off, and it was presumed he would venture a heavy battle to regain i_t. In company with the
general he rode over the line, and by the direction of the general the troops
were posted as they arrived; a part of the line of battle bad been pn:viously
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intrrnched, and work was commenced on other portions; the anticipated fight,
however, did not take place.
On the follow ing day (6th) the army of the Potomac was put in motion in
three parallel columns towards Amelia Court House to attack the enemy, but the
cavalry having early ascertained that he was endeavoring to escape by Decatursville towards Farmville, the direction of the line of march was immediately
changed; the ?.d moved directly on the former place, and in a short time
came upon and commenced a brisk skirmish with the retreating force, and continued to drive him until night closed the operation; the 5th corps was shifted
to the right flank and took the road to Pineville.
Colonel Michler was directed to report the change of movement and explain its
object to the commanding officer of the 6th coq..ls. His column was countermarched and thrown from the right to the left flank. After retracing its i'teps
through Jetersville, and passing some two miles beyond the village, it left the
main turnpike and followed a road which he had found leading towards the
northwest, and by which the troops moving along it were absolutely certain of
striking the flank of the retreating arn~y. '.rhe entire cavalry force was operating on the same flank.
By night the battle of Sailor's creek was fought, which will long be remembered as one of the most brilliant and successful affairs of the war. It was, in
fact, the last desperate engagement between these two armies.
On the 7th of April the pursuit was continued. The enemy having succeeded
in cros::;ing the Appomattox at ],annville and High Bridge, he succeeded in
destroying all the bridges at the former place, but failed in his efforts to damage
the common road bridge at the latter crossing; three spans of the railroad
bridge (Ricl1mond and Danville road) were burnt; this structure is two thousand
four hundred feet long and one hundred and twenty-five feet high. The enemy
made some slight resistance at both these places and also on the Lynchburg
]:Jlank road, at a point about four miles beyond Farmville.
'I'he naturally very strong position at high bridge was rendered additionally
so by several redoubts which had been built there some time previous, for the
protection of the bridge against cavalry raids.
On the 8th the 2d and 6th corps followed along the stage-road to Lynchburg, whilst the 5th, 24th and cavalry corps ]:JurSnP.d; the one by Hampton
Sydney CollPge and Prospect Stations towards Appomattox Court House.
During the day he returned to Farmville to hasten the construction of some
additional pontoon bridges, and rejoined the major general commanding on the
main road. On the previous evening Lieutenant General Grant had demanded
the surrender of General Lee, to avoid the further effusion of blood. No skirmishing had taken place during the day, although the one army was close on the
rear of the other.
About noon on the 9th, in consequence of the negotiations in regard to the
surrender which were pending and exchanged under flags of truce between the
generals commanding the respective armies, the advance of the army of the
Potomac, still engaged in pursuit, when within three miles of Appomattox
Court House was ordered to halt and await the issue of the proceedings. The
othtr column had, by rapid marching, succeeded in passing around and confronting the htad of that of the enemy at the latter place.
The few hours of anxious sut'~pense were happily compensated by the glorious tidings which were soon proclaimed throughout the army, announcing "the
surrender of the army of northern Virginia."
On the following day the army commenced a retrograde movement towards
Burke's St~tion, where it remained in camp until ordered to take up its final
march towards Washington, D. C.
On the 14th of April Colonel Michler was detached from the staff of the
commanding general of the army of the Potomac, and directed, in conformity
with instructions from Lieutenant General Grant, to proceed to Petensburg, in
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order to examine and direct military surveys of the respective intrenched positions held by the two opposing armies dming the siege, and prepare plans of
the same, combined with a detailed and accurate topographical map of the
adjacent country; also to assume charge of the :mrveys of the different battlefields and lines of operations from the James river to Appomattox Court
House.
By the 30th of June, the termination of the fiscal year for which this report
is called, the field-work had been far advanced, but in consequence of the n ecessity of continuing during favorable weather the survey of the several hundred
square miles through which it extends, little or no office duty was accomplishedonly sufficient drawing to answer necessary purposes at the time ; and com~e
quently the maps at that time were not sufficiently far advanced, and could n')t
exhibit the large amount and the nature of the work accomplished.

Narrative colla'edfrom repm·ts qf .~.l!Jojor lYiendell.
PONTOON TRAI:\'S.

The companies of the United States engineer batallion with the army of the
Potomac were under the immediate command of Major Mendell, of the corps of
engineers, with Captain rrurnbull, Lieutenants Mackenzie, Benyaurd, Howell,
Cuyler and Heap, whose services, with the men under their command, are given
in Major Michler's reports.
The pontoon trains for service in the field, and to accompany the several army
corps, were under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Spaulding, of the .50th
New York volunteers. The services rendered by this branch of the engineer
department were indispensable to the success of the army. Without these
transportable bridges, the armies could not have moved through a country intersected with numerous rivers, wide and deep, and oftentimes with rapid currents, as well as ebb and flood tides. The material of this branch of our service
is modelled from the French wooden trains and the Russian canvas trains.
'l'hefle trains, particularly that with light canvas boats, have, during thi::; war,
for the first time been proved advantageous and efficient and adapted to our
country. They have been very generally used by the armies in the west aud
south, as well as the armies in the east. 'rhe officers having charge of these
trains and their constructjon have devised and adopted many useful modifications in·the details. Lieutenant Colonel Spaulding has added much to the~:e
modified improvements. The accompanying tabular statement from his report
will exemplify the use and value of this indispensable branch of the engineer
service.
Dates.
1864.

No . L ' gth
of
iu Kind of bridge,
o'dg feet.

Location.

River.

Officer in comm and of
trains.

----- -- ----l---------1-----------------l-------------r--------------April 29..
May 4....
Do .....
Do .....
Do .....
Do .....
:May 7....
:May 10...

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

Do ..... 9
Do..... JO
!llay 18 ... 11

Canvas ...... K elly's ford . ... . ........ R Hppabannock ..
.... do . . .... . . Ely'M ford ............ . . . Rapidan ........ .
Wooden •........ . . do---········ - -···· ... . do ......... .
... . do ........ Germania ford . . . . .......... do .......... .
Canvas ...... . ... .. do·-·-------······ · ... . do ......... ..
Wooden ..... Culpepper' Mford ............. do ......... ..
.... do ........ Ely 's ford .... . ......... . ... do ........ . ..
.... do. . . . . . . . Fredericksb'g lower cross·
in g. _.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rappahannock . .
50 Canvas.... .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . . . .. .. . . . Po . . .. .. . .. . . . . .
50 .... do ........................... .. ..... Po..............
440 Wooden ..... , Fredericksb'rg Lacy house R a ppahannock . .

180
150
190
220
2:20
lfiO
190
420

Captain Folwell.
Do .
Maj or Bra inerd.
Captain McDonald.
Captain Van Brocklin.
Captain Palmer.
Captain McDonald.
Major Brainerd.
Captain VanBrocklin.
Do.
Major Beers.
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No.I

L'g-ht
of 1 in Kindofbridge.
b'dgj feet.

------l\fay23 ... --12
lVlay24 ... 13
Do . .... 14
May25 ... 15
Do. . . . . Hi
ll'laJ'~6 ... 17
Do ...•. 1~
Do ..... 19
May !27... 20

1\1~ 28::: ~~
0

Do .....
Do .....
Do .....
Junel. ..
June3 ....
Jnne5 ....
Junel2 ...
Do .....
Jnnel3 ...
Do.....
Do .....
Do .....
Ju!lel4.

Location.

I

River.

Officer iu command of
trainH,

~

160 Canv~s ...... Jerichomills ............. North Anna ..... CaptainVanBrocklin.
100 .... do ........ Railway bridge .............. do ........... Captain~'olwell.
100 .... do .............. do ..................... do...........
Do.
100 .... d.o........ Aboverailroad.bridge ........ do ...........
Do.
8ll * \Vooden.... Quarles's millH .............. do . . . . . . . . . . . Majllr Beers.
160 .... do ......•. J~T\.~\\om\\\'i\ ................. do ........... \
Do.
1.\\!J .... O.o ........ 1'>e\ow Tai.\roau 'Qy\1\~;e ........ do . . . . . . . . . . . Ca\)tain li'I.~Donald.
100 .... do ........ Aboverailroadbridge .... \ .... do ...........
Do.
J ~0 Canvas...... Hanover 'l'own ......... ·1Pamunkey . . . . . . ~apta~n Van Brocklin:

i~~ ·::§~~: ::::::: -~j 1:;:~eis~-~·~::::::::::::~::::~~ :::::·.::::: Ca)5~~nFolwell.

23
24
25
21i
27
28
29
:30
31
3'2
33
34
35

140
180
180
188
160
150
60
60
40
60
40
240

,June 19... 36
Juue 23 ... :37

100
60

JOO

_:o·~--~38 16,4:~

Wooden ........... do ..................... do ...........
.... do ........ Hanover Town .............. do . . . .. . . . . . .
.... do ........ Dunkirk ................ 1\Iattapony ......
Canvas ............ do ..................... do . ..........
.... do ........ New Castle ferry ........ Pamunkey ......
. ... do .............. do ..................... do ...........
II Wootlen .... Long bridge ............. Chickahominy ...
t .. do .............. do ..................... do...........
~Canvas ..... Jon es'sbridge ................ do ...........
** .. do ............. do ..................... do...........
~§Wooden ......... do ..................... do ...........
~ .. do ............. do ..................... do...........
vVootlen and
Canvas .... Cole's ferry ................. do ...........
Canvas...... Dunkirk ............. ·j Mattapony . . . . . .
.... do ........ Jones's bridge ............ Chickahominy...
.... do .............. do .................

* Be:;iclr.s pontoon, 220 feet of cribbing. ~Or llirs. Huntley's.
brctnch. ** South branch. §§ 1\fuin channel. ~South branch.

l.... do

...........

II Main

channel.

1\fajorBeers.
Captain VanBrocklin.
Captain Per;onius.
Capt.tin VanBrocklin.
Do.
Captain Folwell.
Major Ford.
Do.
Lir.tHenantFolwell.
Do.
Capt<JinPalmer.
Do.
Lt. Col. Spanlding.
Captain ~'olwell.
Do.
__
D_o_. - - - - - - - - --

t South branch.

t Main

From the above statement, it appears that the total numb t·r of pontoon bridges
built was thirty-eight, and their aggregate length six thousand four hundred
and fifty-ei~ht (6,458) feet.
During the whole time covered by this report he believes the pontoon trains
have been promptly on time when ordered, the bridges rapidly and skilfully
built, :ud all other engineering operations of the command faithfully performed.
Whatever credit may be awarded to this i::; mainly due to the energy and
skill of the officers iu immediate charg·e of the several works, and to the zealous and faithful co-operation of the men under their command.
}.7an·ative from tlu: repoTt C?f Lieutenant P. S. JJ!Jicltie, corps if engineer,s,
brevet bri,.gadier general rif volunteeTs, to General Delafield, Cltir:f Engineer,
United S, a 'es Arm1J, dated 1 Otlz, Octobe1·, 1865.

(See plans Nos. 11 and 12.) ':rhe army of the James, consisting of the
lOth and 18th army corps, (and subsequently of the 24th aud 25th,) commanded by l\Iajor General B. F. Butler, occupied a defensive position across
the peninsula of Bermuda Hundred on a line six thnueand and fifty-eight yards
long, its right resting on the James river about one mile below the Howlett
house, and its left on the Appomattox river, on the high ground across the
creek, from and on the high ground overlooking Port vV althall.
r:rhis defenf'ive line, from its position, was unusually strong. vVith its flanks
resting on and protected by two rivers, and its front of attack being diminished
to abont one-fourth of its length, because of impassable ravines, it was capable
of being held by a much infm·ior force than the enemy ·were required to keep
in its front. • Bnt it had also its disadvantages; for the enemy intrenched on
a line a11proaching not nearer than eight lmndred yards, with flanks as secure
as ours, and a front made unassailable by means of all the .obstacles known to
field defeuce, and thus effectually closed to our forces there every avenue to do
damage to the railroad and turnpike, which were the lines of communication to the
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wings of the rebel army and the avenues to their capital.
two lines is given below in the sketch.

The position of the

N

f

I
I

---!..

I

I

--- ... ,..:_

In addition to the line above described there was a strong work thrown up
on Spring Hill, on the south side of the Appomattox river, just opposite Point
60 w
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of Rocks, and also strong works at Wilson's wharf and Fort Powhattan, on the
James river, all of which were constructed and garrisoned by detachments
fr{!m this army.
rrhese latter commanded the channel of the river at very important points,
and on their occupation depended the uninterrupted supply of the "armies operating ngainst Richmond."•
Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel, United States volunteers, captain United
States engineers, was the senior engineer of this army until October, 1864, but
in consequence of his illness in August, the duties of his office devolved upon
General Michie.
July.-No engineering operations of any importance were carried on during
this month. Attention was principally directed to strengthening the lines
already laid out, in building water batteries for 100-pounder guns for the
defence of Trent's Reach, and in general repairs to the line. During this
month there was constant picket firing all along the front, constant surprises
on part of both forces of the picket lines, and attempts to gain ground towards
each other.
A signal tower one hundred and twenty feet high was built at Point of
Rocks, from the top of which could be seen the Richmond and Petersburg railroad and turnpike. This gave us the means of obtaining a great deal of information, and must have impressed the enemy with this idea, for they established
.a casemated battery of three vVhitworth rifled field guns for the special purpose of
firing at this tower. But one shot of all fired at it struck it, and that only
.splintered one of the posts without damaging the tower itself.
August.-On the 3d of August a pontoon bridge five hundred and sixty feet
long was built on the Appomattox river at Broadway landing, for the passage
of the 2d army corps.
A second signal tower one hundred and twenty-six feet high, and capable of
being made forty feet higher, was built on the right flank of the line, on the
high bluff known as "Crow Nest," James river, opposite Aikin's. From the top
-of this could be seen the Richmond and Petersburg turnpike, and the crossroads connecting the main roads which ran to Richmond on the north side of
the James river. A lookout constantly stationed here gave information of the
enemy's movements.
Major General Butler having conceived the idea of cutting a canal acroEs
the peninsula known as Dutch Gap, to pass iron-clads and other war vessels
through to avoid Trent's Reach and the Howlett battery, and the idea receiving
the warm support of the then commander of the navy in the river, a survey of
the locality was made by his direction.
From the sketch given below it will be seen that the river widens from four
hundred feet at the Howlett house to twenty-seven hundred at Trent's Reach.
As a consequence, at the latter place the channel becomes narrowe~ and shallower, and at ordinary high water vessels drawing twelve feet ten inches of
water can pass under favorable circumstances, but the channel was effectually
blocked by the powerful battery Dantzler at the Howlett house, which had a
plunging fire upon the whole channel from '!'rent's Reach up to within a few hundred yards of the Howlett house. 'l'his battery had also embrasures cut to look
np the river, to give a fire in rear in case any vessel was successful in passing the
heavy fire of its front.
.
The survey of Dutch Gap showed a centre section line five hundred and
twenty-two feet long, from a point in the channel on the south to a point in
the channel on the north, fifteen feet deep. 'l'he highest point on this centre
line was thirty-eight feet and five-tenths above high-water mark, and the lowest
four feet, wllicb was at tlw soutll moutl1. On a line sixty feet from tbis centre
liDf', on either side, the ground rose to forty-two and eight-tenths feet at tl1e
north mouth, and to eleven and four-tenths feet on the south. 'l'he difference
of water-level was ten and oue~tenth inches, taken at extreme low tide,
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river granite, which outcropped a mile above the lower mouth and a mile and a
half below, would be met with beneath the upper strata, and cause a complete
failure.
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The strata met with were as follows, viz: yellow Virginia brick clay for
twelve feet; layer of coarse sand and gravel two to four feet; half an inch to
two inches bog iron ore; layer of pebbles and large gravel two feet, then hard
blue clay, or hard pan, containing a large quantity of sulphuret of iron, or iron
pyrites. This latter stratum was never exhausted, and the bottom and sides of
the canal were chiselled out of this, presenting as smooth and compact a surface
as if built with masonry. In round numbers, there were about forty-eight thousand cubic yards to be excavated-the canal to be sixty feet wide at high
water, forty feet wide at bottom, and fifteen feet deep.
It is a question whether this project, one of the simplest in civil engineering,
would have been of any advantage other than to bring our navy a few miles
further up the river ; for after it was commenced, it was well known that other
and nearly as powerful batteries lined both banks of the James river, commanding almost impassable obstacles, and ready to do their share in disputing the
passage to the rebel capital. And besides, it was an ascertained fact that the
river was filled with torpedoes of the most delicate construction, most painful
evidence of which we had in the nestruction of three of our vessels in reaching
the position then occupied. If any advantage could have accrued to us from
this canal in a military point of view, it would be a maximum only by keeping
it a profound secret.
The excavation being ordered to proceed, ground was broken on the 9th August, and immediately thereafter the enemy began the constant annoyance with
their rifle and mortar batteries, which ended only with the suspension of labor
on the canal, January 1, 1865. 'l'here were thrown in the vicinity of the working parties over twenty thousand shells during the whole period of the work.
':rhe canal was excavated mainly by soldiers and partly by dredg·es. The latter
were old and almost worn out, and were worked by civilians, who did not come
up to their promises, being driven off and frightened by the enemy's shells. Not
more than six thousand to seven thousand cubic yards were removed by the
dredges, which were promised to remove four hundred cubic yards every ten
hours. They worked from the south mouth two hundred feet up into the canal,
where an embankment separated the part on which the soldiers were working
from the lower half.
The whole canal, exce\)t an embankment at tlle north mouth to l?rotect against
~\:rect nr1ng, was exca:vateU. to tb.e -req__uireU. d.\mens\ons. rrb.e so\l was ve-ry
favorable below b1gb-water mark. It was tbe "baril pan" of miners, a baril,
·stiff blue clay, perfectly impervious to, and insoluble in, water. Whatever leakage took place through the strata of sand and gravel was removed by a steam
pump.
About the middle of December the mines which had been made in the embankment were nearly completed. This embankment was much larger than
was intended to be blown out with powder, for it had been General Michie's endeavor to reduce it far below what would have been almost certain to be removed, but during his absence the water had been let into the excavated part
and up to the embankment without orders. It would have required a greater
amoaut of labor and length of time to remove it than we were warranted to use
at this period.
It remained then only to do the best to blow out the mass between the water
in the river and that in the canal; and the "'Problem became to use an amount of
\)OWder large enough to remove the embankment and disturb its foundation so
that it would be easy to remove afterwards, and at the same time not so much
as to disturb and cave down the walls of the canal in the vicinity. 'l'welve
thollt~and pounds of powder were divided among five mines-one of four thousand and four of two thousand each-distributed as follows : Three mines were
placed at a depth of fifteen fe~t below high water, one of four thousand being
on the centre line of the canal and thirty-five feet from the face of the embank-
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ment, and two of two thousand each were placed on the same level, ten feet on
each side of the centre line and twenty-five feet from the face. 'rwo remaining
were at a depth of twenty-five feet below high-water mark, or ten feet lower
than the three first, and twenty feet further out than the central mine, towards
the channel on the north side.
'l,owards the time of charging and tamping the mines the water leaked in very
rapidly, and the pumps were kept going night and day. The powder in the
four smaller mines was in tin cans holding one hundred and twenty-five pounds
each. In the larger mine the powder was in four large rubber bags holding
eight hundred pounds, all opening into a water-tight box which contained eight
hundred pounds, and in the centre of which was the point of fusion of this
mine.
The method of exploding the mines was by means of the Gomez fuze, a quick
burning composition said to be instantaneous for distances under 100 feet. This
method proved defective, and the results showed conclusively that all of the
powder did not burn, and will not when ignited in the centre of large mines.
The effect would, in General Michie's opinion, have been several times gTeater
if centres of fusion could have been made for every hundred pounds of powder,
which can be done now with an electric apparatus.
In the method used, in the centre of each charge was placed the end of a length
of Gomez fuze, cut at different points to allow the flame to ignite the powder in
several places. This fuze was then grafted to an equal length in the same level
running to the other mine. The three 1p.ines in the upper level were joined in
the same way, and finally the two lines were grafted together and joined to the
end of a piece of slow-match, cut to burn twenty minutes. The grafts had been
tried repeatedly before being finally determined on, and had always been successful.
On exploding the mine the embankment was thrown down and a current
commenced running through the canal. Excavation by means of discharging
cans of powder under water deepened and widened the channel, aided by strong
freshets, so that at high water six and a half feet of water is on the embankment. General Butler having been relieved from the department about this
time, work was discontinued by order.
The canal at present is used by the steamer 0. S. Pierce and others of
that class, which save by this way about five and a half mi.les of travel. A few
days' work to clear up the disturbed mass and to widen and deepen the north
mouth would make this the usual travelled route by all vessels navigating the
river. The current and tide partly flow through this way, but their action is
unimportant in clearing it out, because the debris consists of large lumps of cemented gravel and hard blue clay. The above embraces all the data of interest
in this much-talked-of project, and is given complete to avoid referring to it in
the account of each months' labor.
September.-During this month a line of works was built, and a post established at Harrison's landing. The defensive works consisted of a redoubt of
four embrasures, with a stockaded gorge commanded by the gunboats in the
river, and infantry breastworks running from the flanks to the river. The
length of the whole line is fourteen hundred and twelve yards. A canvas pon
toon bridge of twenty-three boats was built on the Appomattox river September 19.
The pontoniers who built it, having no experience with these boats, were twelve
minutes in building the first, and three minutes in building the last, the average
time being seven and a half minutes for each b0at. Owing to the river being
affected by the tide, the claw balks had to be lashed to the saddle piece, or
they would slip up or down, according as the tide was ebb or flow. Often this
bridge had to be covered with manure to deaden the sound of travel, when
troops crossed. In these cases, the dust of the manure falling in the canvas
boats would rot the threads of the cam,.a.:;, and cause more or less leakage. It
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was noticed that some of the canvas coverings would leak as much as six inches
of water at night and none the following day. Teams heavily loaded would
often sink these boats to within four inches of the gunwale. These were among
the most prominent things noticed in the use of these boats in a permanent
bridge, a use, however, for which they were never intended.
During the night of September 28, a pontoon bridge, thirteen hundred and
twenty feet long, was built on the James river at Aikin's landing. With one
hundred pontoniers the bridge was finished in six and a half hours, so quietly
as not to disturb the enemy's pickets on the opposite side of the river.
'rhe army began to cross at 3 a. m. September 29, in two columns, one on the
bridge above spoken of, and the other on the bridge at Deep Bottom. A successful advance was made; Fort Harrison, the key point of the outer line of
Richmond defence carried by assault, and the line of works extending to the
Darby-town road occupied by our army. It having been determined to remain
in the position thus carried, the rebel works from Fort Harrison to the New
Market road were occupied by our troops and their front turned during the night
and following day. Shortly afterward:; a line was thrown up, with batteries at
appropriate intervals, extending from our left flank at Fort Harrison to the James
river, where it rested on a large work at a point a little above Cox's landing.
This work, called ],ort Brady, was on the site on which the rebels had commenced the erection of a powerful rifled battery, to command the mouth of the
canal. We armed the work with three one-hundred-pounder Parrott guns, and
several four-and-a-half-inch Rodman rifles, constructed a large bomb-proof for
the protection of the garrison, and surrounded it by strong lines of abatis. The
line from this work to Fort Harrison afforded a secure defence in case of a flank
attack on the left, as it subjected the attacking party to a chance of being defeated, cut off and captured, or driven into the river, after leaving their own
lines.
Octuber.-Efforts were early made to strengthen the right flank by a strong
line and redoubts, but the work was stopped by order from the then commander of the lOth army corps. A strong attack on this flank was made by the
enemy in force on the 7th of October, which the cavalry who guarded this flank
were unable to wilhstand, and which at one time threatened to be very disastrous to this army.
Terry's division of this corps, with the artillery under Jackson, checked and
finally drove back the enemy, and then the work of securing the flank was
pushed rapidly along.
About four hundred yards east of the New Market road a strong redoubt fifty
yards square was built, and formed a salient from which the whole country
within six hundred yards was commanded, and from its right flank an infantry
parapet of strong profile, well protected from assault by abatis, ran towards the
New 1\Iarket road, where it rested, about the vicinity of the Four-mile church.
From this point to near the mouth of Four-mile creek strong isolated redoubts
were built and manned with troops and artillery, so placed as to mutually support each other. Along New Market heights the most salient points were taken
and occupied by strong closed works, and in their fi-ont, for one thousand and
fifteen hundred yards, the woods were "slashed," thus making a continuous
abatis in their front to the limit of the range of their artillery; works were also
placed to flank the valleys and sides of these hills.
As there was some possibility of moving the greater part of this army to a
new field of operations, leaving but a small foTce behind, a line of interior works,
some three thousand four hundred yards long, was built but for such a contingency. The right rested on FouT-mile creek, and the left on the marsh below
Aiken's landing. 'rhe details of construction were the same as generally belong t.o field defences. the stronger batteries being placed so as to command the
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most important roads or the most probable points from which an attack would
be made, with infantry parapets four to six feet thick on top joining them.
In front were ditches from eight to twelve feet wide and six feet deep, and in
advance of these a line of good abatis. This line was well indicated, the batteries
completed and infantry parapet two-thirds fiRished, the remaining work to be
done after the troops occupied the line. Often the greatest difficulty has been
in getting an army to take up a proper and exact line of defence at first, each
regiment, company, and man digg;ing where they find their spades, without
reference to the fitness of things, indicating the necessity of more engineer officers.
As detached works to this line, it was intended to hold those on New Market
heights and Camp Holly, which would have given us the command of New Market,
Kingsland, and Darbytown roads. r_rhe necessity for this line never occurring,
it was never occupied by troops.
After the occupation of Fort Harrison and the rebel captured lines, the enemy beg.m the construction of a new line of d jJ fence joining their water batteries on the r ;ver at Chaffin's farm with Fort Gilmer, and running thence easterly to join on to that portion of the captured line which we could not occupy
at the Charles City road, and so on to new bridge on the Chickahominy.
rrhe line that our forces occupied was made as strong as possible, and possessed
the advantage of having but a short part exposed to an attaek of the enemy,
which part was strongly manned and guarded.
On the 27th a movement was made on the Darbytown and Williamsburg
roads with no other result than to keep the enemy from sending re-enforcements
to the right of their army at Petersburg, which was then being attacked by the
army of the Potomac. During this movement General Weitzel's troops fought
on the same ground, in advanee of Seven Pines, on which the army of the Potomac fought in 1862.
November.-Details of both engineers and infantry were constantly employed
during this month in repairing the works of defence, and perfecting and completing those alluded to. During this season the roads used by the supply
trains from the wharves and bridges became much cut up, and corduroying was
commenced. vVharves for the quartermaster. ordnance, commissary, and medical departments were built at suitable places on the river. l!..,requent rumors
arriving at Fort Harrison that the enemy were mining the work, in ordcn· to allay
the fears of the garrison well-holes were dug on the glacis to serve for listening
galleries. As the nearest approach of the rebel works was eight hundred yards,
and a valley twenty feet deep had to be crossed before reaching the work, but
little attention was paid to these rumors.
While attention was paid to the defensive operations, we also found time to
collect, repair, and put in working order three saw-mills, which were located in
a splendid forest in the Bermuda woods. By these mills from seven thousand
to ten thousand feet of lumber were sawed per day, the greater portion of which
was used in the construction of a permanent hospital at Point of Rocks. Sufficient was obtained, however, to stock the engineer depot, build platforms and
magazines in all the batteries, wharves and bridges on the river.
Below is a report of the engineer force of the army, and how employed,.
which may be taken as a fair standard of each day's detail during the period of
quiet:
2 officers, 80 men, building redoubts and corduroying roads; 2 officers,
66 men, repairing 1Oth army corps front; 2 officers, 90 men, repairing 18th
army corps front; 1 officer, 30 men, bomb-proof to dredge Dutch Gap and Fort
Brady; 1 officer, fifty men, corduroying roads ; 2 officers, 30 men, engineer depot.3 at Bermuda and Fortress lVIonroe; 2 officers, 143 men, various small details, &c.-l2 officers, 489 men, 1st New York volunteer engineers. 4 officers,
105 men, on duty at saw-mills, building wharf, pontoon bridges, repairing·
wagons, &c.
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December.-This month's labor was a continuation of the last, and the principal roads of supply were ready for winter use quite early in the month.
Whatever damages had been done to the defences were repaired. Timber for a
permanent pile bridge was prepared in the woods, which bridge was to be built
in January. A detachment of engineer troops accompanied the expeditionary
force to Fort Fisher.
January.-As the enemy frequently opened a heavy mortar fire from in front
of his works opposite Fort Harrison, and as the artillery men were unable to
stand to their guns during its continuance, it was deemed advisable to make
protection to the guns on the front of }"ort Harrison. r.rhe mortars used by
the enemy were Coehorns, placed outside of their works, and behind the line
of picket reserves, pr~tected in their front by a strong line of abatis. It was
designed to bomb-proof the whole front of the work, and put in casemates
enough, constructed somewhat on the Hoxo plan, for the guns on the front.
There was a banquette for infantry on top, reached by broad, wide stairs in
rear, which gave the infantry good cover, and enabled them to see perfectly
every point in advance. The ditch was deepened and widened, and a fraise
placed in the scarp to prevent scaling. But four of these casemates were constructed, and two bomb-proofs, a sketch of which is shown on opposite page.
There were also three strong lines of abatis and wire entanglement placed
in front of the ditch, making the whole work quite formidable and easy to hold.
In order to save sandbags, which at this time became very expensive, Lieutenant King, engineer corps, designed some loop-holes for riflemen, and for use
in the picket lines, which proved admirably well adapted for their purpose, and
being prepared at slight cost at the saw-mills, were used on all the works and
rifle-pits. They were constructed of boards, and of the form shown in the diagram. They presented a smaller target for the enemy's sharpshooters, and at
the same time gave a large field of fire. rrhey were not easily discernible at
any distance, and could easily be removed and replaced.
NoTE.-The rebel device for the sa.me purpose consisted in placing logs of
various lengths, ten to fourteen inches in diameter, hewn on two sides, with
notches cut in the lower side once in about six feet, along the interior crest of
the parapet, and banking these logs in front with earth. The notches which
formed the loop-holes were tapering towards the outside, similar to our own, and
where there was much sharpshooting the orifice was still further reduced by a
})late of thin boiler iron, eight or ten inches square, with a hole in th e centre
but little larger than the barrel of a musket. These plates were spiked to the
front side of the logs, (covering the notches,) and in some cases were found with .
fifteen to twenty bullet marks upon them, many of which were so near th e
edge of the opening that the bullets probably went through, and it is quite
likely that all the bullets that struck the plate would have struck the man in
the rear of it had ordinary sandbag loop-holes been used.
The engineer may at times find this expedient worthy his attention, observing that the logs near the crest of the parapet are not suitable where artillery
can be used against them.
r.rhe permanent pile bridge was finished after a little more than two weeks'
labor, being thirteen hundred and sixty-eight feet long. It became necessary
as a substitute for the pontoon bridge, owing to the great freshets in the river,
the floating ice and the drift-wood that came down the river at this time. It
was a pile bridge, each pier consisting of three piles driven firmly into the bed
.of the river and connected by a cap piece, and the piers joined by strong pieces
to form bays each fifteen feet wide. An inclined log was attached to each pier
to ward off drift and ice. This was securely attached to a pile driven a short
distance above and in the prolongation of the pier, which pile was nearly sawed
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off. When driven by the pile-drivers sufficiently it was broken off, and the end
of the inclined pile thus anchored to the bottom; the other was spiked to the
:pier, as shown in the sketch below.

The river deepens to sixteen feet about one thousand feet from the north
shore, and then to thirty feet for a distance of nearly one hundred and eighty
feet, and then decreases rapidly to the shore-line. At the channel a draw of
pontoon boats was made one hundred and eighty feet wide. The lumber which
was used in the construction of this bridge was obtained from the engineer
depot saw-mills.
February-There were additional river batteries on the south side of the
James, constructed and armed with 100-pounder guns, as an additional proteetion against another rebel raid of iron-clads. During this month, and early
in March, the engineer force of the army decreased rapidly, owing to the expiration of their term of service.
Marek.- There were at this time less than three hundred effective men for
duty, and but a small number of these were engineer soldiers proper. Repairs
of the batteries were constantly going on. 'To obviate the effects of winter
weather, platforms were relaid, magazines drained, and their cover rr.newed and
thickened, and generally the lines of the army put in good defensible condition.
The mules belonging to the pontoon train were worked continuously at the
saw-mills during the winter, and only relieved when directed by Major General
Barnard, the engineer of the combined armies operating against Richmond, to
be used in preparing four ( 4) pontoon trains for active service and marching.
New mules wem obtained, and every effort made to break them to harness in
time. The whole artisan force was put at work to repair and strengthen the
wagons and hoats. Finally orders were issued to take a train of but fifteen canvas boats, which was ready for the march on the day specified. The engineer
force was divided; one part under Brevet Major W. R. King, United States engineers, remained with General Weitzel's forces, and entered the city of Richmond with his command. They began and continued the erection of a defensive line, until the news of Lee's surrender reached the city. 'They also built
a pontoon bridge joining Richmond and Manchester, twenty-four hundred feet
long, upon which afterwards the armies of the James, the .Potomac, Sherman's
army, and Sheridan's cavalry crossed. The engineer force with the moving
column consisted of six companies of engineers and one of pontoniers. A tool
train of ten wagons moved with the pontoon trains; the latter consisted of thirtytwo wagons, carrying forage, spare-chess, and three hundred and eighty fe et of
bridge material. 'The weight, drawn by eight mules, was ascertained by weighing a pontoon wagon with its material two weeks after the campaign closed, and
was found to be as follows :
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Two (2) boats of canvas and box ................. .
305 pounds.
rrransoms .................................... .
"
470
Claw balks ......•...... ·...................... . 1,440
"
Saddle balks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .
244 "
Boat sides .................................... .
224
Anchor lines .................................. .
175
Anchors .....•.................................
310
3,168 lbs. wagon load.
Wagon ...............................•........ 1,278 "
Weight dra,vn ...........................•......

4,446 "

During the march there were rains, which would increase the weight. On
the 29th of March the moving column of the army of the James, consisting of rrt1rner's division of West Virginia troops, of the 24th army corps,
and :b...,oster's first division of the same corps, commanded by Major General
Gibbon. and Birney's division of the 25th army corps, all commanded by Major
General Ord, occupied the left of the army of the Potomac, intrenched lines
resting on Hatcher's run.
On the 30th an advance was made across the run by Turner's and Foster's
division, rebel picket line captured, and a position secured btyond Armstrong's
house, with eight hundred yards of the rebel line of works. Turner's division
joined the 2d army corps by a bridge built over the run. On Turner's right
.Foster and Birney made the connexion with the 6th army corps, still in position behind their intrenched lines. Attempts were mafle during the night to
build intrenchments and cover for a battery, but the ground would not stand,
being saturated with water fi·om recent heavy rains, and so spongy that it would
not bear the weight of a horse.
April.-On th~ morning of the 2c1 the successful assault being made, and rapidly
followed up by an attack on Fort Gregg, which was taken after some desperate
fighting the troops occupied a position enti1:ely surrounding Petersburg. During
the night everything was got in readiness for a rapid march in the morning.
Starting at 5 a. m., and taking the Cox road, our army made a rapid march to~
wards Burkeville-a part of the engineer force moved ahead to repair roads and
bridges-the pontoon trains followed headquarters, to be in readiness in case of
necessity. Burkeville was reached on the night of the 5th, and occupied during
the next day. A small force being sent out to burn the high bridge at Farmville was met by the rebel advance and captured, after desperate fighting. rrhe.
troops moved in that direction on the 6th, and engaget1 a portion o( the advance
of the enemy, while the cavalry headed them off on the Prince Edward Court
House road. On the afternoon of the 7th the troops entered Farmville, the enemy
burning the bridges at this place and retreating across the river. The pontoon
train of our army having been well kept up to the front, notwithstanding its
overloaded condition, was fortunately able to be used to pass over the artillery
and trains of the sixth and second army corps and enable them to follow in
rapid pursuit of the enemy that night. ':rhe pontoons were relieved by those
of the army of the Potomac before daybreak, and once more in position for a
new march.
At daylight on the 8th the 24th army corps moved from Farmville, taking
the road running nearly with the 'south side railroad, and made a forced
march of nearly thirty-three (33) miles before midnight, resting for a few hours
on the railroad where Sheridan had captured several cars loaded with bacon and
corn. At 31" a. m. on the 9th the infantry moved again, and at 8 a. m. were in
action on the extreme left of the army. 'l'he leading brigade of Foster's
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division of the 24th army corps went into action on the double-quick, and delivered the volley which staggered and drove back the advance of the enemy
who had at that moment gained some temporary advantage over the cavalry.
The action lasted until 10 a.m., when a truce was granted preliminary to the
surrender.
May.-During this month a bridge was built at Fredericksburg. Surveys
were made, by direction of Major General Barnard, of the detached works surrounding the city, and orders were afterward received to continue the survey of
the intrenched lines and country adjacent to Richmond.
June.-Brevet Major King was intrusted with the charge of rebuilding a
bridge, called Mayo's bridge, connecting Richmond and Manchester. "rhe following is an extract from his report on the completion of the bridge. "rhe plan
adopted for the bridge is represented by the accompanying drawing, page 45.
DESCRIPTION.

cf i, main chords made of four pieces, 4 inches by 12 inches, breaking joints,
and forming continuous beams the entire length of the bridge.
j i, corbels, 14 inches by 16 inches, resting on wall plates w w, and supporting
main chords.
a b g h, &c., straining beams, 10 inches by 12 inches, oak, supported by posts
and struts.
b c g f, &c., main suspending rods in pairs, secured at b and g by wroughtiron plates, and at c andf by cast-iron eonnecting plates bolted to the chord.
c d and ef, lower suspending rods, secured at c andfto cast-iron connecting
plates, and at d and e to horizontal wrought-iron bars; these bars being connected by three small rods d e, d lc, and e k, diagonal iron braces, to prevent
vertical undulations.
k k, floor girders, 10 inches by 14 inches, supporting 4-inch by 12-inch joists
and 3-inch plank.
d k e k, oak supports, 6 inches by 10 inches, resting in cast-iron shoes, which
are supported by wrought-iron bars d and e.
Lateral braces (not shown in drawing) connect the floor girders to prevent
horizontal swaying, and diagonal braces steady the posts d k and e k.
DIMENSIONS.

Entire length thirteen hundred and ninety-six (1,396) feet; entire width, including side-walks, thirty-one (31) feet; width of carriage-way in clear nineteen
and a half (19~) feet; number of bays eighteen ( 18); width of bays, sixty-nine
to seventy-eight ( 69 to 78) feet; height of piers at low water, twenty (20) feet.
The strains on the different rods were computed as follows : Allowing for a
load of forty ( 40) pounds per square foot of road way, forty ( 40) pounds per
cubic foot of timber, and sixty thousand (60,000) pounds as the breaking weight
of iron per square inch, then the greatest strain on the upper suspension rods
will be nearly thirty-two thousand five hundred (32,500) pounds.
Pounds.

Breaking weight of same ............................... - .... Lower inclined suspension rod's greatest strain .................•
Breaking weight ...................................... - .... .
Lower horizontal suspension rod's greatest strain ................ .
Breaking weight ........................... - ......... ,. - .... The entire amount of wrought-iron used, including bolts, plates, &c.,
was ........ ., .. . . . . . . . . . .............................. .
0 as t-iro n . . • . . . . . . . . . . . _. _ _. _ _ _. _. . . . . . . . . . . . __ . . . _ . . . .. _ . _

90,000
16,000
46,500
10,200
26, 000
44, 068
13,586
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Narrativefrom General Tower's reports qf tlte 1st February and 31st March,
1865, to General Delafield, clziif engineer.

II
I

Nashville was first occupied by our army on the 15th and 16th of December,
1864. The officers of the corps of engineers commenced to fortify it at that
time, and as its importance increased from time to time, by making it the depot
for the armies of the west, the labors of the engineers continued, and were not
relaxed to the date of the last effort of the rebels tu cnpture it, and thus endeavor to frustrate Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas to Virginia. To hold it, and check the advance of Hood through Kentucky to the
Ohio, called forth all the ·zeal and talent of the engineers. General 'l'ower had
been sent thither in September, 1864, and labored to perfect the incomplete
defences. On the advance of the rebel General Hood, and while the army was
falling back from Franklin, the necessity for strengthening and completing these
defences became more urgent. He then wrote to the assistant adjutant general
of Major General 'l'hornas, suggesting that the forces of the quartermaster's department might throw an intrenched line over the high hills in advance of the
Lorenz house, should it be thought expedient, (see plan No. 4.) At 12m.
General Thomas visited ]'ort Morton, and informed him that about five thousand men would report at one o'clock. To his question shall they intrench the
Lorenz Hills 7 he replied, no, let them construct your interior lzne connecting
with the forts. The army will hold the hills and intrench them.
~e therefore gave Captain Jenney, who was assisting him, directions to run
the line of infautry intrenchments from Fort Morton around the Taylor house
· to Hill 210. Captain Jenney was assisted by Major Powell, of the 'l'ennessee
army reserve artillery; Major Dickson, inspector of artillery of the army of the
'.rennessee, superintended assiduously the construction of the large and important battery on Hill 210. Captain Barlow, of the corps of engineers, took
charge of the line from the Cumberland river to the Chattanooga railroad, south
side of the city.
A portion of the line from Hill 210 to Hyde Ferry was laid out by Captain
Barlow and himself, the rest by Major Willet. During the fifteen days preceding the battles before Nashville, more than seven miles of infantry parapet
and riflB-pit intrenchments were thus constructed by the quartermaster and
railroad forces. This gave a continuous line (see plan No. 4) in advanee of all
the hospitals, storehouses, and other structures, except the scattered houses of
the suburbs in front of College Hill, and held the elevated positions which
looked upon the buildings within range. It is the line indicated in his report
of October, 1864. It is just as long a line as that occupied by the army over
the hills, but the shortest that would effectually secure the hospitals and other
important structures. The line over the hills was the best army line, but deriving no support from Forts Morton, Houston, Gillem, and Hyde Ferry, could
not be held by the usual forces occupying Nashville.
It would have required a large number of redoubts of expensive construction,
owing to the rocky nature of the soil, to have fortified the line of hills, but such
line would hold an enemy well away from the city, covering it effectually. It
was his opinion that completing the works already described, and strengthening the principal batteries at intermediate points, would make Nashville secure
with its usual garrison, aided by the quartermaster's organized forces. Hill210
must be strengthened, as it is a key position, and the 'l'aylor House knoll should
be supported by a keep. Small block-houses in batteries, like the construction
for Battery Donaldson, are a good arrangement when well covered by the parapets. Unfortunately, wood constructions are the most difficult of accomplishment. Embrasures, magazines, anc1 block-house bomb-proofs cause the great
delay in making forts and batteries. A great deal, however, has been accom-

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

959

plished during the past three months in spite of extremely unfavorable weather:
mud, and muddy roads. It has rained more than half the time.
When General Sherman appointed him inspector general of fortifications for
his military division, he requested him to look well to the defences of Nashville.
He also called his attention to Murfreesboro' and Columbia, the line of defence
for the army falling back. Murfreesboro' was known to be well defended. Columbia was the position on Duck river which would have been held by our
army had the corps from Missouri arrived a week sooner. As things occurred,
Nashville was the threatened point, and he gave his attention to its defences,
using all his personal influence to get aid from every source possible. The
plans submitted will show works devised by him for the defence of this depot,
and alterations in original works. He had to thank the railroad departm ent for
much assistan~e rendered, and especially the quartermaster's department for aid
in laborers and material. These laborers were mostly organized as brigades,
and turned out as such, and guarded two miles of the interior line during the
battles of the 15th and 16th of December, 1864, and in case of an attack on the
city would doubtless be an efficient assistance to this garrison.
Captain Barlow understands this position well, and would doubtless do everything in his power to forward its defences. W aitiug for plans has delayed this
synopsis of engineer operations at Nashville.
He was getting up a plan of the magnificent battles of December 15 and 16,
gained by the United States army, commanded by Major General Thomas,
over the rebel forces under General Hood. (See plan .No. 4.)
Having accompanied the commanding general .d uring these fights, it was his
special request that he should direct the survey and drawing of the plan illustrating them.
Captain Barlow, United StateR engineers, in immediate charge of the defences
of Nashville since the middle of December, had much improved his department,
and heartily responded to his efforts to push forward the defensive line. Captain
Jenney, aide-de-camp on General Sherman's staff, in charge of topographical office
there, had voluntarily assisted and had done excellent service superintending at
Forts Houston, Gillem, and in the construction of infantry line of intrenchments.
He has sent the map (see plan No. 4) of the battles of Nashville, which shows
the dispositions of troops before and during the battles, and which, with the exception of sections, seems clear and complete. By a little attention it will be
perceived how admirably the battle was planned. Its execution was in accordance
with the plan.
X was the turning point on which the army wheeled as on a pivot. Ji.,rom
that point, to the river on the left, the lines were held by new troops under General Steedman, while the tln·ee infantry corps, cummanded by General::; vV ood,
Smith, and Schofield, and the cavalry corps under General Wilson, were hurled
upon the enemy's centre and left. Our army, thus in position, formed nearly a
straight line, of which the left far refused (made up of new troops) held lines
supported by works and covered by a brilliant dash of General Steedman with
a small force in advance towards t.he enemy's right. The right was the old
fighting army, which, though requiring much time to swing into post iion, (about
40,000 strong,) necessarily broke the enemy's left, and drove him from his main
line.
'l'he second day the rebel general had concentrated his forces; but the moral
effect of his first day's fight, his losses, especially in artillery, together with our
superiority of cavalry, which dismounted and attacked his left rear, all contributed to his defeat; and the left of his line was broken about four o'clock by a
dash of General Smith's corps. The battle is worthy of study.

960

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY O:E, WAR.

Narrativefrom tlw rPport qf Brevet Brigadier General 0. Jl!L Poe to the Chiq
Engineer, dated October 8, 1865.
'.rhe operations connected with the march of General Sherman's army, extending over a great portion of the southern States, were of a very rapid character.
Such of them as legitimately belonged to the engineer department were so intimately blended with the whole that it is impossible to separate them. In order
to explain clearly why bridges were built and roads made in the localities where
they were, it will be necessary to give the movements of the army somewhat in
detail, when the reasons will generally be evident. The labors of the engineers
were directed to facilitate these movements, and always with a distinct idea of
their object.
On the 1st of July, 1864, General Poe was on duty as chief engineer with the
army commanded by Major General W. T. Sherman, then before Kenesaw
mountain. At that time the engineer organization for the army in the field was
altogether inadequate. '.rhere were within the limits of the military division the
following engineer organizations, viz:
First Michigan engineers and mechanics.
First Missouri engineers.
Both these regiments belonged to the army of the Cumberland, and were distributed as follows: the former along the railroads, forming our lines of supply,
engaged in building block-houses to defend them against raiding parties of the
enemy's cavalry; and the latter along the important line of railroad from Nashville to Johnsonville, on the Tennessee river, engaged in completing that work.
The department of the Ohio was provided with an engineer battalion in 1863,
when the movement upon East Tennessee commenced.
The department of the Tennessee was not provided with any regular engineer
organization, but was fortunate in having an excellent pioneer organization. In
order to equalize the engineer forces in the military division, the major general
commanding, at General Poe's suggestion, transferred the first Missouri engineers
from the department of the Cumberla~d to the department of the '.rennessee, and
it was ordered to join the army in the field.
Two pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of 1,400 feet, were with the
forces in the field, and distributed as follows: 800 feet, in charge of 'the fiftyeighth Indiana volunteer infantry, commanded by Colonel George P. Buell, were
attached to the army of the Cumberland; 600 feet, in charge of Captain Kossack, aide-de-camp, and a body of pioneers, were attached to the army of the
Tennessee.
Both those bridges were of the kind known as the "canvas bateau bridge."
Two more bridges of the same kind, each 600 feet in length, were held in reserve
at Nashville.
The staff organization of the engineer department with that army was as follows:
Captain 0. M. Poe, United States engineers, chief engineer military division,
Mississippi.
Captain C. B. Reese, corps of engineers, chief engineer department and
army of the 'rennessee.
Captain W. J. Twining, lieutenant of engineers, chief engineer department
and army of the Ohio.
Lieutenant H. C. Wharton, corps of engineers, chief engineer, army of the
Cumberland.
Until the early part of May the duties of chief engineer army of the Cumberland had been performed by captain W. E. Merrill, corps of engineers, but he,
having received authority to organize the regiment of veteran volunteer engineers provided for by act of Congress, had gone to Chattanooga for that
purpose.
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Early in July the following officers of the corps of engineers reprnted to
General Poe, and were assigned to duty as follows, viz :
Captain J. W. Barlow, to army of Tennessee.
First Lieutenant 0. H. Ernst, to army of T-ennessee.
}..,irst Lieutenant W m. Ludlow, to army of Cumberland.
First Lieutenant A. N. Damrell, to army of Ohio.
In the army of the Cumberland, each corps, division, and nearly every brigade was provided with an officer detailed from among the commissioned officers
of the infantry regiments, whose duty it was to make such surveys and reconnaissances as might be wanted. rl'he other two armies were not so well provided,
but had sufficient organization to do all that was requisite.
The military operations of the previous two months had gradually forced the
enemy from his position in Buzzard Roost Gap back to the ground he now
held at Kenesaw mountain. During this time the labors of the engineers
were confined to reconnoitring, road-making, and bridge-building. Pontoon
bridges bad been built over the Oostanaula, at Resaca and at Lay's ferry, and
two flatboat bridges over the Coosawatchie, also pontoon bridges over the
Etowah river, at the cliffs.
1'he enemy showed little disposition to yield his stronghold at Kenesaw.
After the assault of the 27th June it was determined to move towai·ds onr right,
at the same time advancing that flank-a movement which it was supposed
would result in the evacuation by the enemy of all ground north of the Chattahoochee, except his bridge-head at the railroad crossing.
Receiving instructions from General Sherman, commanding, General Poe
made a personal reconnoissance of the ground upon our right as far as our extreme caYalry outposts, at or ncar Anderson's mill, on Olley's creek, and immediately upon his return and report the army of the Tennessee was put in motion.
No aoo11er was this movement developed, than the enemy, on the night of the
2d and morning of the 3d July, evacuated his position at Kenesaw and in
front of l\larietta, and we took possession, the troops moving right on in pursujt.
Contrary to expectation and information, we found that the enemy intended to
make a stand upon a line from Ruff's Station (Neal Dow) to Ruff's mill, the
flanks being refused along Nickajack and Rottenwood creeks. This line had
been prepared by militia and contrabands only a few days before its occupation by J ohmton's army, and was well built, consisting of good infantry parapets, connecting salients, in which were placed a large number of pieces of field
artillery in embrasures. The length of this line was nearly six miles.
On the 4th July our skirmishers drove the enemy's into the works on the
main road by a spirited dash, being supported by the divisions of Stanley, of
the 4th corps, and J olmson of the 14th corps, and our lines pressed up
at all points, but not near enough to silence the artillery. Late in the evening
the 16th corps, forming the left of the army of the Tennessee, carried by assault a portion of the rebel line. At daylight on the morning of the 5th July
our skirmishers advanced, only to find the enemy gone-a movement rendered
necessary upon their part by the success of the 16th corps on the evening
previous.
1'he next line of works was found in front of the railroad bridge, and the several road and pontoon bridges at Pace's, Montgomery's, and Turner's ferries,
forming a. very extensive tete de pont, which consisted of a system of square redoubts in defensive relations, connected by ,infantry pampets. But few of these
redoubts were prepared for artillery, being arranged with a banquette for infantry fire. T'he artillery was placed in small intermediate redans. rrhe redoubts
partook more of the character of tambours. They were constructed by building double log pens, and filling the space between them with earth. 1'here was
nothing in the plan to recommend them to the attention of the engineers.
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The left of this line rested upon a large seven-gun redoubt, near the mouth
of Nickajack creek, and the right upon another redoubt prepared for eight guns,
and situated near the Chattahoochee, about one mile above the railroad bridge.
Opposite this point the intrenchments on the south side of the river began,
and extended, in a continuous line, nearly to Island creek, being altogether about
eight miles.
The railroad bridge at its southern end was protected by three batteries of
irregular shape and one redoubt. This line, owing to the care bestowed upon
its construction, and the nature of the approaches, was far the strongest we had
yet encountered. It had been built for some length of time, and had been located
by good engineers. A few days spent in recounoissances showed us very plainly
that it would cost many lives to carry the position by assault, even were an
assault to succeed, which was extremely doubtful. It was accordingly deemed
best to turn it. An inspection of the country showed that this must be done by
the left, since such a movement to the right, owing to the broken character of
the country, and the fact that the enemy, expecting us to move that way, had
carefully guarded all the crossing places, was almost impossible. Having decided to pass the river by our left, strong demonstrations were made upon our
right to confirm the enemy in the impression that the movement was to be made
in that direction, and that we would attempt to cross the river at some point
·below the mouth of Nickajack creek.
The points selected for the crossing were at Roswell factory and Philip's
(Isham's) ferry, and the army of the 'l'ennessee, which had been demonstrating
upon our right, was suddenly thrown to Roswell, where it crossed the Chattahoochee upon a trestle bridge built by the pioneers of the 16th army corps
out of the materials at hand. No opposition was made by the enemy.
'l'he army of the Ohio, which had been on the left, now became the centre,
made a rapid movement across the river at Philip's ferry, surprising· a small
force of the enemy stationed there, and capturing one piece of artillery. While
t}1c forces which actually effected the crossing were engaged in constructing
some light works to serve as a bridge-head, two canvas pontoon bridges were
thrown, upon which the balance of the army of the Ohio crossed.
General Poe remarks here, that whenever it was deemed necessary to use a
bridge for a greater length of time than forty-eight hours, the pontoon bridges
were invariably replaced by wooden trestle bridges constructed from the materials at hand, either by engineer troops or the pioneer force. 'l'he object of
this was to preserve the canvas covers of the bateaux, even at the expense of
considerable labor, since we had the latter in greater abundance than the former.
'l'he canvas bridges at Philip's ferry were replaced by a trestle bridge
built by the engineer battalion of the 23d army corps. Another pontoon
bridge was thrown, meanwhile, at Powers' ferry, some two miles lower
clown, upon which the 4th army corps crossed. rl'his corps formed a junction with the army of the Ohio, but the army of the Tennessee was still acting
independently.
One division of the 4th corps now swept clown the south bank of the river
to Pace's ferry, which enabled us to build two pontoon bridges at this point,

upon which the 14th and 20th corps crossed.
Two clays- before this the enemy, under influence of the presence of the 4th
and 23c1 corps on the south side of the river, had crossed his whole force to
that side and left us in possession of the strong line on the north side, upon
which so much care and labor had been bestowed.
'l'he passage of the Chattahoochee had now been completely effected. Our
whole army was on the south side of the river, with a loss of less than a dozen
men. But between us and Atlanta, our objective, were still the three serious
obstacles of Nancy's creek, Peach Tree creek, aRd the entire rebel army. vVe
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knew but little about the country, and the inhabitants, always few in number
and indisposed to give us information, had all gone further south. Not an ablebodied man was to be found between Marietta and the enemy's line. We could
only feel our way cautiously forward, using the greatest diligence in reconnoissances.
The army of the Tennessee, forming the left wing, was directed towards
Stone mountain; the army of the Ohio, in the centre, towards Cross Keys and
Decatur, and the army of the Cumberland, on the right, 'V ia Buck Head, towards
Atlanta. 'l'he left wing and the centre crossed Nancy's creek the same day,
(July 18.) The cavalry division of General Garrard, which had been operating
on the extreme left, succeeded in reaching the Augusta railroad between Decatur and Stone mountain.
On the next day, July 19, the :23d army corps, after a sharp skirmish, occupied Decatur, where it formed a junction with the army of the Tennessee.
'J1!1e army of the Ohio then withdrew, and, passing to the right, camped for the
night on Pea Vine creek. The army of the Cumberland crossed a small force
over Peach Tree creek, which maintained its footing.
July 20. The army of the 'l'ennessee advanced along the Augusta railroad
to within about three and a half miles of Atlanta, where the enemy was found
intrenched. The army of the Ohio moved along the road leading from Judge
Peyton's to Atlanta, and soon encountered the enemy intrenched. The army
of the Cumberland crossed Peach Tree creek at several points, and the left of
it, (4th corps,) connecting with the army of the Ohio, met the same obstacle.
The 14th corps, on>the extreme right, moving on the Howell's Mill road, joined
the 20th corps on its left, and this, in turn, joined Newton's division of the 4th
corps, which was moving on the Collier's Mill road. There was no communication on the south side of Peach Tree creek, between Newton's and the other
divisions of the 4th corps.
'l'his was the status when two rebel corps, moving down the Howell's Millroad and Collier's Mill road, attacked the 20th corps, togetherwith the left di~ris
ion of the 14th corps and Newton's division. After a severe engagement, last
ing until dark, the enemy was repulsed at all points. The result was to firmly
establish our position on the south bank of Peach r_rree creek, having overcome
two of three obstacles already referred to as between us and Atlanta.
July 21.-We steadily pressed forward along our whole line, developing the
enemy in his intrenchments, extending from a point about a mile south of the
Augusta railroad around the north side of the city to the Chattanooga railroad.
This .line was well built, and c.apable of a tolerably good defence. It consisted
of a system of open batteries for artillery, connected by the usual infantry parapet, with all the accessories of abatis, chevaux-de-frise, &c. But it was evidently not the main line upon which the enemy relied for his final defence.
July 22.-The enemy evacuated the line referred to above during the night
of the 21st, and we pressed forward on all the roads until the enemy was again
found behind intrenchments. Reconnaissances proved that these were finally
the main lines of defensive works covering Atlanta. 'l'hey completely encircled the city at a distance of about one and a half miles from the centre, and
consisted of a system of batteries, open to the rear and connected by infantry
parapet, with complete abatis in some places in three or four rows, with rows
of pointed stakes and long lines of chevaux-de-frise. In many places ro·ws of
palisading were planted along the foot of the exterior slope of the infantry parapet, with sufficient opening between the timbers to permit the infantry fire, if
carefully delivered, to pass freely through, but not sufficient to permit a person
to pass through, and having a height of twelve to fourteen feet.
'l'he ground in front of these palisades (or stockades) was always completely
swept by the fire from the adjacent batteries, which enabled a very small force
to hold them.
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To this line we opposed another extending from a point one and a half miles
south of the Augusta railroad around by the north to a point one and a half
miles southwest from the three-mile post on the Atlanta and Chattanooga railroad. About noon, while engaged in extending this line to the left and front,
the enemy, making a detour to the south and eastward, passed around our left
flank, and, completely enveloping it, attacked it both in flank and rear. l!"'ortnnately, the 16th corps was en route to meet just such an attack, and was in a
position to form, looking to our left rear, its right joining the 17th army corps.
The fighting here was of the most desperate character. Meanwhile the enemy
1mshed one corps from their ·works right down the Augusta railroad upon our
line, where they gained a temporary success, but were finally driven back at
all points. Our troops were now put under the cover of the ordinary rifletrenches, with works of a slightly heavier character for the artillery. Close reconnoissances were made of the enemy's whole line in our front, and it was decided
that no attempt at assault should be made upon that part of the enemy's line
which we could see. rrhe major general commanding was satisfied that no assault wonlcl be made at present, neither did he desire anything like regular
siege operations, but instructed that the lines occupied by our troops be of such a
character that they could be held against a sortie, and to push them forward at
all points where it could be conveniently done; at the same time he would attempt to reach the enemy's line of railroad communication at or near East
Point, the junction of the roads from West Point and 1iacon to Atlanta. It is
about six miles southwest from Atlanta. rl'his movement, he hoped, would
either result in a general engn.gement, with chances greatly in our favor, or in
the evacuation of Atlanta. He directed General Poe to personally select a line
at the Augusta railroad, where our left flank could rest and command that
road, while the army of the Tennessee was withdrawn to make the movement
indicated.
On the morning of the 24th July, accompanied by Captains C. B. Reese
and J. vV. Barlow, and Lieutenants Twining and Ernst, of the corps of engineers,
General Poe passed over the ground, selected the line, and gave the necessary
directions for its construction.
General Sherman having determined to send a cavalry force around each
flank of the enemy to operate upon his communications, General Poe was
directed to see in person to the construction of a ~ontoon bridge at Turner's
ferry. 'l'his was clone hy ordering the train belongmg to the army of the rrennessee from where it wa::; then laid, at the railroad crossing over the Chattahoochee, cia the old PPach 'l'ree road, to Turner's ferry. After proceeding as far
as Proctor's creek, we found that the enemy occupied Turner's ferry. It was
thm~ too late to do anything towards fighting for possession of the ferry. Upon
a report of the fact::; to General Sherman, he ordered the cavalry division of
General McCook to clear the ground at daybreak next morning, July 2G,
which was done, the bridge constructed, and communication establi::;hed between the cavalry forces on the south bank of the river with those on the north
bank.
'I'he new line to be occupied by our left flank upon the withdrawal
of the army of the 'l'ennessee having been completed by the morning of
the 27th July, the movement of that command towards our right flank commenced, and at the same time the movement of the cavalry forces began, that
passing around the enemy's left flank being under command of General McCook,
and tha,t around his right flank under Generals Stoneman and Garrard, the balance of our army meanwhile pressing forward and gaining ground as rapidly as
possible. This was continued on the 28th July, when at about noon a furious
attack was made upon the army of the Tennessee, particularly upon the 15th
corps, by a force of the enemy which moved from Atlanta out on the Lick
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Skillet Toad. The whole of the 15th corps had been refused along a ridge
extending noTthwestwardly from Ezra chuDch, and nearly parallel witi1 the
Lick Skillet road, its left joining the.17th coTps, and making nearly a right
angle with it near the church. The position was a most admirable one, and
the enemy was severely whipped. '.rhe rebel army in our front had been under
command of Joseph E. Johnston until the 19th July, when the command was
transferred to General Hood. Johnston's policy appeared to be a purely defensive one. Hood's was deciiledly offensive-defensive, as shown by the fact
that three desperate and severe battles were fought within ten days after he
assumed command.
The last three days of July were devoted to skirmishing to attain positions
as favorable as possible. Meanwhile, under instructions from the major general
commanding, General Poe selected a new line to be occupied as a flank by a
portion of the army of the Cumberland, in case it was decided to transfer the
army of the Ohio to the right flank. The line was constructed under the
superintendence of Lieutenant Wharton, United States engineers. It extended
from our front line near Walker's house, on the Collier's Mill (Buckhead) road,
nearly due north, to the line of rebel works evacuated on the night of the 21st
of July.
On the night of the 1st August the army of the Ohio was withdrawn from
its position on the left and rapidly moved to the right, near the JWOr-house,
and extending nearly to the north branch of Utoy creek, at vVillis's mill, the
engineers giving general directions concerning the lines.
The army of the '.rennessee swung forward its extreme right about half a
mile, turning upon its position at Ezra church as a pivot. '.rhe army of the
Ohio connected with the right of the army of the Tennessee. This movement
developed a part of the enemy's line in front of these two armies, and discovered
the same system of batteries, connected by infantry curtains, that we had met
before, thus showing that we had not yet found the enemy's left flank, the
prime object of all our movements.
A portion of the army of the Ohio ,.,-as thrown across Utoy creek, and established itself on the south side without much opposition.
August 4.-An attack was ordered to be made at 3 p. m. by the army of
the Ohio and the 14th corps of the army of the Cumberland, the object being
to thrust our forces through the enemy's lines, and effect a lodgement on the
railroad between ~tlanta and East Point. The attack, however, was not made.
August 5.-The Chattahoochee river railroad bridge wn.s completed, and our
trains ran up to the three-mile post. By General Sherman's direction Lieutenant Ernst was sent to .Marietta to superintend the construction of defences
at that place. An attack was ordered for 2 p. m., the object being as given
above, but again no attack was made.
August 6.-The attack twice before ordered was made, but repulsed. The
two corps of the army of the Cumberland, forming the left of our army, kept
steadily pushing forward, but without anything like siege approaches. Our
sharpshooters had gained such positions as rendered it difficult for the enemy
to work his guns.
August 7.-The attack made yesterday was 1enewed and proved successful. It was found that the line of rifle-trenches carried by the assault was not
the enemy's main line, bnt stood nearly perpendicularly to it. The army of
the Tennessee moved forward about 400 yards, swinging upon the centre of its
right wing as a pivot.
The successive advances, either directly or by swinging upon some part of
the line as a pivot, were made in the following manner: by pushing forward,
just before dayJight, a strong line of skirmishers to the position chosen beforehand, which maintained its ground during the day, each man getti11g such cover
as he could, generally by scooping out a rifle-pit at the foot of a tree, behind a
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log or stone, in which they could find shelter. As soon as night made it possible, working parties were thrown out to the skirmish line, and connected by
the ordinary rifle-trenches the entire chain of rifle-pits. These lines were continually being strengthened until it was desired to make another advance, when
the operation was re!Jeated. In this way our lines were pushed at any point
we wished to within two hundrerl yards of the enemy's, and with slight loss.
A1tgust 8 and 9.-Was at work everywhere strengthening our lines; commenced the construction of batteries for 4~-inch guns, which had been ordered.
These were placed in position as follows: two in front of the 20th army corps
near the Chattanooga railroad, and two others in front of the 16th corps. The
whole of the army of the 'rennessee advanced about i of a mile, in the manner
already described, and the lines of the army of the Cumberland were straightened so that the whole line was as far advanced as the salients had been. 'rhe
army of the Ohio was engaged in intrenching itself in its position south of U toy
creek. August 10, 11, and 12, no advances were made. August 13, it
was decided to move all the army except one corps (which was to be thrown
back to the Chattahoochee railroad bridge) around Atlanta, upon the railroads
running south from East Point, and the pontoon train of the army of the Cumberland was moved from the railroad bridge along the north side of the river to the
Sandtown ferry, preparatory to throwing a bridge across the river at that point.
August 15.-'l'he line of Proctor's creek was examined for the purpose of
selecting a defensive flank to be used when the army of the Cumberland was
withdrawn. Two pontoon bridges were laid at Sandtown ferry. A trestle bridge was commenced at Sandtown ferry to replace the pontoon bridges at that
point.
August 17 .-Orders for the movement of the army to the rear of East Point
were promulgated. The cavalry cc.mmand of General Kilpatrick started upon a
raid to the southward of Atlanta.
August 18 and 19.-'l'he troops kept hard at work to induce the enemy
to believe that we contemplated no movement upon his rear of greater importance than a cavalry raid. The entire force of engineer officers hard at work
reconnoitring all the roads to our right as far as the enemy's cavalry would
per111it.
August 20.-A force of infantry reached the Atlanta and West Point railroad
near lted Oak Station, and tore up a portion of the track. Our batteries were
completed along our whole line and we were ready for any emergency.
ANgust 21 and 2:!.-'l'he pioneer force was all kept at work preparing
siege materials. 'l'he batteries along our whole line kept up a slow but steady
fire, both upon the enemy's lines and upon the city of ~tlanta. 'l1 he remarks
in this paragraph apply to every day for the last two weeks.
August 23-Under instructions from the :M:ajor General commanding, General
Poe ,.,·ent to the Chattahoochee railroad bridge anJ selected a line to be occupied by the corps (20th) which was to be left behind during our movement to
the rear of Atlanta, and gav<> Lieutenant Ludlow full instructions concerning
the building of it.
'l,he position held by the 15th army corps duriug the battle of the 28th July
was selected by Captain Reese, as a flank, to be occupied by the army of the
'l'enncssee upon the withdrawal of the army of the UumberlanJ. General Kilpatrick's cavalry command returned, having passed entirely around Atlanta.
August 24.-At work upon the new flank referred to above. Reconnaissances
pushed to the right almost as far as Campbellt()n.
August 25.-At midnight the grand movement commenced by the withdrawal of the 4th and 20th corps. 'rhe latter marched directly to the railroad
bridge, Pace's and Turner's ferries, while the former, passing in rear of the army
of the Tenne~see bivouacked next night on the Utoy creek. Before the movement began its left had rested on the Decatur road.
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August 26.-The movement of the army of the Cumberland still going on,
and at dark the left wing of the army of the Tennessee was swung to the rear
upon its right, and occupied the position previously prepared for it .
.August 27.-All the army in motion except the army of the Ohio. The
army ofthe Cumberland was placed in position along Camp creek, covering all
the roads leading from Mount Gilead church toward East Point and Red Oak.
The army of the Tennessee was thrown furt?er to the right, but close enough
to keep up communication ; it covered all the roads leading towards Fairburn.
But little resistance was offered to our ad vance.
'rhe troops intrenched their position every night. f_l'his was made a rule from
the time the campaign commenced, and was continued until the close of the war,
whenever the proximity of the enemy rendered it prudent. During all the operations of this great army, extending over a year of time and thousands of
miles of territory, it was never surprised.
August 28.-The army of the Cumberland was thrown forward upon the
Atlanta and West Point railroad at Red Oak, and the army of the '.rennessee at
Shadna church and Fairburn, while the army of the Ohio was thrown into such
a position along the road from Mount Gileaa church to Red Oak as to cover our
left flank. Immediately upon striking the railroad the troops were intrenched,
and without the loss of a dozen men we had secure hold upon it, and could
proceed to destroy it as leisurely as we pleased .
.August 29.-'l'he greater part of the army was at work destroying the railroad, which was effectually done for about 12~ miles, every tie being burned
and every rail bent. The enemy did not attempt to disturb us.
August 30.-The army again in motion,_ being directed as follows : The
army of the Ohio towards Morrow's mill ; the army of the Cumberland towards
Couch's farm .house, and the army of the Tennessee towards the Renfro (Renfrew 1) place. The latter pushed on still further and succeeded in seizing the
Flint River bridge and gaining a foothold between theriver and Jonesboro'. The
enemy was found in force covering tile town.
August 31.-The army of the Ohio moved towards a point on the :Macon railroad two miles south of Rough and Ready Station, and succeeded in reaching it,
and making a secure lodgment (intrenched.) The 4th corps was put in position in support. Four more brigades of the army of the Cumberland moved
from Couch's due east, until they struck the railroad between the army of the
Ohio and Jonesboro', when they also intrenched About the same time that
these forces reached the railroad the enemy attacked the lines of the army of the
Tennessee immediately in front of Jonesboro', and tried to carry them by assault. They were repulsed with heavy loss.
SPptember 1.-The army of the Cumberland was concentrated, so as to connect
from the left of the army of the Tennessee to the railroad about. two miles north
of Jonesboro', the 4th army corps destroying the railroad as it advanced. The
army of the Ohio commenced the destruction of the railroad at Rough and Ready
and connected with the break made by the other troops. About 4 p. m. the
14th army corps assaulted and carried the right of the enemy's line, consisting
of the usual batteries, connected by infantry parapet. The approach of night
alone prevented the capture of the entire rebel force.
We were now squarely upon the rebel lines of supply. The movements of
our army had been so rapid that the enemy exhibited the greatest confusion,
and :o;hortly after midnight the light of the burning buildings and explosions of
ammunition in the direction of Atlanta (distant 20 miles) indicated very plainly
that the enemy was evacuating the place, and on the morning of the 2d September the 20th army corps, which had been left behind at the Chattahoochee
bridge for the purpose, marched into Atlanta.
In describing these operations it has been necessary-to go somewqat into de-tail, in order that they might be clearly understood, deeming it peculiarly the
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province of the engineer to call attention to such brilliant manceuvres as those
which enabled us to pass a river too deep to be forded, in the very face of the
enemy, with a loss of less than a platoon of men, and those which placed six
army corps upon the enemy's lines of communication in oppositiGn to a single
corps.
In accomplishing these results the engineer department performed the following special labor, viz :
10 pontoon bridges built across the Chattahoochee river, averaging 350 feet in
length, 3,500 feet; 7 trestle bridges, built out of material cut from the bank,
across the same stream, of which 5 were double-tracked and two were single,
350 feet long each, 2,450 feet; 50 miles (estimated) of infantry parapet, with a
corresponding length of artillery epaulement; 6 bridges over Peach Tree creek,
averaging 80 feet long each, 480 feet; 5 bridges over Flint river, averaging 80
feet long each, 400 feet; also many smaller bridges built, an(l many miles of
road repaired.
The topographical branch (;fthe engineer department worked efficiently. Surveys were made of all the routes passed over by infantry columns, together with
the lines of parapet built. A map ~n the scale of 411 = 1 mile, illustrating the
siege (so called) of Savannah, has been forwarded to the engineer bureau, in
which these surveys are compiled, from the passage of Peach Tree creek, July
19 to the beginning of the movement upon the enemy's lines of communication, August 25, and a general map (photographic copy) illustrating the entire campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta. General Poe forwarded to the bureau
a complete set of photographic views illustrating military operations about
Atlanta.
From the map department 4,000 copies of campaign maps were issued to the
proper officers to facnitate military operations.
General Poe bears testimolly to the efficiency of the engineer officers on duty
with General Sherman's army. Though all have done well, yet he expresses
particular indebtedness to Captain C. B. Reese and Lieutenants Wharton and
Twining.
Upon the o0cupation of the city of Atlanta examinations were made by General Poe, under the orders of the General commanding, with a view to the
modification of the defences better adapted for defence by the small force to be
left for the purpose. The rebel line was about twelve miles in development ;
the new line was less than three miles in extent. 'l'he entire engineer force
was applied to the construction of the works, aided by details from the infantry of the 20th corps. The balance of the army had been put in motion
against the enemy which had appeared on our lines of communication. A complete set of photographs, illustrating the defences as far as completed, were forwarded to the engineer bureau, and the works were projected on the map illustrating the siege of Atlanta.
'
Preparations were there completed for the march to SaYannah, perfecting the
organization of the engineer department, wbicb now consisted of engineer troops
and troops of the line doing engineer duty, 2, 775 men; pioneers, 1,800 men;
making an aggregate for engineer duty 4,575 men charged with the tools and
tool trains as well as the pontoon train; the aggregate length of the train was
1,430 feet. A large number of axes and shovels were in the hands of the
.t roops.
'l~he engineers were charged with the destruction of railroads, depots, steam
machinery, &c., &c., in the city of Atlanta, all of which was effectually done
without the aid of fire or powder wherever their use might endanger other property. 'l'ies were burnt and rails heated and twisted of all the road s within the
limits of the old rebel defences equal to a length of about ten miles of road.
With all the vigilance o:£-the engineers, lawless persons succeeded in fidng many
buildings in the business part of the city.
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On tlte 15th and 16th of November the army corps severally commenced the
march towards the sea-coast, and in their progress the Augusta railroad was
destroyed as far as the Oconee bridge; the Georgia Central railroad, from within
three miles of Macon to the city of Savannah; the Charleston and Savannah railroad, from the Savannah river bridge to Savannah; the Savannah and
Gulf railroad as far as the Altamaha, and the branch from Millen destroyed,
the branch fi·om Gordon to Eatonton seriously damaged.
On the march fifteen pontoon bridges were built at different localities : two
of 80 feet each long, two of 100 feet, three of 200 feet each, two of 250 feet each,
four of 300 feet each, and two of 400 feet each-an aggregate of 3,460 feet
in length. On the lOth of December the army arrived in front of Savannah,
where reconnoissances were pushed forward and along the entire extent of the
enemy's front, which was located along a chain of swamps and other natural
obstacles, and intrenched in the usual manner, and strengthened by means of
sluice gates and dams, thus flooding the entire front of their line. On the 11th
it was determined to attack Fort McAllister, a p}an of which had been found
during the reconnoissances, this being the only obstacle to a free communicatiun
with the fleet in Ossabaw sound.
The engineer troops, under the direction of Captain Reese, engineers, rebuilt
the "King·'s bridge," which had been destroyed. One division of infantry
crossed and advanced to the vicinity of the fort, formed, assaulted, and carried
the work in a gallant style on the evening of the 13th December.
The fort mounted twenty-two guns, generally in barbette. Its land front
had a good ditch with a row of stout palisades and well-built glacis with abatis,
exterior to which was planted a row of 8-inch shells arranged to explode
when trodden upGn. r_rhe obstructions in the river, piles and torpedoes, were
removed from the channel, and steamboats ascended to King's bridge where
the depot of supplies was located.
The guns of 1!-,ort McAllister, as well as six 30-pounder Parrott's from Hilton
Head, were to be placed in position preparatory to an assault on the mainlines,
when, on the night of December 20, the enemy, crossing the Savannah on a
briilge of flatboats, made his escape, abandoning a large number of guns and material of war, and blowing up his iron-clads. As at Atlanta, no regular siege
approach wa.:; attempted. Reconnoissances led to the belief that assault would
have resulted in success.
General Poe with General Reese,'under the orders of the general commanding,
after careful examination, selected a new line to be intrenched for the defence
of sueh stores and material as might be left there, consisting of a system of large
lunettes closed at the gorge, and in defensive relation, with connecting infantry
parapets, for a garrison estimated at five thousand men. The location of the
new lines was very nearly the same as those of 1814.
A map is in course of preparation which will show the topography of Savannah and vicinity, the work of attack and defence, the new lines constructed during the occupation of the city, and the lines of lt314.
Before leaving Savannah, on the campaign through the Carolinas, by request
of General Grover, who was left in command at Savannah, General Poe handed
him a paper, of which the following is a copy :
"HEADQ.UARTHRS MILITARY DrviSION MrssrssrPPI,
"Chiif Engineer's Ofjice, Savannalt, Ga., .lanuaTy 21, 1865.
"GENERAL: In accordance with your request, I have the honor of submitting the following memoranda with reference to the defence of t4e city of
Savannah.
"First. r_rhe defence of the city itself. This is accomplished by the line of
WO)'ks now in process of construction, after the plan indicated in my letter to
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Major General Sherman, dated December 26, 1864. These works are now
ready to receive sixty (60) guns, partly siege and partly field artillery, and, in
my opinion, are iu a condition which would warrant their defence by the garrison estimated for. Captain Suter, United States engineers, and chief engineer
department of the south, has been furnished with a trace of this line, on which
the several positions of the guns composing the complete armament are indicated.
Captain Suter has also been furnished with thoRe maps captured at this city
which relate to the defence. Opposite the city, on the main Carolina shore, two
small works should be built, to command the union causeway anJ the Huger
causeway. The above contemplates an attack by a much larger force than the
garrison, and, in my opinion, will never be made.
"Second. The defence of the approaches. Three main roads lead into the city
from inland, viz : The Ogeechee plank road, (Darien road,) the Louisville stage
road, the Augusta stage road.'' The last two join within 1~ miles of the city.
The points where the enemy's late lines crossed these roads furnish the best
defencA. \Vhen taken in conjunction with the obstacles formed by opening the
sluice-gates at high tide, the positions arc strong. If the bridge across the
Og·eechec at King's is destroped, it effectually cuts off direct approach by that
road, and it can only be reached by crossing the river above, and getting to
it by some of the numerous cross-roads. An enemy would not be likely to do
this unless he were in largely superior force, since he would necessarily put him
self in a ' pocket.'
"Third. '.rhe defence of the river navigation. This is best accomplished by a
force stationed at this city, large enough to go out and fight any enemy that
would be likely to approach. In order that our opponents might reach any of
the points where they could injure us much, they would be compelled to thrust
themselves some miles beyond us, leaving whatever garrison there might be in
Savannah on their flank and in rear. They could not interrupt navigation
without establishing themselves in enclosed works upon the banks of St. Augustine creek, (we hold Fort Jackson,) and a very short time woul<l suffice for the
captnre of any enemy having temerity enough to do this.
""'With all our great resources of water transportation, I regard it impossible
for our enemy to make a successful lodgement on St. Augustine creek.
"I am, general, very re~pectfully, your obedient servant,
" 0. l\1. POE, Capt. Eng., Brevet Col. U. S. A.,

"Cltiif Eng. Mil. Div'n Miss.
" l\Iajor General GROVER,
"Com'dg U. 8. Fm·ces,

Sa~·annal~.

Ga.''

For the campaign to Goldsboro', inaugurated in mid-winter, to be made
through a country famous for the extent of its swamps, all of which for five
hundred miles distance were to be crosscJ at right angles at that season of the
year when they were flooded with water, and generally regarded as impassable
for troops, the engineer department was organized with great care. 'l'he pontoon trains were put in perfect order. Every officer and man belonging to the
engineer organization was duly impressed with the importance of the part they
were to take in the march, where so much was to depend upon prompt and efficient bridge-building and road-making.
The flame organization of the department was preserved as that made for the
SaYannah campaign:
•
1. Staff: 0. :JI. Poe, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army,
chief engineer military divi::;ion .Mississippi.
C. B. Heese, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army, chief
engineer de""Qa-rtmeut, and ann:y Qt Ten1.1.e~~ee, ~\~\.1.t "\l{l\\~\
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Amos Stickney, first lieutenant engiueers, brevet captain United States
army, assistant to Captain Reese.
William Ludlow, first lieutenant engineers, brevet major United States
army, chief engineer army of Georgia, (left wing.)
William Kossak, captain, A. D. C., chief engineer 17th army corps.
Klosterman, captain, &c., chief engineer 15th army corps.
2. Engineer troops and troops of the line on engineer duty :
1st l\Iichigan engineers and mechanics, Colonel J. B. Yates, unassigned.
1st .Uissouri engineers, Lieutenant Colonel William 'rweeddale, (right wing.)
58th Indiana, volunteer infantry, L1eutenant Colonel J. Moore, (left wing.)
3. Po11toniers and pontoon trains:

Right wing, I st Missouri engineers.
Left wing, 58th Indiana volunteer infantry.·
'rhe pontoon trains remained exactly as before specified.
The tool trains remained the same, but the number of tools carried along by
brigade wagons was greatly increased, particularly the number of axes.
When the movement actually commenced, a portion of the army marched via
Sister's ferry. The pontoon train of the left ·wing accompanied this column;
all other engineer troops and trains were transported by water to Beaufort, and
moved thence by land. Owing to the season and the nature of the country, the
demand for labor of engineer troops was constant.
'l'he heavy rains which fell just as the movement commenced greatly impeoed
the march of the column, which crossed the Savannah at Sister's ferry. To
enable it to progress at all, 700 feet of pontoon bridge were built, and 1,000 feet
of trestle bridge; also some miles of corduroying.
'l'he right wing met with similar obstructions, though not so serious. A pontoon bridge was thrown across Whale branch, and fully one-fourth the road
thence to Pocotaligo was corduroyed.
On the lst of February, the movement from Sister's ferry and Pocotaligo
commenced, the enemy at that time endeavoring to hold the line of the Salkehatcbee. The left wing moved towards Duck Branch post office, and the right
wing by the two roads between the Salkahatchee and the Coosawhatcbee; the
17 th corps being directed on River's bridge, and the 15th corps on Duck Branch
cross-roads, with a division thrown out to Anglesey post office. On the night
of the 3d of February, the enemy's position at River's bridge was carried by a
portion of the 17th army corps.
On the 4th, the 15th army corps reached Banford's (or Beaufert's) bridge,
and found it destroyed, the enemy having evacuated his works at this point.
Twenty-two bridges, t:cattercd over a mile of swamp, and averaging about 25 feet
in length, were rebuilt during the night, and the whole road through the swamp
was corduroyed.
'l1 he left wing, with the cavalry on its left flank, continued its march direct on
Barnwell.
On February 7, the Charleston and Augusta railroad was reached at Midway
by the 17th army corp~; at Barnberg, by the 15th army corps; at Graham's,
by the 20th corps; and at Blackville, by the 14th corps, with the cavalry on
its left. The pontoon train of the right wing was pushed forward towards, and
all the infantry of the entire army, together with the Michigan engineers, were
put at work destroying the railroad. This was effectually done; all wood·
work was burnt, every rail was twisted, and all ·w ater-tanks, engines, and machinery of all kinds destroyed, to inclnde the Edisto bridge and Williston, and
partially destroyed, between Williston and Johnson's.
'
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During the night of the 9th a pontoon bridge was thrown at Binnaker's,
and the enemy driven away from the position he had taken to dispute the
crossing.
Another pontoon bridge was thrown at Holman's, and all our force was across
by the evening of the 11th, the left wing crossing at Duncan's and Guignard's
bridges.
The right wing moved direct upon Orangeburg. The enemy opposed the
crossing of the north fork of Edisto river, but, as usual, he was driven away,
and three pontoon bridges bui'lt; one on the main Orangeburg road, and the
other two at Schilling's bridge.
The 17th corps occupied Orang.eburg. and destroyed the railroad thence to
and including the Uongarce river bridge. The left wing meanwhile was moving towards Columbia by the nearest roads. The right wing now directed its
march towards Columbia, and, after some opposition at r:rhomas's creek and Oongaree creek, where the enemy was found well intrenched, arrived at a point
opposite the city on the 16th of February.
'The bridges over the Saluda, Broad and Congaree rivers were all found to
have been burnt. A pontoon bridge was built at the Saluda river bridge, near
the factory, and a portion of the 15th corps crossed during the night. The
left wing· pontoon bridge was built over the 8aluda at Zion church, 9~ miles
above Columbia, and some force crossed. On the 17th a pontoon bridge was
built just above the ruins of the former bridge over Broad river, three miles above
Columbia, and the right wing crossed to the north bank and occupied the city,
the greater part of which was burnt during the night. Many reasons are given
for this flagrant violation of General Sherman's orders. It was principally due to
the fact that the citizens gave liquor to the troops until they were crazily drunk
and beyond the control of their officers. Thfl burning cotton, fired by retreating rebels, and the presence of a large number of escaped prisoners, excited the
intoxicated soldiers to the first acts of violence, after which they could not be
res trained.
On the 18th the left wing crossed the Broad river on a pontoon bridge, thrown
at the mouth of
ateree creek, near Freshley's mills, and commenced the destruction of the Greenville and Columbia railroad, from Alston toward Columbia.
On the 19th, by direction of General Sherman, all the railroad shops, depots,
city gas-works, &c., in Columbia were destroyed, the Michigan engineers
furnishing the working parties.
On the 20th the march was resumed, the 17th army corps, together with
the J\Iichigan engineers, at work destroying the Columbia and Charlotte
railroad from Columbia northward, while the 15th corps was at work from
Columbia towards Kingsville.
rrhe Charlotte railroad was tlwrougltly destroyed from Columbia to White
Oak Station, 44- miles. At Winnsboro' the whole army was concentrated, and
the left wing assisted in the destruction of the railroad thence to the northward.
From vVinnsboro' and \~Vhite Oak the left wing and the cavalry moved to
Rocky 1\Iount, and the right wing to Peay's ferry. A pontoon bridge was
thrown over the Catawba (Wateree) at each of these points, and after a great
deal of trouble, arising from high water, rapid currents and muddy roads, the
army was transferred to the eastern bank of the river. 'l'hc cros::;ing was begun
on the rooming of the 23c1 February, and was completed on the 27th, afterone
bridg·e at Rocky Mount had been carried away. It was 700 feet in leng th, and
about 200 feet of it was totally lost. The balance was recovered, and the
bridge rebuilt.
By this time the cavalry had passed through I,ancaster-the 20th corps
was at Hanging Rock-and the right wing was at rrillersville, in th e vicinity of
which it crossed Lynch's creek, after almost incredible labor in building b1idges
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and corcluroying roads. The remainder of the army crof?sed at Finilly's and
McMann's bridges. ,'l'he whole army was now moving on Cheraw, and was
concentrated there on the 3d March, without any opposition not easily overcome. A large amount of material of war was captured at Cheraw, all of
which (except three guns brought on as trophies) was destroyed by the Michigan engineers.
'I'he march was resumed on the 6th l\fai·ch, the 15th, 17th, and 20th corps
crossing the Pedee on a pontoon bridge at Cheraw, and the 14th corps and
cavalry on another at Sneedsboro'.
The whole army now aimed to concentrate at Fayetteville, N.C., the cavalry
passing through Rockingham, and thence via the first road north of the Fayetteville and Albemarle plank-road; the 14th corps 1Jia I . ove's bridge over Lnmber river; the 20th corps 'Uia McFarland's btidge; the 15th corps ~'ia Gilchrist's bridge; and the 17th corps via Campbell's bridge.
All these bridges had been destroyed by the E;nemy, and each was replaced
either by a pontoon or a trestle bridge.
The concentration at Fayetteville was effected on the 11th March with very
little opposition, though the enemy's cavalry was all around us. At Ji...,ayetteville it was found that the enemy had greatly enlarged the capacity of the old
United States arsenal.
'l'he Michigan engineers were at once set at work to destroy it, to batter
clown all masonry walls, m.1d to break to pieces all machinery of whatever kind,
and to prepare the two large magazines for explosion. The immense machine
shops, foundries, timber sheds, &c., were soon reduced to a heap of rubbish, and
at a concerted signal, fire was applied to these heaps, and to all wooden buildings and piles of lumber; also to the powder trains leading to the magazines.
A couple of hours sufficed to reduce to ashes everything that would burn, and
the high wind prevailing at the time scattered these ashes, so that only a few
piles of broken bricks remained of that repossessed arsenal. Much of the machinery here destroyed had been brought, at the beginning of the war, from
the old arsenal at Harper's Ferry.
On the 13th pontoon bridges were thrown over the Cape Fear river as fol·
lows: that of the left wing, just below the ruins of the road bridge, (it having
been burned by the enemy,) and that of the right wing, about three miles below, and the army commenced crossing.
On the 15th the bridges were taken up, and the left 'ving, together with the
cavalry, moved out on the Raleigh road. rl'he supply trains of the cavalry and
of the left wing, under escort of one division from the 14th corps and one
from the 20th, after going some seven or eight miles turned to the eastward, taking the main GoldHboro' road, whither they were ordered. The cavalry and the other four divisions continued on the Raleigh road until the enemy
was encountered at. Tayler's Hole creek. Early next morning the enemy, consisting of Rhett's brigade of ~outh Carolina heavy artillery, was attacked and
quickly uil:lloclged from his intrenchments.
Our troops pressed on in pursuit, and soon encountered the enemy in considerable force, intrenched at the cross-roads south of Averysboro', his lines extending from Cape Fear river to Black river. At this point the peninsula between the two rivers is narrowest. By the time proper dispositions were made
to attack, it was clark, and before daylight next morning (March 17,) the enemy
was gone, but was closely followed as far as Averysboro' by one division of the
20th corps.
A map illustrating the operations at this point was forwarded to the bureau
of engineers with General Poe's letter, dated August 14th, 1865.
The pursuit to AverysLoro' developed the fact that the enemy had retreated
in the direction of Smithfield, and our march was resumed along the main road
hence to Goldsboro'. On the morning of the 19th, the right wing was within
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two miles of the left. rrhe enemy having kept at a safe distance from us, and
destroyed all bridges leading to the northward, in advance of the head of our
column, it was inferred that he did not intend to offer any serious opposition to
our march. The right wing was ordered to move from Lee's store direct to
Goldsboro', and the left wing aimed to reach the same point via Cox's bridge.
When near Bentonville, the enemy, moving down the Smithfield road, suddenly
·attacked the left wing and gained a temporary advantage over its leading division; 1ut the other three divisions, the cavalry and the Michigan engineers,
getting into position, repulsed every subsequent attack of the enemy, all of which
were of a very desperate character, as the rebel commander well knew that daylight of next morning would bring with it the 'entire right wing. And such was the
caBe : that part of the army, marching nearly all night, and advancing ~'ia the
same road that the left wing was on, but .from the opposzte direction, reached
the enemy's rear, not having been stopped a moment by the opposition of the
enemy. The rebel line was of course at once doubled back, and a junction
was made between the right and left wings of our forces.
The next day (March 20) the first division 17th army corps succeeded in
getting within 200 yards of the bridge over Mill creek, on the Smithfield road,
and the 15th corps carried and h eld the entire line of the enemy's skirmish pits
in its front. Again the enemy ran away during the night, and was two miles
beyond Mill creek.
On the 14th August General Poe transmitted to the Engineer bureau a map
which was intended to illustrate this battle.
The trains meanwhile had never stopped their movement towards Goldsboro',
and the troops now following, soon began to pour into that town, already occupied by the troops of General Schofield, and the most wonderful campaign of
the war was ended. Two pontoon bridges were built over the Neuse at Uox's,
and two more near the County bridge, upon which fWerything crossed.
· Supplies of all kinds were very badly needed, and among the rest the canvas covers of the pontoon boats needed renewal. In the train attached to the
light wing this was particularly the case, since many of the covers had been in
the water an aggregate of sixty days. Attention is esp ecially directed to this
train, because the material had been hauled from Nashville to Goldsboro' upon
wagons, and had been in constant use, and yet the train was serviceable. Indeed, all that was required to make it pelfectly efficient was a ne~v set of canvas
covers.
Fully one-eighth of the whole army was without shoes, and nearly as badly
off for the other articles of clothing, having now marched through the heart of
the enemy's country, over swamps and through forests, nearly if not quite 500
miles, occupying sixty days of time, during which they drew but little more than
their sugar and coffee from the government, gathering subs istence for themselves and animals ·from the enemy's country.
During the march from Atlanta to Savannah the line of march was parallel
to the larger water-courses. On this, it led at right angles to them all, and,
as expected, the difficulties encountered were greatly increased. 'l'he line of
march was chosen near the junction between the clay of the upland, with the
sand of the lower country, which may be tolerably well defined by tracing a
line through the lower "rapids" on each of the streams crossed.
It was hoped and expected that along this line woulcl be found the best
roads and the minimum amount of mud and swamps, while at the sa,me time it
passed through or in the vicinity of the towns it was considered important to
attack.
This supposition was entirely correct. Still the route, at its best, involves
an immense amount of bridgiug· of every kind known in active campaigning,
besides some four hundred miles of corduroying. '£he lat ter was a very
simple affair, where there were plenty of fence rails, but in their absence in-
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volveu the severest labor. It was found that two good fences furnisned enough
rails to corduroy a strip of road as long as one of them so as to make it passable. General Poe estimates the amount of corduroying on this campaig·n at
fully 100 miles to each army corps, making an aggregate of 400 miles. 'I'his
is a moderate estimate. 'rhis kind of work was rarely done by the cavalry,
since their trains moved with the infantry columns.
'l'he right wing built 15 pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of
3,720 feet. The left wing built about 4,000 feet, thus making a total of 7,720
feet, or nearly 1~ mile. The amount of trestle bridge built was not measured,
but it was not so great.
In corduroying, the entire available force of the army was used-engineers,
pionrers, and infantry. 'I'he pontooning was all done by engineer troops, according to the organization already given, and the building of trestle bridges
by engineers and pioneers.
Surveys have been made of the entire line of march of each army corps, as
well as the route pursued by the headquarters military division. 'I'he latter
was as good a survey as could be made with odometer and prismatic compass,
and was under charge of Captain H. A. Differs, assistant adjutant general Yolunteers, on engineer duty.
Upon arriving at Goldsboro', attention was devoted to refitting the army for
a new campaign. The grand army was reorganized, so that it consisted of
three divisions of two army corps each, viz :
'l'he army of the Tennessee, of the 15th and 17th corps, being the right
wing; the army of the Ohio, department of North Carolina, of the lOth and
23d corps, being the centre; and the army of Georgia, of the 14th and 20th
corps, being the left wing.
The engineer organization to correspond with this, was :
1. Staff: 0. M. Poe, captain engineers, brevet colonel United States army,
chief engineer, military di,·ision, Mississippi; C. B. Reese, captain engineers,
brevet colonel United States army, chief engineer, D. and A. T.; W. J.
Twining, captain engineers, brevet lieutenant colonel United States a~·my,
ehief engineer, department of North Carolina; W. Ludlow, 1st lieutenant,
engineers, brevet major U ~ited States army, assistant to chief engineer,
J\L D. M.; A. Stickney, 1st lieutenant engineers, brevet captain United States
army, assistant to Colonel Reese; A. N. Damvell, 1st lieutenant engineers
United States army, assistant to Lieutenant Colonel '!'wining.
2. Engineer troops and troops of the line on engineer duty : 1st regiment
Michigan engineers and mechanics, Colonel J. B. Yates, commanding, unassigned, under direct orders of chief engineer; 1st regiment Missouri engineers,
Lieutenant Colonel William Tweeddale, (right wing,) pontoniers; detachment
15th regiment New York volunteer engineers, commanding·, (centre,) pontoniers; eugineer battalion 23d army corps. (centre,) engineers; 58th reg·iment
Indiana volunteer infantry, L:eutenant Colonel J. Moore, commanding, (left
wing,) pontoniers.
'
3. Pontoon trains: With right wing, 600 feet canvas; with centre, 600 feet
canvas; with left wing, 800 feet canvas; total, 2,000.
The organization of pioneers and tool trains was exactly as described heretofore, except that it was extended to the additional force that had joined the
army.
On the lOth April the army moved forward upon the road to Raleigh,
meeting with feeble resistance. rl'he usual corduroying and bridge- building
commenced at once, and four pontoon bridges were laid across the N eut:~e on
the 11th. 'l'he city of Raleigh was entered without opposition on the 13th,
and in a day or two afterwards followetl the convention between General
Sherman and the rebel General Joseph E. Johnston. At the time of this con-
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vention we had pushed a pontoon train out to Aven's ford, on Cape Fear
river, and had built a bridge there.
After the surrender of the rebel forces, the forces composing the right and
left wings, as a,lready described, commenced their ma,rch to Washington.
Upon the arrival at vVashington, the pontoon trains which had done such
efficient service were turned over to an officer designated by the Engineer
bureau. One of them had been hauled on wagons from Nashville, Tennessee,
via Chattanooga, Atlanta, Savannah and Raleigh, to this city. And the others
had in like manner been hauled over the same route from Chattanooga, and
they had been in almost daily use for a year, with one single removal of the
canvas covers, and were in excellent condition when delivered here.
Can any fads go further to show the value of the canvas train in campaigns
of the character described 1 No wooden boats would have stood a moiety of
the rongh usage bestowed upon these. A few days' hauling over the mountains of Georgia, or the corduroy roads of the Carolina swamps, would have
used them up.
As the result of experience, it is suggested that a change be made in the
wagons of the canvas pontoon train, so that the wheels and axles shall conform to those in use in the quartermaster's department, and the balance of the
wood-work be that proposed by Colonel Fettes.
It may be mentioned that the bridge equipage, in charge of the 58th Indiana
volunteers, 'vas hauled all the way from Chattanooga to Washington on the
ordinary quartermaster's wagon, the convenience of which was constantly
observed for 1,300 miles.
'l'he constant practice of our troops has made them tolerably good judges of
what constitutes a good defensive line, and lightened the labors of the engineer staff very materially.
The accuracy of the fire of sharpshooters on both sides led the troops to
adopt the ''head log" on all their rifle-trenches. This is a good stout log of
hard wood, which is cut as long as possible, and laid upon blocks placed on the
superior slope, a foot or two outside the interior crest. 'l'he blocks supporting
the'" hertel log" raise it sufficiently from the parapet to allow the musket to
pass through underneath it, and steady aim to be taken, while the log covers the
head from the enemy's fire. 1!-,requently the blocks are replaced by skids,
which rest on the ground in rear of the trench, so that if the "head log" is
knocked off the parapet by artillery fire, it rolls along thrse skids to the rear
without injuring anybody; many miles of these "head logs" were examined
without finding any indication that their use had been otherwise than advantageous. There was no evidence that a single man had been killed on either
side by splinters thrown from them by artillery projectiles, or from logs thrown
off the parapet by the same means.
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Recapitulation of work done by engineer troops and tronps under engineer di?·ection du; ing the campaigns covered by this 1·eport.

What campaign.

Atlanta campaign ........ .
Savannah campaign . . ... " .
Goldsboro' campaign ..... .
:March to Washington ...•. ;.
Total in feet ... . ...... .
Total in miles ......... .

3,500

3,460
7,720
3,000

3,330
1,700
4,000

17,680

9,030

==-------_-

----------=

3.35

1.7

100
60
400
20

26
240
120

====-=--= i=-===i
580

386

980
1,700
2,!500
1,600

==
6,780

Narrative collated from the Report qf Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Sticlcney, corps of engineers, 3d June, 1865, to General Richard Delafield, eM(}/
cnginrer United States a·r my. (See plans Nos. 3 and 1,1.)
While remaining in Goldsboro',. from March 24 to April 10, the pontoon
train was put in complete repair as far as material at hand would admit. 'l'hirty
new canvas boat covers were received, and all but ten of the old covers sent to
Newbern.
April 10 the army moved out from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, arriving at
the latter place· on the 14th. 'l'he next day the 15th army corps proceeded to
1\fonisville and the 17th army corps to Jones's Station, at which places they
were halted on account of the negotiations for the surrender of the enemy's
army. None of the bridges over the streams between Goldsboro' and Raleigh
were destroyed; but the planks were in moRt cases thrown off and were soon
replaced, causing no delay of any consequence. 'rhe roads were in very bad
condition between Goldsboro' and Pineville, the 15th army corps being obliged
to build two hundred ar.d fourteen (214) feet of wagon bridges over sloughs, 175
feet of foot-bridges, and thirteen thousand one hundred and ninety-six ( 13, 196)
yarns of corduroy. The 17th army corps made four hundred and twenty· six
(4.26) feet of bridges and sixteen thousand nine hundred and eighteen (16,918)
yards of corduroy. The army remained in the vicinity of Raleigh till April 29,
when, the rebel army having Bnrrendered, it started on its home,yard march towards Petersburg, where it arrived May 6. 'rhe roads were in excellent
condition, and bridges standing ovee all the rivers except the Neuse and Roanoke. 'l'he army arrived at Robinson's ferry, on the Roanoke, l\1ay 3, the
pontoon train being in advance. ':£lhis river is seven hundred and forty feet
wide at the point at which the army crossed, and the depth of water from five
to ten feet. 'l'he pontoon train contained only five hundred and eighty (580)
feet of bridging; but they found four large wooden boats on the river, which
were rigged up with centre-pieces, made four trestles, and the bridge was ready
for crossing by 8 a. m. on the 4th, after a hard night's work. After remaining
two days at Petersburg the army moved to Manchester.
The major general commandiBg informed Captain Stickney that from Manchester up they would find bridge~ over all streams, as they were to be left for
62 w
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them by the army of the Potomac, which preceded them; consequently he did
not think it necessary to procure more chess.
On the 12th of May the 17th army corps started for Alexandria, ..the 15th
army corps on the folLowing day, and arrived there on the 19th. The roads
were generally good all the way from Raleigh to Alexandria, and the army
moved with su1prising celerity. He was disappointed, however, about the
bridges, there being none over the Pamunkey or Occoquan rivers. The former
was very much swollen, the water overflowing the southern bank to the depth
of about two and a half (2~) feet when they first arrived, the morning of May
13, and continued to rise dnriog the day and following night.
The pontoon bridge was laid and some trains passed over that afternoon; but
before the next morning the water rose so high that it becamt:. necessary to
build a kind of trestle bridge about thirty (30) yards in length to approach the
pontoons. 'This was done by the first Michigan engineers and 17th army corps
pioneers.
Lieutenant Colonel Wm. 'l'weeddale, with his regiment, the 1st Missouri engineers, had charge of the pontoon train.
'l'he pontoon train has, most of the time, been divided into two sectionsone section moving with each army corps, and each section being accompanied
by a portion of the 1st Missouri engineers.
'l'he 1st Michigan engineers moved with the 17th army corps, but were under
Captain Stickney's orders only on the occasion at the Roanoke river.
1!-,ollowing is a statement of places where pontoon bridges were laid :
April 14, over Neuse river, at Battle's bridge, 160 feet.
April 29, over Neu"e river, at Ferrel's bridge, 200 feet.
May 3, over Roanoke river, at Robinson's ferry, 7 40 feet.
May 13, over Pamunkey river, at Little Paige's bridge, 200 feet.
May 18, over Occoquan river, at Occoquan, 280 feet.

]{arrative col1ated from tlw 1·eport if Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet B1·igadier
General Comstock, if the corps r:f engineers, qf the 27th January, 186:5, addressed to General Terry, and copy to General Delujitld, Cltief Engineer.
He submits the following report of engineer operations, in connexion with
the capture of Fort Fisher, together with a sketch of that work, and another
of the country in its vicinity. (See plans Nos. 5 and 6.)
l!"'ort Fisher is situated on the peninsula between the Cape Fear river and
the Atlantic ocean, about a mile and a half northeast of Federal Point. J.i'or
five miles north of Fede1al Point this peninsula is sandy and low, not rising
more than fifteen feet above high tide; the interior abounding in fresh water
swamps, often wooded and almost impassable, while much of the dry land, until
one gets within half a mile of Fort Fisher, is covered "\vith wood or low undergrowth, except a strip about three hundred yards wide along the sea-shore.
'The landing of the troops composing the expedition was effected on the seabeach, about five miles north of ..E'ort Fi::;her, on January 12, 1865, and Paine's
division was at once pu::hed across to Cape Fear river with instructions to
take up a line to be held against any attack from the direction of Wilmington.
This line on the morning of January 13 was alreafty defensible, and was further
strengthened during the day; while on the 14th a second line was laid out and
begun under charge of Lieutenant J. H. Price, in rear of its left. Pioneer companies were organized in Ames's and Paine's divisions; and, as during the 14th
the fire of the rebel gunboat Chickamauga killed and wounded a number of our
men, Lieutenant O'Keeffe, with his company of the 15th regirnent New York
volunteer engineers, was directed to build a battery for two thirty·pounder
rifle Parrott guns on the bank of the river to keep her off.
On the afternoon of January 14 a reconnoissance waR pushed, under direction
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of the major general commanding, to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher,
and a small advanced work taken possession of. 'l'his was at once turned into
a defensive line to be held against any attempt from Fort Fisher. 'l'he reconnaissance showed that the palisading in front of the work bad been seriously
injured by th e navy fire; only nine guns could be seen on the land front, where
sixteen had been counted on Christmas day. 'The steady, though not rapid,
fire of the navy prevented the enemy from using eithbr artillery or musketry
on the reconnoitring party. It seemed probable that troops could be got within
two hundred yards of the vrork without serious loss, and it was a matter of
great doubt whether the necessary ammunition could be supplied by the open
beach if regular approaches were determined on. It was decided to assault,
and the assault was made on the 15th, at 3-2- p. m., after three hours of navy
fire, by three deployed brigades, following one another at intervals of about three
hundred yards, and each making its final rush for the west end of the land face,
from a rough rifle-pit ~bout three hundred yards from the work.
At the point attacked, the palisading was less injured than elsewhere, it being partially bidden, and it was necessary to use axes to cut, and timbers to
batter it down, in order that troops might pass readily through it. Powdersacks for blowing these palisades down had been prepared, but were not used.
After seven hours' fighting, gaining traverse by traverse, the work was won.
Fort Fisher consists o.f two fronts; the first or land front, running across the
peninsula, at this point seven hundred yards wide, is four hundred and eighty
yards in length, while the second, or sea front, runs from the right of the first,
parallel to the beach, to the mound battery, a distance of thirteen hundred
yards. 'rhe land front is intended to resist any attack from the north; the sea
front to prevent any of our naval vessels from running through New inlet or
'
landing troops on Federal Point.
First land front.-This front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape
Fear river side, connected by :JJ curtain with a bastion on the ocean side. The
parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with traverses
1·ising ten feet above it, and running back on their tops, which were from eight to
twelve feet in thickness, to a distance of from thirty to forty feet from the interior crest. 'J.1he traverses on the left half bastion were about twenty-fi \'e feet
in length on top. The earth for this heavy parapet, and the enormous traverses,
at their inner ends more than thirty feet in height, was obtained partly from a
shallow exterior ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work.
Between each pair of traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on
the right of this front were only partially completed. A palisade which is
loop-holed, and has a banquette, runs in front of this face at a distance of about
fifty feet in front of the foot of the exterior slope, from the Cape Fear river to
the ocean, with a position for a gun between the left of the front and the river,
and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle
traverse on the curtain was a bomb-proof postern, whose exterior opening was
covered by a small redan for t~o field-pieces, to give flank fire along· the curtain_
The traverses were generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. 'I' he slopes
of the work appear to have been revettecl with marsh sod, or covered with
grass, and to have had an inclination of forty-five degrees or a little less. On
those slopes most exposed to navy fire the revetment or grassing has been
entirely destroyed, and the inclination reduced to thirty degrees.
'l,he ends of traverses as they rise above the parapet are very ragged ; still
all damage done to the earth-work can be readily repaired, its st?·engtl~ bezng
about the same as before the bombardment.
'l'he damage done by the navy fire was, 1st, to the palisades, which were s:>
injured as in most places to be little obstacle to assaulting troops; 2d, to guns
and carriag·es. 'rhere were originally on the front twenty-one guns and three
mortars; of these tl~ree-fou?·ths were rendered unserviceable by injuries to either
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gun or carriage. · '.rhe gun in the right bastion, the :field·pieces in front of the
postern, and one or two mortars, were used against the assaulting troops.
'l,here \vas a formidable system of torpedoes two hundred yards in advance
of this front, the torpedoes being about eight.y feet apart, and each containilJg,
about one hundred pounds of powder. '.rhey were connected with the fort by
three sets of w.ires; fortunately, the sets leading directly to those over which
the army and navy columns moved had been cut by shells, and no torpedo was
exploded.
Second scafi·ont.-This front consists of a series of batteries, mounting in all
twenty-four guns, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry
parapet so as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses
for the protection of the guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses are
also generally bomb-proofed.
Captain M. Adams, 4th New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J.
H. Price, 4th United States colored troops, commanding pioneer companies of
Ames's and Paine's divisions, and First Lieutenant K. S. 0. Kuppe, commanding
company of 15th 1\ ew York volunteer engineers, have, with their commands,
been of great service in the construction of batteries and defensive works. First
Lieutenant A. H. Knowlton, 4th New Hampshire volunteers, assisted in making
sketches of Fort :E'isher; as also Private :::)clmltze, 15th New York volunteer
engineers.
lt may be added that in thirty bomb-proofs and magazines, and their passages, there were 14,500 feet of floor space, not including the main magazine,
which was exploded, and whose dimensions are unknown.
Nan·ativefrom Major McAlester's report if June 1, 1865,furwarded to General
Delafield, Chiif Engineer United States aTmy.
The maps and plans (Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10) indicate in sufficient detail the engineer operations in the late campaign of the army of West Mississippi in
southeru Alabama, against the defences of the city of Mobile. 'rhe principal
of these took place before Spanish fort. Those before Blakely had been
barely initiated when the place fell by assault.
Formal siege operations not having been ordered or contemplated at Spanish
fort, the attention of the engineer officers was exclusively directed to the location and construction of batteries for the reception of the field guns, with the
troops and the siege guns, as rapidly as they could be delivered on the ground,
and the construction of such trenches as were needed simply to communicate
with the batteries. On the 30th of March, however, by special authority of
the mr0or general commanding, Major McAlester directed the advanced rifle
trenches and pits to be connected and widened to six feet, together with a sufficient
number of approaches thereto, fdr the convenience of troops posted to resist
sorties of the garrison. These were completed by the 4th of April. Subsequently this advanced parallel trench became a ~econd parallel by the uniting
and widening in like manner the rifle trenches and breastworks coustructed on
the advanced crests of the ravines first occupied, forming for some purposes a
:first parallel.
The investment of Spanish fort by land took place on the 27th of March.
On the 29th of March he located a battery of eight thirty-pounder Parrott rifle
guns on the southeast shore of .Minette bay, against batteries Huger and Tracy,
and the rebel gunboats, (all of which enfiladed the ravine occupied by our right,)
and the Spanish fort communications by Blakely river. This battery accomplidiOd all its propo:;;ed objects quite satil::lfr.tctorily at ranges varying from twentyfour hundred to thirty-th.ree l~unr/tred yaTds. Fire was opened from this battery
on the 31st March, as also from eighteen siege guns (including six twenty-
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pounder rifles and eight mortars) and forty-one field guns, all in position on that
date against Spanish fort itself. No enfilading batteries yet complete.
On the 4th April there were in position against Spanish fort thirty-eight
siege guns (including six twenty-pounder rifles and sixteen mortars) and thirtyseven field guns, all of which, (sever~ty-five with the :Minette bay battery
ag·ainst batteries Huger and Tracy, opened fire at 5 p. m., and continued till 7
p.m. The enfilading batteries not quite ready.
On the 8th April there were in position against Spanish fort fifty-three siege
guns (including nine twenty-pounder rifles and eixteen mortars) and thirtyseven field guns. Ten siege rifles and five siege howitzers on onr left centre
eufiladed the enemy's centre and left, and four siege howitzers close in, near
our extreme right, enfiladed the enemy'o:3 eentre. The Minette bay battery,
bearing on batteries Huger and Tracy, contained on this date four thirty-pouuder
and two one-hundred-pounder rifles.
The final bombardment from all these guns opened at 5.30 p. m., and continued till 7.30 p.m. During the bombardment a lodgement was effected within
the enemy's line on his extreme left. At abont midnight the el'tire fort was in
our posse.ssion. Spaniah fort line had a developm3nt of two milea, an l an
arm1ment of about forty guns, seven of which were CoBhorn mortars, two
WAre eight-inch columbiads, four were heavy P<1rrott rifles, and the remainder
siege and field guns.
rrhc development of the enemy's Blakely line was tvi'o and a half miles, and
the arm ~tment between forty and fifty g·uns, principally field guns and howitzers.
The land investment of Blakely was completed on the 5th ApriL On the 6th,
in order to obtain command of the enemy's water communications with l\Iobile,
from Blakely as well as Spanish fort and batteries Huger and 'l'racy, (the navy
having failed in this,) McAlester established a battery for two one hundred-pounder
Parrott rifl<:s on the spur immediately north of the head of .Minette bay. On the
9th April, the one-hundred-pounders not having arrived, four thirty-pounder
Parrott rifles were placed in this battery, and opened :fire on the rebel landing at
Blakely, and the rebel transports moving on Tensas river. On that day there
were in position against Blakely twenty-four field guns, and against the rebel
gunboats, which were stationed so as to enfilade our right, (at a pointjuet above
Blakely,) four thirty-pounder rifles. Early in the morning McAlester asked for
twenty-eight siege guns and sixteen e.iege mortars, and took immediate steps
to place them in position against Blakely. At 5.30 p. m. the place was assaulted successfully.
On the 1Oth April batteries were begun on the shores of :Minette bay, eight
hundred yards north of .1\Iinette bayou, for two one-humlred-pounder and eight
thirty-pounder Parrott rifles against batteries Huger and rrracy, which were
still occupied by the enemy. On the afternoon of the 11th the thirty-pounders
opened fire, together with the battery built on the southeaet shore of Minette
bay, in connexion with operations against Spanish fort, on batteries Huger and
Tracy. At night of the same day the latter were evacuated. '
:Major McAlester refers particularly to the services of Brevet Major J. C.
Palfrey, captain of engineers, senior engineer 13th army corps, and Brevet Captain 0. J. Allen, corps of engineers, senior eng·ineer 16th army corps, in front
of Spanish fort. rrhe ga1lantry and professional skill displayed by them in
conducting engineering operations on their respective fronts, and their energy
and faithfulness in carrying out orders and instructions, arc worthy of unreserved commendation and substantial recognition.
Senior engineers and engineers of corps ancl divisions did valuable service
throughout the campaign.
·
Captain Patten, of the Inspector General's department, volunteered his service3 to construct several batteries in front of Spanish fOTt and on Minette
hay, and they were well app!:eciatecl.
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\VEST PoiNT, N. Y. June 26, 1865.
Sm: 'The board of visitors invited this year to attend the annual examination
-of the United StateR Military Academy, and to inqnire generally into the conditinn of the insnution, respectf ly submit the followjng as their report:
The members of the board, being I)early all present, on the 2d instant entered
at once upon the discharge of their duties. Within a few days, others arriving,
the whole number was complete, with the exception of one gentleman on the list
who has not appeared; and from that time until the termination of their labors,
to day, they have continned to devote themselYes, with more or less constant
participatiun of each, to the business for which they assembled.
'.rhis somewhat protracted session bas been occasioned, not merely by the usual
great variety of subjects presented for investigation and consideration, bnt by
the size of the graduating class of cadet.s, more numerous than any heretofore
ever flent from the academy, and the necessarily longer time required for their
examination. The board believe, however, that the time has not been unprofitably empllyed.
'rhe board, after organization, and at o1her times during their stay, have visited
and carefully inspected the various buildings, grounds, library, scientific apparatus, and other property attached to aad used for the purposes qf the academy,
and have, during a considerable portion of each day, attended the examinations
of the several clas5es, and have also witnessed the exhibition of the drill of the
cadets in the various branches of military service.
The training, drill, and discipline of the cadets in all that relates to the
dut.ies of the soldier appear to the board to be of the first and highest order; and
they doubt if a finer or more creditable exhibition in those particulars can be
made by a body of military students at any other institution in the world.
The average proficiency of the young men of the graduating class, as indicated
by their answers and performances in the examination room, was only fair, or at
least not above the ordinary measure of other first-rate educational establishments
in this country.
'This itl perhaps principally owing to an attempt to crowd too much into the
last year of the academic course; a difficulty which ma,y in some degree be
remedied by a proposed new arrangement of the subjects taught during the four
yea,rs given to instruction here. But it was evident that there was more than a
proper and allowable difference between the sections of the class in question;
and that some of those lo\Ycst on the list would hardly be considered as coming
up to thP standard necessary to secure the honors of a noble national institution
like this.
In one particular, especially, the members of the board could not help but remark a too prevailing deficiency, even in the highest classes. '.rhere was an
almost general want of distinctness and precision in the language in which the
cadets expressed their answers when under examination, exhibited even in frequent and inexcusable errors of pronunciation :1nd of grammatical construction.
'Vhile the board did not yet expect proof of finished cultivation and scholarship,
it is thought that more pains taken on the part both of instructors and pupils
might have avoided at least such common and careless inaccuracy, and would
have secured a habit of exactness not to be altogether overcome or confused,
even under the ordeal of examination.
The 1mbjects of discipline, instruc tion, police, administration, and fiscal affairs,
to which the attention of the board is by li'tw especially directed, were referred
to standing committees; and the reports of those committees are hereto appended,
as parts of this report.
As a means of obtaining direct and reliable information to guide them in their
inquiries and reflections, the board corsidered it proper, also, at an early day after
their organization, to apply to those officers immediately connected with the gov-
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ernment and instruction of the academy. Accordingly, the following resolution
w.as passed, and a copy thereof communicated to the supr.rintendent and each
mern ber of the academic staff:
"Resolved, That the superintendent of the Military Academy and the several
members of the academic staff be invited to communicate to this board their views
and suggestions in writing, for the future management and requirements of the
institution, and what changes, if any, are necessary for its increased usefulness."
And afterwardt>, by further resolution, the same invitation was sent to each
member of the military staff of the academv.
In compliance with. this request, answer~ have been received from the superintendent, and from the majority of the members of the academic and mil1tary
staffs, which, as being of more or less interest, and some of them containing valuable views and statements, are also appended and submitted herewith. Several
of the officers have not, however, made any reply, nor thought proper to give the
board the benefit of their suggestions.
In this connexion it is thought proper to record a difference of opinion in relation to then· respective·powers and duties, which has arisen between the board
and the superinteudent of the academy, and the disposition made of the question.
This record is dae to those who may C1lme after us, as serving to define and construe the power and practice of any future .board of visitors.
Understanding that an order had been issued by the superintendent to the
several members of the academic and military staffs, requiring them to transmit
such communications as the board of visitors had invited them to make, only
through him as" the usual official channel," the board considered it a just interpretation of the duty iu which they were engaged, to pass and convey to the
superintendent the following resolutions:
Resolved, That this board, deriving its existence and authority by appointment of the President, under the provisions of a law of the United States, is
tbarged by that law, and by the inst.ructioas of the appointing power, to inquire iuto, and report for the information of Congress, 'the actual state of the
discipline, instruction, police, administration, :fiscal affairs and other concerns'
of the l\Iilitary Academy; that the information sought for by the board, in the
discharge of their duties, by inquiry and request for written or other communications from the members of the academic and military staffs, or from any
other officers or persons within the command at West Point, is of the nature of
testimony; and this board does not recognize the right of the superintendent of
the academy and commandant of the post to supervise the said testimony,
whether written or oral, or to require the same to pass through his hands, but
denies the propriety of his claim to any such supervision or inspection.
"Resolved, 'l'hat the secretary immediately communicate a copy of the foregoing resolution to Brigadier General Cullum, the superintendent of the academy."
rrhesc resolutions being forwarded by the superintendent to the War Department for instructions, the board are gratified to learn, from copies of correspondence communicated to them, that the Secretary of War is of opinion that "the
department has no authority over the board of visitors to direct its course of procedure for acl]_uiring information upon the points concerning which it is required
to make report." If it were otherwise, it must be very obvious that circumstances might s0me time exist under which a board of visitors might be crippled of its usefulness, and defeated in t.he pursuits of the very information it
might be moRt important to obtain. 'l'hese remarks, however, and the course
of the present board in this matter, are not to be understood as meaning any
impeachment of the present superintendent, so far as relates to the general exercise of the duties of his office, or as intimating any disposition manifested on
his part to interfere with or limit the general scope of the inquiries instituted
by them. On the contrary, the mo~t perfect facility in every other respect for
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pursuing their investigations has been most courteously, and at all times,
afforded by General Cullum himself, as well RS by all others sharing in the government or manRgement of the academy. There was only an issue maJe with
him i11 regard to the proper legal power of the visitors, in which they believed
him honestly mistaken in his intervention; and they considered it a duty to
themselves and to the government to maintain and vindicate their right of free
investigation. But, to their surprise and regret, they find that General Cullum
does not understand the letter of the Secretary of War to him as sustaining
the position taken by the board, but still persists in requiring the information
gi-ven by his officers to come only through him. Several such communications,
when the call for them was renewed, have been thus forwarded just as the board
is closing its session. By reference to the most of these it will be seen tlutt the
writers are remarkably reticent or unwilling to speak in regard to the academy
in any way; and it is only to be left to conjecture ow far such declining to
testify may or may not have been affected by the fact that their letters must
pass under the examination of their commanding officer.
Referring to the accompanying reports of the several committees charged
with the consideration of special subjects, and to the suggestions furnished by
officers of the academy, it is not deemed necessary to repeat the details contained
tl1erein, nor enlarge the views and reasoning on the different points presented.
The members of the boanl are agreed in the following general conclusions and
recommendations, which they propose as embodying· all that they think. most
important now to be urged for the future increased usefulness of the institution :
1. We are of opiniun that the law should be so changed as that the superintendency of the academy may be thrown open to the whole army, instead of confining the selection, as now, to an officer of the engineer corps. The institution having ceased to be only, or mainly, a school for engineers, as at first established, and having become the one great national military and polytechnic
institute of our country, the reason for such e:Yclnsiveness no longer exist ,
and it is recommended that the appointment be free hereafter to every arm of the
service.
·
2. Looking to the probable organization and increase of the army of the
United States, and finding that with the present accommodations, and at a comparatively small increased expense, a greater number can be educated than are
now admitted to the academy, we recommend that the corps of cadets be increased to four hundred; but this increase should of course be made gradually
aud in successive years, so as to keep up a dne proportion aq.d equality of numb;re in the different classes. Wedesire, however, not to be u,nrlerstood in this
recommendation as proposing to interfere with a system which we trust will be
a-2opted for commissioning a large proportion of officers from the ranks or from
civil life, on proper examination. 'l'he demand will be ample enough to require
both sources of supply; and we are clearly satisfied that, in justice to the many
meritorious officers aud soldiers of volunteers who have shown their patriotic
devotion to the country in its late hour of trial and need, selections should be
made, and commissions given to all those who can establish claims to appointment by reasonable proof of capacity and acquirements, taken in connexion
with actual service in the field. On this point, too, we beg leave to suggest
that it might be a wise and just act of legislation for Congl'ess to extend the
age of admission to the academy to twenty-four years, for the benefit of those
young; mf;n who have been not less than two years in the military service of
the United States during the late war of rebellion, thus making their cases exceptional to the general rule.
3. Since the act of 1812 the standard of admission to the academy has been
limited to reading, writing, the four ground rules of arithmetic, proportion, and
vulgar and decimal fractions. We adopt the recommendation contained in the
report of the Committee on Instruction,~ that the standard for admission be raised

REPORT Oli' THE SECRETARY OP WAR.

985

by tl1e addition of English grammar, descriptive geography, particularly of our
own country, and the history of the United States. With the standard thus
raised, not only a better class of students would enter the academy, but a great
and very much-needed relief to the crowded courses of the first and second
classes would be obtained by the transfer of studies proposed by the committee,
\Vhich could be effected in consequence of the time saved by the previous acquirement of the branches recommended.
4. As connected with this raising of the standard of qualification for admission to the academy, we recommend such change of the law as will require appointments of cadets to be made, under proper conditions and restrictions, one
year in advance of the date when they are to enter the institution. This will
secure readiness for examination and many of the ad vantages that would be deIi\'ed from the Pstablishment of a preparatory school.
5. "\Ve repeat the recommendation made so often by former boards of visitors,
that some legislative provision be made for competitive examination of candidates for cadetships. Such examination_s, for convenience and economy, ought
to be held in tlw several States or districtR from which the appointments are to
be made, under the supervision of the members of Congress, who by usage have
the nominations, and at the expense of the government, which expense need be
but trifling in amount, as compared with the great advantages to be gained by
the selection of the most promising aspirants.
G. Candidates may now be admitted between the ages of 16 and 21. We
recommend that in future no one be received who is under 17 or more than
22 y6)ars of age. 'l'he severity of the physical training and discipline is such
that youths of 16 often do not possess the requisite strength and power of endurance. A greater maturity of mind and body of those entering seems desirable.
7. Our attention has been attracted to the fact that under existing reg-u1ations the cadets are forbidden to wear whiskers and moustaches. 'l'his may
seem to be a matter of t:mall consideration ; but we are of opinion that w bile
the present close-shaven faces detract from the manly and soldierly appearance
of the corps, nothing is gained by this 1·ule, but, on the contrary, perhaps something lost in point of health. We recommend that the regulation be so amended
as to allow the entire beard and whiskers to be worn, only requiring that they
be kept closely and neatly trimmed, and with as much regard as possible to
uniformity of style.
8. In view of the fact that a very large proportion of the cadets who are returned to the academy, after having been found deficient and dismissed by the
academic board, fail in their subsequent examinations and are again dismissed,
we are decidedly of opinion that the best interests of the institution require
that great caution and discrimination should be used in returning those who
have thus failed.
9. In accordance with the report of the Committee on Administration, we
desire to record our strong clisapprobation of the too prevalent habit of profane
swearing, as existing among the cadets, and earnestly to recommend that every
proper expedient be used to check and suppress a practice so unbecoming and
pernicious; and we also advise the establishment of public daily prayers for
the cadets, at such hours as may not conflict with other exercises in the academy, and in accordance with the practice of other colleges in the country.
10. It will be observed that the Committee ou Administration have in their
report animadverted with severity on the practice of " hazing," consisting in
the gross imposition by the cadets of the classes above on those newly arrived
or of the fourth class, as well as their forced exaction from those neophytes of
the performance of the most menial offices. The Committee on Discipline have
commented on the same subject, and urged the continuance of measures for its
effectual suppression. It is, in fact, the English system of "fagging," carried
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here sometimes to barbarous extremes. No good, but much harm, can come of
such selfish and oppressive custom, and we trnst that the Secretary of War
will continue to sustain the authorities of the academy in their efforts, by
abridgement of furloughs and other fitting punishments, to entirely break it np.
11. We concur in the view takeJ?. by the Committee on Discipline of the propriety of introducing into the system of punishments of cadets a more
marked distinction between gross offences, or such as involve moral turpitude,
and such as are more strictly conventional, and in violation only of necrssary
Tegnlations. l\Iany delinquencies of the latter class, which are now punished
by drmerit marks, and which marks accumulate against the offender, who may
be only careless and mischievous, but not bad or unpromising, and go to affect
his class standing, it appears to us might better be followed by some fitting
penalty on the spot, and so done with. For such comparatively trivial offences
a prompt and certain punishment would be better, without reserving the added
chances of degradation or dismissal, except in cases of repeated petty misdoing,
-where the penalty might still be loss of future standing, not for the original
breach of rules, but for the spirit of incorrigibility manifested by perseverance
in such behavior.
12. We 1·ecommend that a first assistant professor of the Spanish language be
provided for, to be put on the same footing as first assistant professor in the
other branches of study. The board are gratified to learn, from the clear and
full statement reported by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, that the accounts of
the academy and post have been kept during the past year in the most accurate and satisfactory manner.
Among the objects of proper expenditure to be brought to the attention of
Congress, the board of visitors especially urge for favorable comideration the
great necessity for an improved system of ventilation and heating of the barracks and other academic buildings; an improvement in the apparatus for cooking for the cadets; repairs of the hospital building, including the introduction of
baths for the sick; the construction of water-closets in the library building, and a
supply of new furniture for the recitation rooms, much of that now in use having become dilapidated and worthless. The need of appropriations for these
several purposes is set forth fully in the report of the Committee on Police, and
the board concur in their recommendations. The Secretary of War can cause
exact tstimates of the cost of these several proposed supplies and improvements
to be furnished to him, if he should prefer not to depend on those submitted by that
committee.
r:rhe board concur also with the recommendations made by the Committee on
Fiscal Afl'airs, that sufficient appropriations be made for the removal and enlargement of the gas house and works, which are now inadequate to the wants of
the academy and post; for the removal and reconstruction of the magazine,
which is now in strange and dangerous proximity to the engineer barrack and
other buildings, and for a thorough repair of the officers' quarters .
.Another improvement proposed by the Committee on Administration has been
thought by the board worthy of special mention and recommendati•m. It is an
extension of the cemetery. If the argument for enlargement of that most interesting and sacred spot should not prevail over the objection of economy, it is
hoped that a sum may be ohtained at least sufficient to repair the present dilapidated enclosure and clear up the neglected paths, so as to show decent respect
for the last resting place of the honored brave, and the smitten hopes of our ·
country, whose graveo5 occupy that beautiful plateau .
.Among many improvements made during the administration of the present
superintendent is one of peculiar and touching interest : it is the device of placing
on the walls of the chapel neat. marble tablets, or mural monuments, inscribed with
the names of those dead army officers who have in the past been made illustrious
by rank, or gallant deeds of arms, or have fallen in battle. It was a happy
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thought to be executed at this particular place. It is most fitting that the United
States Military Academy, the nation's great school of arms, should be made to
perpetuate such names and histories; thus keeping before the eyes and present
in the memories of the young men here educated the noble example of faithful
service and devotion to our common country.
1'he board recommend that the tasteful and enduring record thus begun shall
be continued, and that means be furnished to extend the same mark of respect
to all the officers of our army, regulars and volunteers alike, who have suffered
and fallen in the war just closed in a glorious and successful struggle to vindicatethe honor and maintain the life of the nation. Happy for the recreants who
fought to dm::troy their government if, in the light shed from such a brilliant roll
of the faithful, their names and treasonal.Jle career could be thrown into deeper
shadow of oblivion !
For continuing the erection of these memorial tablets, including a mural monument toWashington, for which an appropriate design has been made, the board
earnestly recommend an appropriation by Congress of five thousand dollars.
Such a sum will also enable the superintendent to finish a now incomplete arrangement for the preservation of many of the most interesting trophief! of ·war
which have accumulated here; and especially to inscribe suitably with the names
of the battles in which they were taken some of the finer pieces of ordnance
that have been captured during the rebellion and sent here for keeping. Let
these lasting lessons, engraved on stone, and bronze, and iron, fill and stimulate
the hearts and minds of those whose special task it must be hereafter to aid in
upholding and defending our flag and all that it represents.
Let those who may come here in the future to prepare for such duty from
States once in insurrection hail the sight of these proofs that the parricidal attempt of their fathers was a failure. And let all unite in cultivating by every
help and influence that which now, more than ever before, seems to be a growing·
and strengtbning sentiment at this national school of military and general science,
that the truest and most precious interests, duties, and inheritance of the soldier
and the citizen are one, the same, and can never be separated.
ROBER 'I' C. SOHEN UK, if Ok£o,
President if tlw Board.
F. A. CONKLING if New Yorl",
Secretm·y qf tlze Bom·d.
JOHN M. FESSENDEN, Massachusetts.
ALFRED P. ROCKWELL, Connecticut .
.J. F. DRIGGS, Micltigan.
THOMAS COTTMAN, Louisiana.
D. H. BlNGHAl\1, Alabama.
MORTON S. WILKINSON, lltfinnesota.
J.D. LYMAN, New Hampsll.ire.
CHRIS. 0 COX, Maryland.
A. G. MACKEY, Soutl~ CaTolina.
J. B. 'l'H( lMAS, California.
A. P. KELSEY, Maine.
J. V\T. NYE, .Ne·v ada.
HENRY vV. LEE, Iowa.
DAVID L. SvV AIN, Nortlt Carolina.
1VYLLY vVOODBRIDGE, Georgia.

988

REPORT OP THE SECRETARY OF WAR

WE:olT PoiNT,

N. Y., June 26, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of

the 8th instant, transmitting a resolution of the board of visitors requesting the
academic staff to" communicate in writing their views and suggestions regarding
the future management and requirements of ~his institution, &c., &c." Official
duties have prevented my giving it earlier attention. I now have to reply as
follow~:;:

The laws enacted in 1802 and 1812, under authority of which the :Military
Academy was established, were an acknowledgment by Congress of the neces sity of a. special training for officers of engineers and artillery. At that time the
wants of the military service were inconsiderable as compared with those of the
present day, and the prevailing ideas of what a military education should include
were widely different from those which prevail now. Whatever may have been
the original design of it~ founders, it is clear that in its sphere of usefulness the
l\1ilitarj Academy has far outgrown that which was primarily proposed. Its
graduates not only fill all grades of command in the army, but large nnmbers
have returned to the pursuits of civil life, and carried with them into almost every
community in the land the influences they have there received.
The experience of the present war has impressed on the national mind not
only the advantages, but the absolute necessity, of a mi'.-tary education for officers
of om· army, and has proved the value of the academy in giving that training;
but it has also deepened a wide-spread conviction of the importance of imbuing
its graduates with such a spirit of true nationality and unswerving loyalty, that
at no future time shall the spectacle be presented of men educated at the nation's
expense, and fostered by its hand, turning against it in the hour of its severest
trials, and using the knowledge they owed to its generosity to destroy it. Established, as the academy was, as a school of engineers and artillery; managed, as
it has been for over sixty years, by the engineer department, that department
would have been neglectful of its trust if it had been forgetful of the special
duties assigned it, and had not made its interests, if not of the first, at least of
eminent importance. But to make the school more strictly of national value and
less special than heretofore, its administration must be modified and placed on a
broader foundation, for experience teaches how unwise it is to intrust important
national interests to any one set of men who have one principal end to subserve,
whose antecedents and whose professional experiences are identical, and who,
from the very nature of their interests, their education and their habits, no matter what may be the changes in the wants of the army or the country, find it
difficult to adjust themselves to the new order of things these changes necessarily create. 'rhe Military Academy has well answered what was originally
required of it, and much more; it has given good engineers and numbers of other
gallant officers to the army. But now that the whole army, vastly increased in
numbers, looks to it more than ever before as the fountain-head of its professional
education, it seems but proper, and more consonant with our experience in all
other branches of the government, that the academy should be re-established on
a broader and more liberal basis, at once more consonant with the character of,
and more worthy, the great nation which sustains it. "\Vithout discussing at
length the reasons for the changes here proposed, I shall simply present them
as follows. I consider it of the first importance that the whole matter of military
education t5hould be taken out of the hands of the engineer department, to which
it is now by law solely intmsted, and th~t the administration of the affairs of
the l\lilitary Academy, and any other n::ttional military schools for special purposes which it tnay hereafter seem proper to establish, shall be confided, under
due authority of law, to a separate burea?t if the War Departmenf , distinct and
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independent of all the other bureaus of that department-termed, for instance,
the Bureau if Military Education.
This bureau should be charged with all the details of business connected with
the Military Academy now assigned to the engineer bureau at vVashington,
and should be the sole medium between the academy and the Secretary of War.
It should have at its head a gene1·al ojficP-r, selected from all the general officers
in service, solely for his fitness for the duty, to be appointed to the position
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
It should be provided by law that no officer should hold the office after reaching the age of fifty (50) years.
The superintendent of the Military Academy should be the very best man
who could be selected from the whole army. The position demands the highest
order of ability, joined with a peculiar aptitude for its special duties; and in the
selection of such a man there should be no restriction whatever as to corps or
rank.
It would be a most remarkable condition of things if outside of the corps of
engineers there could be found no officer competent to execute the duties of
this position; but if the Qfficers of engineers were fmperior to all others in the
army in their fitness for the duty, the selection could then be made, as now, from
that body. In view of the importance of the trust and the number of officers constantly on duty at the post, the superintendent should have tlte local rank and
tlw pay and emoluments if a brigadier gene1·al.
No officer should be appointed to or retain the position after he was fifty (50)
years if age.
ACADEMIC RECOMMBNDATIOXR FOR PROMOTION IN THI!: ARMY.

The recommendations of the academic board for the promotion of graduates
into the army are based on the general standing of the class according to merit
in the various studies pursued: in general terms, those who graduate the highest
being recommended for the engineers and all other corps below; all coming after
these, for the ordnance and corps below ; the next in order of merit for the
artillery, cavalry and infantry, and the lower half of the class for the cavalry and
infantry. There is no fixed rule followed as to where the lines of demarcation.
between these grades of merit shall be drawn; but the theory is, that only those
are recommended for special corps who are eminently fitted for them. rroo many
instances can be adduced to show that practically this is not the case, but that
the distinctions deduced from the nume?·ical positions of the graduates are for the
most part entirely arbitrary, and convey no exact idea of the fitness of the individual for particular duties m· pursuits of the practical nature of which he must
necessarily be entirely ignorant. Vlhen these recommendations come to be taken
in connexion with the actual wants of the servi~e at the time a cla.'ls graduates,
still greater inconsistencies arise, and the results are that constantly appointments
.are made most unsuitable and unfortunate, if fitness alone is considered as the
standard.
So long as the academy retains its present status as a school of engineers, in
the eye of the law, so long it may be proper that the present system of promotion from the aca:demy to the army should obtain; but if the school is to be
used for the benefit of the army as a whole, it appears to me to be much more
juRt to the graduates and to the various corps, as well ~s more consistent wit.h the
spirit of our government, to put every graduate at once into such arm of service
in the line qf tlte army as each may select, where, by actual duty with troops
for one or two years, be may firRt acquire that practical every-day knowledge
essential to every officer, no matter what his position or talents, and from the
line pass to that special staff-corps for whose duties he has an aptitnde, by pre-
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senting himself before a board of officers of that corps, and undergoing such
an examination as may be prescribed for such applicant.
Vacancies in the staff corps should only be filled from the line of the army
in this way. It is more just to those meritorious officers in the line who may not
have graduated at West Point, while it deprives the graduate of the Military
Academy of none of the advantages which his W ~st Point education has given ,
him. It avoids all appearances of exclusiveness in the selection of staff officers;
it makes the officers of each staff corps responsible for the new men who are
allowed to enter its ranks, and fills these corps with devoted and willing
servants.
SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION.

The present system of having professors appointed from civil life at the heads
of departments of instruction, assisted by officers of the army detailed for the
purpose, is a good one, provided that, in the case of the professors, a suitable
selection is originally made, and that age, disease, or other infirmity has not impaired their powers; and that in the case of the officers, those only are selected
as assistants whose talents and acquirements peculiarly fit them for the special
duties they are called upon to perform.
With regard to the professors, in the usual order of events, the time must inevitably arrive when they will not be as well fitted for their duties as in the
prime of lifp; the burdens of advancing age must, of necessity, impair their
physical if not their mental vigor, and thus unfit them for the labors which
their positions demand.
Owing to the comparatively recent establishment of the present system of
instruction, this question has not yet presented itself for practical solution, but
it is one which must soon be met a.nd answered.
I would suggest that by means of suitable legislation it be provided that
after a certain period of continued service as a professor, say twenty years, or
after any incumbent shall have attained fifty years of age, such professor be
honorably retired, and the vacancy filled by a new .appointment; that professors so retired should receive the full pay to which they might be entitled
at the date of their surrendering their office; and that, so long as they held their
retired positions, they should be considered as honorary members of the academic board, but having no privilege of voting with it when acting as a deliberative body. Liberality in this matter is true economy, as with such inducements
the best talent could be secured; and by fixing the limit of age at fifty, the institution will be likely to secure the services of these gentlemen during tbe best
period of life, when they will not be so apt, as later, to rely solely on the antecedents and experience of the past, and fail to keep pace with the advances of
the age in their several specialties.
The duties of chaplain and professor of ethics are now united in one person,
and.in this matter a change is much needed. ln addition to the unsuitableness
of a clergyman for the position of an instructor in common, international, and
military law, as well as the practice of courts-martial, there is abundant work
in each department for one person. Both are most important, and should not
be neglected. But if it is proper that the duties of both should be executed, it
is proper that suitable provision should be made for each. As it is now, the position is one of great responsibility; and no matter how assiduous the incumbent
may be, some of his duties must be neglected. r.rhe government can afford to
correct this faulty economy, and it should be done as soon as possible.
vVith n~gard to the officers detailed as assistants, it should be provided by law
that no officer of the arrJJy should return to the academy as an instructor in any
branch in which cadets are students, under a period of five years from the date
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of his graduation, and that no officer be detailed for any duty at the academy
who has not served with troops, doing the duties appropriate to his corps, for at
least one year. The reason for this is, that cadets do not and cannot have that
respect for men with whom they have been associated at the academy, as they
would for officers who are socially entire strangers, and whom they know have
actually served with troops. The evils arising from a violation of these rules
are too apparent to need special comment.
Where officers prove themselves fitted for the academic duties intrusted to
them~ they should not be removed from the position without the most urgent
reasons, and as a rule they should remain at the academy at least three or fom'
years.
Unless some such rule is established great injury results to the educational
interests of the cadets, who, especially in the lower sections of the classes, find
it difficult to accommodate themselves to the idiosyncracies of a succession of
teachers, each of whom has a different method of imparting instruction. So far
as the officer himself is concerned, nothing is better calculated to discourage in
him any desire for improvement, or to render him discontented with his position.
The course of ordnance and gunnery, to a military man, is one of the most
important studied at the academy. 'roo little time is now given to the subject.
Captain Benton's work-the only text-book used-contains five hundred pages
of octavo matter, which is arranged so as to give twenty-seven lessons of, say,
eighteen pages each, and nine lessons on review, of fifty-five pages each. The
most attentive student cannot master the subject in this brief period, and to acquire a good knowledge of it will need at least double the time now devoted to
it. Uf the two studies pursued by the first class-Spanish and ordnance-there
can be no hesitation as to which js of the highest importance to an officer, and
probably from the time given to Spanish the required time could best be taken.
A suitable room for making trials with the electro-ballistic machine, and other
apparatus used in teaching this branch, is much needed. No conveniences whatever for such a purpose are now available.
INCREASE OF THE CORPS.-MANNER OF

lVIAKI~G

APPOINTMENTS.

The question of increasing the number of cadets depends entirely upon the
plan adopted by the government concerning the appointment of officers in the
army, and the numerical size of the army. For one of 50,000 men, organized
on the present system, not less than 3,500 officers will be required. 'l'he current
casualties from all causes in ordinary times of peace may be stated at about eight
per cent. of the whole number in service, or about 280 new appointments would
have to be made annually, to keep the force of officers at its maximum number.
For the purpose of encouraging the enlistment of an intelligent and reliable
class of American young men, say one-third of these vacancies should be filled
directly from the rank and file of the army, either as the reward for gallant and
meritorious services, or upon the recommendation of boards of examiners appointed for the purpose; the other two-thirds of the appointments should be given
to graduates of the Military Academy, all of whom should be commissioned in
the line of the army, as heretofore prescribed. This would require about two
hundred graduates each year; and if the course of study extended over four
years, would give between eight and nine hundred cadets under instruction at
the same time.
'l'o meet the casualties usual in such cases, and to give two hundred graduates, two hundred and fifty appointments must necessarily be made each year.
A portion of these would be made, as now, by members of the House of H.epresentatives and the President; but I deem it of great importance, and a measure
productive of the greatest benefit to the army, in recommendmg its ranks to the
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young men of the country, that at least one hundred, or certainly one-third, of
these appoiutments ·be given to young men in the ranks of the army.
Such a plan would afford evt•ry young man in the nation an opportunity of
competing for a West Point cadetship, unassisted by any political influences;
and as a further reward for his talents and industrr, the opportunity of com~
peting fur a position in a staff corps, which positions are now (except in the
Ordnance department, under the law of .March 3, 1864) entirely beyond the
reach of any except graduates of the Military Academy.
INSPECTIONS.

No matter what plans may be adopted for the administration of the academy
and for interior discipline and instruction of the cadets, thorough inspections, ,
frequently made, of all parts of _the machinery of the institution, are imperatively
required to insure the best results, and to (,mabie the people to judge correctly
of the manner in which its affairs are administered by those charged with this
dutv.
'I1 here should be two kinds of inspections and inspectors. An inspection in
the name of the nation by a board of visitors appointed by the President, as
now provided by law, whose duty it should be to make themselves perfectly
acquainted, by frequent and criticalexarninations, with the actual state of discipl}.ne, instruction, police, administration, fiscal, and all other important concerns
of the academy; in short, to see that a healthy natioual tone pervades the institution, and that the wishes of the nation are carried out fully and properly.
The board should be appointed to serve for one year. A portion of its members should be selected with a view to their acquirements in the particular
sciences taught at the academy; a portion for their legal, and others for their
military attainments, with the object of having on the board one member
thoroughly conversant with at least one of the subjects taught.
I mention the appointment of members for one year in order that time may
be given for several visits to the academy. To inspect any matter or object
critically requires a perfect knowledge of every detail on the part of the inspector;
and as most of the members of the board must necessarily be unfamiliar with
the interior working of the different parts of the system of administration, time
is needed to enable them to comprehend and grasp the whole subject.
The inspections of the board should be made at least three times a year, and
such visits should be unexpected, in order that the academy may be examined
in its real every-day condition, rather than, as now, merely in June, at a time
when it wears its holiday garments in anticipation of the annual official visit of
the board. For instance, the want of a proper system of ventibtion and heating can only be appreciated by visiting the public buildings in the winter months;
the method of imparting instruction from day to day in the section rooms can
only be judged of when the usual routine of study is in progress. No correct
judgment can be formed on these matters in the month of June, when fires are
extinguished and all academic duty is suspended.
With regard to local improvC:Inents which are needed, the subject of heating
and -ventilating the public buildings first demands attention. A very cursory
examination of the arrangements for these purposef1, now in usc, will convince
any one familiar with such matters of their radical defects and of the importance of an entire reformation in this respect. From my own observation I
can assert that there is not a room or hall among all the buildings here, in
which, at present, every principle of good ventilt>.~ion i::s not violated or ignored.
I am of the opinion that if these buildings were properly warmed and ventilated, it would reduce the percentage of sickness in the corps from ten to
twenty per cent.
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The board (of which I am a member) having this subject under consideration will shortly be able to make their report. It will recommend that the
general features of the systems adopted for the purposes required at the New
York State insane asylum at Utica, and the new city hospital at Boston, be
carried out here. To be effectual, the reformation must be thorough, no matter
what it cost; any temporizing with present defects, or patching, will only prove
the most costly in the end.
The magazine, now situated just below the plain, in the midst of the village,
occupied by the enlisted men belonging to the post, and their families, and but
seventy or eighty feet from the engineer barracks, (about to be occupied by one
hundred men,) is a standing comment on the inconsistency of the military principles taught cadets and our every-day practice. Should any accident occur,
of course no one would be to blame. Every dictate of prudence requires that
it should be at once removed to a better site.
A building for the preservation of the many valuable trophies now deposited
here, for the models required for purposes of instruction in the departments of
engineering, ordnance, and artillery, for a museum of arms, both foreign and
American, and containing, besides, a suitable l1all for holding examinations, is
greatly needed.
In conclusion it may be remarked, that while none can deny that the Military
Academy has during the war most signally proved its inestimable value to the
nation, and its loyal graduates have won for their alma mater a name of which
she may justly be proud, it cannot be gainsaid that, as in all such establish-.
ments, there still exists room for improvement, and that while the academy has
many warm friends, it also has many opponents. It should be our aim to remove the objections which are urged by the latter, and make it so national in
its influences and so complete in its training that there can be no room for
cavil.
It has been urged, with some truth, that the tendency of a West Point education is to make officers of the army somewhat forgetful of the fact that they
are citizens of a republic as well as military custodians of its rights, and that
their training is apt to make them ignore those questions of national interest
which in a republican form of government naturally interest and agitate the
people. It remains to be seen whether the mental and social training necessary
for a thorough military education can be made reconcilable and consistent with
the spirit of our American institutions; but I sincerely believe that a judicious,
liberal and wise system of military instruction on a natiOnal basis can be devised, which will be consonant with, and yet characteristic of, our institutions,
and which will give to the nation a class of educated military men, who, in
their devotion to the service and profession they shall choose, will never forget
the higher duties and obligations they owe to that nation as American citizens.
I have the honor to be, very respeetfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. T. BALCH,
Captain Ordnance Corps, Instructor Ordnance and Gunnery.
Ron. F. A. CoNKLING,
Secretary Board of Visitors, present.
63 w
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REPOR1, OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
0RDNA~CE OFFICE, WAR DEPARTME~T,

October 20, 1865.
SIR: I submit the following report of the principal operations of the Ordnance
department during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1865, with such remarks and
recommendations as the interests of that branch of the military service seem to
require.
The fiscal resources and the disbursements of the department, during the
year, were as follows, viz :
Amount of appropriations remaining in the treasury June
30, 1864........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,978, 791 97
In the government depositories, to the credit of disbursing
1, 797, 387 16
officers, on same date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amount of appropriations from 30th J nne, 1864, to 30th June,
1865, including the fixed annual appropriation for arming
and equipping the militia...... . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . 38, 800, 000 00
Received since June 30, 1864, on account of damages to arms
in hands of troops, from sales of arms to officers, and of condemned stores, and from all other sources not before mentioned .....•........................... :.........
207,476 97

TotAL............... . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .

45, 783, 656 10

Amount of expenditures since J nne 30, 1864. . . . . . . . . . . . . . $43, 112, 531 27
In the government depositories, to the credit of disbursing
2, 671, 124 83
officers, June 30, 1865... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amount of appropriations remaining in the Treasury same date, ............ .
TotaL.......................................

45, 783, 656 10

The estimates for the next fiscal year call for appropriations only for continuing the armament of our permanent fortification s, and for the work already
begun for increasing the manufacturing and storage capacity of the arsenals,
including a distinct provision for the proper storage and care of gunpowder.
These are all measures not confined to the necessities of war, but requisite for
keeping up a suitable preparation for any contingency, and for preserving the
large and valuable munitions of war which the country now po3sesses.
rrhe manufacturing capacity of the arsenals was steadily increased from the
date of my last report until 1\tiay. when the sudden termination of hostilities
made it apparent that the immediate demand for munitions of war, beyond the
supply then on hand and contracted for, had ceased .
.Measures were promptly taken to reduce the manufacture and purchase of
supplies, and to provide . fo1· necessary storage, and f0r preserving the vast
quantities of ordnance and ordnance stores which had been issued to the armies
and captured from the enemy. Extensive temporary buildings have been erected
at some of the principal arsenals, and mach of this property has already l.Jeen received and securely stored in them.
Large and commodious fire-proof workshops are now being erected at Allegheny, Watervliet, and Frankford arsenals; and so much of these buildings as
will not be required, in time of peace, for manufacturing purposes, can be advantageously used as storehouses, of which the want of an adequate supply is
now manifest.
It is in contemplation to erect extensive fire-proof workshops at Washington
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arsenal, which is considered an eligible position for a first-class arsenal. A portion of these shops can likewise be used for storing the large quantities of ordnance supplies which are now necessarily kept in insecure temporary buildings
at that arsenal. Money for this object has already been appropriated by
Congress.
The importance to the country of having the armaments placed in the forts
as rapidly as they can be prepared to receive them is so evident, that I have
caused the manufacture of sea-coast gun-carriages to be continued as rapidly as
practicable at the two arsenals which possess the proper facilities for making
them; and orders have been given to the several founders, who have been engaged in making heavy guns for this department, for as many guns as carriages
can be made for.
I have been informed by the chief engineer that he will be prepared to receive guns in the forts faster than carriages can now be made, and it is in contemplation to increase the capacity for manufacturing sea-coast carriages.
Experimental wrought-iron field and siege gun-carriages have also been made
and tested, with results so satisfactory as to render it certain that these carriages may be advantageously substituted for the wooden carriages, and it is proposed to make no more gun-carriages of wood.
The smooth-bore cannon of large calibre which have been used during the
war have given satisfaction, and are regarded as perfectly reliable. The great
importance of having reliable rifled guns of large calibre is universally admitted, and the attention of this government, and of the nations of Europe, has
been directed to that object; but so far, it is believed, without entire success in
its accomplishment.
'rhe many failures, by bursting, of the celebrated Parrott guns in the land
and naval service have weakened confidence in them, and make it the imperative duty of this department to seek elsewhere for a more reliable rifle gun.
Mr. Horatio Ames, of ],ails Village, Connecticut, invented a plan of making
wrought-iron guns, which many believe would possess those qualities which are
so very desirable for guns of heavy calibre, and although the cost of these gun~
was necessarily very great in comparison with the cost of cast-iron guns, a
conditional order was given to Mr. Ames to manufacture fifteen of them for the
government ; the condition being that the guns should be superior to any rifled
guns in the service. One of these guns was fired under the direction of a board
of officers, who unanimously expressed the opinion that the " Ames wroughtiron guns possess, to a degree never before equalled by any cannon of equal
weight offered to our service, the essential qualities of great lateral aud longitudinal strength, and great powers of endurance under heavy charges; that
they are not liable to burst explosively and without warning, even when fired
under very high charges; and that they are well adapted to the wants of the
service generally, but especially whenever long ranges and high velocities are
required." The board also expressed the opinion that the fifteen Ames seveninch guns possessed sufficient weight and strength to receive an eight-inch bore,
and recommended that the gun which had been fired under their direction
should be reamed up to eight inches and subj ected to further trial.
They further decided, t tJat Mr. Ames had fulfilled the obligation incurred by
him in hiR contract to furnish the gun, and that so many of the guns as should
endure a proof of ten rounds with the service charge, and pass the proper inspection, should be accepted and paid for.
Two of the fourteen guns burst in proof, exhibiting serious defects in their
manufacture-defects in welding-which I bad been apprehensive could not be
avoided. The guns which endured the proof of ten rounds were accepted and
paid for by this department.
The gun which was fired under the direction of the board was bored up to
eight inches and fired twenty-four times with service charges, when it burst.
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exhibiting the same defects that were developed in the other guns which burst.
The failures in subsequent firing indicate that these guns cannot be relied upon,
and that no more of them ought to be made for the department.
Believing that, with our present knowledge of the properties of metals and
our skill in working them, reliable rifle guns of large calibre can be made of
cast-iron, I have, with your sanctiqn, caused a pair of eight-inch rifle guns of
the supposed proper model and weight to be made. These guns are now at
Fort Munroe, undergoing extreme proof, and should their endurance be satisfactory, it is proposed to have other guns like them made.
NATIONAL ARMORY.

The capacity of this eRtablishment for the manufacture of muskets was not
increased after the date of my last report, and upon the conclusion of hostilities,
in view of the. large number of muskets on hand of a model which will proba-·
bly become obsolete very soon, the manufacture was reduced as rapidly as it
could be done with economy; and at present no new muskets are being assembled. Only those parts which were in different stages of advancement are
being finished.
In my last report I stated that it was in contemplation to change the manufacture at the national armory as soon as the best model for a breech-loading
musket could be established, and that details for effecting this measure would
receive the early attention of this bureau. Extensive experiments have been
made by a board of officers, and also under my direction and supervision, to effect that object; but as yet, no arm has been presented which I have been
wHling to recommend for adoption. The selection of a proper model is considered so important a measure, that I have preferred to act slowly and with great
care in its selecton, rather than take a false step and have to retrace it. I hope
to be able very soon to recommend a model for your appoval.
A plan for altering the muzzle-loading musket into efficient breech-loaders
has been devised by the master armorer at Springfield armory, which appears to
be superior to any other that I have seen. I have taken measures to have five
thousand muskets altered according to it, and will have some of them issued to
troops for trial as Foon as the alterations can be made.
'rhe muskets of the prescribed pattern which have been turned in by the
troops are being cleaned and repaired.
'l'he number of Springfield muskets on hand and suitable for issue will reach
nearly one million, while the number of foreign and captured muskets will exceed half a million. As none of the latter class will probably be required for
is1me, and as the care and preservation of them will be attended with considerable expense, they should be sold whenever suitable prices can be obtained for
them. This recommendation will apply to other ordnance stores of a perishable nature, which are in excess of the wants of the department.
In my last annual report I called your attention to the danger of keeping
large quantities of gunpowder at our arsenals, which are generally in the vicinity of closely populated districts, and recommended that a suitable site for a
depot capable of storing at least one hundred thousand barrels of gunpowder
should be acquired. The conclusion of the war has left this department with
vast supplies of gunpowder and prepared ammunition on 'Band, all of which has
to be stored at the arsenals, and much of it in buildings which are entirely unfit for the purpose; thereby endangering the safety of the arsenals, and in some
cases of private property in the vicinity. This evil cannot be corrected too
soon, and I earnestly call you attention to the necessity of obtaining from Congress authority to purchase a suitable site for a powder depot.
In my annual estimate I have asked for an appropriation for the purchase of
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a site and the erection of magazines. Only so much powder as may be necessary to supply the current wants of the army should be kept at the arsenals.
The military reserve at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, being a suitable position
for a powder depot, for supplying the Mississippi valley, and a portion of it having some years ago been assigned to this department for the erection of powder
magazines, I have taken measures to have three magaziues, capable of containing five thousand barrels each, erected on it; and two of them will be finished
this fail.
In my last annual report I stated that, in pursuance of the provisions of the
act of Congress approved April 19, 1864, possession had been taken of Rock
island, for the purpose of building and maintaining thereon an arsenal for the
construction, deposit, and repairs of arms and munitions of war. The United
States has not yet acquired a title to the property which has been taken possession of. It iR important that the provisions of the act of Congress above referred
to should be carried into effect, and a complete title to all of Rock island acquired by the United States before any permanent buildings are commenced.
I recommend that this be done with as little delay as practicable. Evidences
of title to the land, of which possession has been taken, have been forwarded
to you for examination by the Attorney General, as is required by the act above
referred to.
Adjacent to Rock island, and connected with it by a dam, is a small island,
known as Benham's island, of which possession haR not been taken. It appears
to have been the intention of Congress in passing the act above referred to that
the United States should have full and complete possession and control of Rock
island for military purposes. Should Benham's island, or any other small islands
or accretions in the river, lying between Rock island and the shores of Illinois
and Iowa, be held by private parties, with the right of way across the island
as is now claimed by the owner of Benham's island, the principal object of the
law will be thereby defeated.
If additional legislation is necessary to give the United States full possession
and control of the whole of Rock island, including the adjacent island, I recommend that it be asked of Congress.
The buildings erected as a prison and barracks on Rock island have been
turned over to the Ordnance department, and are now used as storehouses, &c.
Several of the southern arsenals have been reoccupied, and it is the intention
of the department to reoccupy all of them, except the Fayetteville arsenal, in
North Carolina, which was. destroyed.
An extensive powder-mill at Augusta, Georgia, and a latge armory (unfinished)
and a laboratory at Macon, Georgia, which were built by the rebel government,
have fallen into possession of this department. 'rhe necessary measures for
preserving the property have been taken.
The number of permanent United States arsenals and armories, exclusive of
temporary depots established for war purposes, most of . which have been, and
all of which will soon be discontinued, is now twenty-eight. In addition to the
command and supervision of these, the officers of this department are charged
with the inspection of materials and manufacture of ordnance, gunpowder, and
such small-arms and equipments as are made for the government at the foundries,
powder-mills, and other private establishments. These duties furnish constant
employment for all the officers of the ordnance corps now authorized by law,
the total number of which is sixty-four. The arsenals alone require, as a minimum number in time of peace, fifty-six, and the bureau and inspection duties at
least eight more. During the late rebellion the want of a greater number of
regular ordnance officers, educated for and experienced in their peculiar duties.
was seriously felt; and the necessity, arising from the inadequate provision in
this respect, of the frequent employment of acting ordnance officers, caused
much embarrassment and confusion, and was detrimental to the public service
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and interest. These now require that the additional offices of the ordnance department authorized temporarily by sections 4 and 12 of the act of March 3,
1863, shall be continued as part of the military peace establishment.
The tabular statements accompanying this report show in detail the ordnance,
arms, and other ordnance supplies which have been procured and issued through
this department during the past fiscal year. The armies in the field were amply
and well supplied in this respect. The permanent fortifications have had their
armaments kept in order, and strengthened and increased by the addition of
guns of heavy calibre and great efficiency.
Very respeGtfully, your obedient servant,
A. B. DYER,
Brigadier General and Chief qf Ordnance.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
SecretaTy qf War.

Statement qf ordnance, arms, ammunition, and other ordnance s.tores procured and
supplied to th.e army, and the quantity remaining on hand at the close qf the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1865.
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A. B. DYER,
Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.
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REPORT OF THE SIGN.AL OFFICER OF THE .ARMY.
OFFICE OF THE

SIGNAL OFFICER,

Waslz,ington, October 20, 1865.
SIR: In answer to your communication of the 7th instant, I have the honor
to submit the following annual report of the operations of the signal corps for
the year ending October 20, 1865 :
On the 1st of November, 1864, the corps was represented in the field by the
following detachments, thoroughly equipped, active, and energetic, to wit:

Detachments.

---------------------------------------------1---------------Office of the signal officer_ ....... _........... - ........... -.
Department of Washington .. __ ........ -------- -----------Signal camp of instruction ....... _........................ .
Army of the Potomac ..... _. _. _............ -.............. .
Department of Virginia and North Carolina ............... __
Department of the South ................................. Dep:utmtmt of the Cumberland...........•.................
Department of the Tennessee ............................. _
Department of the Ohio. __ ............................... .
Military division of West Mississippi. ...................... .
Department of Kansas ...........................•........
Middle military division ...............•................. __
Department of the Susquehanna .......................... -Total ........ __ ..................... ___ ... _.... _.. _

3

1
4
3
8

6
16
12
15
7
9
6
4
10
2
8
4

10
7
4
15
5
8
1

102

66

2
5

9

1
10
2
2
2

66
86
167
137
39
87
140
42
210
51
168
64

84

1,266

3

13
14
13
10
7

--- - - ---- - 168

1,350

Such was the disposition of the corps, and the following, in general terms,
the nature of services performed :
The duties of the corps during the past year were better understood than in
previous years, which gave to it more tone and character, and enabled it to
approximate in most of the military departments to its true position.
In one-the department of the Gulf-it combined all the branches of the
corps of information which it was designed, and of right ought to be. Here
it added to aerial telegraphing, telescopic reconnoitring, and geiieral scouting,
the entire secret service department, thus having all information usually gathered from these sources flow into one common centre, where it was compared,
classified, reduced to logical form, and then laid before the commanding general
to be acted upon. r.rhe advantage arising from thus concentrating these services
is specially apparent in the fact that particular reports and doubtful information
could be thoroughly sifted and tested in two, three, or more, different modes,
by the one officer having control of the several means for collecting knowledge
of the enemy's movements and designs.
In other military departments, as I have stated, the corps only approximated
to this more perfect system of economy. But as the value of concentration in
military organizations was being daily more and more recognized, these duties,
if the war had continued, would undoubtedly have been eventually assigned to
the corps, wherever a detachment of it would have been placed upon duty.
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In the army of the Potomac our dutif's were limited to signal communication,
observing and reporting the changes and movements of the enemy, and such
aid duty as we were called upon to perform.
In the armies operating under Major General Sherman the signal detachment
added to signalling and telescopic reconnoitring general scouting, courier,
guide, and aid duty.
The detachment in the department of the South was limited to keeping communication open between the several military posts along the coast, and between
the land and naval forces, when operating in conjunction.
Upon the plains a detachment operated with the various expeditions against
the Indians, keeping open communication between detached parties and the
main body of the army.
In the department of Pennsylvania the signal detachment was employed in
watching the crossings of the Potomac, as well as doing general outpost duty 1
with instructions to give timely information to the commanding general of any
threatening danger, that it might be met upon the threshold of the department,
and overcome before any injury could be done to the community.
In the department of Virginia and North Carolina, in addition to communicating by signals between portions of the army, and the observing of the movements of the enemy, the detachment was beneficially employed in various
expeditions and operations of the army and navy combined, connecting the
commanders of the two forces so immediately as to make their several efforts
harmonize in such manner that their blows fell with double effect upon the
strongholds and battalions of the enemy.
The insurrectionary armies having been, at the opening of the spring campaign, forced to surrender, and the power of the government having been
re-established to its rightful extent, the great work of disbanding and returning
to the conditions of peace the military force of the United States was commenced. The signal corps of the army having been organized by an act of
Congress-which in some of Hs provisions had a view to permanency, but gave
to the corps only an organization for the term of the rebellion-was, by various
orders from the War Department, materially reduced, until all that portion of
it on duty east of the Mississippi riYer was mustered out and discharged.
There now remain the detachment in the military division of the Mississippi,
numbering nine officers, two non-commissioned officers, and thirty-five enlisted
men, and the detachment in the military division of the Gulf, numbering fifteen
officers, thirteen non-commissioned officers, and eighty-six enlisted men. These
detachments are operating with the troops upon the plains, and throughout
'Texas, and along the southwestern boundary.
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER.

The office of the signal officer is three-fold in its character. It is, first, the
headquarters of the corps, where the records are collected, completed, and filed,
and bas advisory superintendence and control of the special duties of the corps,
and of all assignments of officers and men to signal duty. Second, a purchasing and disbursing office, from which supplies of signal stores and equipments
are issued to the various detachments of the corps in the field. Third, an office
for the examining of the signal accounts and returns of signal stores of all
officers responsible to government for such property.
Connected with this office are two clerks of "class two," to wit, Messrs.
Simeon White and Alexander Ashley, appointed in 1863. To the ability and
faithful exertions of these persons is owing much of the degree of system and
perfection attained in the records of the office.
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EXPENDITURES, ETC.

There were expended during the year ending September 30, 1865, of the
sums appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 18o5, eight thou.sand five
hundred and thirty-seven dollars and six cents, leaving a balance, which, added
to that yet remaining of former appropriations, and to the amount appropriated
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1866, makes the sum of two hunched and
forty-eight thousand and sixty-two dollars still available.
SPECIAL SERVICES.

Having thus given .a general view of the corps, its strength, duties, and expenses, I propose, without entering into a detailed statement of the constant
and various acts of service performed, which were part and parcel of every
battle fought, and campaign made, during the year, and which played in each
a more or less important function, to merely place upon record, through the War
Department, several instances where the operations of the corps were of such
vital importance that all who read must acknowledge that the signal corps was
a valuable adjunct to the army, and rendered such material service in the great
contest just closed that its members can view with pride and infinite self-satisfaction a substantial record, made in the face of the difficulties that usually
attend the introduction of a new element into any old established system.
'l'he first instance of the kind referred to which I shall mention occurred in
October, 1864, and just previous to the commencement of the great campaign
of General Sherman from the northern part of Georgia to the sea-coast. That
great leader, whose military genius never allowed him to overlook any visible
means to aid in securing success, or guard against any and all possible occurrences to endanger his plans, in whatever enterprise undertaken, seeing the liability of his telegraph wires communicating with his depot of supplies at Alatoona being cut, he established, in addition, a line of signal communication
through which he afterwards, when the enemy obtained a lodgement in his rear
and cut his telegraph wires, as was foreseen, transmitted his orders and instructions that saved from capture Alatoona, its garrison, and stores of supplies, the
value of which, at that time and place, cannot be computed, as without them it
can well be doubted whether the great campaign, which exposed the great weakness of the enemy and propagated the seeds of the coming dissolution of the
rebellion, could have been executed for months later. In connexion with this
transaction, General Sherman states: "In several instances this corps (signal
corps) has transmitted orders and brought me information of the greatest importance that could not have reached me in any other way. I will instance
one most remarkable case. When the enemy bad cut our wires and actually
made a lodgement on our railroad about Big Shanty, the signal officers on Vining's bill, Kenesaw, and Alatoona sent my orders to General Corse, at Rome,
whereby General Corse was enabled to reach Alatoona just in time to defend it.
Had it not been for the services of this corps on that occasion, I am satisfied
we should have lost the garrison at Alatoona and a most valuable depository of
provisions there, which was worth to us and the country more than the aggregate expense of the whole signal corps for one year." This will serve to evince
the important character of the services of the corps at times when operating
with the army alone. The following account will demonstrate its eminent usefulness where the army and navy operated in conjunction In the expedition
organized to attack :1!-,ort Fisher, in the month of January of this year, an army
signal officer was with Admiral Porter, commanding the fleet, and others with
General 'rerry, commanding the laud forces, who, by means of signals, placed
these commanding officers in such immediate communication that the fire of the
navy, which otherwise must have slackened after the assault commenced upon
the part of the army, was kept up without cessation as the enemy was driven
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from traverse to traverse. In this connexion Admiral Porter, in a communication to the Secretary of the Navy, which induced the latter to tender the thanks
of the Navy Department to the War Department for this efficient agency,
states: "'l'hrough Mr. Clemens (signal officer) I was in constant communication with General Terry, even during the assault on Fort Fisher, and was
enabled to direct the fire of the New Ironsides to the traverses occupied by the
enemy, without fear of hurting our own people, from my complete reliance on
him." '.rhus, through this mobile system of visual telegraphing, the army and
navy are made to act as a unit. During the war there were more forcible
instances of this kind than the above, when, in most important crises, it would
have been impossible for the navy to have rendered the necessary assistance
save through the aid of army r::iguals, by means of which its fire was directed
to unseen points with almost as much facility and certainty as could have been
done if the gunners would have had the object of their aim in view. I would
also state here that improvements were made during the year in the simple
cipher apparatus used by the corps in sending secret messages which, if they
did not absolutely defy deciphering, were of such an intricate and complex
character that messages sent thereby cannot possibly be interpreted by the
uninitiated within such period as to be of any service to the enemy, even should
the messages fall into his hands.
With these references to special transactions of the corps, and having accorded
to its members the merit and thanks so well earned by earnest patriotism, by
zealous, faithful, and constant exertion to render services throughout th0 war to·'
their country, and by the success achieved, and having conceded to them the
claim that no class of the military was more anxious to be useful, or welcomed
with more satisfaction additional duties, we will conclude this report by calling
attention to the necessity for additional action, in order to afford, in the future,
to the army the requisite signal service.
As experience has clearly demonstrated the eminent advantage of having a
signal officer attached to garrisons and posts liable to be besieged, in order to
secure communication over the heads of an enemy, should occasion arise, and
of having a sufficient number of signal officers as a nucleus that would be immediately available in the event of future wars, it is submitted that such action
should be taken by the authorities as would secure for such contingencies the
properly instructed officers. This can be done in two modes: either by continuing a small permanent organization with specifically defined duties, or by
detailing a certain number of officers from other branches of the service, and
directing them to report to the signal officer of the army to be instructed, with
a view to their being al'signed to such garrisons and posts as it may be deemed
necessary to provide with means of signal communication.
If the former mode be adopted, it is recommended that a board of officers,
more or less acquainted with the past services of this department, be appointed
to report the form of the required organization, and to define, as far as practicable, the specific duties to be assigned it, to avoid, in the future, the great
stumbling-block which was left in the way in the past organization, and which,
in many instances, crippled the usefulness of the corps by its not being properly understood what it could do, or was expected to do.
It is presumed that no argument need be presented in favor of a new organization, as it is self-evident greater interest would be taken in the service, and
greater perfection attained in it, than in a simply acting corps.
,
I have the honor, sir, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. F. FISHER,
Chief Signal Officer and Colonel U. S. A.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary qf J.Var, TVasl~ington, D. C.
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REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

Bureau if Military Justice, November 13, 1865.
SIR: In compliance with your directions, I have the honor to submit as follows in regard to the business transacted by this Bureau since March, 1865, the
date of my last official report.
'rhe operations of the Bureau during this period-of about seven and twothirds months-are briefly presented by the following :summary:
1. Number of records of general courts-martial and military commissions received, reviewed, and filed, 16,591.
2. Number of special reports made as to the regularity of proceedings, the
pardon of military offenders, the remission or commutation of sentences, and
upon the numerous miscellaneous subjects and questions referred for the opinion
of this office, including, also, letters of instruction upon ~ilitary law and practice to judge advocates, reviewing officers, and others, 6,123.
By comparing these details with those presented in March last, it will be perceived that the number of records reviewed is slightly, and that of the special
reports very much greater, in proportion to the period of time embraced, than
that specified in my last official communication upon the subject, and that the
business of the Bureau, especially as an advisory branch of the War Department, has not yet been diminished or sensibly affected by the altered condition
of public affairs.
The" Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General," issued by the
Bureau in January last, has, as it is inferred from the commendatory judgment
expressed to me by department and other commanders, and the fact that it has
come into extensive use throughout the army, proved of considerable advantage
to the service in contributing to establish a uniformity of decision and action in
the administration of military justice; and it is proposed, with your approval,
to prepare during the coming winter an enlarged edition of the same, containing, in connexion with those already published, a selection of the official opinions communicated by me during the past year. 'l'he present edition of the _
work has, indeed, because of the constant demand for copies, been very nearly
exhausted.
I have to express my satisfaction with the ability and efficiency with which
the officet·s, as well as the clerks, connected with the Office have performed their
several duties; and to add that, while the close of the rebellion will doubtless
gradually induce a considerable falling off in the business of the Bureau, it is
conceived, as this business will probably not be materially diminished for a
twelve-month, that the present organization of this branch of the public service
may well be continued by Congress.
In concluding this report of the business of this Bureau, it is thought proper
to advert to two cases of unusual public importance, which were prepared under
its supervision, and tried by military commission, since the last session of Congress-that of the assassins of President Lincoln and their accomplices, and
that of Wirz, the keeper of the rebel prison at Andersonville, Georgia.
The first of these cases was brought to trial in May last before a court convened by the President, and composed of two major generals, one brevet major
general, three brigadier generals, one brevet brigadier general, a brevet colonel, and a lieutenant colonel. 'The government was represented by the Judge
Advocate General of the army, assisted by an experienced military judge advocate, and by a distinguished lawyer, who had also lately acted for the United
States in the conduct of a most important prosecution by court-martial. The
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accused were defended by counsel of their own selection, seven in number.
The trial occupied fifty-thre-e days-between three and four hundred witnesses,
in all, having been examined-and was concluded by seven able and elaborate
arguments of counsel; the final reply thereto, and argument, of Hon. John A.
Bingham, on the part of the United States, being annexed hereto as part of this
report. The formal brief review of the case by this Bureau is also appended.
The inevitable result of this trial had been generally anticipated throughout
the country, and has now become matter of history. The most deeply guilty
of the conspirators were sentenced to be hung, and their sentence was summarily executed by order of the President. Of the others, three were condemned
to imprisonment for life, and one to an imprisonment for six years, at hard labor;
and these are now undergoing confinement at the military prison at the Dry Tortugas, Florida.
A full and complete record of the testimony and of the proceedings of the
commission has been prepared under the supervision of an officer of the government, and will present. be given to the public. To this publication reference
must be had for the details of the evidence upon this momentous state trial.
The case of Wirz was conducted before a commission also constituted by the
President, and composed of one major general, three brevet major generals,
two brigadier generals, one brevet brigadier general, one brevet colonel, and
one lieutenant colonel; the prisoner being represented by two counsel of his
choice. The victims of the accused had been so numerous that the mass oftestimony was nearly as great as that adduced upon the former trial, and the period
of time occupied by the investigation even longer. 'rbe number of witnesses
examined was one hundred and forty-eight. Of these a considerable proportion
had been connected with the rebel military service. Beside the evidence from
these sources, much important testimony obtained from the archives of the rebel
government-including the records of the prison at Andersonville-was aho
laid before the commission. The capital sentence in the case was forthwith
approved by the President, and this criminal has recently paid such penalty as
the law could impose for his repeated murders and other atrocious violations of
the laws of civilized warfare.
As it would be impossible to present, in the limits of a brief official report,
even an abstract of the evidence upon this trial, a copy is herewith submitted
of the address of Colonel N. P. Chipman, judge advocate, which, while containing a lucid discussion of the questions of law involved, exhibits also a most faithful summary of the testimony, much of which, indeed, is set forth in the very
language of the witnesses. A copy of the formal review of the proceedings,
addressed by this Bureau to the President on the 31st ultimo, is also annexed. It
is submitted whether a publication of the record of this case, (similar to that
undertaken by private enterprise in the instance of the trial of the assassins,)
or of an abridgment of the same, prepared by some proper person, may not well
be authorized by Congress, not only that a permanent memorial of the testimony
and proceedings may be preserved, but also that the facts of such testimony
may be made accessible to every student of the rebellion.
A peculiar characteristic of these state trials, and that which must invest
them with a deep historical importance, is the fact, that, while the accused were
in each case adjudged to have been guilty of the crimes with which they were
charged, the complicity in those crim6s of chiifs if tlw rebellion was declared
by the court in their findings, and upon testimony which is deemed to have
fully warranted the conclusions reached. In each case the proof justified the
conviction that the prisoners before the court were not merely personally criminals,
but conspirators that they were the hirelings and accompli0es of the cabal of
traitors of whom Davis was the acknowledged chief, and that these traitors
were in fact, as well as in law, equally with the accused, responsible for the
detestable deeds which were adduced in evidence. The assassination of the
J.
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President was portrayed by the testimony as an inspiration of the rebellion,
authorized from its seat of governm<'mt, and executed through its paid agents,
whose plan of action was first matured within the territory of a neighboring
friendly power.
It is proper to remark that events and testimony disclosed subsequent to this
tria:l have added a powerful support to the conclusions arrived at by the court
in reference to the complicity of rebel leaders in the assassination of the President.
The barbarities of Wirz, which resulted in the sacrifice of the lives of at
least ten thousand of our helpless prisoners in his hands, were also clearly
shown to have been but the revolting features of a system, doubtless devised
at Richmond, for the destruction, by starvation and fatal cruelties, of all the
federal prisoners of war who should come into the enemy's hands. As there is
no baseness too infamous to be incompatible with treason, so, for the execution
of the details of this inhuman scheme, fit agents were readily found wearing the
rebel uniform, and to these were committed the care and custody of Union
prisoners. The administration of Wirz, however, though atrocious in the extreme, wa::: but a striking example of the general system of treatment by the
enemy of prisoners of war. Of the enforcement of this system throughout the
south, at Richmond, Belle Isle, SalisbY.ry, North Carolina, Florence, South
Carolina, Macon and Millen, Georgia, Tuscaloosa, Florida, and at many other
localities, the cruelties of Andersonville, as is made to appear by testimony on
file in this bureau, were but a forcible illustration. For the result-for the almost
countless deaths and lasting injuries by wounds, by starvation, by inhuman
punishments, by the maiming and laceration by dogs, by every brutality and by
every neglect-the chiefs of the rebel confederacy, the instigators and leaders of
the rebellion, should be held responsible; and for these they will be held responsible by the judgment of history and by the abhorrence of the civilized worid.
It is to be added that in this case, also, the complicity of the rebel executive
in the crimes of the accused was declared by the court in its findings.
This report cannot well be closed without its bearing testimony to the worth
and efficiency of Militm·y Commissions as judicial tribunals in time of war, as
illustrated by these two trials.
These commissions, originating in the necessities of the rebellion, had been
proved, by the experience of three years, indispensable for the punishment of
public crimes in regions where other courts had ceased to exist, and in cases of
which the local criminal . courts could not legally take cognizance, or whieh,
by reason of intrinsic defects of machinery, they were incompetent to pass upon.
These tribunals had long been a most powerful and efficacious instrumentality
in the hands of the Executive for the bringing to justice of a large class of malefactors in the servic~ or interest of the rebellion, who otherwise would have
altogether escaped punishment; and it had, indeed, become apparent that, without their agE;lncy, the rebellion could hardly, in some quarters, have been suppressed. So conspicuous had the importance of these commissions, and the
necessity for their continuance, become, that the highest civil courts of the
country had recognized them as part of the military judicial system of the
government, and Congress, by repeated legislation, had confirmed their authority
and indeed extended their jurisdiction.
But it was not until the two cases under consideration came on to be tried by
the Military Commission that its highest excellence was oo:.hibited. It was not
merely in that it was unincumbered by the technicalities and inevitable embarrassments attending the administration of justice before civil tribunals, or in the
fact that it could so readily avail itself of the military power of the government
for the execution of its processes and the enforcement of its orders, that its
efficacy (though in these directions most conspicuous) was chiefly illustrated.
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It was rather in the extended reach which it could give to its investigation, and
in the wide scope which it could cover by testimony, that its practical and preeminent use and service were displayed. It was by means of this freedom of
view and inquiry that the element of conspiracy, which gave to these cases so
startling a significance, was enabled to be traced and exposed, and that the fact
. that the infamous crimes which appeared in proof were fruits borne by the rebellion and authorized by its head was published to the community and to the
world. By no other species of tribunal, and by no other known mode of
judicial inquiry, could this result have been so successfully attained ; and it may
truly be said that without the aid and agency of the Military Commission one of the
most important chapters in the annals of the rebellion would have been lost to history, and the most complete and reliable disclosure of its inner and real life, alike
treacherous and barbaric, would have failed to be developed.
It is due not only to the late President, who, as commander-in-chief, unhesitatingly employed this tribunal in the suppression of crimes connected with the
rebellion, but to the heads of the military departments and other commanders,
who so resolutely and effectively availed themselves of its simple but potent
machinery; to the national legislatures, which, recognizing its continuance as
indispensable during the war, have confirmed and increased its jurisdiction; and
to the intelligence and good sense of the people at large, who, disregarding the
shallow and disloyal clamors raised against it, have appreciated its service to
the country, that this brief testimony to its value, as an arm of the military
administration, evidenced alike by the fairness of its judgments and by its enlightened and vigorous action, should be publicly and formally borne by this
Bureau.
J. HOVT,
Judge Advocate General.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary qf War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Bureau qf Military Justice, July 5, 1865.
To tlw President:
The following named persons, David E. Herold, G. A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne,
Michael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and
Samuel A. Mudd, were tried by military commission convened at Washington,
D. C., on the 9th day of May, 1865, by order of the President of the United
States, on the following charge and specification:
CHARGE

1.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Specification.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
After their arraignment under the foregoing charge and specification, the
prisoners severally pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. 'l'heir plea was,
after mature deliberation, overruled, whereupon they severally pleaded not
guilty. 'l'he investigation of the case upon its merits immediately commenced,
and was continued until the 29th of June, when all the evidence having been
introduced, and the arguments for the prosecution and in behalf of the prisoners
having been presented, the commission proceeded to deliberate upon their findings.
Tile findings and sentences pronounced by the cour~ were as follows:
'l'he prisoners Hei;.Old, Atzerodt, and Payne were found guilty, except of the
words alleging confederation and conspiracy with Edward Spangler in the
crimes charged, and were sentenced to death.
Mary E. Surratt was found guilty, except of the words alleging conspiracy
with Edward Spangler, and her receiving and concealing in her house the
prisoners Arnold and O'Laughlin, and was sentenced to death.
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Michael O'Laughlin was found guilty, except of the words alleging that he
lay in wait for, with intent to murder, Lieutenant General Grant, and also of
those alleging conspiracy with Spangler, and was sentenced to imprisonment for
life.
Samuel Arnold was found guilty, except of conspiring with Edward Spangler,
and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Samuel A. Mudd was found guilty, excepting of the words alleging conspiracy
with Spangler, and those which allege his receiving and concealing Payne,
Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt, Arnold, and Mary E. Surratt in his house, and
was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
'l'he finding in the case of Edward Spangler was, of the charge, not guilty;
but guilty of having feloniously and traitorously aided and abetted J. Wilkes
Booth in making his escape, after having killed and murdered Abraham Lincoln,
President of the United States; he, the said Spangler, at the time of aiding
and abPtting, as aforesaid, well knowing that the said Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, as uforesaid, had been murdered by the said J.
Wilkes Booth, as aforesaid; and of the specification, not guilty, except as to
those words which allege substantially the crime of which he was convicted
under the charge. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in a penitentiitry.
Having been personally engaged in the conduct of the foregoing case as
judge advocate of the commission, I deem it unnecessary to enter in this report
into an elaborate discussion of the immense mass of evidence submitted to the
consideration of the court.
After a trial continuing for fifty-three days, in which between three and four
hundred witnesses were examined for the prosecution and defence, and in which
the rights of the accused were watched and zealously guarded by seven able
counsel of their own selection, the commission have arrived at the conclusions
presented above.
I feel further relieved from the duty of submitting a detailed review of the
record, because of the full and exh~ustive examination of the questions of law
and fact arising in the case, which is to be found in the argument of Assistant
Judge Advocate Bingham, to which, it forming a part of the record, reference
is respectfully made.
'l'he opinion is entertained that the proceedings were regular, and that the
findings of the commission were fully justified by the evidence. It is thought
that the highest considerations of public justice, as well as the future security
of the lives of the officers of the government, demand that the sentences based
on these findings ·should be carried into execution.
Respectfully submitted:
J. HOLT, Judge Advocate General.

Argument of John A. Bingham, special judge advocate, in 1'eply to t!te several a1·guments in
defence of MaTy E. Sun·att and others, charged with conspiracy and the murdeT of Ab,-aham Lincoln, late P1·esident of the United States, S,c.
MAY IT PLEASE THE CouRT: The conspiracy here charged and specified, and the acts
alleged to have been committed in pursuance thereof, and with the intent laid, constitute a
crime the atrocity of which has sent a shudder through the civilized world. All that was
agreed upon anc1 attempted by the alleged inciters and instigators of this crime constitutes a
combination of atrocities with scarcely a parallel in the annals of the human race. Whether
the prisoners at your bar are guilty of the conspiracy and the acts alleged to have been done
in pursuance thereof, as set forth in tbe charge and specification, is a question the ~etermi
nation of which rests solely with this honorable court, and in passing upon which th1s court
are the sole judges of the law and the fact.
·
In presenting my views upon the questions of law ra~sed by the several cou~sel for .the
defence, and also on the testimony adduced for and agamst the accused, I desue to be JUSt
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to them, just to you, just to my country, and just to my own convictions. The issue joined
involves the highest interests of the accused, and, in my judgment, the highest interests of
the whole people ofthe United States.
It is a matter of great moment to all the people of this country that the prisoners at your
bar be lawfully tried and lawfully convicted or acquitted. A wrongful and illegal conviction or a wrongful and illegal acquittal upon this dread issue would impair somewhat the
seeur1ty of avery man's life, and shake the stability of the republic.
The crime charged and specified upon your record is not simply the crime of murdering a
human being, but it is the crime of killing and murdering on the 14th day of April, A. D.
1865, within the military department of Washington and the intrenched lines thereof, Abrabraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, and commander-in-chief of the army
and navy thereof; and then and there assaulting, with intent to kill and murder, William H.
Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States; and then and there lying in wait to
kill and murder Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States, and Ulysses S.
Grant, then lieutenant general and in command of the armies of the United States, in pursuance of a treasonable conspiracy entered into by the accused with one John Wilkes Booth
and John H. Surratt, upon the instigation of Jefferson Davis, Jacob Thompson, and George
N. Sanders and others, with intent thereby to aid the existing rebellion and subvert the ConstitutiOn and laws of the United States.
The rebellion, in aid of which this conspiracy was formed and this great public crime committed, was prosecuted for the vindication of no right, for the redress of no wrong, but was
itself simply a criminal conspiracy and gigantic assassination. In resisting and crushing
this rebellion the American people take no step backward, and cast no reproach upon their
past history. That people now, as ever, proclaim the self-evident truth that whenever government becomes subversive of the ends of its creation, it is the right and duty of the people to alter or abolish it; but during these four years of conflict they have as clearly proclaimed, as was their right and duty, both by law and by arms, that the government of their
own choice, humanely and wisely administered, oppressive of none and just to all, shall not
be overthrown by privy conspiracy or armed rebellion.
What wrong bad this government or any of its duly constituted agents done to any of the
guilty actors in this atrocious rebellion? They themselves being witnesses, the government which they assailed bad done no act, and attempted no act, injurious to them, or in
any sense violative of their rights as citizens and men; and yet for four years, without cause
of complaint or colorable excuse, the inciters and instigators of the conspira<;y charged upon
your record have, by armed rebellion, resisted the lawful authoriry of the government, and
attempted by force of arms to blot the republic from the map of nations. Now that their
battalions of treason are broken and flying before the victorious 1egions of the republic, the
chief traitors in this great crime against your government secretly conspire with their hired
confederates to achieve by assassination, if possible, what they have in vain attempted by
wager of battle-the overthrow of the government of the United States and the subversion
of its Constitution and laws. It is for this secret conspiracy in the interest of the rebellion,
formed at the instigation of the chiefs in that rebellion, and in pursuance of which the acts
charged and specified are alleged to have been done and with the intent laid, that the accused
are upon trial.
The government in preferring this charge does not indict the whole people of any State or
section, but only the alleged parties to this unnatural and atrocious conspiracy and crime.
The President of the United States, in the discharge of his duty as commauder-in-chief of
the army, and by virtue of the power vested in him by thl Constitution and laws of the United States, has constituted you a military court, to hear and determine the issue joined
against the accused, and bas constituted you a court for no other purpose whatever. To this
charge and specification the defendants have pleaded, first, that this court has no jurisdiction
in the premises; and, second, not guilty. As the court has already overruled the plea to
the juri:;diction, it wnuld be passed over in silence by me but for the fact that a grave and
elaborate argument has been made by counsel for the accused, not only to show the want of
jurisdiction, but to arraign the President of the United States before the country and the
world as a usurper of power over the lives and the liberties of the prisoners. Denying the
authority of the President to constitute this commission is an averment that this tribunal is
not a court of justiee, has no legal existence, and therefore no power to hear and determine
the issue joined. The learned counsel for the accused, when they make this averment by
way of argument, owe it to themselves and to t~eir country to show how the President could
otherwise lawfully and efficiently discharge the duty enjoined u11on him by his oath to protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.
An_existing rebellion is alleged and not denied. It is charged that in aid of this existing
rebellion a conspiracy was entered into by the accused, incited and instigated thereto by the
chiefs of this rebellion, to kill and murder the executive officers of the government, and the
commander of the armies of the United States, and that this conspiracy was partly executed
by the murder of Abraham Lincoln, and by a murderous assault upon the Secretary of State ;
and c?unsel reply, by elaborate argument, that although the facts be as charged, though the
conspirators be numerous and at large, able and eager to complete the horrid work of assas-
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sination already begun within your military encampment, yet the successor of your murdered President is a usurper·if he attempts by military force and martial law, as eommanderin·chiPf, to prevent the consummation of this traitorous conspiracy in aid of this treasonable
rebellion. The civil courts, say the counsel, are open in the District. I answer, they are
closed throughout half the republic, and were only open in this District ou the day of this
confederation and conspiracy, ow. the day of the traitorous assassination of your President,
and are only open nt this hour, by force of the bayonet. Does any man suppose that if the
military forces which garrison the intrenchments of your capital, fifty thousand strong, were
all withdrawn, the rebel bands who this day infest the mountain passes in your vicinity
would allow this court, (lr any court, to remain open in this District for the trial of these their
confederates, or would permit your executive officers to discharge the trust committed to
ihem, for twenty-four hours?
At the time this -conspiracy was entered into, and wl1en this court , was convened and entered upon this trial, the country was in a stA.te of civil war. An army of insurrectionists
have, since this trial begun, shed the blood of Union soldiers in battle. The conspirator,
by whose hand his co-conspirators, whether present or absent, jointly murdered the President
on the 14th of last April, could not be and was not arrested upon civil process, but was pursued
by the military power of the government, captured, and slain. Was this an aet of usurpation ?-a violation of the right guaranteed to that fleeing assassin by the very Constitution
against which and for the subversion of which he had conspired and murdered the President? Who in all this land is bold enough or base enough to assert it?
I would be glad to know by what law the President, by a military force acting only upon
his military orders, is justified in pursuing, arresting, and killing one of these conspirators,
and is condemned for arresting in like manner, and by his order subjecting to trial, according to tbe laws of war, any or all of tbe other parties to this same damnable conspiracy and
CI ime, by a military tribunal of justice-a tribunal, I may be pardoned for saying whose integrity and impartiality are above suspicion, and pass unchallenged even by the accused
themselves.
The argument against the jurisdiction of this court rests upon the assumption that even in
time of insurrection and civil war no crimes are cognizable and punishable by military commission or court-martial, save crimes committed in the military or naval service of the United States, or in tbe militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the
United States. But that is not all the argument; it affirms that under this plea to the jurisdiction the accused have the right to demand that this court shall decide that it is not a judicial tribunal and bas no legal existence.
This is a most extraordinary proposition-that the President, under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, was not only not authorized but absolutely forbidden to constitute
this eourt for the trial of the accused, and, therefore, the act of the President is void, and the
gentlemen who compose the tribunal without judicial authority or power, and are not in fact
or in law a court.
That I do not misstate what is claimed and attempted to be established on behalf of the
accused, I ask the attention of the court to the following as the gentleman's (Mr. Johnson's)
propositions :
That Congress has not authorized, and, under the Constitution, cannot authorize the appointment of this commission.
That this commi::;sion has, " as a court, no legal existence or authority," because the President, who alone appointed the commission, has no such power.
That his act "is a mere nullity-tha usurpation of a power not vested in the Executive,
and conferring no authority upon you."
"\Ve have had no common exhibition of law learning in this defencP, prepared by a senator of the United States; but with all his experience, and all his learning and acknowledged
ability, he has failed, utterly failed, to show how a tribunal constituted and sworn, as this
l1as been, to duly try and determine the charge and specification against the accused, and by
its commission not authorized to hear or determine any other issues whatever, can rightfully
entertain, or can by any possibility pass upon, the proposition presented by this argument
of the gentleman for its consideration.
The members of this court are officers in the army of the United States, and by order of
the President, as commander-in-chief, are required to discharge this duty, and are authorized in this capacity to discharge no other duty, to exercise no other judicial power. Of
course, if the commission of the President constitutes this a court for the trial of this case
only, as such court it is competent to decide all questions of law and fact arising in the trial
of the case. But this court bas no power, as a court, to declare the authority by whi<:h it
was constituted null and void, and the act of the President a mere nullity, a usurpation. Has
it been shown by the learned gentleman, who demands that this court shall so decide, that
officers of the army may lawfully and constitutionally question in this manner the orders of
their commander-in-chief, disobey, set them aside, and declare them a nullity and a usurpation? Even if it be conceded that the officers thus detailed by order of the commanderin-chief may question and utterly disregard his order and set aside his authority, is it possible, in :the nature of things, that any body of men, constituted and qualified as a tribunal of
jus~ice, can sit in judgment upon the proposition that they are not a court for any purpose,
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and finally decide indicially, as a court, that the government which appointed them was without authority ? Why not crown the absurdity of this pr.oposition by asking the several members of this court to determine that they are not men-living, mtelligent, responsible men!
This would be no more irrational than the question npon which they are asked to pass.
How can any sensible man entertain it? Before he begins to reason upon the proposition
he must take for granted, and therefore decide in advance, the very question in dispute, to
wit, his actual existence.
So with the question presented in this remarkable argument for the defence: before this
court can enter upon the inquiry of the want of authority in the President to constitute them
a court, they must take for granted and decide the very point in issue, that the P1esident
had. the authority, and that they are in law and in fact a judicial tribunal ; and. having assumed this, they are gravely asked. as such judicial tribunal, to finally and solemnly decide
and declar~that they arenotin fact or in law a judicial tribunal, but a mere nullity and nonentity. A most lame and impotent conclusion!
As the learned counsel seems to have great reverence for judicial authority, and requires
precedt'nt for every opinion, I may be pardoned for saying that the objection which I urge,
against the' possibilit.y of any judicial tribunal, after being officially qualified as Ruch, entertaining, nlUch less judicially deciding, the proposition that it has no leg·al existence as a
court, and that the appointment was a usurpation and without authority of law, has been
solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States.
That court says: " I he acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority
from whit;h it is derived. If a court should enter upon the inquiry. (whether the authority of
the government which established it existed,) and shoulj] t;Ome to the conclusion that the government under which it acted bad been put aside, it would cease to be a court and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides at
all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under
which it is exer~ising judicial power." (Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard, 40.)
That is the very question raised by the learned gertleman in his argument-that there was
no autlw1·ity in the President, by whose act alone this tribunal was constituted, to vest it with
judicial power to try this issue; and by the order upon your record, as has already been
shown, if you have no power to try this issue for want of authority in the commander-inchief to constitute you a court, you are no court, and have no power to try any issue, because
his order limits you to this issue, and this alone.
It requires no very profound legal attainments to apply the ruling of the highest judicial
tribunal of this country, just cited, to the point raised, not by the pleadings, but by the argument. This court exists as a judicial tribunal by authority only of the President of the United
States; the acceptance of the office is an acknowledgment of the validity of the authority
conferring it, and if the President had no authmity to order, direct, and constitute this court
to try the accused, and, as is claimed. did, in so constituting it, perform an unconstitutional
and illegal act, it neces-arily results that the order of the President is void and of no effect;
that the order did not and could not constitute this a tribunal of justice, and therefore its
mem hers are incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the que;;tion presented.
There is a marked distinction between the question here presented and that raised by a plea
to the jurisdiction of a tribunal whose existence as a court is neither questioned nor denied.
Here it is argued, through many pages, by a learned senator and a distinguished lawyer,
that the order of the President, by whose authority alone this court is constituted a tribunal
of military justice, is unlawful. If unlawful, it is void and of no effect, and has created no
court; tht>refore this body, not being a court, can have no more power as a court to decide
any question whatever than have its individual members power to decide that they as men
do not in fact exist.
It is a maxim of the common law-the perfection of human reason-that what is impossible the law requires of no man.
How can it be possible that a judicial tribunal can decide the question that it does not exist,
any more than that a rational man can decide that he does not exist?
The absurdity of the proposition so elaborately urged upon the consideration of this court
cannot be saved from the ridi<>.ule and contempt of sensible men by the pretence that the court
is not ash:ed judicially to decide that it is not a court, but only that it bas no jmisdiction; for
it is a fact not to be denied that the whole argument for the defence on this point is that the
President bad not the lawful authority to issue the order by which alone this court is 9onstituted, and that the order for its creation is null and void.
Gentlemen might as well ask the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a plea to the
jurisdi~tion, to decide, as a court, that the President had no lawful authority to nominate the
judges thereof severally to the Senate, and that the Senate had no lawful authority to advise
and consent to their appointment. as to ask this court to decide, as a court, that the order of
the President of the United States constituting it a tribunal for the sole purpose of this trial
was not only without authority of law, but against and in violation of law. If this court is
not a lawful tribunal, it has no existence, and can no more speak as a court than the dead,
much less pronounce the judgment required at its hands-that it is not a court, and that the
President of the United States, in constituting it such to try the question upon the charge
and specification preferred, has transcended his authority and violated his oath of office.
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Before passing from tl1e consideration of the proposition of the learned senator, that this is
not a eonrt, it is fit that I should notice that another of the counsel for the accused (Mr.
Ewing) has also advanced the same opinion, certainly with more direetness and candor, aud
without any qualification. His statement is, "Yon," gent1emen, "are no court under the
Constitution." This remark of the gentleman cannot fail to excite surprise, when it is remembered that the gentleman, not many months since, was a general in the service of the country, and as such, in his department in the west, proclaimed and enforced martial Jaw by the
constitution of military tribunals for the trial of cit.izens not in the land or naval forces, but
who were guilty of military offences for which he dPemed thPm justly punishable before military courts, and aecordingly he punished thPm. Is the gentleman quite sure, when that account comes to be rendered for these all(\ged unconstitutional assumptions of power, that he
will not have to answer for more of these alleged violations of the rights of citizens by illegal
arrests, convictions, and exeeUiions, than any of the members of this court? In support of
his opinion that this is no court, the gentleman eites the 1ld article of the Constitution, which
provides "that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court,
and such inferior courts as Congress may establish," the judges whereof "shall hold their
offices during good behavior."
It is a sufficient answer to say to the gentleman, that the power of. this government to try
and punbh military offences by military tribunals is no part of the "judicial power of the
United States," under the 3d article of the Constitution, but a power conterred by the 8th section of the 1st article; and so it has been ruled by the Supreme Court in Dyres vs. Honver, 20
Howard, 78. If this povrer is so conferred by the 8th section, a military court authorized by
Congress, and constituted as this has been, to try all pNsons for military crimes in time of
war, though not exercising "the judicial po,ver" provided f01 in the 3d article, is nevertheless a court as cDnstitutional as the Supreme Court itself. The gE'ntleman admits this to the
extent of the trial by courts-martial of persons in the military or naval service, and by admitting it he gives up the point. There is no e7,press grant for any such tribunal, and the
pm.wr to establish such a cDurt, therefore, is implied from the provisions of the 8th section,
1st article, that "Congress shall have power to provide and maintain a navy, ' and also "to
make rules for the government of the land and naval forces." Fro111 these grants the Supreme
Court infer the power to establish courts-martial, and from the grants in the same Hth section, as I shall notice hereafter, that ''Congress shall have power to declare war," and ·• to
pass all laws necessary and proper to carry this and all other powers into effect," it is neces~
sarily implied that in time of war Congress may authorize military commissions, to try aU
crimes committed iu aid of the public enemy, as such tribunals are necessary to give effect tQ
the power to make war and suppress insurrection.
Inasmuch as the gentleman, (General Ewing.) for whom, persona1ly, I have a high regard
as the military commander of a western department, made a liberal exercise, under tbe order
of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, • f this power to arrest. and try military offenders not
in the land or naval forces of the United States, and inflicted upon them, as I am informed,
the extreme penalty of the law, by virtue of his military juribdiction, I wish to know whether
he proposes, by his proclamation of the personal responsibility awaiting all such usurpatioos
of judicial authority, that he himself shall be subjected to the same stern judgment wbil\h he
invokes against others-that, in short, be shall be drawn and quartered for inflicting the extreme penalties of the law upon citizens of the United States in violation of the Constitution
and laws of his country? I trust that his error of judgment in pronouncing this military
jurisdiction a usurpation and violation of the Constitution may not rise up in judgment to
condemn him, and that be may never be subjected to pains and penalties for having done his
duty heretofore in exercising this rightful authority, and in bringing to judgment those who
conspired against the lives and liberties of the people.
Here I might leave this question, committing it to the charitable speeches of men, but for
the fact that the learned counsel has bel'n more careful in his extraordinary argument to denounce the President as a usurper, than to show how the court could possibly decide that it
has no judicia! existence, and yet that it has judicial existence.
A representative of the people and of the rights of the people before this court, by the appointment of the President, and whieh appointment was neither sought by me nor desired, I
cannot allow all that has here been said by way of denunciation of the murdered President
and his successor to pass unnoticed. This has been made the occ.asion by the learned counsel, Mr. Johnson, to volunteer, not to deffmd the accused, Mary E. Surratt, not to make a
judicial argument in her behalf, but to make a political harangue, a partisau speech against
his government and country, and thereby swell the cry of the armed legions of sedition and
rebellion that but yesterday shook the heavens with their infernal enginery of treason and
filled the habitations ofthe people with death. As the law forbids a senator of the United
States to reeeive compensation, or fee, for defending in cases before civil or military com-.
missions, the gentleman volunteers to make a speech before this court, in which he denounces
the action of the Executive department in p10claiming and executing martial law against
rebels in arms, their aiders and abettors, as a usurpation and a tyranny. I deem it my duty
to reply to this dennnciation, not for the purpose of presenting thereby any question tor the
decision of this .court, for I have shown that the argument of the gentleman presents no ques-·
tion for its decision as a court, but to repel, as far as I may be able, the unjust aspersion at>-
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tempted to be cast upon the memory of our dead President, and upon the official conduct of
his suecessor.
I propose now to answer fully a11 that the gentleman (Mr. Johnson) bas said of the want
of jurisdiction in this court, and of the alleged usurpation and tyranny of the Executive, that
the enlightened public opinion to which he appeals may decide whether all this denunciation
is just-whether, indeed, conspiring against the whole people, and confederation and agreement in aid of insurrection to murder all the executive officers of the government, cannot be
checked or arrested by the Executive power. Let the people decide this question; and in
doing so, let them pass upon the ac6on of the senator as well as upon the action of those
whom he so arrogantly arraigns. His plea in behalf of an expiring and shattered rebellion
is a fit subjeyt for public consideration and for public condemnation
Let that people also note, that while the leamed gentleman, (Mr. Johnson,) as a volunteer,
without pay, thus condemns as a usurpation the means elllployed so effel'tually to suppre::.s
this gigantic insurrection, the New York News, whose proprietor, Benjamin ·wood, is shown
by the testimony upon your record to have received from the agents of the rebellion twentyfive thousand dollars, rushes into the. lists to champion the cause of the rebellion, its aiders
and abettors, by following to the letter his colleague, (Mr. Johnson,) and with greater
plainness of speech, an!l a fe"rvor intensified, doubtless, by the tweuty-five thousand dollars
Teceived, and the hope of more, denounces the court as a usurpation and threatens the members with the consequences!
The argument of the gentleman, to which the court bas listened so patiently and so long,
is but an attempt to show that it is unconstitutional for the government of the United States
to arrest upon military order and try before military tribunals, and punish upon conviction,
in accordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations, all criminal ofl'enders acting in
aid of the existing rebellion. It does seem to me that the speech, in its tone and temper. is
the same as that which the country has heard for tl1e last four years uttered by the armed
rebels themselves and by their apologists, averring that it was unconstitutional for the government of the United States to defend by arms its own rightful authority and the supremacy
of its laws.
It is as clearly the right of the republic to live and to defend its life until it forfeits that
right by crime, as it is the right of the individ11al to live so long as God gives him life, unless
he forfeits that right by crime. I mal'e no argument to support this proposition. Who is
there here or elsewhere to cast the reproach upon my country that for her crimes she must die 1
Youngest born of the nations! is she not immortal by all the dread memories of the pa:st-by
that sublime and voluntary sacrifice of the present, in which the bravest and noblest of her
sons have laid down their lives that she might live, giving their serene brows to the dust of
the grave, and lifting their hands for the last time amidst the consuming fires of battle'{ I
assume, for the pmposes of this argument, that self-defence is as clearly the right of nations
as it is the acknowledged right of men, and that the American people may do in the defence
and maintenance of their own rightful authority against organized armed rebels, their aiders
and abettors, whatever free and independent nations anywhere upon this globe, in time of
war, may oiright do.
All thiS is substantially denied by the gentleman in the remarkable argument which be has
here made. There is nothing further fi·om my purpose than to do injustice to the learned
gentleman or to his elaborate and ingenious a1gument. To justify what I have alreadysaid,
I may be permitted here to remind the court that nothing is said by the counsel touching the
conduct of the accused, Mary E. Surratt, as shown by the testimony; that he makes c.. nfession at the end of his arraignment of the government and country that he has not made
sueh argument, and that he leaves it to be made by her other counsel. He does take care,
however, to arraign the country and the government for conducting a trial ·with clostd doors
and before a secret tribunal, and compares the proceedings of this court to the Spanish Inquisition, using the strongest words at his command to intensHy the horror which he supposes
his announcement will excite throughout the civilized world.
Was this dealing fuirly by this government? \Vas there anything in the conduct of the
proceedings here that justified any such remark? Has this been a secret trial? Has it not
been conduc.ted in open day, in the presence of the accused, and in the presence of seven gentlemen learned in the law, who appeared from day to day as their counsel ·? Were they not
informed of the accusation against them? Were they deprived of the right of challenge?
Was it not secured to them by law, and were they not asked to exercise it? Has any part
of the evidence been suppressed? Have not all the proceedings been published to the world?
"That, then, was done, or intended to be done, by the government which justifies this clamoT
about a Spanish Inquisition?
That a people assailed by organized treason over an extent of territory half as 1arge as the
continent of Europe, and assailed in their very capital by secret assassins banded together
and hired to do the work of murder by the instigation of these conspirators, may not be per~it~ed to make inquiry, even with closed doors, touching the nature and extent of the organIzatiOn, ought not to be asserted by any gentleman who makes the least pretensi(lns to any
knowledge of the law, either common, civil, or military. Who does not know that at the
common law all inquisitions touching crimes and misdemeanors, preparatory to indictment
by the grand inquest of the state, is made with closed doors 1
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In this trial no parties accused, nor their counsel, nor the reporters of this court, were at
any time excluded from its deliberations when any testimony was being taken; nor has there
be~n any testimony taken in the case with closed doors, save that of a few witnesses, who
testified, not in regard to the accused or either of them, but in res1-ect to the traitors and conspirators not on trial, who were alleged to have incited this crime. Who is there to say that
the American people, in time of arn1ed rebellion and civil war, have not the right to make
such an examination as secretly as they may deem necessary, either in a military or civil
court?
I have said this, not by way of apology for anything the government has done or attempted to do in the progress of this trial, but to expose the animus of the argument, and to repel
the accusation against my country ~>ent out to the world by the counsel. l!'rom anything
that he has said, I Lave yet to learn that the American people have not the right to make their
inquiries secretly, touching a general conspiracy in aid of an existing rebellion, which involv~s
their nationality and the peace and security of all.
•
The gentleman then enter.- into a learned argument for the pnrpose of showing that, by
the ConstitLttion, the people of the United States cannot, in war or in peace, subject any
person to trial before a military tribunal, whatever may be his crime or offence, unless such
person be in the military or naval service of the United States. 'l'he conduct of this argument is as remarkable as its assaults upon the government are unwarranted, and its insinuations about the revival of the Inquisition and secret trials are inexcusable. The court will
notiee that the argument, from the beginning almo.~t to its conclusion, insists that no person
is liable to be tried by military or martial law before a military tribunal, save those in the
land and naval service of the United States. I repeat, the conduct of this argument of the
gentleman is remarkable. As an instance, I ask the attention, not only of this court, but of
that public whom he has ventured to address in this tone and temper, to the authority of the
distinguished Chancellor Kent, whose great name the cnunsel ~as endeavored to prP.ss into
his service in support of his general proposition, that no person save those in the military or
neva! service of the United States is liable to be tried for any crime whatever, either in peace
or in war, before a military tribunal.
The language of the gentleman, after citing the provision
the Constitution, "that no
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment orindictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger," is, "that this exception
is designed to leave in force, not to enlarge, the power vested in Congress by the original
Constitution to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
that the land or naval forces are the terms used in both, have the same meaning, and until
lately have been supposed by every commentator and judge to exclude from military jurisdiction offe11ces committed by citizens not belonging to such forces." The learned gentleman then adds: ''Kent, in a note to his lst Commentaries, 341, states, and with accuracy,
that 'military and naval crimt?s and offences, committed while the party is attached to and
under the immediate authority of the army and navy of the United States and in actual service, are not cognizable under the common-law j tuisdiction of the courts of the United
States.' " I ask this court to bear in mind that this is the only passage which he quotes
from this note of Kent in his argument, and that no mau possessed of common sense, however destitute he may be of the exact and varied learning in the law to which the gentleman
may rightfully lay claim, ean for a moment entertain the opinion that the distinguished
chancellor of New York, in the pasf;age just cited, intimates any such thing as the counsel
asserts, that the Constitution excludes from military jurisdiction offences committed by citiizens not belonging to the land or naval forces.
Who can fail to see that Chancellor Kent, by the passage cited, only decides that military
and naval crimes and offenees committed by a party attached to and under the immediate
. authority of the army and navy of the United States, and in actual service, are not cognizable under the common-law jurisdiction of the courts of the United States? He only says they
are not cognizable under its common-law jurisdiction; but by that he does not say or intimate, what is attempted to be said by the counsel for him, that "all crimes committed by
citizens are by the Constitution excluded from military jurisdiction,'' and that the perpetrators of them can under no circumstances be tried before military tribunals. Yet the counsel
ventures to proceed, standing upon this passage quoted from Kent, to say that, ·'according
lo this great authority, every otlter class of persm1s aud every other species of offt:>nces are
within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and entitled to the protection of the proceeding by
presentmeut or indictment and tl1e public trial in such a court."
Whatever that great authority may have said elsewhere, it is very doubtful whether any
cR..ndiJ man in America will be able to come to the very learned and astute eonclusion that
Chancellor Kent has so stated in the note or any part of the note which the gentleman has
just cited. If he has said it elsewhere. it is for the geutleman, if he relies upon Kent for
authority, to produce the passage. But was it fair treatment of this "great authority"was it not taking an unwarrantable privilege with the distinguished chancellor and his great
work, tbe enduring monument of his learning and genius, to so mutilate the note referred to,
as might leave the gentleman at liberty to make his deductions and assertions under cover of
the great name of the New York chancellor, to suit the emergency of his case, by omitting
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the following passage, which occurs in the same note, and absolutely excludes tbe conclu~
sion so defiantly put forth by the counsel to support his argument 7 In that note Chancellor
Kent says:
''Military law is a system of regulations for the government of the armies in the service
oi'the United States, authorized by tbe act of Congress of April 10, 1806, known as the Articles of War, and naval law is a similar system for tbe government of the navy, under the
act of Congress of April 23, 1800. But martwllaw is quite a distinct thing, and is founded
upon parauwunt necessity, and proelaimcd by a rnilitfJry chuj."
HowevPr unsuccessful, after this exposure, the gentleman appears in maintaining his
monstrous proposition, that the American people are by their own Constitution forbidden to
try the aiders and abettors of armed traitors aud rebellion before military tribunals, and subject them, aecording to the laws of war and the usages of nations, to just punishment for
t.heir great crimes, it has been made c~ear from what I have already stated that l1e has been
emine-ntly successful in mutilating this beautiful production of that great mind; )\ hich act of
mutilation every one knows is violative alil'e of the laws of peace and war. Even in war
the divine creations of art and the immortal produetions of genius antlleaming- me spared.
In the same spi1 it, and it seems to me with the same unfairness as that Just noted, the
learned gentleman has very adroHly pressed into his service, by an extract from the Autobiography of the war-worn veteran and hero, General Scott, the names of the late Secretary of
War, Mr. Marcy, and the learned ex-Attorney General, Mr. Cushing. This adroit performanc;e is achieved in this way : after stating the fact that General Scott in Mexico proclaimed
marriallaw for the trial and punishment by military tribunals of persons guilty of "assassination, murder, and poisoning," the gentleman pro~;eeds to quote from tLe Autobiography,
''that this order, when han dell to the then Secretary of War (Mr. Marcy) for his app1 oval,
'a startle at the title (lllartiallaw order) was the only comment he then or ever made on the
subject,' and that it was 'soon silently returned as too explosive for safe handling.' 'A
little later (he adds) the Attorney Generct.l (Mr. Cushing) called and asked for a copy, and
the law officer of the govemment, whose business it is to speak on all such matters, was
stricken with legal durubnes
' Thereupon the learned gentleman pr0ceeds to say: ''How
much more startled and mor aralyzed would these g1eat men have been had tl1ey been consulted on such a comndssion as this! A commission, not to sit in another country, and to
iry ofiences not provided for in any law of the United States, civil or military, then in force,
but in their own country, and in a part of it where there are laws providing· for tl1eir trial and
punishment, and civil courts clothed with ample powers for both, and in the daily and undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction."
I think I may safely say, without stopping to make any special references, that the offi·
cial career of the late SeCJetary of War (.Mr. Marey) gave no indication that be ever doubted
or denied the constitutional power of the American people, acting through thtir duly consti·
tuted agents, to do any act justified by the laws of war, for the suppression of a rebellion or
to repel invasion. Ce1.tainly there is nothing iu this extract from the Autobiography which
justifies any such concm:sion. He was startled, we are told. It may have been as much
the admiration he had for the boldness and wisdom of the conqueror of Mexico as any abhorrence he had for tbe trial and punishment of'' assassins, poisoners, and murderers," according to the laws and usages of war.
·
But the official utte~ances.ofthe ex-Attorney General, (Cushing,) with which the gentleman
doubtless was fttmiliar when he prepmed this argument, by no means justify the atreu1pt
here made to quote him as authority against the proclamation and enforcement of martial law
in time of rebellion and civil war. Tllat distinguisl1ed man, not second in legal attainments
to any who have held that position, has left an official opinion of record touching this subject. Refening to what is said by Sir Mathew Hale, in his History of the Common Law,
concerning martial law, wherein he limits it, as the gentleman bas seemed by the whole
drift of his argument desiiOus of doing, and says that it is "not in truth and in nality law,
but something indulged rather than allowed as a law-the necessity of government, order,
and di:;cipline in an army," Mr. Cushing makf.s this just criticism : "This proposition is
a mere composite blunder, a total misapj.nel1ension of the matter. 1t confounds rnaTtial law
and lnw military; it ascribes to the former the uses of the latter ; it erroneously assumes that
the government of a body of troops is a necessity more than of a body of civilians or citizens.
It confounds and confuses all the relations of the subject, and is an apt illustration of the
incompleteness of the notions of the common-law jurists of Eng lana in rega1 d to matters not
comprehended in that limited braneh of legal science. * * • " Military Jaw, it is now
perfectly understood in England, is a branch of the law of the land, applicable only to cer·
tain acts of a partlcular cla:;s of persons and administered by special tril.nmals ; but neither
in that nor in any other respect essentially differing as to foundation in constitutioJJal reason
from admiralty, ecclesiastical, or, indeed, chancery and common law. " .,. * lt is the system of rules for the government of the army and navy established by successive acts of Parliament.
"
"
"
*
Martial law, as exercised in any country by the commander of a forPign army, is an element of the jus belli.
"It is incidental to the state of solemn war, and appertains to the law of nations.
"
*
Thus, while the armies of the United Sates occupied different provinces of the .Mexican republic, the respective commanders were not limited in authority by any local law. They
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allowecl, or rather required the magistrates of the country, municipal or judicial. to cotJtinue
to admini~ter the laws of the country among tbeir countrymen; but in subjection, always,
to the militaty vower, which acted summarily and according to diseretion, when the belligerent
interests of the conqueror required it, 1:md which Pxercised jurisdiction, either summarily or
by means of military commissions, for the protection or the punishment of eitizeus of the
United States in Mexico. "-Opinions of Attorneys General. vol. viii, 366-369.
Mr. Cusbiug says, "That, it would seem, was one of the forms of martial law;" but he
adds, that such an .example of martial law administered by a foreign army in the enemy's
country •'does not enlighten us in rt"gard to the question of martial law in one's own country
and as admimstered by its military commanders. That is a case which the law of nations
does not re~tch. Its regulation is of the domestic resort of the organic laws of the country
itselt; and regarding which, as it happens, there is no definite. or explicit legislation in the
United States, as tLere is none in England.
'
"Accordingly, in England, as we bave Feen, Earl Grey assumPs that when martial law
exists it has no legal origin, but is a mere fact of necessity, to be legalized afterwards by a
bill of indemnity, it there be oecasion. I am not prepared to say that, under existing laws,
such may not also be the case in the United States."-lbid., ~70.
After sul·h a statement, wherein ex-Attorney Genf'ral Cushing very clearly recognizes the
rigLt of tt1is government, as also of England. to employ martial law as a means of defence
in a time of war, whether domestic or foreign, he will be as much surprised when l1e reads
the argument of the learned gentleman, wherein be is described as being struck with leual
dumbness at the mere mention of proelaiming martial law, and its enforeement by the commander of our army in Mexico, as the late Secretary of War was sturtled with even the
mention of its title.
Even some of the reasons given, and certainly the power exercised by the veteran hero
himself~ would seem to be in dired conflict with the propositions of the learned gentleman.
The Lieutenant General says, he "excludes from llis order cases already cognizable by
court-mat tial, and limits it to cases not pn.vided for in the act of Congress establishing rules
and articles tor the government of the atmies of the United St11tes." Has not the gentleman
who atteu1pts to press General Scott into his service argued and insisted upon it, that the
commander of the army cannot subject the soldiers under his command to any control or
punishllJeut wl:latever, save that which is provided for in the articles?
It will not do, in order to sustain the gentleman's hypothesis, to say that these provisions
of the Constitution, by whieh he attempts to fetter the power of the peoph· to punish such
offeuces in tin1e of war within the territory of the United States, may be disregarded by an
officer of the United States in command of its armies, in the trial and punishment of its
soldiers in a foreign war. The law of the United States for the government of its own armies
follows the flag upon every sea and in every land.
The truth is, that the right of the people to proclaim and pxecute martial law is a
neces~>ary inddent of war, and this was the right exercised, and rightfully exereised, by
Lieutenant General Scott in Mexico. It was wltat Earl Grey has justly said was a'' fact
of nec~.:ssity," and I may add, an act as clearly authorized as was the act of fighting the
enemy when they appea1ed before him.
ln making this exception, the lieutenant general followed the rule rf.'cognized by the American authuri1ies on milita1y law, in which it is declared that "many crimes committed even by
milita1y tdficers, enlisted men, or camp retainers, cannot be tried under the rules and articles
of war. Military commissions must be resorted to for such cases, and these commissions
should be ordered by the same'fiuthority, be con~tituted in a similar manner and their proceediugs be conducted according to the san,e general rules, as general courts-martial."Btnet, 15.
There remain for me to notice, at present, two other points in this extraordinary speech:
First, that u.artial law does not warrant a military commissiou for the trial of military
oif'ences-that is, offences committed in time of war in the interests of the public enemy, and
by concert and agreement with th~ enemy; and second, that martial law does not prevail in
the U1.1ited States, and has never been dedared by any competent authority.
lt is not necessary, as the gentleman himself has declined to argue the first point-whether
mania] law authorizes the organization of military commissions by order of the commanderin-chief to try such offences-that I should say more than that the authority just cited by me
shows that such commissions are authonzed un<ier martial law, nnd are created by the comn~ander for the trial of all sueh offences, when tbeir puuishment by court-martial is not proVIded fur by the express statute law of the country.
The ~ecund point-ti.Jat martial law has not been decl!ued by any competent authority-is
an anmgument of the late murdered President of the United States for his proclamation of
SepteUJlJl·r ~4, Hl62, declaring martial law throughout the United States; and of which, in
Lawrence's edition of \Vheaton on International Law, p. 522, it is Eaid, "'Whatever may be
the inierence to be deduced either from constitutional or international law, or from the usages
of European governments, as to the legitimate depository of the power of suspending the
writ uf lwbeas corp1.ts, tbe virtual abrogation of the judiciary in cases affecting individual
liberty, and the establishment as matter offact in the United States, by the Exel·.utive alone,
of martial law, not merely in the insurrectionary districts, or in eases of military occupancy
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but throughout the entire Union, and not temporarily, but as an institution as pennanent as
the insunection on which it professes to be based, and capable, on the same prineiple, of
being revived in all cases of foreign as well as civil war, are placed beyond question by the
President's proclamation of September 24, 1862." That proclamation is as follows:
"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas it has become necessary to call in tv service not only volunteers, but also portions
of the militia of the States, by a draft, in order to suppress the insurrection existing in the
United States, and disloyal persons are not adequately restrained by the ordinary processes
of law from hinderiug this nwasure, and from givi11g aid ant1 comfort in various ways to the
insurrection: Now, therefore, be it ordered that during the existing immrrection, and as a.
necessa1y means for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments . re~:>isting
militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels, against
the authority of the lJnited States, shall be suhject to martial law, and liable to trial aud
punishment by courts-martial or military commission.
"Second. That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested.
or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion sbal be, imprisoned in any fcrt, camp,
arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the
sentence of any court-martial or military commission.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United
States to be affixed.
"Done at the city of Washington this 24th clay of September, A. D. 1862, and of the
independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
"By the President:
"WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
" Secretary of State."
This proclamation is duly certified from the War Drpartment to be in full force and notrevoked, and is evidence of record in this case; and but a few days since a proclamation of the
President, of which this court will take notice, declares that the same remains in full force.
It bas been said by another of the counsel· for the accused (Mr. Stone) in his argument,
that, admittmg its validity, the proclamation ceases to have effect with the insurreetion, and
is terminated by it. It is true the proclamation of martial law only continues during the
insurrection; but inasmuch as the question of the existence of an iusUirection is a P"litical
question, the decision of w hicb belongs exclusively to tbe political departmPnt of the government, that department alone can declare its existence, and that department alone can declare
its termination, and by the action of the political department of the govemment every judicial
tribunal in the land is concluded and bound. That question bas been settled for fifty years
in thls country by the Supreme Court of the United States: :F irst, in the case uf Brown vs.
The United States, (8 Cranch;) also in the prize cases, (2 Black, 641.) Nothing more, therefore, need be said upon this question of an existing insurreetion than this: The political department of the government has heretofore proclaimed an insurrection; that department bas
not yet declared the insurrection ended, and the event on the 14th of April, which robbed the
people of their cho,.,en Executive, and clothed this land in mourning, bore sad but overwhelming witness to the fact that the reuellion is not ended. The faPt of the insurrection is not an
open question to be tried or settled by parol, either in a military tribunal or in a civil eourt.
The declaration of the learned gentleman who opened the defence, (Mr. Johnson,) that
ma1 tial law has never been dec.lared by any competent authority, as I have already said,
arraigns Mr. Lincoln for a usurpation of power. Does the gentleman mean to say that, until
Congress authorizes it, the President cannot proclaim and enforce martiallaw in the suppression of armed and organized rebellion? Or does he only affirm that this act of the late President is a usurpation?
The proclamation of martial law in 1862 a usurpation! though it armed the people in that
dark hour of trial with the means of defence against traitorous and secret enemies in every
State and district of the country; though by its use some of the guilty were brought to swift
and jm;t judgment, and others deterred fi·om crin1e or driven to flight; though by this means
Lhe innocent a11d defenceless were protectrd; though by this means tbe city of the gentleman's
residence was saved from the violence and pillage of the mob and the torch of the incendiary.
But, says the gentleman, it was a usurpation, forbidden by the laws of the land!
The same was said of the proclamations of blockade issued Apri119 and 27, 1861, which
declared a blockade of the ports of the insurgent States, and tb&t all vessels violating the same
were subjects of capture, and, together with the cargo, to be condemned as prize Inasmuch as Congress bad not then recognized the fact of civil war, these proclamations were
denounced as void. The Supreme Com t deeicled otherwise, and affirmed the power of the
Executive thus to subject property on the seas to seizure and condemnation. I read from
that decision:
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"The Constitution confers upon the President the whole executive power; he is bound to
take care that the Jaws be faithfu11y executed; he is commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United ~tates, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual
service of the United States. * * "'Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as commander-in-chief in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile rrsistance
and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this court must be g·overned
by the dec.isions and acts of the political department of the government to which this power
was intrusted. He must determine what deg-ree of force .the crisis demands.
"The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the court that
a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under
the circumstances peculiar to the ease." (2 Black, 670.)
It has bern solemnly ruled hy the same tribunal, in an earlier case, "that the poweds confided to the Executive of the Union to determine when it is nec·essary to call out the militia of
the States to repel invasit:m;" as follows: "That he is necesl'larily constituted the judg-e of
the existence of the exig-ency in the first instance. and is bound to act according to his belief
of the facts. If be does so act, and decides to call forth the militia, his orders for this purpose
are in strict conformity with the provisions of the law; and it would seem to follow as a
neeessary consequence, that. every act done by a subordinate officer, in obedience to such
orden;, is equally justifiable. The Jaw contemplates that, under such circumstances, orders
shall be given to carry the power into effeet; and it cannot., therefore, be a correct inference
that any other person has a just right to disobey them. The law does not provide for any
appeal from the judgment of the President, or for any right in subordinate oflkers to review
his decision, and in effect defeat it. Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any
person, to be flxercisPd by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of
construction. that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts." ( 12 Wheaton. 31.)
In the light 0f these decisions, it must be clear to every mind that the question of the existence of an insurrection, and the necessit.y of calling into requisition for its suppressi0n both
the militia of the States and the army and navy of the United States, and of proclaiming
martial law, which is an essential condition of war, whether foreign or domestic, must rest
with the offi<'er of the government who is charged by the express terms of the Constitution
with the performance of this great duty for the common defence and the execution of the laws
of the Union.
.
But it is further insisted by the gentleman in this argument that Congress has not authorized the establishment of military commissions, which are essential to the judicial administration of martial law and the punishment of crimes committed during the existence of a
civil war, and especially t~at sueh commissions are not so authorized to try per,ons other
than those in the military or naval service of the United Statef', or in the militia of the several
States, when in the actual service of the United States. '.rhe gentleman's argument assuredly
destroys itself, for he insists that Congress, as the legislative department of the government,
can pass no law which, either in peace or war, can constitutionally subject any citizen not
in the land or naYal forces to trial for criiile before a military tribunal, or otherwise than by
a jury in the civil courts.
Why does the learned gentleman now tell us that Congress has not authorized this to be
done, after deelaring just as stoutly that by the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution 110 such military tribunals can be established for the trial of any person not in the military or naval serviee of the United States, or in the militia when in actual service, for the
commission of any crime whatever in time of war or insurrection? It ought to have occurred
to the gentleman, when commenting upon the exeeption in the fifth article of the Constitution, that there was a reason for it very different from that which he saw fit to assign, and
that reason, manifestly upon the face of the Comtitution itself, was, that by the eighth section of the first Hrticle it is expressly provided that Congress shall have power to rna ke rules
for the government of the land and naval forces, and to provide for organizing, arming, and
diseiplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, and that, inasmuch as military di:-:cipline and order are as essential in an army in time of peace as in time of war, if the Constitution would leave this power
to Congress in peace, it must make the exception, so that rules and regulations for the government of the army and navy should be operative in time of peace as weJl as in time of
war; because the provisions of the Constitution give the right of trial by jury IN TIME OF
PEACE in all criminal prosecutions by indictment, in terms embracing every human being
that may be held to answer for crime in the United States; and therefore if the eighth section
of the first article was to remain in full force IN TJME OF' PEACE, the exceptiOn must be
made; and, accordingly, the exception was made. But, by the argument we have listened
to, this court is toid, and the country is told, that IN 1 IME oF WAR-a war which involves
in its dread i"lsue the lives and interests of us all-the guarantees of the Constitution are in
full force for the benefit of those who conspire with the enemy, creep into your camps,
murder in cold blood, in the interests of the invader or insurgrnt, the commander-in-chief of
your army, and secure to him the slow and weak provisions of the civil law; wllile the soldier, who may, when overcome by the demands of exhausted nature, which cannot be re-
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sisted, h&ve slept at his post, is subject to be tried upon the spot by a military tribunal and
shot. The argument amounts to this: that as military courts and military trials of civilians
in time of war are a usurpation and tyranny, and as soldien are liable to such arrests and
trial, Scrgeaut Corbett, who shot Booth, should be tried and executed by sentence of a military cou1 t, while Booth's co-conspirators and aiders should be saved from any such indignity
as a military trial! I confess that I am too dull to comprehend the logie, the reasou, or the
sense of such a conclusion. If there is any one entitled to this privilege of a civil trial, at
a remote period, and by a jury of the District, IN TIME OF CIVIL WAH, when the foundations of the republic. are rocking beneath the earthquake tread of armed rebellion. that man
is the defender of the republic. It will never do to say, as has been said in this argument,
that the soldier is not liable to be tried in time of war by a military tribunal for any other
offence than those prescribed in the rules and articles of war. To my mind nothing can be
clearer thau that citizen and soldier alike, in time of civil or foreign war, after a proclamation of martial law, are triable by military tribunals for all offences of which they may be
guilty, in the iuterest.s of, or in concert with, the enemy.
These provisions, therefore, of your Constitution for indictment and trial by jury in civil
courts of all c1imes are, as I shall hereafter show, silent and inoperative in time of war when
the public safety requires it.
The argument to which I have thus been replying, as the court will not fail to perceive,
nor tbat public to which the argument is addressed, is a labored attempt to establish tl_le
proposition, that, by the Constitution of the United States, the American people cannot,
even in a dvil war the greatest the w0rld has ever seen, employ martial law and military
tribunals as a means of successfully asserting their authority, preserving their nationality,
and sel'm ing protection to the lives and property of all, and especially to the persons of
tho-e to wh(lm they have committed, officially, the great trust of maintaining the, national
authority. The gentleman says, with an air of perfect confidence, that he denies the jurisdiction ,,f military tribunals for the trial of civiiians in time of war, because neither the Constitution nor laws justify, but on the contrary repudiate them, and that all the experience of
the past is agai11st it. I might content myself with saying tbaL the practice of all nations
is against the gentleman's conclusion. The struggle for our national independence was aided
and prosecuted by military tribunals and martial law, as well as by arms. 'l'he contest for
American nationality began with the establishment, very soon after the fi1 ing of the -first gun
at Lexington on the 19th day of April, 1775, of military tribunals and martial law. On the
30th of Ju11e, 1775, the Contine11tal Congress provided that ·'whosoever, belrmgiv!! to the
continental army, shall be co11victed of holding correspondence with, or giving intelUgence
to the enemy, either indirectly or directly, shall suffer such punishment as by a court-martial
shall be ordered." This was found not suffil'ient, inasmuch as it did not reach those civitwns
who, like certain civilians of our day, claim the protection of the civil law in time of war
against military arrests and military trials for military crimes. Therefore the same Cot1gress,
on the 7th of November, 1775, amended this provision by striking out the words ''belonging
to the continental army," and adopting the article as follows:
"Atl per:;uns convicted of holding a treacherous correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a general court-martial
shall think proper."
And on the 17th of June, 1776, the Congress added an additional rule:
"That all persons, not members of nor owing allegiance to any of the United States of
.Ammica, who should be found lmking as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments
of the armies of the United States, or any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law
and usage of nations, by the sentence of a court-martial, or such other punishment as a
court-u1a1 tial shall di1 ect."
ComprehPnsive as was this legislation, embracing as it did soldiers, citizens, and aliens,
subjecting all alike to tdal for their UJilitary crillles by the military tribunals of justice, according to the law and the mage of nations, it was found to be insufficient to meet that most
dangerous of all crimes committed in the interests of the enemy by citizt>ns in titue of warthe crime of conspiring together to assassinate or seize and carry away the soldier~ and citizens
who were loyal to the cause of the country. Therefore, on the 27th of February, 1778, the
Congret:ls adopted the follovving resolution:
".Htsoi'/Jid, That wha,tever inhabitant of these States shall kill, or seir,e, or take any loyal
citizen or citizens thereof and convey him, her, or them to any place within the power of the
eneUJy, or shall ENTER INTO ANY COMBINATION for such purpose, or attempt to carry tile
same into f:'xeeution, or hath assi:;ted or shall assist therein, or shall, by giving intelligence, acting as a guide, or in any manner whatever aid the ~:-nemy in the perpetration thereof, be
shall sufl'er death by the judgment of a court·martial as a ttaitor, assassin, or spy, if the
offence be committed within seventy miles of the headquarters of the grand or other armies
of these ~tates where a general officer commands."_:_Jou1·nals of Congress, vol. ii, pp. 459, 460.
So stood the law until the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. Every wellinformed man lmows that at the titue of the passuge of these acts the courts of justice, having
cognizance of all crimes against persons, were open in many of the States, and that by their
several constitutions and charters, which were then the supreme law for the punish111ent of
crimes comlllitted within their respective territorial limits, no man was liable to conviction
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out by the verdict of a jury. Take, for example, the provisions of the constitution of
North Carolina, adopted on the lOth of November, 1776, and in full force at the time of the
passage of the last resolution by Congress above cited, which provisions are as follows:
"That no freeman shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by indictment, presentmfmt, or impeaehment."
.
·'That no freeman shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a
jury of good and lawful men in opf>n court, as heretofore used."
This was the law in 1778 in all the States, and the provision for a trial by jury every one
knows meant a jury of twelve men, impane1led and qualified to try the issue in a c::ivil court.
The conclusion is not to be avoided, that these enactments of the Congress under the Confederation set aside the trial by jury within the several States, and expressly providPd for the
trial by court-martial of "any of the inhabitants" who, during the revolution, might, contrary to the provi:;ions of said Jaw, and in aid of the public enemy, give them intelligence,
or kill any loyal citizens of the United States, or enter into any combination to kill or carry
tl1em away. How comes it, if the argument of the counsel be true, that this enactment was
passed by the Congress of J77H, when the constitutions of the f:everal States at that day as
fully gua1anteed t1ial by jury to every person held to answer for a crime, as does tbe Constitution of the Uuited States at this hour? Notwithstanding this fact, I haYe yet to learn that
any loyal man ever challenged, during aU the period of our conflict for independence and
nationality. the validity of that law for the trial for military offences by military tribunals of all
offenders as the law, not of peace, but of vvar, and absolutely essential to the prosecution of
war. I may be pardoned for saying that it is the accepted common law of nations that
martial law is at all times and everywhere essential to the successful prosecution of war,
whether it be a civil or a foreign war. The validity of these acts of the Continental and
Confederate Congress I know was challenged, but only by men charged with the ~ilt of
their country's blood.
Washington, the peerless, the stainless, and the just, with whom God walked through the
night of that great trial, enforced this just and wise enactment upon all oceasions. On the
30th of Septelllber, 178U, Joshua H. Smith, by the order of General Washington, was put upon
his trial bef01e a court-martial, convened in the State of New York, on the charge of there
aiding and assisting Benedict Arnold, in a eombination with the enemy, to take, kill, and
seize ~>ucb loyal citizens or soldiers of the United States as were in garrison at "\Vest Point.
Smith object€d to the jurisdiction, averring that be was priYate citizen, not in the military
or naval SPrvice, and therefore was only amenable to the civil authority of the State, whose
constitution bad guaranteed the right of trial by jury to all persons held to answer for er!me;
(Chandler's Criminal Trials, vol. ~. p. 1R7.) The constitution of New York then in force
had so provided; but, notwithstanding that, the court overruled the plea, held him to answer, •
and tried him. I repeat, that when Smith was thus tried by court-martial, the constitution
of New Y01k as fully guaranteed trial by jury in the civil courts to all civHians charged and
held to answer for crimes within the limits of that State, as does the Constitution of the
Uniteu States guarantee such trial within the limits c•f the Distriet of Columbia. By the
second of the Articles of Confederation each State retained "its sovereignty," and every
power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. By those articles there was no express delegation of judicial power; therefore the
States retained it fully.
If the military courts, constituted by the commander of the army of the United States
under the Confederation, who was appointed only by a resolution of the Congress, without
any express grant of power to authorize it-his office not being created by the act of the people in their tundamental law-had juri:;diction in every State to try and put to death "any
inhabitant" thmeof who should kill any loyal citizen or enter into "any combination" for
any such pUI pose therein in time of war, notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution
and laws ot such States, how can any man conceive that under the Constitution of the United
Stated, which is the oupteme law over every State, anything in the constitution and laws of
such ::J_tate to the contrary notwithstanding, and the supreme law over every Territory of the
republic as well, the Commander-in-Chief of the a,rmy of the United States, who is made such
by the Cunstituti'on, and by its supreme authority clothed with the power and charged with
the d~ty of ?irect~ng and controlling the whole military power of the United States in time of
rebellion or mvaswn, has not that authority?
I need nut remind the court that one of the marked differences between thP. Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States was, that, under the Confederation, the
C~ngress. was the sole depository of all federal power. The Congress of the Confed~rat~on,
sa1~ Macllson, h~ld "the command of the army." (Feel., No. 3tl.) Has the Const1tutwn,
whiCh was ordamed by the people the better ''to insure domestic tranquillity and to provide
f?r the ~onm~un clefenee," so fetten·d the gTeat power of seH~defence against armed insurrectwn. or J_nva:;wn that martial law, so essential in war, is forbidden by that great instrument?
I w11l ywld to no man in reverence for or obedience to the Constitution of my cour1try, esteemiJJg it, as 1 do, a new evangel to the nat1ons, embodying the democracy of the New
'l'estau.ent-tL~ ab:;olute equality of all men before the law, in respect of those rights of human na,ure wh1eh are the gift of God, and therefore as universal as the material structure of·
man. Can it be that this Uunstitution of ours so divine in its spirit of justice, so beneficent
in its results, so fUll of wisdom and goodness ~nd truth, under which we became one people,
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a great and powerful nationality, has, in terms or by implication, denied to this pPop1e the
power to crush armed rebelHon by war, and to arrest and punish, during the existence of
such rebellion, according to the laws of war and the usages of nations, secret con:-pirators,
who aid and abet the public enemy?
Here is a con~<piracy, organized and prosecuted by armed traitors and hired assassins, receiving the moral support of thousands in every State and district, who pronounced the war
for the Union a failure, and your now murdered but immortal commander-in-cltief a tyrant;
the object of which conspiracy, as the testimony shows, was to aid the tottering- rebellion
which struek at the nation's life. It is in evidence that Davis, Thompson, and others, chiefs
in this rebellion, in aid of the same, ag-reed and conspired with others to poison the fountains
of water which supply your commercial metropolis, and thereby murder its inhabitants; to
secretly deposit in the habitations of the people and in the ships in your harbors i ll flammable
matmials, and thereby destn)y them by fire; to murder by the slow and consuming- torture
of famine your soldiers, captive in their hands; to import pestilence in infected clothes to be
distrilmted in your capital and camps, and thereby murder the surviving heroes and defenders ot the republic, who, standing by the holy graves of your unreturning brave, pr .. udly
and defiantly challenge to honorable combat and open battle all public enemies, that their
country may live; and, finally, to crown this horrid catalogue of crime, this sum of all human atrocities, conspired, as charged upon your record, with the accused and John Wilkes
Booth and John H. Surratt, to kill and murder in your capital the exec.utive officers of your
government and the commander of your armies. When this conspiracy, entered into by
these traitors, is revealed by its attempted execution, and the foul and brutal murder of your
President in the capital, you are told that it is unconstitutional, in order to arrest the further
execution of the conspiracy, to interpose the military power of this g-overnment for the arrest,
with~t civil process, of any of the parties thereto, and for their tlial by a military tribunal
of justice. If any such rule had obtained during our struggle for independence we never
would have been a nation. If aoy such rule bad been adopted and acted upon now, during
the fierce struggle of the past four years, no man can say that our nationality would have
thus long survived.
The whole people of the United States by their Com;titution have created the office of
President of the United States and commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and have
vested, by the terms of that Constitution, in the person of the President and c.ommander-inchivf the power to enforce the execution of the laws, and preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution.
The question may well be asked : If, as commander-in-chief, the President may not, in
time of insurrection or war, proclaim and execute martial law, according to the usages of
nations, how can be successfully perform the duties of his office-execute the laws, preserve
the Constitution, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion?
Martial law aud military tribunals are as essential to the successful prosecutio:J?. of war as
are men, and arms, and munitions. The Constitution of the United States bas vested the
power to deelare war and raise armies and navies exclusively iu the Congress, and the power
to prosecute the war and command the army and navy exclusively in the President of the
United States. As, under the Confederation, the commander of the army, appointed only
by the Congress, was by the resolution of that Congress empowered to act as be might think
proper fur the good and welfare of the service, subject only to such restmints or orders as the
Cougress might give; so, under the Constitution, the President is, by the people who ordained that Constitution and dedared him comm<mder-in-chief of the army and navy, vested
with full power to direct and control the army and navy of the United States, and employ all
the forces necessary to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and execute the laws,
as enjoined by his oath and the very letter of the Constitution, subject to no re!;triction or
direction save such as Congress may from time to time prescribe.
That these powers for the colllmon defence, intrusted by the Constitution exclusively to the
Congress and the President, are, in time of civil war or foreign il;tvasion, to be exPrci,;ed without limitation or restraint, to the extent of the public neces~hy, and without any intervention
of the federal juuiciary or of State constitutions or State laws, are facts in our histmy not
open to question.
The position is not to be answered by saying you make the American Congress thereby omnipotent, and clothe the American Exeeutive with the asserted attribute of hereditary monarchy-the king can do no wrong. Let the position be fairly stated-that the Congress
and President, m war as in peace, are but the agents of ·the w bole people, and that this unlimited power for the common defence against armed rebellion or foreign invasion is but the
power of the people intrusted exclusively to the legisla tive aud executive departlll ents as their
agents, for any and every abuse of which these agents are dil(}Ctly responsible to the peopleand the demagogue cry of an omnipotent Congress, and an Executive invested with royal
prerogatives, vanishes like the ba;.;eless fabric of a vision. If the Congress corruptly, or
oppressively, or wantonly abuse this great trust, the people, by the irresistible power of the
ballot, hurl therr. from place. If the President so abu:o;e the trust, the people by their Congress withhold supplies, or by impeachment trausfPr the trust to better hands, strip h1m of
the franchises of citizenship and of office, and declare him forever disqualified to hold any
position of honor, trust, or power under the go,-!::'rnment of his country.
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I can understand very well why men should tremble ::tt the f\Xerrise of this great power by
a monarch whose person, by the ronstitution of his realm, is inviolable, but I cannot conceive
how any American citizen, who has faith in the capacHy of the whole people to govern themselves, should give himself any concern on the subject. Mr. Hallam, the distinguished
author of th(\ Constitutional History of England, has said:
"Kings love to display the divinity with which their flatterers invest them in nothing so
much as in the instantaneous execution of their will, and to stand revealed, as it were, in the
storm and thunderbolt when their power breaks through the operation of secondary causes and
awes a prostrate nation without the intervention of law."
How just are such words when applied to an irresponsible monarch! bow absnrd when
applied to a whole people, acting through their duly appointed agents, whose will, thus
dl'clared, is the SlJpreme law, to a\ve into submission a11d peace and obedience, not a prostrate
nation, but a prostrate 1ebellion! The same great author utters the fact which all history
attests, when be says:
"It has been usual for all governments. during actual rebellion, to proclaim martial law
for the sm pension of civil jurisdiction ; and this anomaly I must admit," he adds,;' is very far
from being less indispensable at such unhappy seasons where the ordinary mode of trial is by
jur.v, than where the right of decision resides in the court.''-Const. Hist., vol. i, ch. 5, p. 326.
That the power to proclaim mftrtiallaw, and fully or partially suspend the civil jurisdiction,
federal and State, in time of rebellion or civil war, and punish by military tribunals all offences
committed in aid of the public enemy, is conferred upon Congress and the Executive, necessarily results from the unlimited grants of power for the comm&n defence to which I have
already briefly referred. I may be pardoned for saying that this position is not assumed by
me for the purposes of this oceasion, but that early in the first year of this great struggle for
our national lite I proclaimed it as a representative of the people, under the obligation of my
oath, ano, as I then belieYed, and still believe, upon the authority of the great men who
formed and fashioned the wise and maj~stic fabric of Ameiican government.
Some of the citations which I deemed it my duty at that time to make, and some of which
I now rep1oduce, have, I am pleased to say, found a wider circulation in books that have
since been pi1blished by others.
When the Constitution was on trial for its deliverance before the people of the several
States, its ratification was opposed on the ground that it conferred upon Congress and the
Executi~~e unlimited power for the common defence.
To all such objectors-and they were
numerous in every State-that great man, Alexander Hamilton, whose words will live as
long as our language lives, speaking to the listening people of all the States, and urging
them not to reject that matchless instrument "·hich bore the name of Washington, said:
" The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are these: To raise armies;
to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direl't their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist WITHOUT Lli\11TATION;
because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and
the correspondent exte!Jt and varif'ty of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.
"The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite ; and for this reason
no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on tl1e power to which the care of it is com*
*
*
This power ought to be under the direction of the same councils
mitted.
which are appointed to preside over the common defence.
*
*
*
It must be
admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation oft.bat authority which
is to provide for the defence and rrotection of the community in any manner essential to Its
efficacy ; that is, in any manner essential to the formation 1 direction, or support of the national
fon:es."
l:le adds the further remark: "This is one of those truths which, to a cor:~;ect and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be
made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are uni
versal-the means ought to be propmtioned to the end; the persons from whose agency the
attainment of any end, is expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained."Federuli:;t, No. ~3.
In the same great contest for the adoption of the Constitution, Madison, sometimes called
the Father of the Constitution, said:
·'Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the
negative.
*
*
*
Is the power of raising armies. and equipping· fleets necessary?
?'
*
* It is involved in the power of self-defence.
*
*
*
With what
color of propriety could the force necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot
liUlit the ton~e of offence?
*
*
*
The means of security ean only be regulated
by the means and the danger of attack.
*
*
*
It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain, because it plants
in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power."-Fedemlist, No. 41.
With this construction, proclaimed both by the advocates and opponents of its ratification,
the Constitution of the United States was accepted and adopted, and that construction has
been followed and acted upon by every department of the government to this day.
It was as well understood then in theory as it bas since been illustrated in practice, that the
judicial power, both federal and State, had no voice and could exercise no authority in the
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conduct and prosecution of a war, except in subordination to the politieal department of the
government. The Constitution cor.tains the significant provision, ''The privilege of the writ
of habeas eorpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safet_y may require it "
What was this but a declaration that in timA of rebellion or invasion the public safety is
the highest law? that so far as necessary the eivil eourt,; (of wbieh the commandPr-in cbief,
under the direction of Congress, shall be the solA judge) must be silPnt, and the rights of
each citizen, as secured in time of peace, must yield to the wants, interests, and necPssities
of the nation? Yet we have been gravely told by the gentleman, in his argument, that the
maxim salus populi suprema est lex is but fit for a tyrant's use. Those grand men, whom
God taught to build the fabric of empire, thought otl1erwise when they put that maxim into
the Constitution of their country. It is very clear that the Constitution recognizPs tile grea,t
principle which underlies the structure of soeiety and of all civil government, that no man
lives for himself alone, bnt each ior all; that, if need be, some must die, that the State may
live. bccauRe at best the individual is but for to-day, while the commonwealth is for all time.
I agree with the gentleman in tbe maxim which be borrows fi·om Aristotle, "Let the public
weal be under the protection of the law;" but I claim that in war, as in peacE', by the very
terms of the Constitution of the country, the public safety is under the protection of tl1e law;
that the Constitution itself bas proYided for the declaration of war for the common defence,
to suppress rebellion, to repel invasion, and, by ex~ress terms, bas declared that whatever
is necessary to make the prosecution of the war successful may be done, aud ought to be
done, and is therefore constitutionally la·wful.
vVbo will dare to svy that in time of civil war "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
and property without due proeess of Jaw?" This is a provision of your Constitutiou than
which there is uone more just or sacred in it; it is, however, only the Jaw of peace, not of
war. In peaer., that wise provision of the Constitution must be, and is, enforced by the eivil
courts; in war, it must be, and is, to a great extent, inoperative and disregarded. The
thousands slain by your armies in battle were deprived of life "without due process oflaw."
All spies arrested, convicted, and executed by your military tribunals in time of war are
deprived of liberty and life "without due process of law;" all enemies captUl ed ancl held as
prisoners of war are deprived of liberty "without due process of law;" all owners, whose
property is forcibly seized and appropriated in w~tr, are deprived of their property "without
due process of law." The Constitution recognizes the principle of common law, that every
man's bouse is his castle; that his home, the shelter of his wife and children, is his most
saered possession; and bas therefore specially provided '' that no soldier shall, in time of peace,
be quartered in any bouse without the consent of its O\Yner, nor in time of war, b~t in a
m?..nner to be prescribed by law," [III Amend.;] thereby declaring that, in time of war,
Congress may by law authorize, as it bas done, that without the consent and against the
consent of the owner, the soldif.'\r may be quartered in any man's bouse, and upon any man's
hearth. What I have said illustrates the proposition that in time of war the civil tri buuals of
justice are wholly or partially silent, as the public safety may require; that the linlitations
and provisions of the Constitution in favor of life, liberty, and property are therefore wholly
or partially suspended. In this I am sustained by an authority second to none with intelligent Ameriean eitizens. Mr. John Qnincy Aoams, than whom a purer man or wise1 statesman never ascended the chair of the Chief Magistracy in America, said in his place in the
House of Representatives, in 18:~6, that:
" In the authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the United States to declare
war, all the powers incident to war are by nect>ssary implication conferred upon the govern~
ment of the United States. Now the powers incidental to war are derived, not fi'om their
internal murdeipal source, but from the laws and usages of nations. There an~, then, in the
authority of Cougress and of the Executive two classes of powers altogether different in their
nature, and often incompatible with each other, the war power and the peace power. The
peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by provisions prescribed within the Con~
stitution itself. The war power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. This
power is tremendous ; it is strictly conRtitutional, but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously
erected for the protection of liberty, of property, and of life."
If this be so, bow can there be trial by jury for military offences in time of civil war? If
you cannot. and do not try the armed enemy before you shoot him, or the captured enemy
before you imprison him, why should you be belcl to open the civil courts and try the spy,
the conspirator, and the assassin, in the secret service of the public enemy, by jury, before
you convict and punish him? Why not clamor against holding imprisoned the captured
armed rebels, deprived of their liberty without due process of law? Are they not citizens?
Why not clamor against slaying for their crime of treason, which is cognizable in the civil
courts, by your rifled ordnance and the leaden hail of your musketry in battle these public
enemies, without trial by jury? Are they not citizens? Why is the clamor confined exclusively to the trial by military tribunals of justice of traitorous spies, traitorous conspirators,
and assassins hired to do secretly what the armed rebel attempts to do ope11ly-murder your
nationality by assassinating its defenders and its executive officers? NothiJ,g can be clearer
than that the rebel eaptured prisoner, being a citizen of the republic, is as much entitled to
trial by jury before he is committed to prison as the spy or the aider and abettor of the treason
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by conspiracy and assassination, being a citizen, is entit1ed to such trial by jury before he
is subjected to the just punishment of the law for his gre~t crime. I think that in time of
war the remark of Montesquieu, touching the civil judieiary, is true, that "it is next to
nothing." Hamilton well said, "The Executive holds the sword of the community; the
judiciary bas no direction of the strength of society; it has neither force nor will; it has
judgment aione, and is dependent for the executi<•n of that upon the arm of the Executive."
The people of these States so understood the Constitution, and adopted it and intended
thereby, without limitation or restraint, to empower their Congress and Executive to autht>rize
by law and execute by force whatever the public safety might require to suppress rebellion
or repel invasion.
Notwithstanding aU tlmt has been said by the counsel for the accused to the contrary, the
Constitution has received this construction from the day of its adoption to this hour. The
Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly decided that the Constitution has conferred
upon the government authority to employ all the means necessary to the faithful execution of
all the powers which that Constitution enjoins upon the government of the United States, and
upon every dPpartmPnt and every officer thereof. Speaking of that provision of the Constitution which provides that "Congress shall have power to make all laws that may be necessary and proper to carry into effect all powf>.rs granted to 'the government of the United
States, or to any department or officer thereof," Chief Justice Marshall, in his great decision
in the case of McCulloch vs. State of Maryland, says:
''The powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution, and the
governmPnt, in all sound reason and fair interpretation, must have the ehoice of the means
which it deems the most convenient and appropriate to the Pxecution of the power. " * *
The powers of the government were given for the welfare of the nation ; they were intended
to endme for ages to com~, and to be adapted to the various crises in human affairs. To
prescribe the svecific means by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powe1, and to confine the choice of means to such narrow limils as should not leave it in the
power of Congress to adQpt any which might be appropriate and conducive to the end,
would be most uuwise and pernicious." ( 4 Wheaton, 4~0.)
·words fitly spok~n! w hieh illustrated at the time of their utterance the wisdom of the
Constitution in providing this general grant of power to meet ¥very possible exigency which
the fortunes of war m.ight cast upon the country, and the wisdom of which words, in turn,
has been illustrated to-day by the gigantic and triumphant struggle of the peop'e during the
last four years for the supremacy of the Constitution, and in exact accordance with its provisions. In the light of these wonderful events the words of Pinckney, uttered when the
illustrious Chief J ustiee· bad concluded this opinion, "The constitution of my country is
immortal!" seem to have become words of prophecy. Has not this great tribunal, through
the chief of all itR judges, by this luminous and profound reasoning, declared that the government may by law authorize the executive to employ, in the prosecution of war, the ordinary means, and all the means necessary and adapted to the end 1 And in the other decision, before referred to, in the 8th of Cranch, arising during the late war with Great
Britain, Mr. Justice Story sa1d:
"When the legislative authority, to whom the right to declare war is confided, has declared war in its most unlimited manner, the executive authority, to whom the execution of
the war is confided, is bound to carry it into effect. He bas a discretion vested in him as to
the manner and extent, but he cannot lawfully transcend the rules· of warfare established
among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize proceedings
which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims. The sovereignty as to declaring war
and limiting its effects rests with the legislature. The sovereignty as to its execution rests
with the President." (Brown vs. United States, 8 Cranch, 153.)
Has the Congress, to whom is committed the sovereignty of the whole people to declare
war, by legislation restricted the President, or attempted to restrict him, in the prosecution
of this war for the Union, from exercising all the "powers" and adopting all the "proceedings" usually approved and employed by the civilized world 1 He would, in my judgment,
be a bold man who asserted that Congress has so legislated; and the Congress which should
by lu,w fetter the executive arm when raised for the common defence would, in my opiuion,
be false to their oath. That Congress may prescribe rules for the government of the army
and navy and the militia when in actual service, by articles of war, is an express grant of
power in the Constitution, which Congress has rightfully exercised, and which tbe Executive
must and does obey. That Congress may aid the Executive by legislation in the prosecution
of a war, civil or foreign, is admitted. That Congress may restrain the Executive, and
arraign, try, and condemn him for wantonly abusing the great trust, is expressly decla1 ed in
the Constitution. 'l'hat Congress shall pass all laws NECt;;SSARY to enable the Executive to
execute tho laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion, is one of the
express requirements of the Constitution, for the performance of which the Congress is bound
by an oath.
W bat was the legislation of Congress when treason fired its first gun on Sumter 1 By the
act of 1795 it is provided that whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed, in any State, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed
by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding, or by the powers vested in the marshals, it
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shall bC' lawful by this act for the President to call forth the militia of such State, or of any
other State or States, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations and to cause the
laws to be executed. (lst Statutes at Large, 4~4.) By the act of 1807 it is provided that
in case of insurrection or obstruction to the laws either of the United States or of any
individual State or Territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United States to call
forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to
be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ for such purpose such part of the land
or navul forces of the United States as shall be judged necessary. (2d Statutes at Large,
443.)
Can any one doubt that by these acts the President is clothed with full power to determine
whether armed insurrection exists in any State or Territory of the Union; and if so, to make
war upon it with all the force he may deem necessary or be able to command? By the
simple exercise of this great power it necessnrily results that he may, in the prosecutiOn of
the war for the suppression of such insurrection, suspend, as far as may be nece:-;sary, the
civil administration of justice by substituting in its stead martial law, which is silllply the
common law of war. If in such a momeut the President ruay make no arrests without civil
warrant, and may inflict no violence or penalties on persons (as is claimed here for the accused) without first obtaining the verdict of juries and the judgment of civil courts, then is
this legislation a mockery, and the Constitution, which not only authorized but enjoined its
enac.tment, but a glittering generality and a splendid bauble. Happily the Supreme Court
has settled all controversy on this question. In speaking of the Rhode Island insurrection
the court say:
"The Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency of this
kind and atrthorized the general government to interfere in the domestic concerus of a State,
has treated the subject as political in its nature, and plaeed the power in the hands of that
department."
*
*
*
" By the act of 1795 the power of deciding w hetber the
exigency has arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere is
giveu to the President."
The court add :
"When the President l: as acted and ca1led out the militia, is a circuit court of the United
States authorized to inquire .whether his decision was right? If it could, then it. would become the duty of the eourt, provided it came to the conclusion that the President bad decided
incorreetly, to discharge those who were arrested or detained by the troops in the service of
the United States."
*
*
*
"If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee
contained in the Constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarehy and not of
order."
*
*
*
"Yet if this right does not reside in the courts when the conflict
is raging, if the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of the political, it
must be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when peace is restored, punish
as offences and crimes the acts which it before recognized and was bound to recognize a.s
lawful." (Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard, 42, 43.)
If this be law, what becomes of the volunteer advice of the volunteer counsel, by him given
Without money and without price, to this COurt, of their responsibility, their pe1·sonal responsibility, for obeying the orders of the President of the United States in trying persons
accused of the murder of the Chief Magistrate and commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States in time of rebellion, and in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into with
the public enemy? I may be pardoned for asking the attention of the court to a further
citation from this important decision, in which the eourt say the employment of military
power to put down an armed insurrection "is essential to the existence of every government,
and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other government; and if the government of the State deem the armed opposition so formidable as to require the use of mili.~
tary force and the declaration of MARTIAL LAW, we see no ground upon which this court can
question its authority." (Ibid.) This decision in term~ declared that under the act of 1795
the President had power to decide and did decide the question so as to exdude further
inquiry whether the State government which thus employed force and proclaimed martial
law was the government of the State, and therefore was permitted to act. If a State may do
this to put down armed insurrection, may not the federal government as well? The reason
of the man who doubts it may justly be questioned. I but quote the language of that
tribunal in another case before cited, when I say the Constitution confers upon the President
the whole executive power.
We have seen that the proclamation of blockade made by the President w1;1s affirmed by
the ~upreme Court as a lawful and valid act, although its uirect effect was to dispose of the
property of whoever violated it, whether citizen or stranger. It is difficult to perceive what
course of reasoning can be adopted, in the light of that decision, which will justify any man
in saying that the President had not the like power to proclaim marliallaw in time of insurrection against the United States, and to establish, according to the customs of war among
civilized nations, military tribunals of justice for its enforcement, and for the punishment of
all crimes committed in the interests of the public enemy.
The:-e acts of the President have, however, all been legalized by the subsequent legislation
of Congress, although the Supreme Court decided, in relation to the proclamation of blockade,
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that no sueh legislation was necessary. By the act of August 6, 1861, ch. 63, sec. 3, it is
enacted that"All the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th
of March, 1861, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out, or relating to, the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved in all respects, legalized, and made valid to the same extf'nt and with tl~ same effect as if they had been issued
and done under the previous express authority and airection of the Congress of the United
States." (J 2 Stat. at Large, :326.)
This act legalized, if any such legalization was necessary, all that the President had done
from the day of his inauguration to that hour, in the prosecution of the war for the Union.
He had suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and resisted its execution when
issued by the Chief Justice of the United States; he had c,alled out and accepted the services
of a large body of volunteers for a period not previously authorized by law; he had declared
a blockade of the southern ports ; he had declared the southern States in insurrection; he
had ordered the armies to invade them and ~uppress it; thus exercising, in accordance with
the laws of war, power over the life, the liberty, and the property of the citizens. Congress
ratified it tmd affirmed it.
In like manner, and by subsequent legislation, did the Congress ratify and affirm the
proclamation of martial Jaw of September 2G, 1862. That proclamation, as the court will
have observed, declared that during the existing insurrection all rebels and insurgents, their
aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons guilty of any disloyal practice
affording aid and comfurt to the rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be '
subject. to martial Jaw, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commission; and, second, that the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, &c!,
by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or military commission.
One would suppose that it needed no argument to satisfy an intelligent and patriotic citizen of the United States that, by the ruling of the Supreme Court cited, so much of this
proclamation as declares that all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, shall be
subject to martial law and be liable to trial and punishment by court-martial or military eommitlsion, needed no ratifi.cation by Congress. Every step that the President took against
rebt'ls and insurgents was taken in pursuance of the rules of war, and was an exercitle of
mat tiallaw. Who says that he should not deprive them, by the authority of this law, of lif~
and iiberty? Are the aiders and abettors of these insurgents entitled to any higher consideration than the armed insurgents themselYes? It is against these that the President proclaimed martial law, and against all others who were guilty of any disloyal practice affording
ai.d and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States. Against these be
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and these, and only such as these,
were by that proclamation subjected to trial and punishment by cotlrt-martial or military
commission.
That the proclamation covers the offence charged here, no man will or dare ' for a moment
deny. Was it not a disloyal practice? vVas it not aiding and abetting the insurgents and
rebels to enter into a conspiracy with them to kill and murder, within your capital and your
intrenched camp, the Commander-in-Chief of our army, your Lieutenant General, and the
Vice-President, and the Secretary of State, with intent thereby to aid the rebellion and subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States? But it is said thftt the President could
not establish a eourt for their trial, and therefore Congress must ratify and affirm this proclamation. I have said before that such an argument comes with ill grace from the lips of him
who declared as solemnly that neither by the Congress nor by the President could either the
rebel himself or his aider or abettor be lawfully or constitutionally subjected to trial by any
military tribunal, whether court-martial or military commission. But the Congress did ratif3r,
in the exercise of the power vested in them, every part of this proPlamation. I have said,
upon the authority of the fathers of the Constitution, and of its judicial interpreters, that
Congress bas power by legislation to aid the Executive in the suppression of rebellion, in
executing the laws of the Union when resisted by armed insurrection, and in repelling
invasion.
By the act of March 3, 1863, the Congress of the United States, by the first section thereof,
~1eclared that during the present rebellion the President of the United States, whenever in his
JUdgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
in any ease throughout the United States or any part thereof. By the fourth section of the
same act it is declared that any order of the President, or under his authority, made at any
time dunng the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a clefenee in all courts to any
action or prosecution, civi or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, se.izure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, clone, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by
virtue of such order. By the fifth section it is provided, that if any suit or prosecution, civil or
criminal, has been Ol' shall be commenced in any State court against any officer, civil or
n1ilitary, or against any other person, for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wro11gs done or committed, or any act omitted to be done at any time during the present
rebellion, by virtue of or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under
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the President of the United States, if the defendant shall, upon appearance in such conrt,
file a petition &tating· the facts upon affidavit, &c., as aforesaid, for the removal of the cause
for trial to the cjrcuit court of the United States, it shall be the duty of the State court, upon
his giving security, to proceed no further in the cause or prosecution. Thus declaring that
all orders of the President, made at any time during the existence of the present rebell1on.
and all acts done in pursuance thereof, $all be held valid i!l the courts of justice. Without
further inquiry, these provisions of this statute embrace Order 141, which is the proclamation
of martial law, and necessarily legalize every act done under it, either before the passage of
the act of 1863 or since. Inasmuch as that proclamation ordered that all rebels, insurgents,
their aiders and abettors, and persons guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States, at any time during the existing insurrection, should be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by a military
commission, the sections of the law just cited de<'.laring lawful all acts done in pursuance of such
order, including, of course, the trial and punishment by military commission of all such
offenders, as directly legalized this order of the President as it is possible for Congress to
legalize or authorize any executive act whatever. ( l 2 Stat. at Large, 755 -'6.)
But, after assuming and declaring with great earnestness in his argument that no person
could be tried and convicted for such crimes by any military tribunal, whether a court ·martial
or a military commission, save those in the land and naval service in tili1e of war, the gentleman makes the extraordinary statement that the creation of a military commission must be
authorized by the legislative departmt-nt, and demands, if there be any such legislation.
'"let the statute be prouuced." The statute has been produced. The po·wer so to try, says
the gentleman, must be authorized by Congress, when the demand is made for such authority.
Does not the gentleman thereby give up his argument, and admit, that if the Congress has so
authorized the trial of all aiders and abettors of rebels or insurgents for whatever they do in
aid of such rebels and insurgents during the insurrection, the statute and proceedings under
it are lawful and valid? I have already shown that the Congress hfLve so legislated by expressly legalizing Order No. 141, which directed the trial of all rebels, their mders and abettors, by miltary commission. Did not Congress expressly legalize this order by declaring
that the order shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal,
for acts done in pursuance of it? No amount of argument could make this point clearer
than the language of the statute itself. But, says the gentleman, if there be a statute authori~ing trials by military commission, "let it be produced."
By the act of March 3, 1863, it is provided, in section 30, that in time of war, insunection.
or rebellion, murder and assault with intent to kill, &c., when committed by persons in the
military service, shall be punishable by the sentenee of a court-martial or military commission, and the punishment of such offences shall neyer be less than those inflicted by the laws
of the State or district in which they may have been committed. By the 38th section of the
same act, it is provided that all persons who, in time of war or rebellion against the United
States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies in or about the camps, &c., of tho United
States, or elsewhere, shall be triable by a milita1·y eommission, and shall, upon conviction,
s:1ft'er death. Here is a statute which expressly declares that all persons, whether citizens or
strangers, who in time of rebellion shall be found acting as spies, shall suffer death upon conviction by a military commission. Why did not the gentleman give us some argument upon
this law? We have seen that it was the existing law of the United States under the Confederation. Then, and since, men not in the land or naval forces of the United States have suf:.
fered death for this offence upon conviction by comts-martial. If it was competent for Congress to authorize their trial by courts-martial, it was equally competent ior Congress to
authorize their trial by military commission, and accordingly they have done so. By tbe
same authority the Congress may extend the jurisdiction of military commissions over all
military oB'ences or crimes committed in time of rebellion or war in aiu of the public enemy;
and it certainly stands with right reason, that if it were just to subject to death, by the sentence of a military commission, all persons who should be guilty merely of lurking as spies
in the interest of the public enemy in time of rebellion, though they obta,ined no information, though they inflicted no personal injury, but were simply overtaken and detected in the
endeavor to obtain intelligence for the enemy, those who enter into consviracy with the enemy
not only to lurk as spies in your camp, but to lurk there as murderers and adsassins, and who,
in pursuance of that conspiracy, commit assassination and murder upon the Commander-inChief of your army within your camp and in aid of rebellion, should be subject in like manner
to trial by military commission. (Stat. at Large, 12, 736-'7, ch. 8.)
According·ly, tl1e President having so declared, the Congress, as we have stated, have affirmed that his order was valid, and that all persons acting by authority, and consequently as
a court pronouncing such sentence upon the oB'ender as the usage of war requires, are justified by the law of the land. With all respect, permit me to say that the learned gentleman
has manifested more acumen and ability in his elaborate arguwent by what he has omitted
to say than by anything which he has said. By the act of July 2, 1t:l64, cap. 215, it is provided that the commanding general in the field, or tl'e commander of the department, as the
case may be, shall have power to cany into execution all sentences against guerilla marauders for robbery, arson, burglary, &c., and for violation of the laws and customs of war, as
well as sentences against spies, mutineers, deserters, and mur<1erers.
From tbe legislation I liave cited, it is apparent tbat military commissions are expressly
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recognized by the law-making power; that they are authorized to try capital offences against
citizens not in the service of the United States, and to pronounce the sentence of death upon
them; and that the commander of a department, or the commanding general in the field, may
carry such sentence into execution_ But, says the gentleman, grant all this to be so; Congress has not declared in what manner the court shall be constituted. The answer to that
objection has already been anticipated in the citation from Benet, wherein it appeared to be
the rule of the law martial that in the punishment of all military offences not provided for by
the written law of the la,nd, military commissions are constituted for that purpose by the authority of the commanding officer or the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, v,rho selects
the officers of a court-martial; that they are similarly constituted, and their proceedings conducted according to the same general rules. That is a part of the very law martial which the
President proclaimed, and which the Congress has legalized. The Proclamation has declared
that all such offenders shall be tried by military commissions. The Congress has legalized
the same by the act which I have cited; aud by every intendment it must be taken that, as
martial law is by the Proclamation declared to be the rule by which they shall be tried, the
Congress, in affirming the act of the President, simply declared that they should be tried according to the customs of martial law; that the commission should be constituted by the
Commander-in-Chief aceording to the rule of procedure ]mown as martial law; and that the
penalties infl.ieted should be in aecordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations.
Legislation no more definite than this has been upon your statute-book since the beginning
of the century, and has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States valid for the
punishment of offenders.
By the 32d article of the act of 23d April, 1800, it is provided that ''all crimes committed
by persons belonging to the navy, which are not specified in the foregoing articles, shall be
punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea." Of tilis article the Supreme Court of the United States say that when offences and crimes are not given in terms
or by definition, the want of it may be supplied by a comprehensive enactment such as the
32d article of the rules for the government of the navy; which means that courts-martial have
jurisdi<;tion of such crimes as are not specified, but which have been recognized to be crimes
and offences by the usages in the navies of all nations, and that they shall be punished according to the laws and customs of the sea. (Dynes vs. Hoover, 20 Howard., B2)
But it is a fact that must not he omitted in the reply which I make to the gentleman's argument, that an effort was made by himself and others in the Senate of the United States, on
the 3d of March last, to condemn the arrests, imprisonments, &c., made by order of the President of the United States in pursuance of his proclamation, and to reverse, by the judgment
of that body, the law which had been before passed affirming his action, which effort most
signally failed.
Thus we see that the body which by the Constitution, if the P):esident had been guilty of
the misdemeanors alleged against him in this argument of the gentleman, would, upon presentation of such charge in legal form against the President, constitute the high court of impeachment for his trial and condemnation, has decided the question in advance, and declared
upon the occasion referred to, as they had before declared by solemn enactment, that this order
of the President decladng martial law and the punishment of all rebels and insurgents, their
aiders and abettors, by military commission, should be enforced during the insurrection, as
the law of the land, and that the offenders should be tried, as directed, by military commission. It may he said that this subsequent le'g islation of Congress, rati(ying and affirming
what had been done by the President, can have no validity. Of course it cannot if neither
the Congress nor the Executive can authorize the proclamation and enforcement of martial
law in the suppression of rebellion for the punishment of all persons committing military
offences in aid of that rebellion. Assuming, however, as the gentleman seemed to assume by
asking for the legislation of Congress, that there is such power in Congress, the Supreme
Court of the United States bas solemnly affirmed that such ratification is valid. (2 Black, 671.)
The gentleman's argument is full of citations of English precedent. There is a late Eng
lish precedent bearing· upon this point-the power of the legislature, by subsequent enact
ment, to legalize executive orders, arrests, and imprisonment of citizens-that I beg leave to
commend to his consideration. I refer to the statute of 11 and 12 Victoria, ch. 35, entitled
"An act to empower the lord lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Irelaud, to
apprehend and detain until the first day of March, 1849, such persons as he or they shall
suspect of conspiring against her Majesty's person and government," passed July 25, 1848,
which statute in terms declares that all and every person and persons who is, are, or shall be,
within that period, within that part of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland called
Ireland at or on the clay the act shall receive her Majesty's royal assent, or after, by warrant
for high treason or treasonable practices, or suspicion of high treason or treasonable practices,
signed by the lord lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being,
or hi~ or their chief secretary, for such causes as aforesaid, may be detained in safe custody
without bail or main priz"', until the first day of March, 1849; and that no judge or justice
shall bail or try any such person or persons so committed, without orller from her Majesty's
privy council, until the said first day of March, 1849, any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding. The 2d section of this act provides that, in cases where any persons have
been, before the passing of the act, arrested, committed, or detained for such cause by war
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rant or warrants signed by the officers aforesaid, or either of them, it may be lawful for the
person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed to detain such person or persons in his or their custody in any place whatever in Ireland; and that such person
or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed shall be deemed and taken,
to all intents and purposes, lawfully authorized to take into safe custody and be the lawful
jailers and keepers of snch persons so arrested, committed, or detained.
Here the power of arrest is given by the act of Parliament to the governor or his secretary;
the process of the civil co:t1rts ·was wholly suspended; bail was denied and the parties imprisoned, and this not by process of the courts, but by warrant of a chief governor or his secretary; not for crimes charged to have been committed, but for being suspected of treasonable
practices. Magna charta, it seems, opposes no restraint, notwithstanding the parade that is
made about it in this argument, upon the power of the Parliament of England to legalize arrests and imprisonments made before the passage of the ad upon an executive order, and
without colorable authority of statute law, and to authorize like arrests and imprisonments of
so many of six million of people as such executive officers might su::pect of treasonable practices.
But, says the gentleman, whatever may be the precedents, English or American, whatever may be the provisions of the Constitution, whatever may be the legislation of Congress,
whatever may be the proclamations and orders of the P1esident as commander-in-chief, it is
a usurpation and a tyranny in time of rebellion and civil war to subject any citizen to trial
for any crime before military tribunals, saYe such citizens as are in the land or naval forces,
and against this usurpation, which he asks this court to rebuke by solemn decision, be
appeals to public opinion. I trust that I set as high -.alue upon enlightened public opinion
as any man. I recognize it as the reserved power of the people which creates and dissolves
armies, which creates and dissolves legislative assemblies, which enacts and repeals fundamental laws, the b~tter to provide for personal seeurity by the due administration of justice.
To that public opinion upon this very question of the usurpation of authority, of unlawful
arrests, and unlawful imprisonments, and unlawful trials, condemnations, and executions by
the late President of the United States, an appeal has already been taken. On tbis very
issue the President was tried before the tribunal of the people, that great nation of freemen
who cover this continent, looking out upon Europe hom their eastern and upon Asia fi·om
their western homes. That people came to the consideration of this issue not unmindful of
the fact that the tirst struggle for the establishment of our nationality could not have been,
and was not, successfully prosecuted without the proclamation and enforcement of martial
la\ov, declaring, as we have seen, that any inhabitant who, during that war, should kill any
loyal citizen, or enter into any combination for that purpose, should, upon trial aud conviction before a military tribunal, be sentenced as an assassiu, traitor, or spy, and should suffer
death, and that iu this last struggle for the maintenance of American nationality the President but followed the example of the illustrious Father of his Country. Upon that issue the
people passed judgment on the eighth day of last November, and declared that the charge of
usurpation was false.
From this decision of the people there lies no appeal on this earth. Who can rightfully
challenge the authority of the American people to decide such questions for themselves?
The voice of the people thus solemnly proclaimed, by the omnipotence of the ballot, in favor
of the righteous order of their murdered President, issued by him for the common defence,
for the preservation of the Constitution and for the enforcement of the laws of the Union,
ought to be accepted, and will be accepted, I tl'ust, by all just men, as the voice of God.
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: I have said thus much touching the right of the people,
under their Constitution, in time of civil war and rebeUion, to proclai1n through their Executive, with the sanction and approval of their Congress, martial law, and enforce the
same according to the usage of nations.
I submit that it has been shown that, by the letter and spirit of the Constitution as well as
by its contemporaneous construction, followed and approved by every department of the
government, this right is in the people; that it is inseparable from the condition of war,
whether civil or foreign, and absolutely essential to its vigorous and successful prosecution;
that, according to the highest authority upon constitutional law, the proclamation and enforcement of martial law are "usual under all governments in tiine of rebellion;" that our
own highest judicial tribunal has declared this, and solemnly ruled that the question of the
necessity for its exercise rests exclusively with Congress and the President; and that the
decision of the political departments of the government, that there is an armed rebellion and
a necessity for the employment of military force and martial law in its suppression, concludes
the juclie.iary.
In submitting what I have Raid in support of the jurisdiction of this honorable court and
of its constitutional power to hear and determine this issue, I have uttered my own convictions; and for their utterance in defence of my country, and its right to employ ail the means
necessary for the common defence against armed rebellion and secret treasonable conspiracy
in aid of such rebellion, I shall neither ask pardon nor ofl'er apology. I find no words with
which more fitly to conclude all I have to say upon the question of the jurisdiction and constitutional authority of this court than those employed by the illustrious Lord Brougham to
the House of Peers in support of the bill before referred to, which empo·wered the lord lieu-
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tenant of Ireland, and his deputies, to apprehend and detain for the period of seven months
or more, aU such persons within that island as they should suspect of conspiracy against her
Majesty's person and government Said th~t illustrious man, "A friend of liberty I have
lived, and such will I die; nor care I bow soon the latter event may happen if I cannot be
a friend of liberty without being a friend of traitors at the same time-a protector of cdminals
of the deepest dye-an accomplice of foul rebellion and of its .concomitant, civil war, with
all its atrocities and all its fearful consequences." (Hansard's Debates, 3d series, vol. -100,

p. 6:)5.)
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: It only remains for me to sum up the evidence and present
my views of the law arising upon the facts in the case on trial. The questions of fact involved in the issue areFirst. Did the accused, or any two of them, confederate and conspire together as charged 7
and,
Second. Did the accused, or any of them, in pursuance of such conspiracy, and with the
intent alleged, commit either or all of the several acts specified?
If the conspiracy be established as laid, it results that whatever was said or done by either
of the parties thereto in the furtherance or execution of the common design, is the declaration or act of all the other parties to the conspiracy; and this, whether the other parties, at
the time such words were uttered or such acts done by their confederates, were present or
absent-here, within the intrenched lines of your capital, or crouching behind the intrenched
lines of Richmond, or awaiting the results of their murderous plot ag-ainst their country, its
Constitution and laws, across the border, under the shelter of the British flag·.
The declared and accepted rule ofl law in cases of conspiracy is that" In prosecution:;; for conspiracy it is an established rule that where several persons are
proved to have combined together for the same illeg·al purpose, any act done by one of the
party in pursuance of the original concerted pla\), and in reference to the common object, is,
in the contemplation of law as well as in sound reason, the act of the whole party; and,
therefore, the proof of the act will be evidence against any of the or,hers, who were engaged
in the same general conspiracy, without regard to the question whether the prisoner is proved
to have been concerned in the particular transaction." (Phillips on Evidence, p. 210.)
The same rule obtains in cases of treason: "If several persons agree to levy war, some
in one place and some in another, and one party do actually appear in arms, this is a levying
of war by all, as well those who were not in arms as those who were, if it were done in pursuance of the original concert, for those who made the attempt were emboldened by the confidence inspired by the general concert, and therefore these particular acts are in justice imputable to all the rest." (1 East., Pleas of the Crown, p. 97; Roscoe, 84.)
In Ex parte Bollrnan and Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 126, Marshall, Chief Justice, rules: "If
war be actually levied-that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of
effecting, by force, a treasonable purpose-all those who perform any part-however minute, or
however nrnote frorn, t!te scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors."
In United States vs. Cole et al., 5l\1cLean, 601, Mr. Justice McLean says: "A conspiracy
is rarely, if ever, proved by positive testimony. When a crime of high magnitude is about
to be perpetrated by a combination of individuals, they do not act openly but covertly and
secretly. The purpose formed is known only to those who enter-into it. Unless one of the
original conspirators betray his companions and give evidence against them, their guilt can
be proved only by circumstantial evidence. * * It is said by some writers on evidence
that such circumstances are stronger than positive proof. A witness swearing positively, it
is said. may misapprehend the facts or swear falsely, but that circumstances cannot lie.
"The common design is the essence of the charge; and this may be made to appear when
the defendants steadily pursue the same object, .w bether acting separately or together, by
common or different means, all leading to the same unlawful Tesnlt. And whore p1·ima facie
evi<lence has been given of a combination, the acts or confessions of one are evidence against
all. ·~ * It is reasonable that where a body of men assume the attribute of individuality,
whether for commercial business or for the commission of a crime, the association should be
bound by the acts of one of its members in carrying out the design."
It is a rule of the law, not to be overlooked in this connexion, that the conspiracy or agreement of the parties, or some of them, to act in concert to accomplish the unlawful ad charg·ed,
may be established either by direct evidence of a meeting· or consultation for the illegal purpose charged, or moTe usually, from the very nature of the case, by circumstantial evidence.
(2 Starkie, 232.)
Lord Mansfield ruled that it was not necessary to prove the actual fact of a conspiracy,
but that it might be collected from collateral circumstances. (Parson's Case, 1 \V. Blackstone, 3!..12.)
''If," says a great authority on the law of evidence, ''on a charg·e of conspiraey, it appear that two persons by their acts are pursuing the same object, and often by the same
means, or one perfonniug part of the act, and the other completing it, for the attainment of
the same object, the jury may draw the conclusion there is a conspiracy. If a conspiracy be

1030

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

formed, and a person join in it afterwards, he is equally guilty with the original conspirators."
(Roscoe, 415.)
''The rule of the admissibility of the acts and declarations of any one of the conspirators,
said or done in furtherance of the common design, applies in case., as well where only part
of the conspirators are indicted, or upon trial, as where all are indicted and upon trial. Thus,
upon an indictment for murder, if it appear that others, together with the prisoner, conspired
to commit the crime, the act of one, done in pursuance of that intention, will be evidence
against the rest.'' (2d Starlde, 237.)
They are all alike guilty as principals. (Commonwealth vs. Knapp, 9 Pickering, 496; 10
Pickering, 477; 6 Term Reports, 528; 11 East., 584.)
vVhat is the evidence, direct and circumstantial, that the accused, or either of them, together with John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverley Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, and
George Young, did combine, confederate, and conspire, in aid of the existing rebellion, as
charged, to kill and murder, within the military department of Washington, and within the
fortified and intrenched lines thereof, Abraham Lin,-.,oln, late, and, at the time of the said
combining, conf()derating, and conspiring, President of the United States of America and
commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, Vice-President of the
United States; William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States; and Ulysses
S. Grant, lieutenant geneml of the armies thereof, and then in command, under the direction
of the President?
The time, as laid in the charge and specification, when this conspiracy was entered into
is immaterial, so that it appear by the evidence tha.t the criminal combination and agreement
were formed before the commission of the acts alleged. That Jefferson Davis, one of the
conspirators named, was the acknowledged chief and leader of the existing rebellion against
the government of the United States, and that Jacob Thompson, George N. Sanders, Clement
C. Clay, Beverley Tucker, and others named in the specification, were his duly accredited
and authorized agents to act in the interests of said rebellion, are facts established by the
testimony in this case beyond all questiOn. That Davis, as the leader of said rebellion, gave
to those agents, then in Canada, commissions in blank, bea1·ing the official signature of his
war minister, James A. Seddon, to be by them filled up and delivered to such agents as they
might employ to act in the interests of the rebellion within the United States, and intended
to be a cover and protection for any crimes they might therein commit in the service of the
rebellion, is also a faet established here, and which no man can gainsay. Who doubts that
Kennrdy, whose confession, made in view of immediate death, as proved here, was commissioned by those accredited agents of Davis to burn the city of New York 7 that he was to
have attempted it on the night of the presidential election, and that he did, in combination
with his confederates, set fire to four hotels in the city of New York on the night of the 25th
of November last 7 Who doubts that, in like manner, in the interests of the rebellion and
by the authority of Davis, these his agents also commissioned Bennett H. Young to commit
arson, robbery, and the murder of unarmed citizens, in St. Albans, Vermont·? Who doubts,
upon the testimony shown, that Davis, by his agents, deliberately adopted the system of
stal'Yation for the murder of our captive soldiers in his hands; or that, as shown by the testimony, be sanctioned the burning of hospitals and steamboats, the property of private persons, and paid therefor ftom his stolen treasure the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars in
gold? By the evidence of Joseph Godfrey Hyams it is proved that Thompson-the av,ent of
Jefferson Davis-paid him money for the service he rendered in the infamous and fiendish
project of importing pestilence into our camps and cities to destroy the lives of citizens and
soldiers alike, and into the house of the President for the purpose of destroying his liJe. It
may be said, and doubtless will be said, by the pensioned advocates of this rebellion, that
Hyams, being infamous, is not to be believed. It is admitted that b" is infamous, as it must
be conceded that any man is infamou,s who either participates in such a crime or attempts in
anywise to extenuate it. But it will be observed that Hyams is supported by the testimony
of Mr. Sanford Conover, who beard Blackburn and the other rebel agents in Canada speak
of this infernal project, and by the testimony of Mr. ·wall, the well-lmown auctioneer of this
city, whose character is unquestioned, that be received this importation of pestilence, (of
course without any knowledge of the purpos'e,) and that Hyams consigned the goods to him
in the name of J. W. Harris-a fact in itself an acknowledgment of guilt; and that hereceived afterwards a letter from Harris, dated Toronto, Canada West, December 1, 1864,
wherein Harris stated that he had not been able to come to the States since his return to
Canada, and asked for an account of the sale. He identifies the Godfrey Joseph Hyams
who testified in court as the J . W. Harris who imported the pestilence. The very transaction shows that Hyams's statement is truthful. He gives the names of tbe parties connected
with this infamy, (Clement C. Clay, Dr. Blackburn, Rev. Dr. Stuart Robinson, J. C. Holcombe-all refugees from the confederacy in Canada,) and states that he gave Thompson a
receipt for the fifty dollars paid to him, and that he was by occupation a shoemaker; in none
of which facts is there an attempt to discredit him. It is not probable that a man in his position in life would be able to buy five trunks of clothing, ship them all the way from Halifax to \Vashington, and then order them to be sold at auction, without regard to price, solely
upon his own account. It is a matter of notoriety that a part of his statement is verified by
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tbe results at Newbern, North Carolina, to which point, he says, a portion of the infected
goods were shipped, through a sutler; the result of which was, that nearly two thousand citizens and soldiers died there about that time with the yellow fever.
That the rebel chief, Jefferson Davis, sanctioned these crimes, committed and attempted
through the instrumentality of his accredited agents in Canada-Thompson, Clay, Tucker,
Sanders, Cleary, &c.-upon the persons and property of the people of the north, there is
positive proof on your' record. The letter brought from Richmond, and taken from the
archives of his late pretended government there, dated February 11, 1865, and addressed to
him by a late rebel senator from Texas, W. S. Oldham, contains the following significant
words : ''When Senator Johnson, of Missouri, and myself waited on you a few days since,
in relation to the project of annoying and harassing the enemy by means of burning their
shipping, towns, &c., &c., there were several remarks made by you upon the subject which
I was not fully prepared to answer, but which, upon subsequent conference with parties proposing the enterprise, I find cannot apply as objections to the scheme. First, the 'combustible materials' consist of several preparations, and not one alone, and can be used without
exposing the party using them to the least danger of detection whatever.
*
*
>~
Second, there is no necessity for sending persons in the military service into the enemy's
country, but the work may be done by ag·ents.
*
;,
*
I have seen enough of
the effects that can be produced to satisfy me that in most cases, without any danger to the
parties engaged, and in others but very ,~light, we can, first, burn every vessel that leaves a
foreign port for the United States; second, we can burn every transport that leaves the harbor of New York, or other northern port, with supplies for the armies of the enemy in the
south; third, burn every transport and gunl)oat on the Mississippi river, as well as devastate
*
*
*
the country of the enemy, and fill his people wHh terror and consternation.
For the purpose of satisfying your minci upon the subject, I respectfully, but earnestly, request that you will give an interview with General Harris, formerly a member of Congress
from Missouri, who, I think, is able, from conclusive proofs, to convince you that what I
have suggest€d is perfectly feasible and practicable."
. No one can doubt, from the tenor of this letter, that the rebel Davis only wanted to be satisfied that this system of arson and murder could be carried on by his agents in the north
successfully and without detection. With him it was not a crime to do these acts, but only
a crime to be detected in them. But Davis, by his indorsement on this letter, dated the 20th
of February, 1865, bears witness to his own complicity and his own infamy in this proposed
work of destruction and crime for the future, as well as to his complicity in what had before
been attempted without complete success. Kennedy, with his confederates, had failed to burn
the city of Nevv York. The "combustibles" which Kennedy had employed were, it seems,
defective. This was "a difficulty to be overcome." Neither had he been able to consummate the dreadful work without subjecting himself to detection. This was another "difficulty to be overcome." Davis, on the ~Oth of February, 1855, indorsed upon this letter these
words: "Secretary of State, at his convenience, see General Harris and learn what plan he
has for overcoming the difficulties heretofore experienced. J. D."
This indorsement is unquestionably proved to be the handwriting of Jefferson Davis, and
it bears witness on its face that the monstrous proposition met his approval, and that he desired his rebel secretary of state, Benjamin, to see General Harris and learn how to overcome
the difficulty heretofore experienced, to wit, the inefficiency of "the combustible materials"
that had been employed, and the liability of his agents to detection. After this, who will
doubt that he had endeavored, by the hand of incendiaries, to destroy by fire the property
and lives of the people of the north, and thereby "fill them with terror and consternation;"
that be knew his agents had been unsuccessful; that he knew his agents had been deteeted
in their villany and punished for their crime; that he desired through a more perfect " chemical preparation," by the science and skill of Professor McCulloch, to accomplish successfully what had before been unsuccessfully attempted?
The intercepted lMter of his agent, Clement C. Clay, dated St. Catherine's, Canada West,
November l, 1854, is an acknowledgme!lt and confession of what they had attempted, and a
suggestion made through J. P. Benjamin, rebel secretary of state, of what remained to be
done in order to make the " chemical preparations" efficient. Speaking of this Bennett H.
Young, he says: "You have doubtless learned through the press of the United States of the
raid on St. Albans by about twenty-five confederate soldiers, led by Lieutenant Bennett H.
Young; of their attempt and failure to burn the town; of their robbery of three banks there
of the aggregate amount of about two hundred thousand dollars; of their arrest in Canada,
by United States forces; of their commitment and the pending· preliminary trial." He makes
application, in aid of Young and his associates, for additional documents, showing that they
acted upon the authority of the Confederate States government, taking· care to say, however,
that t1e held such authority at the time, but that it ought to be more explicit so far as regards
the particular [Lets comp1ai.nec1 of. He states that he met Young at Halifax in May, 1864,
who developed his phLns for retaliation on the enemy; that he, Clay, recommended him to
the rebel secretary of war; that after this "Young was sent back by the Secretary of 'War
with a commission as seeond lieutenant to execute his plans and purposes, but to report to
Hon. - - - and myself." Young afterwards "proposed passing through New England
burning some towns and robbing them of whatever he could convert to the use of the confed:
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erate government. This I approved as justifiable retaliation. He attempted to bnrn the
town of St. Albans, Vermont, and would have succeeded but for the failure of the chemical
preparation with which he was armed. He then robbed the banks of funds amounting to
over two hundred thousand dollars. That he was not prompted by selfish or mereenary motives I am as well satisfied as I am that he is an honest man. He assured me before going
that his effort would be to destroy towns and farm-houses, but not to plunder or rob; but be
said it; after firing a town, he saw he could take funds fi'om a bank or any house, and thereby niginflict injury upon the enemy and benefit his own government, he would do so. He
added most emphatically. that whatever be took should be turned over to the government or its
representatives in foreign lands. My instructions to him were, to nestroy whatever was valuable; not to stop to rob, but if, after firing a town, he could seize and cauy off money m·
treasury or bank notes, be might do so upon conditjon that they were delivered to the proper
authorities of the confederate States "-that is, to Clay himself.
"'When he wrote this letter it seems that this accredited agent of Jefferson Davis was as
strongly impressed with the usurpation and despotism of Mr. Lincoln's administration as
some of the advocates \:Jf his aiders and abettors seem to be at this day ; and he indulges in
the followillg· statement: "All that a larg-e portion of ·the northern people, especially in the
northwest, want to resist the oppressions of the despotism at Washington is a leader. They
an• ripe for resistance, and it may come soon after the presidential election. At all events, it
must come, if our armies are not overcome, or destroyed, or dispen;ed. No people of the
Anglo-Saxon blood can long endure the usurpati!Jl1s and tyrannies (\f Lincoln." Clay does
not sign the despatch, but indorses the bearer of ~t as a person who can identify him and
give his name. The bearer of that letter was the witness Richard Montgomery, who saw
Clay write a portion of the letter, and received it fi'om his bands, and subsequently delivered
it to the Assistant Secretary of vV ar of the United States, Mr. Dana. That the letter is in
Clay's handwriting is clearly proved by those familiar with it. Mr. Montgomery testifies that
he was instructed by Clay to deliver this letter to Benjamin, the rebel secretary of state, if he
could get through to Richmond, and to tell him what names to put in the blanks.
This letter lea Yes no doubt, if any before existed in the mind of any one who had read the
letter of Oldham and DaYis's indorsement thereon, that "the chemical preparations" and
"combustible materials" bad been tried and had failed, and it had become a matte1· of great
moment and concern that they should be so prepared as, in the words of Davis, "to overcome the difficulties heretofore experieneed;" that is to say, complete the work of destruction, alld secure the perpetrators against personal injury or detection in the performance of it.
It only remains to be seen whether Davis, the procur~r of arson and of the indiscriminate
murder of the innocent and unoffendillg necessarily resultant therefi'om, was capable also of
endeavoring to procure, and in fact did procure, the murder, by direct assassination, of the
President of the United States and others charged with the duty of maintaining the govern·
ment of the United States, and of suppressing the 1:ebellion in which this arch-traitor and
conspirator was engaged.
The official papers of Davis, captured under the guns of our victorious army in his rebel
capital, identified benmd question or shadow ot' doubt, and placed upon your record, together
with the declarations and acts of his co-conspirators and agents, proclaim to all the world
that he was capable of attempting to accomplish his treasollable procuration of the murder
of the late President, and other chief officers of the United States, by the hands of hired assassins.
In the fall of 1804, Lieutenant W. Alston addresses to "his excellency" a letter now
before the court, whieh contains the following won.ls:
"I now offer you my services, and if you will favor me in my designs, I will proceed, as
soon as my health will permit, to rid my country of some of her deadliest enemies, by striking at the very hearts' blood of those who seek to enehain her in slavery. I consider nothing
dishonorable having such a tendency. All I ask of you is, to favor me by granting me the
necessary papers, &c., to travel on. * " * * lam perfectly familia?· with tlte north, and
feel eonfident that I can execute anything I undertake. I was in the rai,llast June in Kentucky, under General John H. Morgan; * * * was taken prisoner; '" * * eseaped
from them by dressing myself in the garb of a citizen. * * * I went through to the
Canadas, fi·om whence, by the assistance of Colonel J. P. Holcomb, I succeeded in working
my way around and through the blockade. * * "" I should like to have a personal intmview with ;rou in order to perfect the arrangements before starting."
Is there any room to doubt that this was a proposition to assassinate, by the hand of this
man and his associates, such persons in the north as he deemed the " deadliest enemies" of
the rebellion? The weakness of the man who for a moment can doubt that such was the
proposition of the writer of this letter is certaillly an object of commiseration. What had
Jeften;on Davis to say to this proposed assassination of the "deadliest .enemies" in the north
of his great trea::;on 'I Did the atrocious suggestion kindle in him indignation against the
villian who offered, ·with his own hand, to strike the blow? Not at alL On the eontrary, he
ordered his private secretary, on the 29th of November, 1864, to indorse upon the letter these
words: '·Lieutenant W. Alston; accompanied· raid into Kentucky, and ·was captured, but
escaped into C'tnrtda, hom whence he found his way back. Now offers his services to rid
the country of some of its deadhest enemies; asks for papers, &c. Respectfully referred, by
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direction of the President, to the honorable secretary of war." It is also indorsed, for attention
"By order. (Signed) J. A. Campbell, assistant secretary of war."
Note the fact in this connexion, that Jefferson Davis himself, as well as his subordinates,
bad, before the date of this indorsement, concluded tbat Abraham Lincoln was "the deadliest
enemy" of the rebellion. You hear it in the rebel camp in Virginia in 1863, deelared by
BQoth, then and there present, and assented to by rebel officers, that "Abraham Lincoln
must be killed." You hear it in that slaughter-pen in Georgia, Andersonville, proclaimed
among rebel officers, who, by the slow torture of starvation, inflicted cruel and untimely
death on ten thousand of your defenders, captives in their hands-whispering, like demons,
their horrid purpose, "Abraham Lincoln must be killed." And in Canada, the accredited
agents of Jefferson Davis, as early as October, 1864, and afterwards, dec.ared that" Abraham
Lincoln must be killed" if his re-election could not be prevented. These agents in Canada,
on the 13th of October, 1864, delivered, in cipher, to be transmitted to Richmond by Richard
Montgomery, the w;itness, whose reputation is unchallenged, the following communication:
''OCTOBER 13, 1864.
"We again urge the immense necessity of our gaining imme:diate advantages. Strain
every nerve for victory. We now look upon the re-election of Lincoln in November as almost certain, and we need to whip his hirelings to prevent it. Besides, with Lincoln re-elected
and his armies victorious, we need not hope even for recognition, much less the help mentioned
in our last. Holcomb will explain this. Those figures of the Yankee armies are correct to a
unit. Our friends shall be immediately set to work as you dinct."
To which an official reply, in cipher, was de1ivered to Montgomery by an agent of the
state department in Richmond, dated October 19, 1864, as follows :
"Your letter of the 13th instant is at band. There is yet time enough to colonize many
voters before November. A blow will shortly be stricken here. It is not quite time. General
Longstreet is to attack Sheridan without delay, and then move north as far as practicable
towards unprotected points. This will be made instead of movement before mentioned. He will
endeavor to assist the 1·epublicans in collecting thei1· ballots. Be watchful and assist him."
On the very day of the date of this Richmond despatch Sheridan was attacked, with ·vvhat
success history will declare. The court will not fail to notice that the 1·e-election of Mr.
Lincoln is to be prevented if possible, by any and every means. Nor will they fail to notice
that Holcomb is to ''explain this "--the same person who, in Canada, was the friend and adviser
of Alston, who proposed to Davis the assassination of the "deadliest enemies" of the rebellion.
In the despatch of the 13th of October, which was borne by Montgomery, and transmitted
to Richwoud in October last, you will find these words: "Our friends shall be immediately
set to work as you direct." Mr. Lincoln is the subject of that despatch. Davis is therein
notified that his agents in Canada look upon the re-election of Mr. Lincoln in November as
almost certain. ln this connexion be is assured by those agents that the friends of their
ca'use are to be set to work as Davis had diTected. The conversations, which are proved by
witnesses whose characters stand unimpeached, disclose what "work" the "friends'' were
to do under the dinction of Davis himself. Who were these "friends," and what was "the
work" which his agents, Thompson, Clay, Tucker, and Sanders, had been directed to set
them at? Let Thompson answer for himself. In a conversation with Richard Montgomery
in the summer of ltlo4, Thompson said that "he had !tis friends, confederates, all over the
northern States, who were ready and willing to go any lengths for the good of the cause of
the south, and be could at any time have the tymnt L-incoln, or any othe1' of his advisers that
he chose, put out of !tis way; that they would not consider it a crime when done for the cause
of the confederacy." This conversation was repeated by the witness in the summer of 1864
to Clement C. Clay, who immediately stated: "That is so; we are all devoted to our cause,
and ready to go any length-to do anything under the snn."
At and about the time that these declarations of Cl,1y and Thompson were made, Alston,
who made the proposition, as•we have seen, to Dav1s, to be furnished with papers to go no,rth
anJ. rid the coniederacy of some of its ''deadliest enemies," was in Canada. He was doubtless one ('f the "friends" referred to. As appears by the testimony of Montgomery, Payne,
the prisoner at your bar, was about that time in Canada, and was seen standing by T hompsou's door, engaged in a conversation with Clay, between whom and the witness some words
were interchangeu, when Clay stated he (Payne) was one of their friends-" we trust him."
It is proved beyond a shadow of doubt that in October last John Wilkes Booth, the assassin
of th~:J President, was also in Canada, and upon mtimate terms with Thompson, Clay, Sanders, and other rebel agents. Who can doubt, in the light of the events which have since
tran.~pired, that he was one of the ''friends" to be ''set to work," as Davis had already
directt>d-not, perhaps, as yet to assassinate the President, but to do that other work which
is suggested in the letter of Oldham, indorsed by Davis in his own band, and spread upon
your record-the work of the secret incendiary, which was to "fill the people of the north
with terror and consternation." The other "work" spoken of by Thompson-putting the
tyrant Lincoln and any of his advisers out of the way, was work doubtless to be commenced
only after the re-election of Mr. Lincoln, which they had already declared in their despatch
to their employer, Davis, was with them a foregone conclusion. At all events, it was not
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until after the presidential election in November that Alston proposed to Davis to go north
on the work of assassination; nor was it until after that election that Booth was found in
possession of the letter which is in evidence, and which discloses the purpose to assassinate
the President. Being assured, however, when Booth was with them in Canada, as they had
already declared in their despatch, that the re-election of Mr. Lincoln was certain, in which
event there would be no hope for the confederacy, they doubtless entered into the arrangement with Booth as one of their "friends," that as soon as that fact was determined he
should go "to work," and as soon as might be "rid the confederacy; of the tymnt Lincoln
and of his advisers."
That these persons named upon your record, Thompson, Sanders, Clay, Cleary, and
Tucker, were the agents of Jefferson Davis, is another fact established in this case beyond a
doubt. They made affidavit of it themselves, of record here, upon the examination of their
"friends," charged with the raid upon St. Albans, before Judge Smith, in Canada. It is in
evidence also by the letter of Clay, before referred to.
The testimony to which I have thus briefly referred shows, by the letter of his agents of
the 13th of Oetober, that Davis had before directed those agents to set his friends to work.
By the letter of Clay it seems that his direction had been obeyed, and his friends had been
set to work, in the burning and robbery and murder at St. Albans, in the attempt to burn
the city of New York, and in the attempt to introduce pestilence into this capital and into
the house of the President. It having appeared, by the letter of Alston, and the indorsement
thereon, that Davis had in November entertained the proposition of sending agen,ts, that is
to say, "friends," to the north to not only ''spread terror and consternation among the
people" by means of his " chemical preparations," but also, in the words of that letter, " to
strike," by the hands of assassins, " at the heart's blood" of the deadliest enemies in the
north to the confederacy of traitors; it has also appeared by the testimony of many respectable
witnesses, among others the attorneys who represented the people of the United States and
State of Vermont, in the preliminary trial of the raiders in Canada, that Clay, Thompson,
Tucker, Sanders and Cleary declared themselves the agents of the confederacy. It also
clearly appears by the correspondence referred to, and the letter of Clay, that they were
holding, and at any time able to command, blank commissions from Jefferson Davis to authorize tlteir jTiends to do whatever work they appointed them to do, in the interests of the
rebellion, by the destruction of life and property in the north.
If a pTima facie case justifies, as we have seen by the law of evidence it does, the intro(lucticn of all declarations and acts of any of the parties to a conspiracy, uttered or done in
the prosecution of the common design, as evidence against all the rest, it results, that whatever was said or done in furtherance of the common design, after this month of October,
1864, by either of these agents in Canada, is evidence not only against themselves, but
against Davis as wen, of his complicity with them in the conspiracy.
Mr. Montgomery testifies that he met Jacob Thompson in January, at Montreal, when he
said that "a proposition had been made to him to rid the world of the tyrant Lincoln, Stanton, Grant, and some others; that he knew the men who had made the proposition were
bold, daring men, able to execute what they undertook; that he himself was in favor of
the proposition, but had determined to defer his answer until he had consulted his government at Richmond; that he was then only awaiting their approval." This was about the
middle of January, and consequently more than a month after Alston had made his proposition direct to Davis, in writing, to go north and rid their confederacy of some of its
"deadliest enemies." It was at the time of this conversation that Payne, the prisoner, was
seen by the witness standing at Thompson's door in conversation with Clay. This witness
also shows the intimacy between Thompson, Clay, Cleary, Tucker, and Sanders.
A few days after the assassination of the President, Beverly Tucker said to this witness
"that President Lincoln deserved his death. long ago; that it was a pity he didn't have it
long ago, and it was too bad that the boys had not been allowed to act when they wanted
to."
This remark undoubtedly had reference to the propositions made in the fall to Thompson,
and alse to Davis, to rid the south of its deadliest enemies by their assassination. Cleary,
who \vas accredited by Thompson as his confidential agent, also stated to this witness that
Booth was one of the party to whom Thompson had referred in the C')nversationin January,
in which he said he knew the men who were ready to rid the world of the tyrant Lincoln,
and of Stanton and Grant. Cleary also said, speaking of the assassination, "that it was a
pity that the whole work had not been done," and added, "they had better look out-we
are not done yet;" manifestly referring to the statement made by his employer, Thompson,
before in the summer, that not only the tyrant Lincoln, but Stanton and Grant, and others
of his advisers, should be put out of the way. Cleary also stated to this witness that Bovth
had visited Thompson twice in the winter, the last time in December, and had also been
there in the summer.
Sanford Conover testified that he had been for some time a clerk in the war department
at Richmond; that in Canada he knew Thompson, Sanders, Cleary, Tucker, (;Jay, and
other rebel agents; that he knew John H. Surratt and John ·wilkes Booth; that be saw
Booth there upon one occasion, and Surratt upon several successiYe days ; that he saw Snrxatt (whom he describes) in April last, in Thompson's room, and also in company with
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Sanders; that about the 6th or 7th of April Surratt delivered to Jacob Thompson a despatch
brought by him from Benjamin at Richmond, enclosing one in cipher from Davis. Thompson had before this proposed to Conover to engage in a plot to assassinate President Lincoln
and his cabinet, and on this occasion he laid his hand upon these despatches and said, "this
makes the thing all right," referring to the assent of the rebel authorities, and stated that the
rebel authorities had consented to the plot to assassinate Lincoln, Johnson, the Secretary of
vVar, Secretary of State, Judge Chase, and General Grant. Thompson remarked further
that the assassination of these parties would leave the government of the United States entirely without a head; that there was no provision in the Constitution of the United States
by which they could elect another President, if these men were put out of the way.
In speaking of this assassination of the President and -others, Thompson said that it was
only removing them from office, that the killing of a tyrant was no murder. It seems that
he had learned precisely the same lesson that Alston had learned in November, when he
communicated with Davis, and said, speaking of the President's assassination, "he did not
think anything dishonorable that would serve their cause." Thompson stated at the same
time that he had conferred a commission on Booth, and that everybody engaged in the enterprise would be commissioned, and if it succeeded, or failed, and they escaped into Canada,
they could not be reclaimed· under the extradition treaty. The fact that Thompson and
other rebel agents held blank commissions, as I have said, has been proved, am1 a copy of
one of them is of record here.
This witness also testifies to a conversation with William C. Cleary, shortly after the surrender of Lee's army, and on the day before the President's assassination, at the St.
Lawrence hotel, Montreal, when speaking of the rejoicing in the States over the capture of
Richmond, Cleary said, ''they would put the laugh on the other side of their mouth in a day
or two." These parties knew that Conover was in the secret of the assassination, a11d talked
with him about it as freely as they would speak of the weather. Before the assassination
he had a conversation also with Sanders, who asked him if he knew Booth well, and
expressed some apprehension that Booth would "make a failure of it; that he was desperate
and reckless, and he was afraid the whole thing would prove a failure."
Dr. James D. Merritt testifies that George Young, one of the parties named in the record,
declared in his presence, in Canada, last fall, that Lincoln should never be inaugurate<l;
that they had friends in Washington, who, I suppose, were some of the same friends referred
to in the despatch of October 13, and which Davis had directed them "to set to work."
George N. Sanders also said to him ''that Lincoln would keep himself mighty close if he did
serve another term ; " while Steele and other confederates declared that the tyrant never should
serve another term. He heard the assassination discussed at a meeting of these rebel agents
in Montreal in l<'ebruary last. '' Sanders said they had plenty of money to accomplish the
assassination, and named over a number of persons who were ready and willing to engage
in undertaking to remove the President, Vice-President, the cabinet, and some of the leading generals. At this meeting he read a letter which he had received fi·om Davis, which
justified him in making any arrangements that he could to accomplish the object." This
letter the witness. heard read, and it, in substance, declared that ifthe people in Canada and
the southerners in the States were willing to submit to be governed by sueh a tyrant as
Lincoln, he didn't wish to recognize them as friends. The letter was read openly ; it was
also handed to Colonel Steele, George Young, Hill, and Scott, to be read. This was about
the middle of February last. At this meeting Sanders name<l over the persons who were
willing to accomplish the assassination, and among the persoBs thus named was Booth,
whom the witness had seen in Canada in October; also George Harper, one of the conspirators named on the record, Caldwell, Randall, Harrison, and Surratt.
The witness understood, from the reading of the letter, that if the President, Vice-President, and cabinet could be disposed of~ it would satisfy the people of the north that the southerners had jTiends in the north; that a peace could be obtained on better terms ; that the
rebels had endeavored to bring about a war between the United States and England, and
that Mr. Seward, through his energy and sagacity, had thwarted all their efforts; that was
given as a reason for removing him. On the 5th or 6th of last April this witness met George
Harper, Caldwell, Randall, and others, who are spoken of in this meeting at Montreal as
engaged to assassinate the President and cabinet, when Harper said they were going to the
States to make a row such as had never been heard of, and added that "if I (the witness)
did not hear of the death of Old Abe, of the Vice-President, and of General Dix in less than
ten days, I might put him down as a fool. That was on the 6th of April. He mentioned
that Booth wa~ in Washington at that time. He said they had plenty of friends in Washington, and that some fifteen or twenty were going."
This witness ascertained, on the 8th of April, that Harper and others had left for the
States. The proof is that these parties could come through to Washington from Montreal or
Toronto in thirty-six hours. They did come, and within the ten days named by Harper the
President was murdered! Some attempts have been made to discredit this witness, (Dr.
Merritt,) not by the examination of wituesses in court, not by any apparent want of truth in
the testimony, but by the ex parte sta;,ements of these rebel agents in Canada and their hired
advocates iu the United States. There is a statement upon the record, verified by an official
communication from the War Department, which shows the truthfulness of this witness,
and that is, that before the assassination, learning that Harper and his associates had started
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for the States, informed as he was of their purpose to assassinate the President, cabinet, and
leading generals, Merritt deemed \this duty to call, and did call, on the lOth of April, upon
a justice of the peace in Canada, named Davidson, and gave him the information, that he
might take steps to stop these proceedings. The correspondence on this subject with Davidsou has been brought into court. Dr. Merritt testifies, further, that aftt!r this meeting in
Montreal he had a conversation with Clement C. Clay, in Toronto, about the letter fi:om
Jefferson D8vis which Sanders had exhibited, in which conversation Clay gave the "\Vitness
to understand that he knew the nature of the letter perfectly, and remarked that he thought
" the end would justify the means." The witness also testifies to the presence of Booth
with Sauders in Montreal last fall, and of Surratt in Toronto in February last.
The court must be satisfied, by the manner of this and other witnesses to the transactions
in Canada, as well as by the fact that they are wholly uncontradicted in any material matter
that they state, that they speak the truth, and that the several parties named on your record,
Davis, Thompson, Cleary, Tucker, Clay, Young, Harper, Booth, and John H. Surratt, did
combine and conspire together in Canada to kill 'and murder Abraham Lincoln, Andrew
Johnson, \Villiam H. Seward, and Ulysses S. Grant. That this agreement was substantially entered into by Booth and the agents of Davis in Canada as early as October there
canuot be any doubt. The languag·8 of Thompson at that time anl before was, that he was
in favor of the assassination. His further language was, that he knew the men who were
ready to do it; and Booth, it is shown, was there at that time, and, as Thompson's secretary
says, was one of the men referred to by Thompson.
The fact that others, besides the parties named on the record, were, by the terms of the
conspiracy, to be assassinated, in nowise affects the case now on trial. If it is true that
these parties did conspire to murder other parties, as well as those named up<tl the record,
the substance of the charge is proved.
It is also true that if, in pursuance of that conspiracy, Booth, confederated with Surratt
and the accused, killed and murdered Abraham Lincoln, the eharge and specification is
proved literally as stated on your reeord, although their conspiracy embraced other persons.
In law the case stands, though it may appear that the conspiracy was to kill and murder the
parties named . in the record and others not named in the record. If the proof is that the
accused, with Booth, Surratt, Davis, &c., conspired to kill and murder one or more of the
persons named, the charge of conspiracy is proved.
The declaration of Sanders, as proved, that there was plenty of money to carry out this
assassination, is very strongly corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Campbell, cashier of
the Ontario Bank, who states that Thompson, during the current year preceding the assassination, had upon deposit in the Montreal branch of the Ontario Bank six hundred and
forty-nine thousand dollars, besides large sums to his credit in other bauks in the province.
There is a further corroboration of the testimony of Conover as to the meeting of Thompson and Surratt in Montreal, and the delivery of the despatches from Richmond on the 6th
or 7th of April-first, in the fact which is shown by the testimony of Chester, that in the
winter or spring Booth said he himself or some other party n:wst go to Richmond; and,
second, by the letter of Arnold elated 27th of March last, that he pl'eferred Booth's first query,
that he would first go to Richmond and see how they would take it, manifestly alluding to
the proposed assassination of the President. It does not follow, because Dads had written a
letter in February ·which, in substance, approved the general object, that the parties were
fully satisfied with it, because it is clear there was to be some arrangement made about the
funds; and it is also clear ~at Davis had not before as distinctly approved and sanctioned
this act as his agents either in Canada or here desired. Booth said to ('hester, ''We must
have money; there is money in this business, and if you will enter into it I will place three
thousand dollars at the disposal of your family; but I have no money myself, and must go
to Richmoud," or one of the parties must go, " to get money to carry out the enterprise."
This was one of the arrangements that was to be "made right in Canada." The funds at
Thompson's disposal, as the banker testifies, were exclusively raised by drafts of the secretary of the treasury of the Confederate SLates upon London, dep·osited in their bank to the
credit of Thompson.
Accordingly, about the 27th of March, Surratt did go to Richmond. On the 3d of April
he returned to Washington, and the same day left for Canada. Before leaving, he stated to
Weichmann that when in Richmond he had had a conversation with Davis and with Benjamin. The fact in this connexion is not to be overlooked, that on or about the clay Surratt
arrived in Montreal, April6, Jacob Thompson, as the cashier of the Ontario Bank states,
drew of these confederate funds the sum of one hundred and eighty thousand dollars in the
form of certificates, which, as the bank officer testifies, "might be used anywhere.''
What more is wanting? Surely no word further need be ~poken to show that John
Wilkes Booth was in this couspiracy; that John H. Surratt was in this conspiracy; and
that Jefferson Davis and his several agents named, in Canada. were in this conspiracy. If
any additional evidence is wanting to show the complicity of Davis in it, let the paper found
in the possession of his hired assassin Booth come to bear witness against him. That paper
contained the secret cipher whieh Davis used in his state department at Richmond, which he
employed in communicating with his agents in Canada, and which they employed in the
letter of October 13, notifying him that ''their friends would be set to work as ltc had
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directed." The letter in cipher found in Booth's possession is translated here by the use of
the cipher machine now in court, which, as the testimony of Mr. Dana shows, he brought
from the rooms Of Davis's state department in Richmond. Who gave Booth this secret
cipher? Of what use was it to him if he was not in confederation with Davis?
But there is one other item of testimony that ought, amonf}honest and intelligent people at
all conversant with this evidence, to end all further inquiry as to whether Jefferson Davis
was one of the parties, with Booth, as charged upon this record, in the conspiracy to assassinate the President and others. That is, that on the fifth day after the assassination, in the
city of Charlotte, North Carolina, a telegraphic despatch was received by him, at the house
of Mr. Bates, from John C. Breckinridge, his rebel secretary of war, which despatch is produced here, identified by the telegraph agent, and placed upon your record in the words following:
"GREENSBORO', April '19, 1865.
" His Excellency President Davis:
"President Lincoln was assassinated in the theatre in Washington on the night of the 14th
instant. Seward's house was entered on the same night and he was repeatedly stabbed, and
is probably mortally wounded.
"JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE."

At the time this despatch was handed to him, Davis was addressing a meeting from the
steps of Mr. Bates's bouse, and after reading the despatch to the people be said: ''If it were
to be done, it were better it were well done." Shortly afterwards, in the house of the witness,
in the same city, Breckinridge, having come to see Davis, stated his regret that the occurrence
had happened, because he deemed it unfortunate for the people of the south at that time. Davis replied, referring to the assa~sination, '' Well, general, I don't know ; if it were to be done
at all, H were better that it were well done ; and if the same had been done to Andy J obnson,
the beast, and to Secretary Stanton, the job would then be complete.,.,
Accomplished as this man was in all the arts of a conspirator, he was not equal to the task-as
happily, in the good providence of God, no mortal man is-of concealing, by any form of words,
any great crime which he may have meditated or perpetrated either against his government or his
fellow-men. It was doubtless furthest fi·om Jefferson Davis's purpose to make confession, and
yet he did make a confession. His g·uilt demanded utterance; tbat demand he could not resist;
therefore his words proclaimed his guilt, in spite of his purpose to conceal it. He said, " if it
were to be done, it were better it were u,ell done." Would any man ignorant of the conspiracy
be able to devise and fashion such a form of speech as that? Had not the President been murdered? Had he not reason to believe that the Secretary of State had been mortally wounded?
Yet he was not satisfied, but was compelled to say, ''it were bctteT it were well done"-that is to
say, all that had been agreed to be done had not been done. Two days afterwards, in his conversa tion with Breckinridge, l1e not only repeats the same form of expression, "if it were to
be done, it were better it ·were well done," but adds these words: ''And if the same had been done
to Andy Johnson, the beast, and to Seeretary Stanton, the job would then be complete." He
would accept the assassinafon of the President, the Vice-President, of the Secretary of State
aml the Secretary of War, as a complete execution of the "job" which he had given out upon
contract, ancl which be had "made all right," so far as the pay was concerned; by the despatches he had sent to Thompson by Surratt, one of his hired assassins. Whatever may be
the conviction of others, my own conviction is that Jefferson Davis is as clearly proven g·nilty
of this conspiracy as is John ·w ilkes Booth, by whose hand Jefferson Davis inflicted the mortal
wound upon Abr&ham Lincoln. His words of intense hate, and rage, and disappointment
are not to be overlooked-that the assassius had not clone their work weLt; that they bad not
succeeded in robbing the people altogether of their constitutional ExecutiYe and his advisers;
and hence he exclaims, "lf they had killed Andy Johnson, the beast!" Neitbei· can he coneeal his chagrin and disappointment that the war minister of the republic, whose energy,
incorruptible integrity, sleepless vigilance, and executive abili'ty bad organized day by day,
month by month, ancl year by year, victory for our anus, bad escaped the knife of the hired
assassius. The job, says this procurer of assassination, was not well done; it bad heen better
if it had been well done! Because Abraham Lincoln had been clear in his great office, and had
saved the nation's life by enforcing the nation's laws, this traitor declares he must he murdered ; because Mr. Seward, as the foreign secretary of tbe country, had thwarted the purposes of treason to plung·e his country into a war with England, he must be murdered; because,
upon the murder ofMr. Lincoln, Andrew Johnson would succeed to the presidency, ~and because he had been true to the Constitution and government, faithful found among the faithless of his own State, elinging to the falling pillars of the republic when others had fled, he
must be murdered; and because the Secretary of vVar had taken care, by the faithful discharge of his duties, that the republic should live and not die, he must be murdered. Inasmuch as these two faithful officers were not also assassinated, assuming that the Secretary of
State was mortally wounded, Davis could not conceal his disappointment and chagrin that
the work was not ''well done," that ''the job was not complete !"
Thus it appears by the testimony that the proposition made to Davis was to kill and murder
the cleadlier>t enemies of the confederacy-not to kidnap them, as is now pretended here; that
by the declaration of Sanders, Tucker, Thompson, Clay, Cleary, Harper and Young, the con-
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spirators in Canada, the agreement and combination among them was to kill and murder
Abraham Lincoln, ·william H. Seward, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, Edwin M:. Stanton, and others of his advisers, and not to kidnap them; it appears from every utterance of
John \Vilkes .Booth, as well as from the Charles Selby letter, of which mention will presently
be made, that, as early as November, the proposition with him was to kill and murder, not to
kidnap.
Since the first examination of Conover, who testified, as the court will remember, to many
important facts against these conspirators and agents of Davis in Canada-among others, the
terrible and fiendish plot disclosed by Thompson, Pallen, and others, that they had ascertained
the volume of water in the reservoir supplying New York city, estimated the quantity of poison
required to render it deadly, and intended thus to poison a whole city-Conover returned to
Canada, by direction of this court, for the purpose of obtaining certain documentary evidence.
'l'here, about the 9th of June, he met Beverley Tucker, Sanders, and other conspirators, and
conversed with them. Tucker declared that Secretary Stanton, whom he denounced as "a
scoundrel," and Judge Holt, who:n1 he called "a bloodthirsty villain," "could protect themselves as long as they remained in office by a guard, but that would not always be the case,
and, by the Eternal, he had a large account to settle with them." After this, the evidence of
Conover here having been published, these parties called upon him and asked him whethex
he had been to Washington, and bad testified before this court. Conover denied it ; they
insisted, and took him to a room, where, with drawn pistols, they compelled him to consent
to make an affidavit that he had been falsely personated here by another, and that he would
make that affidavit before a Mr. Kerr, who would witness it. They then called in Mr. KelT
to Gertify to the public that Conover had made such a denial. They also compelled this witness to furnish for publication an advertisement offering a reward of five hundred dollars for
the ;trrest of the "infamous and pmjured scoundrel" who had recently personated Jamas W.
Wallace under the name of Sanford Conover, and testified to a tissue of falsehoods before the
military commission at .Washington, which advertisement was published in the papers.
To these facts Mr. Conover now testifies, and also discloses the fact that these same men
published, in the report of the proceedings before Judge Smith, an affidavit purporting to be
his, but which be never made. The affidavit which he in fact made, and which was published
in a newspaper at that time, produced here, is set out substantially upon your record, and
agrees with the testimony upon the same point given by him in this court.
To suppose that Conover ever made such an affidavit voluntarily as the one wrung from
him as stated is impossible. Would he advertise for his own arrest and charge himself with
falsely personatin~ himself? But the fact cannot evade observation, that when these guilty
conspirators saw Conover's testimony before this court in the public prints, revealing· to the
world the atrocious plots of these felon conspirators, conscious of the truthfulness of his statements, they cast about at once for s.ome defence before the public, and devised the foolish and
stupid invention of compelling him to make an affidavit that he was not Sanford Conover, was
not in this court, never gave this testimony, but was a practicing lawyer in .Montreal! This
infamous proceeding, coupled with the evidence before detailed, stamps these ruffian plotters
with the guilt of this conspiracy.
•
John \Vilkes Booth having· entered into this conspiracy in Canada, as has been shown, as
early as October, he is next found in the city of New York on the 11th day, as I claim, of
November, in disguise, in conversation with another, the conven;ation disclosing to the witness, Mrs. Hudspeth, that they had some matter of personal interest between ·i,hem: that upon
one of them the lot had fallen to go to Washington-upon the other to go to Newbern. This
witness, upon being shown the photograph of Booth, swears "that the face is the same" as
that of one of those men, who she says was a young man of education and culture, as appeared by his conversation, and who had a scar like a bite near the jaw-bone. It is a fad
proved here by the Surgeon General that Booth had such a scar on the side of his neck. Mrs.
Hudspeth heard him say he would leave for Washington the day after to-morrow. His companion appeared angry because it had not fallen on him to go to \Vashington. This took
place after the presidential election in November. She cannot fix the precise date, but says
she was told that General Butler left New York on that day. The testimony discloses tha,t General Butler's army was on the 11th ofNovemberleaving New York. The register of theN ational
Hotel shows that Booth left Washington on the early morning train, NoYember 11, and that
he returned to this city on the 14th. Chester testifies positively to Booth's presence in New
York early in November. This testimony shows most conclusively that Booth was in New
York on the 1 ltb November. The early morning train on which be left Washin~ton would
1·each New York early in the afternoon of that day. Chester saw him there early in November, and Mrs. Hudspeth not only identifies his lJicture, but describes his person. The scar
upon his neck near his jaw was peculiar and is well described by the witness as like a bite.
On that day Booth had a letter in his possession which he accidentally dropped in tbe street
cal' in the presence of Mrs. Hudspeth, the witness, who delivered it to Major General Dix the
same day, and by whom, as his letter on file before this court shows, the same was transmitted to the \Var Department November 17, 1864. That letter contains these words:
"DEAR LoUIS: The time has at last come that we have all so wished for, and upon you
everything depends. As it was decided before you left we were to cast lots, we accordingly
did so, and you are to be the Charlotte Corday of the 19th century. When you remember
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the fearful, solemn vow that was taken by us, you will feel there is no drawba~k. Abe must
die, and now. You can choose your weapons-the cup, the knife, the bullet. The cup failed
us once, and might again. Johnson, who will give this, has been like an enraged demon
since the meeting, because it has not fallen upon him to rid the world of the monster " *
You know where to find your friends. Your disguises are so perfe~t and complete that
without one knew your face, no police telegraphic despatch would catch you. The English
gentleman, Harcuu1·t, must not act hastily. Remember he has ten days. Strike for your
home; strike for your country; bide your time, but strike su1·e. Get introduced ; congratulate him; listen to his stories; (not many more will the brute tell to earthly friends;) do
anything but fail, and meet us at the appointed place within the fortnight. You will probably hear from me in Washington. Sanders is doing us no good in Canada.
" CHAS. SELBY."
The learned gentleman, (Mr. Cox,) in his very able and carefully-considered argument
in defence of O'Laughlin and Arnold, attached importance to this letter, and doubtless
very clearly saw its be~ring upon the case, and therefore undertook to show that the witness, Mrs. Hudspeth, must be mistaken as to the person of Booth. The gentleman assumes
that the letter of General Dix, of the 17th of November last, transmitting this letter to the
\Var Department, reads that the party who dropted the letter was heard to say that he would
start to vVashington on Friday night next, alt~ough the word ''next" is not in the letter,
neither is it in the quotation which the gentleman makes, for he quotes it fairly; yet he concludes that this would be the 18th of N ov'ember.
Now, the fact is, the 1 I th of November last was Friday, and the regi3ter of the National
Hotel bears witness that Mrs. Hudspeth is not mistaken; because her language is, that
Booth said he would leave for Washington clay after to-morrow, which would be Sunday,
the 13th, and, if in the evening. would bring him to Washington on Monday, the 14th of
November, the day on which the register shows he did return to the National Hotel. As to
the improbability which the gentleman raises, on the conversation happening in a street car,
crowded with people, there was o.othing· that transpired, although the conversation was
earnest, which enabled the witness, or could have enabled any one, in the absence of this
letter, or of the subsequent conduct of Booth, to form the least idea of the subject-matter of
their conversation. The gentleman doel not deal altogether fairly in his remarks touching
the letter of General Dix ; because, upon a careful examination of the letter, it will be found
that he did not form any such judgment as that it was a hoax for the Sunday Mercury, but
he wok care to forward it to the department, and asked attention to it; when, as appears by
the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Dana, the letter was delivered to Mr.
I~incoln, who considered it important enough to indorse it with the word "Assassination,"
and file it in his office, where it was found after the commission of this crime, and brought
into this court to bear witness against his assassins.
Although this letter would imply that the assassination spoken of was to take place
speedily, yet the party was to bide his time. Though he had entered into the preliminary
arrangements in Canada, although conspirators had doubtless agreed to co-operate with him
in the commission of the c ime, and lots had been cast for the chief part in the bloody
drama, yet it remained for him, as the leader and principal of the hired assassins, by whose
hand their employers were to strike the murderous blow, to collect about him and bring to
Washington such persons as would be willing to lend themselves for a price to the horrid
crime and likely to give the necessary aid and support in its consummation. The letter declares that Abraham Lincoln must die, and now, meaning as soon as the agents can be employed and the work done. To that end you will bide your time. But, says the gentleman,
it could not have been the same conspiracy charged here to which this letter refers. \Vhy
not? It is charged here that Booth, with the accused and others, conspired to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln-that is precisely the conspiracy disclosed in the letter. Granted that
the parties on trial had not then entered into the combination ; if they at any time afterward
entered into it they became parties to it, and the conspiracy was still the same. But, says
the gentleman, the words of the letter imply that the conspiracy was to be executed within
the fortnight. Booth is directed, by the name of Louis, to meet the ·writer within the fortnight. It by no means follows that he was to strike within the fortnight, because he vms to
meet his co-conspirator within that time; and any such conclusion is excluded by the '"'·ords
"bide your time." Even if the conspiracy was to be executed within the fortnight, and.
was not so executed, and the same party, Booth, afterwards, by concert and agreement with
the accused and others, did execute it by "striking sure" and killing the PresiLlent, that act,
whenever clone, would be but the execution of the same conspiracy. The letter is conclusive evidence of so much of this conspiracy as relates to the murder of President Lincoln.
As Booth wa~ to do anything but fail, he immecltately thereafter sought out the agents to enable him to strike sure, and execute all that he had agreed with Davis and his co-confederates
in Canada to do-to murder the President, the Secretary of State, the Vice President, General Grant, anu Secretary Stanton.
Even Booth's co-conspirator, Payne, now on his trial, by his defence admits all this, and
says Booth had just been to Canada, "was filled with a mighty scheme, and wa'i lying in
wait for agents." Booth asked the co-operation of the prh;oner, Payne, and said : " I will
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give you as much money as you want; but first. you must swear to stick by me. It is in
the oil business." This you are told by the accused was early in March last. Thus guilt
bears witness against itself.
We find Booth in New York in November, December, and January, urging Chester to
enter into this combination, assuring him that there was money in it; that they bad ''friends
on the other side;" that if be would only participate in it be would never want for money
while be lived, and all that was asked of him was to stand at and oj1en the back door of
Ford's Theatre. Booth, in his interviews with Chester, confesses that he is witlwut money
himself, and allows Chester to reimburse him the fifty dollars which he (Booth) bad transmittet.l to him in a letter for the purpose of paying his expenses to Washington as one of the
parties to this conspiracy. Booth told him, although he himself was penniless, "there is
money in this-we have friends on the other side;" and if you will but engage, I will have
three thousand dollars deposited at once for the use of your family.
Failing to secure the services of Chester, because his soul recoiled with abhorrence fi·om
the foui work of assassination and murder, be found more willing instruments in others
whom be gathered about him. Men to commit the assassinations, horses to secure speedy
and certain escape, were to be provided, and to this end Booth, with an energy worthy of a
better cause, applies himself. For this latter purpose be told Chester he had already expended five thousand dollars. In the latter 'art of November, 1864, he visits Charles county,
Maryland, and is in company with one of the prisoners, Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, with whom
he lodged over night, and through whom he procures of Gardner one of the several horses
which were at his disposal, and used by him and his co-conspirators in W asbington on the
night of the assassination.
Some time in January last, it is in testimony, that the prisoner Mudd introduced Booth to
J obn H. Surratt and the witness W eichmann; that Booth invited them to theN ational Hotel;
that when there, in the room to which Booth took them, Mudd went out into the passag·e,
called Booth out, and had a private conversation with him, leaving the witness and Surratt
in the room. Upon their return to the room, Booth went out with Surratt, and, upon their
coming in, all three (Booth, Surratt, and Samuel A. Mudd) went out together and bad a
conversation in the passage, leaving the witness alone. Up to the time of this interview it
seems that neither the witness nor Surratt had any knowledge of Booth, as they were then
introduted to him by Dr. Mudd. ·whether Surratt had, in taet, previously known Booth it
is not important to inquire. Mudd deemed it necessary, perhaps a wise preeaution, to introduce Surratt to Booth; he also deemed it neeessarv to have a private eonversation with
Booth shortly afterwa1ds, and directly upon that to have a conversation toge ther with Booth
and Surratt alone. Had this eonversation, no part of which was heard by the witness, been
perfectly innocent, it is not to be presumed that Dr. Mudd, who was an entire stranger to
Weiebmann, "\vould have deemed it neeessary to bold the conversation seeretly, nor to have
volunteered to tell the witness, or rather pretend to tell him, what the conversation was ; yet
he did say to the witness, upon their return to the room, by -vmy of apology, I suppose,
for the privacy of the eonversation, that Booth had some private business with him, and
wished to purchase his farm This silly device, as is often the case in attempts at deeeption,
failed in tbe execution ; for it remains to be shown how the fact that Mudd had private business with Booth, and that Booth wished to purehase his fa:nn, made it at aU neeessary, or
even proper, that they should both volunteer to call out Surratt, who up to that moment was
a strauger to Booth. What had Surratt to do with Booth's purehase of Mudd's farm ·? And
if it was necessary to withdraw and talk by themselves secretly about the sale of the farm,
why should they diselose the faet to the very man fi·om whom they had eoneealed it?
Upon the return of these three parties to the room, they seated them selves at a table. and
upon the back of an envelope Booth traced lines with a pencil, indieating, as the witness
states, the direetion of roads. \Vhy -..vas this done? As Booth had been previously in that
section of eountry, as the prisoner in his defenee has taken great pains to show, it was eertainly not necessary to anything eonnected with the purebase of .Mudd's farm that at that
time be should be indicating the direetion of roads to or from it; nor is it made to app<•ar, by
anything in this testimony, how it eomes that Surratt, as the witness testifies, seemed to be
as mueh interested in the marking out of these roads as Mudd or Booth. It does not appear
that Surratt was in anywise eonnected with or interested in the sale of Mudd's farm. From
all that Las transpired since this meeting at the hotel, it would seem that this plotting the
roads was intended, not so mueh to show the road to Mudd's farm, as to point out the shortest and safest route for flight from the capital, by the houses of all the parties to this conspiracy, to their "fi-iends on the other side."
But, says the learned gentleman, (Mr. Ewing,) in his very able argument in defenee of
this prisoner, why should Booth determine that his flight should be through Charles eounty?
The answer must be obvious, upon a moment's reflection, to every man, and could not possibly have escaped the notice or" the eounscl himself, but for the reason that his zeal for his
client eonstrained him to overlook it. It was absolutely essential that this murderer should
have his eo-conspirators at eonvenient points along his route, and it does not appear in
evidence that by the route to his friends, who bad then fled from Richmond, which the gentleman (Mr. Ewing) indieates as the more direct, but of whieh there is not the slightest
evidenee whatever, Booth had co-conspirators at an equal distance from Washington. The
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testimony discloses, further, that on the route selected by him for his flight there is a large
population that would be most likely to favor and aid him in the execution of his wicked
pmpose, and in :~paking his escape. But it is a sufficient answer to the gentleman's question,
that Booth's co-conspirator Mudd lived in Charles county.
To return to the meeting at the hotel. In the light of other facts in this case, it must become clear to the court that this secret meeting between Booth, Surratt, and Mudd was a
conference looking to the execution of this conspiracy. It so impressed the prisoner-it so
impressed his counsel, that they deemed it necessary and absolutely essential to their defence
to attempt to destroy the credibility of the witness W eichmann.
I may say here, in passing, that they have not attempted to impeach his general reputation
for truth by the testimony of a single witness, nor have they impeaehed his testimony by
calling a single witness to discredit one material faet to which he has testified in this issue.
Failing to find a breath of suspicion against Weichmann's eharacter, or to contradict a single
fact to which he testified, the accused had to fly to the last resort, an alibi, and very earnestly
did the learned counsel devote himself to the task.
It is not material whether this meeting in the hotel took place on the 23d of December or
in January. But, says the counsel, it was after the commencement or close of the congressional holiday. That is not material; but the concurrent resolution of Congress shows that
the holiday eommenced on the 2.2cr December, the day before the accused spent the evening
in Washington. 'l'he witness is not certain about the date of this meeting. The material
fact is, did this meeting take place-either on the 23d of December or in January last?
'Vere the private interviews there held, and was the apology made, as detailed, by Mudd and
Booth, after the secret conference, to the witness? That the meeting did take place, and that
Mudd did explain that these secret interviews, with Booth first, and with Booth and Surratt
directly afterward, had relation to the sale of his farm, is eonfessedly admitted by the endeavor of the prisoner, through his counsel, to show that negotiations had been going on
between Booth and Mudd for the sale of Mudd's farm. If no such meeting was held, if no
such explanation was made by Mudd to W eichmann, can any man for a moment believe that
a witness would have been called here to give any testimony about Booth having neg·otiated
for Mudd's farm? What conceivable connexion has it with this case, except to show that
Mudd's explanation to v.,reichmann for his extraordinary conduct was in exact accordance
witb the fact? Or was this testimony about the negotiations for Mudd's farm intended to
show so close an intimacy itnd intercourse with Booth that Mudd could not fail to recognize
him when he came flying for aid to his house from the work of assassination? It would be
injustice to the able counsel to suppose that.
I have said that it was wholly immaterial whether this conversation took place on the 23d
of December or in J anum·y; it is in evidence that in both those months Booth was at the
National Hotel; that he occupied a room there ; that he arrived there on the 22d and was
there on the 23d of December last, and also on the 12th day of January. The testimony of
the witness is, that Booth said he had just come in. Suppose this conversation took place in
December, on the evening of the 23d, the time wh' nit is proved by J. T. Mudd, the witness
for the accused, that he, in company with Samuel A. Mudd, spent the night in Washington
city. Is there anything in the testimony of that or any other witness to show that the accused did not have and could not have had an interview with Booth on that evening? J.
T. Mudd testifies that he separated from the prisoner, Samuel A. Mudd, at the National
Hotel early in the evening of that day, and did not meet him again until the accused came
in for the night at the Pennsylvania House, where he stopped. Where was Dr. Samuel A.
Mudd during this interval? \Vhat does his witness know about him during that time?
How can he say that Dr. Mudd did not go up on Seventh street in company with Booth,
then at the National; that he did not on Seventh street meet Surratt and Weichmann; thai
he did not return to the National Hotel; that he did not have this interview, and afterwards
meet him, the witness, as he testifies, at the Pennsylvania House? Who knows that the
congressional holiday had not in fact commenced on that day? What witness has been
called to prove that Booth did not on either of those occasions occupy the room that had for- .
merly been occupied by a member of Congress, who had temporarily vacated it, leaving his
books there? Weichmann, I repeat, is not positive as to the date: he is only positive as to the
fact; and he disclosed voluntarily, to this court, that the date could probably be fixed by a
reference to the register of the Pennsylvania House; that register cannot, of course, be conclusive of whether Mudd was there in January or not, for the very good reason that the proprietor admits that he did not know Samuel A. Mudd, therefore Mudd might have registered
by any other name. W eichmann does not pretend to know that Mudd had registered at all.
If Mudd was here in January, as a party to this conspiracy, it is not at all unlikely that,
if he diu register at that time in the presence of a man to whom he was wholly unknown, his
kinsman not then being with him, he would register by a false name. But if the interview
took place in December, the testimony of W eichmann bears as strongly against the accused
as if it had happened in January. Weichmann says he does not know what time was occupied in this interview at the National Hotel; that it probably lasted twenty minutes; that,
after the private interviews between Mudd and Surratt and Booth, whieh were not of very
long duration, had terminated, the parties went to the Pennsylvania House, where Dr. Mudd
had rooms, and after sitting together in the common sitting-room of the hotel, they left DL
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Mudd there about ten o'clock p. m., who remained during the night. Weichmann's testimony leaves no doubt that this meeting on Seventh street and interview at the National took
place after dark, and terminated before or about ten o'clock p. m. His OW¥1 wHness, J. T.
Mudd, after stating that he separated from the accused at the National Hotel, says after he
had got through a conversation with a gentleman of his acquaintance, he walked down the
avenue, went to several clothing stores, and " after awhile" walked round to the Pennsyl-·
vania House, and "very soon after" he got there Dr. Mudd came in, and they went to bed
shortly afterwards. What time he spent in his "walk alone 71 on the avenue, looking at
clothing; what period he embraces in the terms "after awhile," when he returned to the
Pennsylvania House, and "soon after" which Dr. Mudd got there, the witness does not disclose. Neither does he intimate, much less testify, that he saw Dr. Mudd when he first entered the Pennsylvania House on that night after their separation. How does he know that
Booth and Surratt and Weichmann did not accompany Samuel A. Mudd to that house that
evening ? How does he know that the prisoner and those persons did not converse together
some time in the sitting-room of the Pennsylvaina Hotel'! Jeremiah Mudd has not testified
that he met Doctor Mudd in that room, or that be was in it himself. He Las, however,
sworn to the faet, which is disproved by no one, that the prisoner was separated from him
long enough that evening to have had the meeting with Booth, Surratt, and W eichmann~
and the intervit~ws in the National Hotel, and at the Pennsylvania House, to which 'Veieh•
mann has testified? Who is there to disprove it? Of what importance is it whether it was
on the 23d day of December or in January? How does that affect the eredibility of Weichmann? He is a man, as I have before said, against whose reputation for truth and good
conduct they have not been able to bring one witness. If this meeting did by possibility
take place that night, is there anything to render it impxobable that Booth and Mudd and
Surratt did have the conversation at the National Hotel to which Weicbmann testifies 1 Of
what avail, therefore, is the attempt to prove that Mudd was not here during January, if it
was clear that he was here on the 23d of Deeember, 1864, and had this conversation with
Booth? That this attempt to prove an alibi during January has failed, is quite as clear as
is the proof of the fact that the prisoner was here on the evening of the 23d of December,
and present in the National Hotel, where Booth stopped. The fact that the prisoner, Samuel
A. Mudd, went with J. T. Mudd on that-evening to the National Hotel, and there separated
from him, is proved by his own witness, J. T. Mudd; and that he did not rejoin h~m until
they retired to bed in the Pennsylvania House is proved by the same witness, and eontradieted by nobody. Does any one suppose there would have been sueh assiduous care to
prove that the prisoner was with his kinsman all the time on the 23d of December in Washington, if they had not known that Booth was then at the National Hotel, and that a meeting
of the prisoner with Booth, Surratt, and Weicbmann on that day would corroborate and confirm W eicbmann's testimony in every material statement he made concerning that meeting 1
The accused having signally failed to aecount for his absenee after he separated fwm his
witness, J. T. Mudd, early in the evening of th'e 23d of December, at the National Hotel,
until they bad again met at the Penmylvd!tia House, when they retired to rest, he now attempts to prove an alibi as to the month of January. In this he has failed, as he failed in
the attempt to show that he could not have met Booth, Surratt, and Weicbmann on the 23d
of December.
·
For this purpose the aecuseCL calls Betty Washington. She had been at Mudd's house
every night ,since the Monday after Christmas last, except when here at court, and says that
the prisoner, Mudd, has only been away from home three nights during that time. This
witness forgets that Mudl has not been at home any night or day since this comt assembled.
Neither does she account for the three nights in which she swears to his absence from home.
First, she says he went to Gardner's party; second, he went to Giesboro', then to Washington. She does not know in what month be was away, the second time, all night. She only
knows where he went, from what be and his wife said, which is not evidenee; but she does
testi(y that when he left home and was absent over night, the second time, 1t was about two
or three weeks after she came to his house, wbieh would, if it were three weeks, make it just
about the 15th of January, 1865; because she swears she came to his house on the first Monday after Christmas last, whieh was the 26th day of December; so that the 15th of January
would be three weeks, less one day, from that time; and it might have been a week earlier,
according to her testimony, as, also, it might have been a week earlier, or more, by Weichmann's testimony, for he is not positive as to the time. What I have said of the register of
the Pennsylvania House, the headquarters of Mudd and Atzerodt, I need not here repeat.
That record proves nothing, save that Dr. Mudd was there on the 23d of December, which,
as vYe have seen, is a fact, along with others, to show that the meeting at the National then
took place. I have also called the attention of the court to the faet that if Mudd was at that
house again in January, and did not register his name, that fact proves nothing; or, if be
did, the register only proves that he registered falsely; either of which facts might have happened without the knowledge of the witness called by the accused from that bouse, who does
not know Samuel A. Mudd personally.
The testimony of Henry L. Mudd, his brother, in support of this alibi, is, that the prisoner was in Washington on the 23d of March, and on the lnth of April, four days before
the murder! But he does not account for the absent night in January, about which Betty
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Washington testifies. Thomas Davis was called for the same purpose, but stated that he
was himself absent one night in January, after the 9th of that month, and he could not say
whether Mudd was there on that night or not. He does testify to Mudd's absence over night
three times, and fixes one occasion on the night of the 26th of January. In consequence of
his own absence one night in January, this witness cannot account for the absence of Mudd
on the night referred to by Betty Washington.
This matter is entitled to no further attention. It can satisfy no one, and the burden of
proof is upon the prisoner to prove that he was not in Washington in January last. How
can such testimony convince any rational man that Mudd was not here in January, against
the evidei1ce of an unimpeached witness, who swears that Samuel A. Mudd was in ·washington in the month of January 7 Who that has been examined here as a witness knows
that he was not 1
The Rev. Mr. Evans swears that he saw him in "\Vashington last winter, and tha~ at the
same time he saw Jarboe, the one coming out of, and the other going into, a house on H
street, which he was informed on inquiry was the house of Mrs. Surratt. Jarboe is the only
witness called to contradict Mr. Evans, and he leaves it in extreme doubt whether he does
not corroborate him, as he swears that he was here himself last winter or fall, but cannot
state exactly the time. Jarboe's silence on questions touching his own credibility leaves no
room for any one to say that his testimony could impeach Mr. Evans, whatever he might
swear.
Miss Anna H. Surratt is also called for the purpose of impeaching Mr. Evans. It is sufficient to say of her testimony on that point that she swears negatively only-that she did
not see either of the persons named at her mother's house. This testimony neither disproves,
nor does it even tend to disprove, the fact put in issue by Mr. Evans. No one will pretend,
whatever the form of her expression in giving her testimony, that she could say more than
that she did not know the fact, as it was impossible that she could know who was, or who
·was not, at her mother's house, casually, at a period so remote. It is not my purpose, neither
is it needful here, to question in any way the integrity of this young woman.
It is further in testimony that Samuel A. Mudd was here on the 3d clay of March last, the
<lay preceding the inauguration, when Booth was to strike the traitorous blow; and it was,
<loubtless, only by the interposition of that God who stands within the shadow and keeps
watch above his own, that the victim of this conspiracy was spared that day from the assassin's hand that he might complete his work and see the salvation of his country in the fall
of Riehmond and the surrender of its great army. Dr. Mudd was here on thttt day (the 3d
of March) to abet, to encourage, to nerve his co-conspirator for the commission of this great
crime. He was ca.rried away by the awful purpose which possessed him, and ru~hed into
the room of Mr. Norton at the National Hotel in search of Booth, exclaiming excitedly:
"I'm mistaken: I thought this was Mr. Booth's room." He is told Mr. Booth is above, on
the next floor. He is followed by Mr. Norton, because of his rude and excited behavior, and
wing followed, conscious of his guilty errand, he turns away, afraid of himself and afraid to
be fonud in concert with his fellow confederate. Mr. Norton identifies the prisoner, and
has no doubt that Samuel A. Mudd is the man.
The Rev. Mr. Evans also swears that, after the 1st and before the 4th clay of March last,
he is certain tha.t within that time, and on the 2d or 3d of March, he saw Dr. Mudd drive
into "\Vashington city. The endeavor is made by the accused, in order to break clown this
witness, by proving another alibi. The sister of the accused, Miss Fanny Mudd, is called.
~he te-;tifies that she saw the prisoner at breakfast in her father's house on the 2cl of March,
ahout 5o clock in the morning, and not again until the 3d of :ft!arch at noon. Mrs. Emily
l\Iulld .-wPars substantially to the same statement. Betty 'V ashington, called for the accused,
swears that he was at home aU day at work with her on the 2d of March, and took breakfa~t ttt home. Frank "~ashington swears that Mudd was at home all day: that he saw him
when he first came out in the morning about sunrise from his own house, ancl knows that he
"·as there all clay with them. "\Vhich is correct, the testimony of his sisters or the testimony
of hi~ serYants? The sisters say that he was at their father's house for breakfa:st on the
moruin~ of the 2d of March; the servants say he was at home for breakfast with them on
that day. If this testimony is followed, it proves one alibi too much. It is impossible, in
th(• mture of things, that the testimony of all these four witnesses can be true.
:-\t~mg this weakness in the testimony brought to prove this second alibi, the endeavor is
ne t made to discredit ~Ir. Norton for truth; and two witnesses, not more, are called, who
testi(y that his reputation for truth has suffered by contested litigation between one of the im·
peaehiug witnesses autl others. }!'our witnesses are called, who testify that Mr. Norton's
Iepntatiun fur truth is very good; that he is a man of high character for truth, and entitled
to be belie; ed whether he speaks under the obligation of an oath or not. The late Postmaster General, lion. Horatio King, not only sustains Mr. Norton as a man of good reputation
for truth, hut expre~sly corroborates his testimony, by stating that in l\farch last, about the
4th of )larch, Mr. Norton told him the same fact to which he swears here; that a man came
into his room under excitement, alarmed his sister, was followed out by himself, and went
dmrn stairs instead of g-oing up; and that Mr. Norton told him this before the assassination,
and about the time of the inauguration. What motive had Mr. Norton at that time to tabicate this statement? It detracts nothing from his testimony that he did not at that time
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mention the name of this man to his friend, Mr. King; because it appears fi·om his testimony-and there is none to question the truthfulness of his statement-that at that time he did
not know his name. Neither does it take from the force of this testimony, that Mr. Norton
did not, in communicating this matter to Mr. King, make mention of Booth's name; because there was nothing in the transaction, at the time, he being ignorant of the name of
Mudd, and equally ignorant of the conspiracy between Mudd and Booth, to ~ive the least
occasion for any mention of Booth or of the transaction further than as he detmled it. With
such corroboration, who can doubt the fact that Mudd did enter the room of Mr. Norton,
and was followed by him, on the 3d of March last? Can he be mistaken in the man 1
..Whoever looks at the prisoner carefully once will be sure to recognize him again.
For the present I pass from the consideration of the testimony showing Dr. Mudd's connexion with Booth in this conspiracy, with the remark that it is in evidence, and I think
established, both by the testimony adduced by the prosecution and that by the prisoner, that
since the commencement of this rebellion John H. Surratt visited the prisoner's house; that
he concealed Surratt and other rebels and traitors in the woods near his house, where for
several days he furnished them with food and bedding; that the shelter of the woods by
night and by day was tLe only shelter that the prisoner dare furnish these friends of his; that
in November Booth visited him and remained over night; that he accompanied Booth at that
time to Gardner's, from whom he purchased one of the horses used on the night of the assassination to aid the escape of one of his confederates ; that the prisoner had secret interviews
with Booth and Surratt, as sworn to by the witness Weichmann, in the National Hotel,
whether on the 23d of Decem beT or in January, is a matteT of entire indifference; that he
rushed into Mr. Norton's room on the 3d of March in search of Booth; and that he was here
again on the 1Oth of April, four days before the murder of the President. Of his conduct
after the assassination of the President, which is confirmatory of all this-his conspiring with
Booth and his sheltering, concealing, and aiding the flight of his co conspirator, this felon
assassin-I shall speak hereafter, leaving him for the present with the remark that the attempt
to prove his character has resulted in showing him in sympathy with the rebellion, so cruel
that he shot one of his slaves and declared his purpose to send several of them to work on the
rebel batteiies in Richmond.
WLat others, besides Samuel A. Mudd and John H. Surratt and Lewis Payne, did Booth,
after his return from Canada, induce to join him in this conspiracy to murdeT the President,
the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Lieutenant General, with the intent
thereby to aid the Iebellion and overthrow the government and laws of the United States?
On the lOth of February the prisoners Arnold and O'Laughlin came to Washington and
took rooms in the house of Mrs. V antyne; were armed; were there visited frequently by
John ·wilkes Booth, and alone; were occasionally absent when Booth called, who seemed
anxious for their retum; would sometimes leave notes for them, and sometimes a request
that when they came in they should be told to come to the stable. On the 18th of:March
last, when Booth played in "The Apostate," the witness, Mrs. Vantyne, 1·eceived from
O'Laughlin complimentary tickets. 'l'hese persons remained there until the 20th of March.
They were visited, so far as the witness knows, during their stay at her house, only by
Booth, save that on a single occasion an unknown man came to see them, and remained
with them over night. They told the witness they were in the "oil business." With Mudd,
the guilty purpose was sought to be concealed by declaring that he was in the "land business;" with O'Laughlin and Arnold it was attempted to be concealed by the pretence that
they were in the "oil business." Booth, it is proved, had closed up all eonnexion with oil
business last September. There is not a word of testimony to show that the accused,
O'Laughlin and Arnold, ever invested or sought to invest, in any way or to any amount, in
the oil business; their silly words betray them; they forgot when they uttered that false
statement that truth is strong, next to the Almighty, and tLat their crime must find them out
was the irrevocable and irresistible law of nature and of nature's God.
One of their co-conspirators, known as yet only to the guilty parties to this damnable plo-t
and to the Infinite, who will unmask and avenge all blood-guiltiness, comes to bear witness,
unwittingly, against them. This unknown conspirator, who dates his letter at South Branch
l3ridge, April 6, 1865, mailed and postmarked Cumberland, Maryland, and addressed to
John Wilkes Booth, by his initials, "J. W. B., National Hotel, Washington, D. C.," was
also in the "oil speculation." In that letter he says:
" FRIEND WILKES: I received yours of March 12th, and reply as soon as practicable. I
saw French, Brady, and others about the oil speculation. The subscription to the stoek
amounts to eight thousand dollars, and I add one thousand myself, which is about all I can
stand, Now, when you sink your well, go deep enough; don't fail; everything depends
upon you and your lzelpe1·s. If you cannot get through on your t1·ip after you strike oil,
strike through 'Thornton Gap and across by Capon, Romney, and down the Branch. I can
keep you safe from all hardships for a year. I am clear of all surveillance now that infernal
Purdy is beat.
*
*
*
"I send this by 'Tom, and if he don't get drunk you will get it the 9th. At all events, it
cannot be understood if lost.
*
*
*
*
"No more, only Jake will be at Green's with the funds.
(Signed)
LoN."
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That this letter is not a fabrication is made apparent by the testimony of Purdy, whose
name occurs in the letter. He testified that he had been a detective in the government service, and that he had been falsely accused, as the letter recites, and put under arrest; that
there was a noted rebel by the name of Green living at Thornton Gap; that there was a servant, who drank, known as "Tom," in the neighborhood of South Branch Bridge; that
there is an obscure route through the gap, and as described in the letter; and that a man
commonly called "Lon" lives at South Branch Bridge. If the court are satisfied-and it is
for them to judge-that this letter was written before the assassination, as it purports to
have been, and on the day of its date, there can be no question with any one who reads it that
the writer was in the conspiraey, and knew that the time of its execution drew nigh. If a conspirator, every word of its contents is evidence against every other party to this conspiracy.
Who can fail to understand this letter? His words, "go deep enough," "don't fail,"
"everything depends on you and your helpers," ''if you can't get through on your trip after
you strike oil, strike through Thornton Gap,'' &c., and '' I can keep you safe from all hardships for a year," necessarily imply that when he "strikes oil" there will be an occasion for
a flight; that a trip, or route, has already been determined upon; that he may not be able
to go through by that route; in which event he is to strike for Thornton Gap, and across by
Capon and Romney, and down the branch, for the shelter which his co-conspirator offers
him. "I am clear of all surveillance now "-does any one doubt that the man who wrote
those words wished to assure Booth that he was no longer watched, and that Booth could
safely hide with him from his pursuers? Does any one doubt, from the further expression
in this letter, "Jake will be at Green's with the funds," that this was a part of the price of
blood, or that the eight thousand dollars subscribed by others, and the one thousand additional, subscribed by the writer, were also a part of the price to be paid?
"The oil business," which was the declared business of O'Laughlin and Arnold, was the
<1eclared business of the infamous writer of this letter; was the declared business of John H.
Surratt; was the declared business of Booth himself, as , explained to Chester and Payne;
was "the business" referreCl to in his telegrams to O'Laughlin, and meant the murder of the
President, of his cabinet, and of General Grant. The first of these telegrams is dated Washington, 13th March, and is addressed to M. O'Laughlin, No. 57 North Exeter street, Baltimore, Maryland, and is as follows: "Don't you fear to neglect your business; you had
better come on at once. J. Booth." The telegraphic operator, Hoffman, who sent this despatch from Washington, swears that John Wilkes Booth delivered it to him in person on the
<lay of its date; and the handwriting of the original telegram is established beyond question
to be that of Booth. The other telegram is dated Washington, March 27, addressed "M.
O'Laughlin, Esq., 57 North Exeter street, Baltimore, Maryland," and is as follows: "Get
word to Sam. Come on w1th or without him on Wednesday morning. We sell that day
sure; don't fail. J. Wilkes Booth." The original of this telegram is a1so proved to be in
the ha.ndwriting of Booth. 'l'he sale referred to in this last telegram was doubtless the murder
of the President and others-the "oil speculation," in which the writer of the letter from
South Branch Bridge, dated April6, had taken a thousand dollars, and in wh,i ch Booth said
there was money, and Sanders said there was money, and Atzerodt said there was money.
The wordf-of this telegram, "get word to Sam," mean Samuel Arnold, his co-conspirator,
who had been with him during all his stay in Washington, at Mrs. Vantyne's. These parties to this conspiracy, after they had gone to Baltimore, had additional correspondence with
Booth, which the court must infer had relation to carrying out the purposes of their confederation and agreement. The colored witness, Williams, testifies that John Wilkes Booth
handed him a letter for Michael O'Laughlin, and another for Samuel Arnold, in Baltimore,
some time in March last; one of which he delivered to O'Laughlin at the theatre in Baltimore, and the other to a lady at the door where Arnold boarded in Baltimore.
Their aO"rl'ement and co-operation in the common object having been thus established, the
letter written to Booth by the prisoner Arnold, dated March 27, ltl6G, the handwriting of
which is proved before the court, and which was found in Booth's possession after the assassination, becomes testimony against O'J_,aughlin, as well as against the writer Arnold, because it is an act done in furtherance of their combination. That letter is as follows:
"DEAR JOHN: Was business so important that you could not remain in Baltimore till I
saw you 7 I came in as soon as I could, but found you had gone to Washington. I called
also to see Mike, but learned from his mother he had gone out with you and had not
returned. I concluded, therefore, he had gone with you. How inconsiderate you have
been! When I left you you stated that we would not meet in a month or so, and therefore I
made application for employment, an answer to which I shall receive during the week. I
told my parents I hacl ceased with you. Can I, then, under existing circumstances, act es
you request 7 You know full well that the government suspicions something is going on
there, therefore the undertaking is becoming more complicated. Why not for the pnsent
desist 7-for various reasons, which, if you look into, you can readily see without my
making any mention thereof. You nor any one can censure me for my present course.. Y." ou
have been its cause; for how can I now come after telling them I had left you? SuspiCIOn
rests upon me now from my whole family, and even parties in the country. I will be COJ?·
pelled to leave home any how, and how soon I care not. Noue, no, not one, were more m
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hvor of the enterprise than myself, and to-day would be there bad you not done as you have.
By this I mean manner ofproct:leding. I am, as you well.know, in need. I am, you may
say, in rags, whereas to-day I ought to be well clothed. I do not feel right stalking about
with means, and more from appearances a beggar. I feel my dependence. But even all
this would have been and was forgotten; for I was one with you. Time more propttious
will arrive yet. Do not act rashly or in baste. I would prefer your first query, 'Go and
see how it will be taken in Richmond ; ' and en long I shall be better prepared to again be
with you. I dislike wr~ing ; would sooner verbally make known my views. Yet your
now waiting causes me thus to proceed. Do not in anger peruse this. Weigh all I have
said, and, as a rational man and a jTiend, you cannot censure or upbraid my conduct. I
sincerely trust this, nor aug·ht else that shall or may occur, will ever be an obstacle to obliterate our former friendship and attachment. Write me to Baltimore, as I expect to be in
about vV ednesday or Thursday ; or, if you can possibly come on, I will Tuesday meet you
at Baltimore at B.
"Ever, I subscribe myself, your friend,
''SAM."
Here is the confession of the prisoner Arnold that he was one with Booth in this conspiracy ; the further confession that they are suspected by the government of their country,
and the acknowledgment that since they parted Booth bad communicated, among other
things, a suggestion which leads to the remark in this letter, "I would prefer your first
query, 'Go and see how it will be taken in Richmond,' and ere long I shall be better prepared to again be with you." This is a declaration that affects Arnold, Booth, and
O'Laughlin alike, if the court are satisfied; and it is difficult to see how they can have doubt
on the subject, that the matter to be referred to Richmond is the matter of the assassination
ofthe President and others, to effect which these parties bad previously agreed and conspired
together. It is a matter in testimony, by the declaration of John H. Surratt, who is as
clearly proved to have been in this conspiracy and murder as Booth himself, that about the
very date of this letter, the 27th of March, upon the suggestion of Booth, and with his
knowledge and consent, be went to Richmond, not only to see "how it would be taken
there," but to get funds with which to carry out the enterprise, as Bqoth had already dec.lared to Chester in one of his last interviews, when he said that he or "some one of the
party" would be constrained to go to Richmond for funds to carry out the conspiracy.
Surratt returned from Richmond, bringing with him some part of the money for ·which he
went, and was then going to Canada, and, as the testimony discloses, bringing with him
the despatches from Jefferson Davis to his chief agents in Canada, which, as Thompson declared to Conover, made the proposed assassination "all right." Surratt, after seeing the
parties here, left immediately for Canada and delivered his despatches to Jacob Thompson,
the agent of Jefferson Davis. This was done by Surratt upon the suggestion, or in exact
accordance with the suggestion, of Arnold, made on the 27th of March, in his letter to
Booth just read; and yet you are gravely told that four weeks before the 27th of March
Arnold had abandoned the conspiracy.
Surratt reached Canada with these despatches, as we have seen, about the 6 · or 7th of
.April last, when the wHness Conover saw them delivered to Jacob Thompson, and heard
their contents stated by Thompson, and the declaration from him that these despatches made
it "all right." That Surratt was at that time in Canada is not only established by the testimony of Conover, but it is also in evid~nce that he told Weichmann on the 3d of April that
he was going to Canada, and on that day left for Canada, and afterwards t-wo letters, addressed by Sun:att over the fictitious signatme of John Harrison, to his mother and to Miss
Ward, dated at Montreal, were received by them on the 14th of April, as testified by Weichmann and by Miss vVard, a witness called for the defence. Thus it appears that the condition named by .Arnold in his letter had been complied with. Booth had " gone to Richmond," in the person of Surratt, "to see how it would be taken." The rebel authorities at
Richmond had approved it, the agent bail returned, and Arnold was, in his own words,
thereby the better prepared to rejoin Booth in the prosecution of this conspiracy.
To this end Arnold went to Portress Monroe. As his letter expressly declares, Booth
said when they parted, "we would not meet in a month or so, and tlum;fore I made application for employment, an answer to which I shall receive during the week." He
did receive the answer that week from Fortress Monroe, and went there to await the "more
propitious time," bearing with him the weapon of death which Booth had provided and
ready to obey his call, as the act had been approved at Richmond and been made "all
right." Acting upon the same fact that the conspiracy had been approved in Richmond
and the funds provided, O'Laugblin came to 'Vashington to identify General Grant, the
person who was to become the victim of his violence in the final eonsummation of this
erime-General Grant, ·whom, as is averred in the specification, it had become the part of
O'Laughlin by his agreement in tl1is conspiracy to kill and murder. On the evening preceding the assassination-the 13th of April-by the testimony of three reputable witnesses,
against whose truthfulness not one word is uttered here or elsewhere, O'Laughlin went into
the house of the Secretary of ·war, where General Grant then was, and placed himself in
position in the hall where he could see him, having declared befonil he reached that point to
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one of these witnesses that he wished to see General Grant. The house was brilliantly
illuminated at the time. Two, at least, of the witnesses conversed with the accused, and
the other stood very near to him, took especial notice of his conduct, called attention to it,
and sug·gested that he be put out of the house, and he was accordingly put out by one of the
witnesses. These witnesses are confident, and have no doubt, and so swear upon their
oaths, that Michael O'Laughlin is the man who was present on that occasion. There is no
denial on the part of the accused that he was in ·washington during the day and during the
night of April 13, and also during the day and during the night of the 14th; and yet, to get
rid ofthis testimony, recourse is had to that common device, an alibi-a device never, I may
say, more frequently resorted to than in this trial. But what an alibi! Nobody is called to
prove it, save some men who, by their own testimony, were engaged in a drnr>ken bebauch
through the evening.
reasonable man who reads their evidence can hardly be expected
to allow it to outweigh he united testimony of three unimpeached and unimpeachable witnesses who were clear in their statements, who entertain no doubt of the truth of what they
say, ·whose opportunities to know were full and complete, and who were constrained. to take
special notice of the p1isoner by reason of his extraordinary conduct.
These witnesRes describe accurately the appearance, stature, and complexion of the
accused; but because they describe his clothing as dark or black it is urged that as part of
his clothing, although dark, was not blaek, the witnesses are mistaken. O'Langhlin and
his drunken companions (one of whom swears tbat he drank ten times that evening) were
strolling in the streets and in the direction of the house of the Sec.retary of \Var, up the
avenue; but you are asked to believe that these witnesses could not be mistaken in saying
they were not off the avenue above Seventh street, or 011 K street. I venture to say thiLt no
man who reads their testimony can determine satisfactorily all the places that were visited
by O'Laughlin and his drunken associates that evening· from 7 to 11 o'clock p. m. All this
time, from 7 to 11 o'clock p. m., must be accounted for satisfactorily before the alibi can be
established. Laughlan does not account for all the time, for he left O'Laughlin after 7
Q'clock, and rejoined him, as he says, "I suppose about 8 o'clock." Grillet did not meet
him until lwlf past ten, and then only casually saw him in passing the hotel. May not
G1illet have been mistaken as to the faet, although he did meet O'Laughlin after 11 o'clock
the same evening, as he swears?
Purdy swears to seeing him in the bar with Grillet about half past ] 0 ; but, as we lHtve
seen by Grillet's testimony, it must have been after 11 o'clock. Murphy contradicts, as to
tim<}, both Grillot and Purdy; for he says it was half past 11 or 12 o'elock wlH'n he and
O'Laughlin returned to Rullman's from Platz's, and Early swears the accused went fi·om
Rullman's to Second street to a dance about a quarter past 11 o'clock, when O'Laughli11
took the lead in the dance and stayed about one hour. I follow these witBcsses no further.
They contradict each other, and do not account for O'Laughlin all the time from 7 to 11
Q'clock. I repeat that no man can read their testimony without finding contradictions most
material as to time, and coming to the conviction that they utterly fail to acconnt for
O'Laughlin's whereabouts on that evening. To establish an alibi the witnesses must know
the fact and testify to it. Laughlan, Grillet, Purdy, Murphy, and Early utterly fail to prove
it, and only succeed in showing that they did not know where O'Langhlin was aU this time,
and that some of them were grossly mistaken in what they testified, both as to time anrl
place. The testimony of James B. Henderson is equally unsatisfactory. He is contradieted
by other testimony of the accused as to place. He says O'Laughlin went np the avenue
above Seventh street, but that he did not go to Ninth street. The other witnesses swear ho
went to Ninth street. He swears he went to Canterbury about 9 o'clock, after going back
from Se-venth street to Rullman's. Laughlan swears that O'Laughlin was with him at the
corner of the avenue and Ninth street at 9 o'clock, and went from there to Canterbury, while
Early swears that O'Laughlin went up as far as Eleventh street and returned with l1im and
took supper at \Velcker's about 8 o'clock. If these witnesses prove an alibi, it is really
agaiust each other. It is folly to pretend that they prove facts which make it impossible
that O'Laughlin could have been at the house of Seeretary Stanton, as three witnesses swear
he was, on the evening of the 13th of April, looking for General Grant.
Has it not, by the testimony thus reviewed, been established prima facie that in the mon~hs
of February, March, and April O'Laughlin had combined, confederated, and agreed with
John Wilkes Booth and Samuel Arnold to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln, \Villi am H.
Seward, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. Grant? Is it not established beyond a shadow of
doubt that Booth had so conspired with the rebel agents in Canada as early as October last;
that he was in search of agents to do the work on pay, in the interests of the rebellion, and
that in tl1is Hpeculation Arnold and O'Laughlin had joined as early as February; that then,
and 1tfter, with Booth and Surratt, they were in the "oil business," which was the business
of assassination by contract as a speculation? If this conspiracy on the part of O'Laughlin
with Arnold is established even prima facie, the declarations and acts of Arnold and Booth, the
other couspirators, in furtherance of the common de,;ign, is evidence against O'Langhlin as
well as against Arnold himself or the other parties. The mle of law is, that the act or declaration of oue conspirator, done in pursuance or furtherance of the common design, is the act
or declaration of all the conspirators. (1 Wharton, 706.)
Tbe letter, therefore, of his co-consp1rator, Arnold, is evidence against O'Laughlin, be-
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cause it is an act in the prosecution of the common conspiracy, suggesting what should be
done in order to make it effective, and which suggestion, as has been stated, was followed
out. The uefence has attempted to avoid the force of this letter by reciting the statement of
Arnold, made to Horner at the time he was arrested, in which be declared, among other
things, that the purpose was to abduct President Lincoln and take him south; that it was
to be done at the theatre by throwing the President out of the box upon the floor of the
stage, when the accu$ed was to catch him. The very announcement of this testimony excited derision that such a tra~edy meant only to take the President and carry him gently
away! This pigmy to catch the giant as the assassins hurled him to the floor from an elevation of twelve feet! 'l'he court has viewed the theatre, and must be satisfied that Booth,
in leaping from the President's box, broke his limb. The court cannot fail to conclude that
the statement of Arnold was but another silly device, like that of t4£1 "oil business," which,
for the time being, he employed to bide from the knowledge of his captor the fact that the
purpose was to murder the President. No man can for a moment beHeve that any one of
these conspirators hoped or desired, by such a proceeding as that stated by this prisoner, to
take the President alive in the presence of thousands assembled in the theatre after be bad
been thus thrown upon the floor of the stage, much less to carry him through the city,
through the lines of your army, and deliver him into the hands of the rebels. No such purpose was expressed or hinted by the conspirators in Canada who commissioned Booth to let
these assassi11ations on contract. I shall waste not a moment more in combatting such an
absurdity.
Arnold does confess that he was a conspirator with Booth in this proposed murder; that
Booth had a letter of introduction to Dr. Mudd; that Booth, O'Laugblin, Atzerodt, Sunatt,
a man with an alias, "Mosby," and another whom he does not know, and himself, were
parties to this conspiracy, and that Booth bad furnished them all with arms. He concludes
this remarkable statement to Horner with tke declaration that at that time, to wit, the first
week of March, or four weeks before he went to Fortress Monroe, he left the conspirac.y, and
that Booth told him to sell his arms if he chose. This is sufficiently answereu by the fact
that, four weeks ujterwa1·ds, he wrote his letter to Booth, which was found in Booth's possession after the assassination, suggesting to him what to do in order to make the conspimcy a.
success, all(l by the further fact that at the very moment he uttered these declarations part
of his arms "\Yere found upon his person, and the rest not disposed of, but at his father's
house.
A party to a treasonable and murderous conspiracy against the government of his country
cannot be~ held to have aba11doned it because he makes such a declaration as this, when he
is in the hands of the officer of the law, arrested for his crime, and especially when his declaration is in conflict with and expressly contradicted by his written acts, and unsupported by
any conduct of his which becomes a citizen and a man.
If he aba11doned the conspiracy, why did he not make known the fact to Abraham Lincoln
and his constitutional advisers that these men, armed with the weapons of assassination,
were daily lying in wait for their lives? To pretend that a man who thus conducts himself
for weeks after the pretended abandonment, volunteering advice for the successful prosecution of the conspiracy, the evidence of which is in writing, and about which there can be no
mistake, has in tact abandoned it, is to insult the common understanding of men. O'Laugblin having conspired with Arnold to do this murder, is therefore as much concluded by the
letter of Arnold of the 27th of March as is Arnold himself. The further testimony touching
O'Laugl•lin, that of Streett, establishes the fact that about the 1st of April be saw him in
confidential conversation with J. ·wilkes Booth, in this city, on the avenue. Another
man, whom the witness does not know, was in conversation. O'Laughlin ca.lled Streett to
one side, and told him Booth was busily engaged with his friend-was talking p1·ivatety to
his fHend. This remark of O'Laughlin is attempted to be accounted for, but the attempt
failed; his counsel taking the pains to ask what induced O'Laughlin to mal;:e the remark,
received the fit reply: ''I did not see the interior of Mr. O'Laughlin's mind; I cannot tell." It
is the province of this court to infer why that remark was made. and what it signified.
That John H. Surratt, George A. Atzerodt, Mary E. Surratt, David E. Herold, and Louis
Payne entered into this conspiracy with Booth, is so very clear upon the testimo11y that little
time need be occupied in bringing again befdre the court the evidence which establishes it.
By the testimony .of vVeicbmann we find Atzerodt in February at the house of the prisoner,
Mrs. Surratt. He inquired for her or for John when he came and remained over night.
After this and before the assassination he visited there frequently, and at that house bore
the name of "Port Tobacco," the name by which he was known in Canada among the
conspirators there. The same witness testifies that he met him on the street, when he said
he was going to visit Payne at the Herndon House, and also accompanied him, along with
Herold and John H. Surratt, to the theatre in March to hear Booth play in the Apostate. At
the Pennsylvania House, one or two weeks previous to the assassination, At7.erodt made the
8tatement to Lieutenant Keirn, when asking for his knife which he had left in his room, a
knife corresponding in size with the one exhibited in court, "I want that; if one Jails I want
the other," wearing at the same time his revolver at his belt. He also stated to Greenawalt,
of the Pennsylvania House, in March, that he was nearly broke, but had friends enough to
give him as much money as would see him tltrough, adding, "I am going a·way some of these
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days, but will return with as much gold as will keep me all my lifetime." Mr. Greenawalt
also says that Booth had frequent interviews with Atzerodt, sometimes in the room, and at
other times Booth would walk in and immediately go out, Atzerodt following.
John M. Lloyd testifies that some six weeks before the assassination, Herold, Atzerodt,
and J obn H. Surratt came to his house at Surrattsville, bringing with them two Spencer carbines with ammunition, also a rope and wrench. Surratt asked the witness to take care of
them. and to conceal the carbines. Surratt took him into a room in the house, it being his
mother's bouse, and showed the witness where to put the carbines, between the joists on
the second floor. The carbines were put there according to his directions, and eoncealed.
Marcus P. Norton saw Atzerodt in conversation with Booth at the National Hotel about the
2d or 3d of Mareh; the conversation was confidential, and the witness accidentally heard
them talking in regard to President Johns(ln, and say that "the class of witnesses would be
of that character that there could be little proven by them." This conversation may throw
some light on the fact that Atzerodt was found in possession of Booth's bank book!
Colonel Nevens testifies that on the 12th of April last be saw Atzerodt at the Kirkwood
House; that Atzerodt there asked him, a stranger, if be knew where Vice-Presit1ent Johnson was, and where Mr. Johnson's room was. Colonel Nevens showed him where the room
of the Vice-President was, and told him that the Vice-President was then at dinner. Atzerodt then looked into the dining-room, where Vice-President Johnson was dining alone.
Robert R. Jones, the clerk at the Kirkwood House, states that on the 14th, the day of the
murder, two days after this, Atzerodt registered his name at the hotel, G. A. Atzerodt, and
took No. 126, retaining the room that day, and carrying away the key. In this room, after
the assassination, were found the knife and revolver with which he intended to murder the
Vice-President.
The testimony of all these witnesses leaves no doubt that the prisoner, George A. Atzerodt,
entered into this conspiracy with Booth; that he expected to receive a large compensation
for the service that he would render in its execution; that be had undertaken the assassination of the Vice-President for a price; that he, with S\uTatt and Herold, rendered the important service of depositing the arms and ammunition to be used by Booth and his confederates as a protection in their flight after the conspiracy had been executed; and that he was
careful to have his intended victim pointed out to him, and the room he occupied in the
hotel, so that when he came to perform his horrid work he would know precisely where to
go and w born to strike.
I take no further notice now of the preparation which this prisoner made for the successful
execution of this part of the traitorous and murderous design. The question is, did he enter
into this conspiracy ? His language, overheard by Mr. Norton, excludes every other conclusion. Vice-President Johnson's name was mentioned in that secret conversation with
Booth, and the very suggestive expression was made between them that "little could be
proved by the witnesses." His confession in his defence is conclusive of his guilt.
That Payne was in this conspiracy is confessed in the defence made by his counsel, and
is also evident from the facts proved, that when the conspiracy was being organized in
Canada by Thompson, Sanders, Tucker, Cleary, and Clay, this man Payne stood at the door
of Thompson; was recommended and indorsed by Clay with the words "We trust him;"
that after corning hither he first reported himself at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, inquired for her and for John H. Surratt, remained there for four days, having conversation
with both of them; having provided himself with means of disguise, was also supplied with
pistols and a knife, such as he afterwards used, and spurs, preparatory to his flight; was
seen with John H. Surratt practicing with knives, such as those employed in this deed of
assassination, and now before the court; was afterwards provided with lodgiug at the
Herndon House, at the instanee of Surratt ; was visited there by Atzerodt, and attended
Booth and Surratt to Ford's Theatre, occupying with those parties the box, as I believe, and
which we may readily infer, in which the President was afterwards murdered.
If further testimony be wanting that he entered into the conspiracy, it may be found in
the fact s>vorn to by Weichrnann, whose testimony no candid man will discredit, that about
the 20th of March Mrs. Surratt, in great excitement, and weeping, said that her son John
had gone away not to return, when about three hours subsequently, in the afternoon of the
same day, John H. Surratt reappeared, came rushing in a state of frenzy into the room, in
his mother's house, armed, declaring be would shoot whoever came into the room, and proclaiming that his prospects were blasted and his hopes gone; that soon Payne came into the
same room, also armed and under great excitement, and was immediately followed by Booth,
with his riding-whip in his hand, who walked rapidly across the floor from side to side, so
much excited that for some time he t1icl not notice the presence of the witness. Observing
Weicbmann the 11m·ties then withdrew, upon a suggestion from Booth, to an upper room,
and there bad a private interview. From a1l that transpired on that occasion, it is apparent
that when these parties left the house that day, it was with the full purpose of completing
some act essential to the final execution of the work of assassination, in conformity with their
previous confederation and agreement. They returned foiled-from what cause is unknowndejected, angry, and covered with confusion.
It is almost imposing upon the patience of the court to consume time in demonstrating the
fact! which none conversant with the testimony of this case can for a moment doubt, that
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John H. Surratt and Mary E. Surratt were as surely in the conspiracy to murder the President as was Joh11 Wilkes Booth himself. You have the frequent interviews between John
H. Surratt and Booth, his intimate relations with Payne, his visits from Atzerodt and Herold,
his deposit of the arms to cover their flight after the conspiracy should have boen executed ;
his own declared visit to Richmond to do what Booth himself said to Chester must be done,
to wit, that he or some of the party must go to Richmond in order to get funds to carry out
the conspiracy; that he brought back with him gold, the price of blood, confessing himself
that he was there; that he immediately went to Canada, delivered despatches [in cipher to
Jacob Thompson from Jefferson Davis, which were interpreted and read by Thompson in the
presence of the witness Conover, and in which the conspiracy was approved, and, in the
language of Thompson, the proposed assassination was "made all right."
One other fact, if any other fact be needed, and I have dune with the evidence which
proves that John H. Surratt entered into this combination; that is, that it appears by the
testimony of the witness, the cashier of the Ontario Ban~. Montreal, that Jacob Thompson,
about the day that these despatches were cielivered, and while Surratt was tLen present in
Canada, drew from that bank of the rebel funds there on deposit the sum of one hundred and
eighty thousand dollars. This being done, Surratt, finding it safer, doubtl('SS, to go to Canada
for the great bulk of funds which were to be distributed among these hired aRsassins than
to attempt to carry it through our lines direct from Richmond, immediately returned toW ashington, and was present in this city, as is proven by the testimony of Mr. Reid, on the afternoon of the 14th of April, the day of the assassination, booted and spurred, ready for the
flight whenever the fatal blow should have been struck. If he was not a conspirator and a
party to this great crime, how comes it that from that hour to this ro man has seen him in
the capital, nor has he been reported anywhere outside of Canada, having arrivEJd at Montreal, as the testimony shows, on the 18th of April, four days after the murder! Nothing
but his conscious coward guilt could possibly induce him to absent himselffrom his mother,
as he does, upon her trial. Being one of these conspirators, as charged, every act of his in
the prosecution of this crime is evidence against the other parties to the conspiracy.
That :Mary E. Surratt is as guilty as her son of having thus conspired, combined, and
confederated to do this murder, in aid of this rebellion, is clear. First, her bouse was the
headquarters of Booth, John H. Surratt, Atzcrodt, Payne, and Herold. She is inquired for
by Atzerodt; ·she is inquired for by Payne; and she is visited by Booth, and holds private
conversations with him. His picture, together with that of the chief conspirator, Jefferson
Davis, is found in her house. She sends to Booth for a carriage to take her, on the 11th of
April, to Surrattsville for the purpose of perfecting the arrangement deemed necessary to the
successful execution of the conspiracy, and especially to facilitate and protect the conspirators
in their escape from justice. On that occasion Booth, having disposed of his carriage, gives
to the agent she employed ten dollars with which to hire a conveyance for that purpose.
And yet the pretence is made that Mrs. Surratt went on the 11th to Smrattsville exclusively
upon her own private and lawful business. Can any one tell, if that be so, bow it comes
that she should apply to Booth for a conveyance, and how it comes that he, of his own accord,
having no conveyance to furnish her, should send her ten dollars with which to procure it 7
There is not the slightest indication that Booth was under any obligation to her, or that she
had any claim upon him, either for a conveyance or for the means with which to procure one,
except that he was bound to contribute, being the agent of the conspirators in Canada and
Richmond, whatever money might be necessary to the consummation of this infernal plot.
On that day, the 11th of April, John H. Surratt had not returned from Canada with the
funds furnished by Thompson!
Upon that journey of the 11th the accused, Mary E. Surratt, met the witness John M.
Lloyd at Uniontown. She called him; he got out of his carriage and came to her, and she
whispered to him in so low a tone that her attendant could not hear her words, though Lloyd,
to whom they were spoken, did distinctly hear them, anQ. testifies that she told him he should
have those "shooting-irons" ready, meaning the carbines which her son and Herold and
Atzerodt had deposited with him, and added the reason, "for they would soon be called for."
On the day of the assassination she again sent for Booth, hacl an interview with him in her
own house, and immediately went again to Surrattsville, and then, at about six o'clock in
the afternoon, she delivered to Lloyd a field-glass, and told him "to have two bottles of
whiskey and the carbines ready, as they would be called for that night." Having thus perfected the arrangement she returned to \Vashington to her own house, at about half-past
eight o'clock in the evening, to await the final result. How could this woman anticipate on
Friday afternoon, at six o'clock, that these arms would be called for and would be needed
that night unless she was in the conspiracy and knew the blow was to be struck, and the
flight of the a8sassins attempted and by that route? Was not the private conversation which
Booth held with her in her parlor on the afternoon of the 14th of April, just before she left on
this business, in relation to the orders she should give to have the arms ready?
An endeavor is made to impeach Lloyd. But the court will observe that no witness has
been called who contradicts Lloyd's statement in any material matter; neither has his general character for truth been assailed. How, then, is he impeached ? It is claimed that his
testimony shows that he was a party to the conspiracy. Then it is conceded by those who
set up any such pretence that there was a conspiracy. A conspiracy between whom? There
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can be no conspiracy without the co-operation or agreement of two or more persons. "Tho
were the other parties to it 7 Was it Mary E. Surratt 7 Was it John H. Surratt, George A.
Atzerodt, David E. Herold'! Those are the only persons, so far as his own testimony or the
testimony of any other witness discloses, with whom he had any communication ·whatever
on any subject immediately or remotely touching th1s conspiracy before the assassination.
His receipt and concealment of the arms are, unexplained, evidence that he was in the conspiracy.
The explanation is that he was dependent upon Mary E. Surratt; was her tenant; and his
declaration, given in evidence by the accused herself, is that "she had ruined him, and
brought this trouble upon him." But because he was weak enough, or wicked enough, to
become the guilty depositary of these arms, and to deliver them on the order of Mary E. Surratt to the assassins, it does not follow that he is not to be believed on oath. It is said that
he concealed the facts that the arms· had been left and called for. He so testi:fies himself, but
he gives the reason that he did it only from apprehension of danger to his life. If he were
in the conspiracy, his general credit being unchallenged, his testimony being uncontradicted
in any material matter, he is to .be believed, and cannot be disbelieved if his testimony is
substantially corroborated by other reliable witnesses. Is he not corroborated touching the
deposit of arms by the fact that the arms are produced in court-one of which was found
upon the person of Booth at the time he was overtaken and slain, and which is identified as
the same which had been left wit)l Lloyd by Herold, Surratt, and Atzerodt? Is he :not corroborated in the fact of the first interview with Mrs. Surratt by the joint testimony of Mrs.
Offut and Lewis J. vVeichmann, each of whom testified, (and they are contradicted by no
one,) that on Tuesday, the 11th day of April, at Uniontown, Mrs. Surratt called Mr. Lloyd
to come to her, which he did, and she held a seoret conversation with him? Is be not corroborated as to the last. conversation on the 14th of April by the testimony of Mrs. Offut,
who swears that upon the evening of the 14th of April she saw the prisoner, Mary E. Surratt,
at Lloyd's house, approach and hold conversation with him? Is he not corroborated in the
fact, to which be swears, that Mrs. Surratt delivered to him at that time the field-glass wrapped
in paper, by the sworn statement of W eichmann that Mrs. Surratt took with her on that occasion two packages, both of which were wrapped in paper·, and one of which he describes
as a small package about six inches in diameter? The attempt was made by calling Mrs.
Offut to prove that no such package was delivered, but it failed; she merely states that Mrs.
Surratt delivered a package wr pped in paper to her after her arrival there, and before Lloyd
came in, which was laid down in the room. But whether it was the package about which
Lloyd testifies, or the other package of the two about which vVeichmann testifies, as having
been carried there that day by Mrs. Surratt, does not appear. Neither does this witness pretend to say that Mrs. Surratt, after she had delivered it to her, and the witness had laid it
down in the room, did not again take it up, if it were the same, and put it in the hands of
Lloyd. She only knows that she did not see that done; but she did see Lloyd with a package like the one she received in the room before Mrs. Surratt left. How it came into his possession she is not able to state; nor what the package was that Mrs. Surratt first handed her;
nor which of the packages it was she afterwards saw in the hands of Lloyd.
But tMre is one other fact in this case that puts forever at rest the question of the guilty
participation of the prisoner, Mrs. Surratt, in this conspiracy and murder; and that is that
Payne, who had lodged four days in her house-who during all that time had sat at her
table, and who had often conversed with her-when the guilt of his great crime was upon
him, and he knew not where elfle he could so safely go to find a co-conspirator, and he could
trust none that was not like himself~ guilty, with even the knowledge of his presence-under
cover of darkness, after wandering for three days and nights, skulking before the pursuing
officers of justice, at the hour of midnight, found his way to the door of Mrs. Surratt, rang
the bell. was admitted, and upon being :Jsked, "Whom do you want to see," replied, "Mrs.
Surratt." He was then asked by the officer Morgan, what he came at that time of night for?
to which he replied, "to dig a gutter in the morning; Mrs. Surratt had sent for him." Afterwards he said "Mrs. Surratt knew he was a poor man and carne to him." Being asked
where he last worked 7 he replied, "sometimes on 'I' street;" and where he boarded? he
replied, "he had no boarding-house, and was a poor man who got his living with the pick,''
which he bore upon his shoulder, having stolen it from the intrenchments of the capital.
Upon being pressed again why he came there at that time of night to go to work, he answered that he simply called to see what time he should go to work in the morning. Upon
being told by the otlicer 1 who fortunately had preceded him to this house, that he would have
to go to the provost marshal's office, he moved and did not answer, whereupon Mrs. Surratt
was asked to step into the hall and state whether she knew this man. Raising her right hand
she exclaimed, "Before God, sir, I have not seen that man before; I have not hired him; I
do not know anything about him." The hall was brilliantly lighted.
If not one word had been said, the mere act of Payne in flying to her house for shelter
would have borne witness against her, strong as proofs from Holy vVrit. But when she denies~
after bearing his declarations, that she had sent for him, or that she had gone to him and
hired him, and calls her God to witness that she had never seen him, and knew nothing of
him, when, in point of fact, she had seen him for four successive days in her own house~ in
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the same clothing :which he then wore, who can resist for a moment the conclusion that these
parties were alike guilty 1
The testimony of Spangler's complicity is conclusive and brief. It was impossible to hope
for escape after assassinating the President, and such others as might attend him in Ford's
Theatre, without arrangements being first made to aid the flight of the assassin and to some
extent prevent immediate pursuit.
A stable was to be provided close to Ford's Theatre, in which the horses could be concealed and kept ready for the assassin's use whenever the murderous blow was struck.
Accordingly, Booth secretly, through Maddox, hired a stable in rear of the theatre and connecting with it by an alley, as early as the 1st of January last; showing that at that time he
had concluded, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, to murder the President in Ford's Theatre and provide the means for immediate and successful flight. Conscious
of his guilt, he paid the rent for this stable through Maddox, month by month, giving him
the money. He employed Spangler, doubtless for the reason that he could trust him with
the secret, as a carpenter to fit up this shed, so that it would furnish room for two horses, and
provided the door with lock and key. Spangler did this work for him. Then, it was necessary that a carpenter having access to the theatre should be employed by the assassin to provide a bar for the outer door of the passage leading to the President's box, so that when he
entered upon his work of assassination he would be secure from interruption from the rear.
By the evidence it is shown that Spangler was in the box in which the President was murdered on the afternoon of the 14th of April, and when there damned the President and General Grant, and said the President ought to be cursed, he had got so many good men killed:
showing not only his hostility to the President, but the cause of it-that he had been faithful
to his oath and had resisted that great rebellion in the interest of which his life was about to
be sacrificed by this man and his co-conspirators. In performing the work which had
doubtless been intrusted to him by Booth, a mortise was cut in the wall. A wooden bar was
prepared, one end of which could be r~adily inserted in the mortise and the other pressed
against the edge of the door on the inside so as to prevent its being opened. Spangler had
the skill and the opportunity to do that work and all the additional work which was done.
It is in evidence that the screws in "the keepers" to the locks on each of the inner doors
of the box occupied by the President were drawn. The attempt has been made, on behalf of
the prisoner, to show that this was done some time before, accidentally, and with no bad design, and bad not been repaired by reason of inadvertence; but that attempt has utterly
failed, because the testimony adduced for that purpose remtes exclusively to but one of the
two inner doors, while the fact is, that the screws were drawn in both, and the additional precaution taken to cut a small bole through one of these doors through which the party approaching and while in the private passage would be enabled to look into the box and examine
the exact posture of the President before entering. It was also deemed essential, in the execution of this plot, that some one should watch at the outer door, in the rear of the theatre,
by which alone the assassin could hope for escape. It was for this work Booth sought to
employ Chester in January, offering $3,000 down of the money of his employers, and the
assurancP that he should never want. \Vhat Chester refused to do Spangler undertook and
promised to do. When Booth brought his horse to the rear door of the theatre, OIP the evening of the murder, he called for Spangler, who went to him, when Booth was heard to say
to him, "Ned, you'll help me all you can, won't you." To which Spangler replied, "Oh,
yes."
When Booth made his escape, it is testified by Colonel Stewart, who pursued him across
the stage and out through the same door, that as he approached it some one slammed it shut.
Ritterspaugh, who was standing behind the scenes when Booth fired the pistol and fled, saw
Booth run down the passage towards the back door, and pursued him ; but Booth drew his
knife upon him and passed out, slamming the door after him. Ritterspaugh opened it and
went through, l€aving it open behind him, leaving Spangler inside, and in a position from
which he readily could have reached the door. Ritterspaugh also states that very quickly
.after he had passed through this door he was followed by a large man, the first who followtd
him, and who was, doubtless, Colonel Stewart. Stewart is very positive that he saw this
door slammed ; that be himself was constrained to open it, and had some difficulty in opening
it. He also testifies that as he approached the door a man stood near enough to have thrown
it to with his band, and this man, the witness believes, was the prisoner Spangler. Ritterspaugh has sworn that he left the door open behind him when he went out, and that he was
first followed by the large man, Colonel Stewart. ·who slammed that door behind Ritterspaug-h? It was not Ritterspaugh; it could not have been Booth, for Ritterspaugh swears
that Booth was mounting his horse at the time; and Stewart swears that Booth was upon
his horse when he came out. That it was Spangler who slammed the door after Ritterspaugh may not only be infened from Stewart's testimony, but it is made very clear by his
own conduct afterwards upon the return of Ritterspaugh to the stage. The door being then
open, and Ritterspaugh being asked which way Booth went, had answered. Ritterspaugh
says: "Then I came back on the stage, where I had left Edward Spangler; he hit me on
the face with his hand and said, 'Don't say which way he went.' I asked him what he
meant by slapping me in the mouth 1 He said, 'For God's sake, shut up."'
The testimony of Withers is adroitly handled to throw doubt upon these facts. It cannot
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got a side view of him. A man knocked down and senseless, on " coming to" might mistake anybody by a side view for Booth.
An attempt has been made by the defence to discredit this testimony of Ritterspangh, by
showing his contradictory statemeJ;J.ts to Gifford, Carlan, and Lamb, neither of whom do in
fact contradict him, but substantially sustain him. None but a guilty man would have met
the witness with a blow for stating which way the assassin had gone. A like confession of
guilt was made by Spangler when the witness Miles, the same eve?-ing, ~nd directly after the
assassination, came to the back door, where Spangler was standmg w1th others, and asked
Spangler who it was that held the horse, to which Spangler replied: "Hush; don't say anything about it." He confessed his guilt again when he denied to Mary Anderson the fact,
proved here beyond all question, that Booth had called him when he came to that door with
his horse, using the emphatic words, "No, he did not; he did not call me." The rope comes
to bear witness against him, as did the rope which Atzerodt and Herold and John H. Surratt
had carried to Surrattsville and deposited there with the carbines.
It is only surprising that the ingenious counsel did not attempt to explain the deposit of
the rope at Surrattsville by the same method that he adopted in explanation of the deposit of
this rope, some sixty feet long, found in the carpet-sack of Spangler, unaccounted for save
by some evidence which tends to show that he may have carried it away from the theatre.
It is not needful to take time in the rec~tpitulation of the evidence, which shows conclusively that David E. Herold was one of these conspirators. His continued association with
Booth, with Atzerodt, his visits to Mrs. Surratt's, his attendance at the theatre with Payne,
Surratt, and Atzerodt, his conncxion with Atzerodt on the evening of the murder, riding
with him on the street in the direction of and near to the theatre at the hour appointed for the·
work of assassination, and his final flight and arrest, show that he, in common with all the
other parties on trial, and all the parties named upon your record not upon tri<:tl, had
combined and confederated to kill and murder in the interests of the rebellion, as charged and
specified ag·ainst them.
That this conspiracy was entered into by all these parties, both present and absent, is thus
proved by the acts, meetings, declarations, and correspondence of all the parties, -beyond any
doubt whatever. True it is circumstantial evidence, but the court will remember the rule
before recited, that circumstances cannot lie; that they are held sufficient in every court
where justice is judicially administered to establish the fact of a conspiracy. I shall take
no further notice of the remark made by the learned counsel who opened for the defence,
and which has been followed by several of his associates, that, under the Constitution,
it requires two witnesses to prove the overt act of high treason, than to say, this is not ·
a charge of high treason, but of a treasonable conspiracy, in aid of a rebellion, with intent to
kill and murder the executive officer of the United States, and commander of its armies, and
of the murder of the President in pursuance of that conspiracy, and with the intent laid, &c.
Neither by the Constitution, nor by the rules of the common law, is any fact connected with
this allegation required to be established by the testimony of more than one witness. I
might say, however, that every substantive averment against each of the parties named upon
this record has been established by the testimony of more than one witness.
That the several accused did enter into this conspiracy with John Wilkes Booth and John
H. Surratt to murder the officers of this government named upon_ the record, in pursuance of
the wishes of their employers and instigators in H.ichmond and Canada, and with intent
thereby to aid the existing rebellion and subvert the Constitution and laws of the United
States, as alleged, is no longer an open question.
The intent as laid was expressly declared by Sanders in the meeting of the conspirators at
Montreal in February last, by Booth in Virginia and New York, and by Thompson to Conover and Montgome~y; but if there were no testimony directly upon this point, the law
would presume the intent, for the reason that such was the natural and necessary tendency
and manifest design of the act itself.
The learned gentleman (Mr. Johnson) says the government has survived the assassination
of the President, and thereby would have you infer that this conspiracy was not entered into
and attempted to be executed with the intent laid. With as much show of reason it might
be said that because the government of the United States has survived this. unmatched rebellion, it therefore results th!ft the rebPl conspirators waged war upon the g ' .vernment with
no purpose or intent thereby to subvert it. By the law we have seen that without any direct
evidence of previous combination and agreement between these parties, the conspiracy might
be established by evidence of the acts of the prisoners, or of any others with whom they cooperated, concurringm the execution of the common design. (Roscoe, 416.)
Was there co-operation between the several accused in the execution of this conspiracy 1
That there was is as clearly established by the testimony as is the fact that Abraham Lincoln
was killeu and murdered by John ·wilkes Booth. The evidence shows that all of the accused, save Mudd and Arnold, were in Washington on the 14th of April, the day of the assassination, together with John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt; that on that day Booth
had a secret interview with the prisoner Mary E. Surratt; that immediately thereafter she
went to Surrattsville to perform her part of the preparation necessary to the successful execution of the conspiracy, and did make that preparation; that John H. Surratt had arrived
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here from Canada, notifying the parties that the price to be paid for this great crime had
been provided for, at least in part, by the deposit receipts of Ap1il 6th for $180,000, procured
by Thompson of the Ontario Bank, Montreal, Canada; that be was also prepared to keep
watch, or strike a blow, and ready for the contemplated flight ; that Atzerodt, on the afternoon of that day, was seeking to obtain a horse, the better to secure his own safety by flight,
after he Rhould have performed the task whlch he had voluntatily undertaken by contract in
the conspiracy-the murder of Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States;
that he did procure a horse for that purpose at Naylor's, and was seen about nine o'clock in
the evening to ride to the Kirkwood House, where the Vice-President then was, dismount,
and enter. At a previous hour Booth was in the Kirkwood House, and left his card, now in
evidence, doubtless intended to be sent to the room of the Vice-President, and which was in
these words: "Don't wish to disturb you. Are you at home? J. Wilkes Booth." Atzerodt, when be made application at Brook's in the afternoon for the horse, said to Weichmann,
who was there, he was going to ride in the country, and that "he was going to get a horse and
send for Payne." He did get a horse for Payne, as well as for himself; for it is proven that on the
12th he was seen in Washington liding the horse which had been procured by Booth, in company with Mudd, last November, from 3-ardner. A similar horse was tied before the door of
Mr. Seward on the night of the murder, was captured after the flight of Payne, who was
seen to ride away, and which horse is now identified as the Gardner horse. Booth also procured a horse on the same day, took it to his stable in the rear of the theatre, where he had
an interview with Spangler, and where be concealed it. Herold. too, obtained a horse in
the afternoon, and was seen between nine and ten o'clock riding with Atzerodt down the
avenue from the treasury, then up Fourteenth and down F street, passing close by Ford's
Theatre.
O'Langhlin had come to w·asbington the day before, had sought out his victim (General
Grant) at the house of the Secretary of War, that he might be able with certainty to identify
him, and at the very hour when these preparations were going on was lying in wait at Rullman's, on the avenue, keeping watch, and declaring, as he did, at about 10 o'clock p. m.,
when told tbat the fatal blow bad been struck by Booth, "I don't believe Booth did it."
During tbe !lay, and the night before, be had been visiting Booth, and doubtless encouraging him, and at that very hour was in position, at a convenient distance, to aid and protect
him in his ,flight, as well as to execute his own part of the conspiracy by inflicting death upon
General Grant, who happily was not at the theatre nor in the city, having left the city that
day. \Vho doubts that, Booth having ascertained in the course of the day that General
Grant would not be present at the theatre, O'Laughlin, who was to murder General Grant,
instead of entering the box with Booth, was detailed to lie in wait, and watch alld support
him.
·
His declarations of his reasons for changing his lodgings here and in Baltimore; after the
murder, so ably and so ingeniously presented in the argument of his learned counFel, (Mr.
CCix,) avail nothing before the blasting fact that he did change his lodgings, and declared
"be knew nothing of the affair whatever." O'Laugblin, who lurked here, conspiring daily
with Booth and Arnold for six weeks to do this murder, declares '' he knew nothing of the
affai1." O'Laughlin, who said he was "in the oil business," which Booth and Surratt, and
Payne and Arnold, hav~ all declared meant this conspiracy, says be "knew nothing of the
affair." O'Laughlin, to whom Booth sent the despatches of the 13th and 27th of MarchO'Langhlin, who is named in Arnold's letter as one of the conspirators, and who !'earchccl
for General Grant on Thursday night, laid in wait for him on Friday, was defeakd by that
Providence "which shapes our ends," and laid in wait to aid Booth and Payne, declares
"he knows nothing of the matter." Such a denial is as false and inexcusable as Peter's denial of our Lord.
Mrs. Surratt bad arrived at home, from the completion of her part in the plot, about half
past eight o'clock in the evening. A few moments afterwards she was called to tho parlor
and there bad a private interview with some one unseen, but whose retreating fol)tsteps were
heard by the witness \Veicbmann. This was doubtless the secret and last visit of Juhu H.
Surratt to his mother, ·who had instigated and encouraged him tv strike this traitorL)ilS and
murderous blow against his country.
\Vhile all these preparations were going on, Mudd was awaiting the execution of the plot,
r-eady to faithfully perform his part in securing the safe escape of the murderers. Arnold
was at his post at Fortress Monroe, awaiting the meeting· referred to in his letter of March
27, wht>rein be says they were not "to meet for a month or so," which month }u~d more
than expired on the day of the mmder, for his letter and the testimony disclose that this
month of suspension began to run from about the first week in March. He stood ready with
the arms which Booth had furnished him to aid the escape of the murderers by that route,
and secure their communication with their employers. He bad given the assurance in that
letter to Booth, that although the government '' suspicioned them,'' and the undertaking
was "becoming complicated," yet "a time more propitious would arrive" for the consum
mation of this conspiracy in which he "was one" with Booth, and when he would "be
better prepared to again be with him."
Such were the preparations. The horses were in readiness for the flight ; the ropes were
procured, doubtless for the purpose of tying the horses at whatever point they might be
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eonstrained to delay and to secure their boats to tl!eir moorings in making their way across
the Potomac. The five murderous camp knives, the two carbines, the eight revolvers, the
Derringer, in court and identified, all were ready for the work of death. The part that each
had played has already been in part stated in tlus argument, and needs no repetition.
Booth proceeded to the theatre about nine o'clock in the evening, at the sanw time that
Atzerodt and Payne and Herold were riding the streets, while Surratt, having parted with
his mother at the brief interview in her parlor, from which his retreating steps were heard,
was walking the avenue, booted and spurred, and doubtless consulting with O'Laughlin.
When Booth reached the rear of the theatre be called Spalilgler to him, (whose denial of that
fact when charged with it, as proven by three witnesses, is very significant,) and received
from Spangler his pledge to help him all he could, when, with Booth, be entered the theatre
by the
doubtless to see that the way was clear from the box to the rear door of
the
upon their victim, whose exact position they could study from the stage.
After this
passes to the street, in front of the theatre, where, on tlie pavement
with other conspirators yet unknown, among them one described as a low-browed villain,
he awaits the appointed moment. Booth himself, impatient, enters the vestibule of the theatre
from the front and asks the time. He is referred to the clock and returns. Presently, as the
hour of ten o'clock approached, one of his guilty associates called the time: they wait;
again, as the moments elapsed, this conspirator upon watch called the time ; again, as the
appointed hour draws nigh, he calls the time; and finally, when the fatal moment arrives,
he repeats in a louder tone, "ten minutes past ten o'clock." Ten minutes past ten o'clock!
The hour bas come when the red right hand of these murderous conspirators should strike,
and the dreadful deed of assassination be done.
Booth, at the appointed moment, entered the theatre, ascended to the dress-circle, passed
to the right, paused a moment, looking down, doubtless to see if Spangler was at his post,
and approached the outer door of the close passage leading to the box occupied by the President, pressed it open, passed in, and closed the passage door behind him. Spangler's bar
was in its place, and was readily adjusted by Booth in the mortise, and pressed against the
inner side of the door, so that he was secure from interruption from without. He passes on
to the next door, immediately behind the President, and there stopping, looks through the
aperture in the door into the President's box and deliberately observes the precise position
of his victim, seated in the chair which had been prepared by the conspirators as the altar
for the sacrifice, looking calmly and quietly down upon the glad and grateful people whom
by his fidelity he had saved from the peril which had threatened the destruction of their government, and all they held dear this side of the grave, and whom he had come upon invitation to greet with his presence, with the words still lingering upon his lips which he bad
uttered with uncovered head and uplifted hand before God and his country, when on the
fourth of last March he took again the oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,
declaring that he entered upon tlie duties of his great office "with malice toward nonewith charity for all." In a moment more, strengthened by the knowledge that his eo-conspirators were all at their posts, seven at least of them present in the city, two of them,
Mudd and Arnold, at their appointed places, watching for his coming, this hired assassin
moves stealthily through the door, the fastenings of which had been removed to facilitate his
entrance, fi1es upon his victim, and the martyr spirit of ABRAHAM LINCOLN ascends to God.
'' TreaHon has done his worst; nor steel, nor poison,
Malice clomestic, foreign levy, nothing
Can touch him further."

At the same hour, when these accused and their co-conspirators in Richmond and Canada,
bytbc hand of John 'Vilkes Booth, inflicted this mortal "vound which deprived the republic
of its defencl t~r, and filled this land from ocean to ocean with a strange, great sorrow, Payne,
a very demon in human form, with the words of falsehood upon his lips, that he was the
bearer of a mePsage from the physician of the venerable Secretary of State, sweeps by his
servant, en~ounters his son, who protests that the assassin shall not disturb his father, prostrate on a bed of sickness, and receives for answer the assassin's blow from the revolver in
his hand, re1 0atecl again and again, rushes into the room, is encountered by Major Seward,
inflicts wound after wound upon him with his murderous knife, is encountered by Hansell
and Rebinson, each of whom he also wounds, springs upon the defenceless and feeble Secre·
tary of State, stabs first on one side of his throat, then on the other, again in the face, and
is only vreventcd from literally hacking out his life by the persistence and courage of the
attendant Robinson. He turns to flee, and, his giant arm and murderous hand for a moment
paralyz.(>(l by the consciousness of guilt, he drops his weapons of death, one in the house,
the other at the door, where they were taken up, and are here now to bear witness a()'ainst
him. He attempts escape on the horse which Booth and Mudd had procured of Gard"'nerwith w h, t sucee,;s lms already been stated.
AtzPrJdt, near midnight, returns to the stable of Naylor the horse which he had procured
for this work of murder, having been interrupted in the execution of the part assigned him
at the Kirkwood House by the timely coming of citizens to the defence of the Vice-President,
and creeps into the Pennsylvania House at two o'clock in the morning with another of the
41j>nspirators, yet unknown. There he remained until about five o'clock, when he left, found
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his way to Georgetown, pawned one of his revolvers, now in court, and fled northward into
M?-ryland.
·
He is traced to Montgomery county, to the house of Mr. Metz, on the Sunday succeeding
the murder, where, as is proved by the testimony of three witnesses, he said that if the man
that was to follow General Grant !tad followed him, it was likely that Grant was shot. To
one of these witnesses (Mr. Layman) he said, he did not think Grant had been killed; or, if
he had been killed, he was killed by a man who got on the cars at the same time that Grant
did ; thus disclosing most clearly that one of his co-conspirators was assigned the task of
killing and murdering General Grant, and that Atzerodt knew that General Grant had left
the city of ·washington, a fact which is not disputed, on the Friday evening of the murder,
by the evening train. Thus this intended victim of the conspiracy escaped, for that night,
the knives and revolvers of Atzerodt, and O'Laughlin, and Payne, and He
and Booth,
and John H. Surratt, and, perchance, Harper and Caldwell, and twenty
, who were
then here lying in wait for his life.
In the mean time Booth and Herold, taking the route before agreed upon, make directly
after the assassination for the Anacostia bridge. Booth crosses first, gives his name, passes
the guard, and is speedily followed by Herold. They make their way directly to Surrattsville,
where Herold calls to Lloyd, ''bring out those things," showing that there had been communication between them and Mrs. Surratt after her return. Both the carbines being in readiness,
according to Mary E. Surratt's directions, both were brought out. They took but one. Booth
declined to carry the other, saying that his limb was broken. They then deelared that they had
murdered the President and the Secretary of State. They then make their way directly to the
house of the prisoner, Mudd, assured of safety and security. They arrived early in the morning, before day, and no man knows at what hour they left. Herold rode towards Bryantown with Mudd about three o:clock that afternoon, in the vicinity of which place he parted
with him, remaining in the swamp, and was afterwards seen returning the same afternoon in the
direction of Mudd's house; about which time, a little before sundown, Mudd returned from
Bryantown towards his home. This village at the time Mudd was in it was thronged with
soldiers in pursuit of the murderers of the President, and although great care has been taken
by the defence to deny that any one said in the presence of Dr. Mudd, either there or elsewhere on that day, who had committed this crime, yet. it is in evidence by two witnesses,
whose truthfulness no man questions, that upon Mudd's return to his own house, that afternoon, he stated that Booth was the murderer of the President, and Boyle the murderer of
Secretary Seward, but took care to make the further remark that Booth had brothers, and be
did not know which of them bad done the act. When did Dr. Mudd learn that Booth had
brothers? And what is still more pertinent to this inquiry, from whom did he learn that
either John Wilkes Booth or any of his brothers had murdered the President? It is dear
that Booth remained in his house until some time in the afternoon of Saturday; that Herold
left the house alone, as one of the witnesses states, being seen to pass the window; that he
alone of these two assassins was in the company of Dr. Mudd on his way to Bryantown.
It does not appear when Herold returned to Mudd's house. It is a confession of Dr. Mudd
himself, proven by one of the witnesses, that Booth left his house on crutches, and went in
the direction of the swamp. How long he remained there, and what became of the horses
which Booth and Herold rode to his house, and which were put into his stable, aTe facts nowhere disclosed by the evidence. The owners testify that they have never seen the horses
since. The accused give no explanation of the matter, and when Herold and Booth were
captured they bad not these horses in their possession. How comes it that, on Mudd's return from Bryantown, on the evening of Saturday, in his conversation with Mr. Hardy and Mr.
]:<...,arrell, the witnesses before referred to, he gave the name of Booth as the murderer of the
President and that of Boyle as tho murderer of Secretary Seward and his son, and carefully
avoided intimating to either that Booth had come to his house early that day, and had remained there until the afternoon; that he left him in his house and had furnished him a razor
with which Booth attempted to disguise himself by shaving off his moustache? How comes
it, also, that, upon being asked by those two witnesses whether the Booth who killed the
Pre;;ident was the one who had been there last fall, he answered that he did not know
whether it was that man or one of his brothers, but he understood he had some brothers, and
added, that if it was the Booth who was there last fall, !te knew that one, but concealed
the fact that this man had been at his house on that day and was then at his bouse, and had
attempted, in his presence, to disguise his person? He was sorry, very sorry, that the thing
had occurred, but not so sorry as to be willing to give any evidence to these two neighbors,
who were manifestly honest and upright men, that the murderer had been harbored in his
house all day, and was probably at that moment, as his own subsequent confession shows,
lying eoncealed in his house or near by, subject to his call. This is tl~e man who undertakes
to show by his own declaration, offered in evidence against my protest, of what he said afterwards, on Sunday afternoon, the 16th, to his kinsman, Dr. George D. Mudd, to whom he then
stated that the assassination of the President was a most damnable act-a conclusion in
which most men will agree with him, and to establish which his testimony was not needed.
But it is to be remarked that this accused did not intimate that the man whom he knew the
evening before was the murderer had found refuge in h1s house, had disguised his perso~
and sought concealment in the swamp upon the crutches which he had provided for him.
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Why did he concet;tl this fact from his kinsman? After the church serviees were over, however, in another conversation on their way home, he did tell Dr. George Mudd that two suspicious persons had been at his house, who had come there a little before daybreak on Saturday morning: that one of them had a broken leg, ·which he bandaged; that they got something to eat at his house; that they seemed to be laboring under more excitement than probably would result from the injury; that they said they came from Bryantown, and inquired
the way to Parson Wilmer's: that while at his house one of them called for a razor and
shaved himself. The witness says, "I do not remember whether he said that this party
shaved off his whiskers or his moustache, but he altered somewhat, or probably materially,
his features." Finally, the prisoner, Dr. Mudd, told this witness that he, in company with
the younger of the two men, went clown the road towards Bryantown in search of a vehicle
to take the wounded man away from his house. How comes it that he concealed in this conversation the fact proved, that he went with Herold towards Bryantown and left Herold outside of the town '! How comes it that in this second conversation, on Sunday, insisted upon
here with such pertinacity as evidence for the defence, but which had never been called for by
the prosecution, he concealed from his kinsman the fact which he had disclosed the day before to Hardy and Farrell, that it was Booth who assassinated the President, and the fact
which is now disclosed by his other confessions given in evidence for the prosecution, that it
was Booth whom he had sheltered, concealed in his house, and aided to his hiding-place in
the swamp? He volunteers as evidence his further statement, however, to this witness, that
on Sunday evening he requested the witness to state to the military authorities that two sus1picious persons had been at his house, and see if anything could be made of it. He did not
tell the witness what became of Herold, and where he parted with hrm on the way to Bryantown. How comes it that when he was in Bryantown on the Saturday evening before, when
he knew that Booth was then at his house, and that Booth was the murderer of the President,
he did not himself state it to the military authorities then in that village, as he well knew?
It is difficult so see what kindled his suspicions on Sunday, if none were in his mind on Saturday, when he was in possession of the fact that Booth had murdered the President, and
was then secreting and disguising himself in the prisoner's own house.
His conversation with Gardner on the same Sunday at the church is also introduced here
to relieve him from the overwhelming evidences of his gunt. He communicates nothing to
Gardner of the fact that Booth h11d been in his house; nothing of the fact that he knew the
day before that Booth had murdered the President: nothing of the fact that Booth had disguised or attempted to disguise himself; nothing of the fact that he had gone with Booth's
associate, Herold, in search of a vehicle, the more speedily to expedite their flight; nothing
of the fact that Booth had found concealment in the woods and swamp near his house, upon
the crutches which he had furnished him. He contents himself with merely stating, "that
we ought to raise immediately a home guard, to hunt up all suspicious persons passing
through our section of country and arrest the , for there were two suspicious persons at my
house yesterday morning."
It would have looked more like aiding justice and arresting felons if be had put in execution his project of a home guard on Saturday, and made it effective by the arrest of the man,
then in his house, who had lodged with him last fall, with whom he had gone to purchase one
of the very horses employed in this flight after the assassination, whom he had visited last
winter in ·washington, and to whom he had pointed out the very 1·oute by which he hadescaped by "''ay of his house; whom he had again visited on the 3d of last March, preparatory
to the commission of this great crime, and who he knew, when he sheltered and concealed
him in the woods on Saturday, was not merely a suspicious person, but was, in fact, the
murderer and assassin of Abraham Lincoln. While I deem it my duty to say here, as I
said before, when these declarations, uttered by the accused on Sunday, the 16th, to Gardner
and George D. :Mudd, were attempted to be offered on the part of the accused, that they are
in no sense evidence, and, by the law, were wholly inadmissible, yet I state it as my conviction that, being upon the record upon motion of the accur.ed himself, so far as these declarations to Gardner and George D. :Mudd go, they are additional indications of the guilt of the
accused, in this, that they are manifestly suppressions of the truth and suggestions of falsehood and deception; they are but the utterances and confessions of guilt.
To Lieutenant Lovett, Joshua Lloyd, and Simon Gavican, who, in pursuit of the murderer,
visited his house on the 18th of April, the Tuesday after the murder, he denied positively,
upon inquiry, that two men had'passed his house, or had come to his house on the morning
after the assassination. Two of these witnesses swear positively to his having made the denial, and the other says he hesitated to answer the question he put to him; all of them
agree that he afterwards admitted that two men had been there, one of whom had a broken
limb, which he had set; and when asked by this witness who that man was, he said he did not
know; that the man was a stranger to him, and that the two had been there but a short
time. Lloyd asked him if he had ever seen any of the parties, Booth, Herold, and Surratt, and
he said he had never seen them; while it is positively proved that he was acquainted with
John H. Surratt, who had be,~n in his house; that he knew Booth, and had introduced
ooth to Surratt last winter. Afterwards, on Friday, the 21st, he admitted to Lloyd that he
d been introduced to Booth last fall, and that this man who came to his house on Satur-
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day, the 15th, remained there from about 4 o'clock in the morning until about 4 o'clock in
the afternoon; that one of them left his house on horseback, and the other walking. In the
first conversation he denied ever having seen these men.
Colonel Wells also testifies that, in his conversation with Dr. Mudd on Friday, th,e 21st,
the prisoner said that he had gone to Bryantown, or near Bryantown, to see some friends on
Saturday, and that as he came back to his own house he saw the person he afterwards supposed to be Herold passing to the left of his house towards the harn, but that he did not see
the other person at all after he left him in his own house, about 1 o'clock. If this statement
be true, how did Dr. Mudd see tbe same person leave his house on crutches 1 He further
stated to this witness that he returned to his own house about 4 o'clock in the afternoon; that
he did not know this wounded man; said be could not recognize him fi·om the photograph
which is of record here, but admitted that he had met Booth some time in November, when
be had some conversation with him about lands and horses; that Booth had remained with
him that night in November, and on the next day had purchased a horse. He said he had not
again seen Booth from the time of the introduction in November up to his arrival at his uouse
on the Saturday morning after the assassination. Is not this a confession that he did see
John Wilkes Booth on that morning at his house, and knew it was Booth? If he did not
know him, how came he to make this statement to the witness, that "he had not seen Booth
after November p1·ior to his arrival there on the Saturday morning?"
He had said before, to the same witness, he did not know the wounded man. He said
fmther to Colonel Wells, that when he went up stairs after th.eir arrival, he noticed that the r
perwn be supposed to be Booth had shaved off his moustache. Is it not inferable from this
declaration that he then supposed him to be Booth? Yet he declared the same afternoon, and
while Booth was in )lis own house, that Booth was the murderer of the President. One of·
the most remarkable statements made to this witness by the prisoner was that he heard for
the first time on Sunday morning, or late in the evening d Saturday, that the President ha
been murdered! From whom did be bear it? The witness (Colonel Wells) volunteers hi
"impression" that Dr. Mudd had said he had heard it after the persons had left his house.
If the "impression" of the witness thus volunteered is to be taken as evidence-and th~
counsel for the accused, judging from their manner, seem to think it ought to be-let th1 ,
question be answered, How could Dr. Mudd have made that impression upon anybody truthfully, when it is proved by Farrell and Hardy that on his return from Bryantown, on Satur
day afternoon, be not only stated that the President, Mr. Seward and his son bad been as
sassinated, but that Boyle bad assassinated Mr. Seward, and Booth had assassinated the Presi
dent? Add to this fact that he said to this witness that he left his own house at 1 o'clock,\
and when he returned the men were gone, yet it is in evidence, by his own declarations, that;
Boot left his house at 4 o'clock on crutches, and he must have been there to have seen it, Oli
he could not have known the fact.
!
Mr. Williams testifies that he was at Mudd:s house on Tuesday, the 18th of April, wheri
he said that strl}.ngers had not been that way, and also declared that be heard for the first time
of the assassination of the President on Sunday morning, at church. Afterwards, on F1iday,
the 21st, Mr. Williams asked him concerning the men who had been at his bouse, one of
whom had a broken limb, and he confessed they had been there. Upon being asked if they
were Booth and Herold, he said they were not; that he knew Booth. I think it is fair to ~on
elude that he did know Booth, when we consider the testimony of Weichmann, of Norton,
of Evans, anJ all the testimony just referred to, wherein he declares himself that be not only
knew him, but that he bad lodged with him, and that be had himself gone with him when
he purchased his horse from Gardner last fall, for the very purpose of aiding the flig·ht of
himself or some of his confederates.
All these circumstances taken together, which, as we have seen upon high authority, are
stronger as evidence of guilt than even direct testimony, leave no further room for argument,
and no rational doubt that Doctor Samutl A. Mudd was as certainly in this conspiracy as
were Booth and Herold, whom be sheltered and entertained, receiving them under cover of
darkness on the morning after the assassination. concealing them throughout that day from
the hand of offended justice, and aiding· them, by every endeavor, to pursue their way successfully to their co-conspirator, Arnold, at Fortress Monroe, and in which direction they
fled until overtaken and Booth was slain.
We next find Herold and his confederate, Booth, after their departure from the house of
Mudd, across the PotomaC', in the neighborhood of Port C mvay, on Monday, the 24th of
April, conveyed in a wagon. There Herold, in order to obtain the aid of Captain Jett, Ruggles, and Bainbridge, of the confederate army, said to J ett, " 'Ve are the assassinators of
the President;" that this was his brother with him, who, vvith himself, belonged to A. P.
Hill's corps; that his brother had been vvounded at Petersburg; that their names were Boyd.
He requested Jett and his rebel companions to take them out of the lines. After this Booth
joined these parties, was placed on Ruggles's horse, and crossed the Rappahannock river.
They then proceeded to the bouse of Garrett, in the neighborhood of Port Royal, and nearly
midway between Washington city and Fortress Monroe, where they were to have joined
Arnold. Before these rebel guides and guards parted with them, Herold confessed that the
were travelling under assumed names; that his own name was Herold and that the name of
the wounded man was John Wilkes Booth, "who bad killed the President." The rebels left
Booth at Garrett's, where Herold revisited him, from time to time, until they were captured.
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At 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning, the 26th, a party of United States officers and soldiers
surrounded Garrett's barn, where Booth and Herold lay concealed, and demanded their surrender. Booth cursed Herold, calling him a coward, and bade him go, when Herold came
out and surrendered himself, was taken into custody and is now brought into court. The barn
was then set on fire, when Booth sprang to his feet, amid the flames that were kindling about
him, carbine in hand, and approached the door, seeking, by the flashing light of the fire, to
find some new victim for his murderous hand, when he was shot, as he deserved to be, by
Sergeant Corbett, in order to save his comrades from wounds or death by the hands of the
desperate assassin. Upon his person was found the following bill of exchange:
'·No. 1492. The Ontario Bank, Montreal Branch. Exchange for £61 l::!s. lOd. Montreal, 27th October, 1864. Sixty days after sight of this first of exchange, second and third
of the same tenor and date, pay to the order of J. Wilkes Booth £61 12s. 10rl. sterling, value
received, and charge to the account of this office. H. Stanus, manager. To Messrs, Glynn,
Mills & Co., London."
Thus fell, by the hands of one of the defenders •of the republic, this hired assassin, who, for
a price, murdered Abraham Lincoln, bearing upon his person, as this bill of exchange testifies, additional evidence of the fact that he had undertaken, in aid of the rebellion, this work
of assassination by the hands of himself and his confederates, for such sum as the aecredited
agents of Jefferson Davis might pay him or them out of the funds of the <!"onfederacy which,
as is in evidence, they had in "any amount" in Canada for the purpose of rewarding conspirators, spies, poisoners, and assassins, who might take service under their false commissions, and do the work of the incendiary and the murderer upon the lawful repl'esentatives of
the American· people, to whom had been intrusted the care of the republic, the maintenance
of the Constitution, and the execution of the laws.
The court will remember that it is in the testimony of Merritt and Montgomery and-Conover that Thompson, and Sanders, and Clay, and Cleary made their boasts that they had
money in Canada for this very purpose. Nor is it to be overlooked or forgotten that the officers
of the Ontario Bank at Montreal testify that during the current year of this conspiracy and
assassination Jacob Thompson had on deposit in that bank the sum of six hundred and fortynine thousand dollars, and that these deposits to the credit of Jacob Thompson accrued from
the negotiation of bills of exchange drawn by the secretary of the treasury of the so-ca1led
Confederate States on Frazier, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, who were known to be the
financial agents of the Confederate States. With an undrawn deposit in this bank of four
hundred and fifty-five dollars, which has remained to his credit since October last, and with
an unpaid bill of exchange drawn by the same bank upon London, in his possession and
found upon his person, Booth ends his guilty career in this work of conspiracy and blood in
April, ltl65, as be began it in October, 1864, in combination with Jefferson Davis, Jacob
Thompson, George N. ~anders, Clement C. Clay, 'William C. Cleary, Beverley Tucker, and
other co-conspirators, making use of the money of the rebel confederation to aid in the execution and in the flight, bearing at the moment of his death upon his person their money,
part of the price which they paid for his great crime, to aid him in its consummation, and
secure him afterwards from arrest and the just penalty ·which by the law of God and the law
of man is denounced against treasonable conspiracy an<l murder.
By all the testimony in the case it is, in my judgment, made as clear as any transaction
can be shown by human testimony, that John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, and the
several accused, David E. Herold, George A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, Michael O'Laughlin,
Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and Samuel A. Mudd, did, with intent
to aid the existing rebellion and to subvert the Constitution and laws of the United States, in
the month of Oetober last and thereafter, combine, confederate, and conspire with Jefferson
Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverley Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement
C. Clay, George Harper, George Young, and others unknown, to kill and murdnr, within
the military department of Washington, anu within the intrenched fortifications and miljtary
lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States and commander-in-chief
of the army and navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, Vice-President of the United States; William H. Seward, Secretary of State; and Ulysses S. Grant, Lien tenant General, in command
of the armies of the United States; and that Jefferson Davis, the chief of this rebellion, was
the instigator and procurer, through his accredited agents in Canada, of this treasonable conspiracy.
•
It is also submitted to the court, that it is clearly established. by the · testimony that John
Wilkes Booth, in pursuance of this conspiracy, so entered into by him and the accused, did,
on the night of the 14th of April, 1865, within the military department of "\Vashington, and the
intrenched fortifications and military lines thereof, and with the intent laid, inflict a mortawound upon Abraham Lincoln, then President and commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States, whereof he died; that in pursuance of the same conspiracy and within
the said department and intrenched Jines, Lewis Payne assaulted, with intent to kill and
murder, "\Villiam H. Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States; that George A.
Atzerodt, in pursuance of the same conspiracy, and within the said department, laid in wait,
with intent to kill and murder Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States;
that Michael O'Laughlin, within said department, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, laid
in wait to kill and murder Ulysses S. Grant, then in command of the armies of the United
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States; and that Mary E. Surratt, David E. Herold, Samuel Arnold, Samuel A. Mudd, and
Edward Spangler did encourage, aid, and abet the commission of said several acts in the
prosecution of said conspiracy.
If this treasonable conspiracy has not been wholly executed; if the several executive officers of the United States and the commander of its armies, to kill and murder whom the said
several accused thus confederated and conspired, have not each and all fallen by the hands
of these conspirators, thereby leaving the people of the United States without a President or
Vice-President; without a Secretary of State, who alone is clothed with authority by the law
to call an election tiD fill the vacancy, should any arise, in the offices of President and VicePresident; and without a lawful commander of the armies of the republic, it is only because
the conspirators were deterred by the vigilance and fidelity of the executive officers. whose
lives were mercifully protected on that night of muriler by the care of the Infinite Being who
has thus far saved the republic and crowned its arms with victory.
If this conspiracy was thus entered into by the accused; if John Wilkes Booth did kill
and murder Abraham Lincoln in pursuance thereof; if Le·wis Payne did, in pursuanee of
said conspiraey, assault with intent to kill and murder William H. Seward, as stated, and if
the several parties accused did commit the several acts alleged against them in the prosecution of said conspiracy, then, it is the la-vv that all the parties to that conspiracy, whether
present at the time of its execution or not, whether on trial before this court or not, are alike
guilty of the several acts done by each in the execution of the common design. What these
conspirators did in the execution of this conspiracy by the hand of one of their co-conspirators they did themselves; his act, done in the prosecution of the common design, was the act
of all the parties to the treasonable combination, because done in 'execution and furtherance
of their guilty and treasonable agreement.
As we have seen, this is the rule, wheth()r all the conspirators are indicted or not ; whether
they are all on trial or not. "It is not material what the nature of the indictment is, provided the offence involve a conspiracy. Upon indictment for murder, for instance, if it
appear that others, together with the prisoner, conspired to perpetrate the crime, the act of
one done in pursuance of that intention would be evidence against the rest.'' (1 Whar.,
706.) To the same effect are the words of Chief Justice Marshall, before cited, that whoever
leagued in a general conspiracy, performed any part, however l\HNUTE, or however REMOTE,
from the scene of action, are guilty as principals. In this treasonable conspiracy, to aid the
existing armed rebellion, by murdering the executive officers of the United States and the
commander of its armies, all the parties to it must be held as principals, and the act of one
in the prosecution of the common design the act of all.
I leave the decision of this dread issue with the court, to which alone it belongs. It is for
you to say, upon your oaths, whether the a<'cused are guilty.
I am not conscious that in this argument I have made any erroneous statement of the evidence, or drawn any erroneous conclusions; yet I pray the court, out of tender regard and
jealous care for the rights of the accused, to see that no error of mine, if any there be, shall
work them harm. The past services of the members of this honorable court give assurance
that, without fear, favor, or affection, they will discharge with fidelity the duty enjoined upon
them by their oaths. ~atever else may befall, I trust in God that in this, as in every other
American court, the riglrts of the whole people will be respected, and that the republic in
this, its supreme hour of trial, will be true to itself and just to all-ready to protect the rights
of the humblest, to redress every wrong, to avenge every crime, to vindicate the majesty of
law, and to maintain inviolate the Constitution, whether assailed secretly or openly, by
hosts armed with gold or armed with steel.

Trial

if

Henry lVi1·z.

Bureau qf Military

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Just~·ce, October 31, 1865.

TO tlte President ,•
HENRY WlRZ was tried- by a military commission, convened at \Vashington,
D. 0., on the twenty-third day of August, 1865, by order of the President of the
United States, on the following charges and specifications:
CHARGE !.-Maliciously, wilfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the then
existing armed rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the
first day of March, A. D. 186-!, and on divers other days between that day and
the tenth day of April, 1865, combining, confederating, and conspiring together
with John H. Winder, Richard B. Wiuder, .Joseph vVhite, W. S. Winder, R.
R. Stevenson, and others unknown, to injure the health and destroy the lives of
soldiers in the military service of the United States, then held and being prison·
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ers of war within the lines of the so-called Confederate State~ and in the military
prisons thereof, to the end that the armies of the United States might be weakened and impaired, in violation of the laws and customs of war.
Specification.-In this: that he, the said Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate, and conspire with them, the said John H. Winder, Richard B. vVinder,
Joseph ·white,
S. vVinder, R. R. Stevenson, and others whose names are
unknown, citizens of the United States aforesaid, and who were then engaged
in armed rebellion against the United States, maliciously, traitorously, and in
violation of the laws of war, to impair and injure the health and to destroy the
lives-by subjecting to torture and great suffering, by- confining in unhealthy
and unwholesome quarters, by exposing to the inclemency of winter and to the
dews and burning sun of summer, by compelling the use of impure water, and
by fnrnishiag insufficient and unwholesome food-of large numbers of federal
prisoner~\ to wit, the number of thirty thousand, soldiers in the military service
of the United States of America, held as prisoners of war at Andersonville, in
the State of Georgia, within the lines of the so-called Confederate States, on or
before the first day of March, A. D. 1864, and at divers times between that day
and the tenth day of April, A. D. 1865, to the end that the armies of the United
States might be weakened and impaired, and the insurgents engagerl. in armed
rebellion against the United States might be aided and C0lnforted. And he, the
said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military service of the so-called Confederate
States, being then and there commandant of a military prison at AndersonYille,
in the State of Georgia, located by authority of the so-called Confederate States
for the confinement of prisoners of war, and as such commandant fully clothed
with authority, and in duty bound to treat, care, and provide for such prisoners
held as aforesaid, as were or might be placed in his custody, according to the
law of war, did, in furtherance of such combination, confederation, and conspiracy,
and incited thereunto by them, the said John H. \Ninder, Richard B. Winder,
Joseph White, W. S Winder, R R. Stevenson, and others whose names are
unknown, maliciously, wickedly, and traitorously confine a large number of such
prisoners of war, soldiers in the military service M the United States, to the
amount of thirty thousand men, in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, in a
close and small area of ground, wholly inadequate to their wants and destructive
to their health, which he well knew and intended; and while there so confined,
during the time aforesaid, did, in furtherance of his evil design, and in aid of the
said conspiracy, wilfully and maliciously neglect to furnish tents, barracks, or
other shelter sufficient for their protection from the inclemency of winter and
the dews and burning· sun of summer; and with such e"il intent did take and
cause to be taken from them their clothing, blankets, camp equipage, and
other property of which they were possessed at the time of being placed in
his custody; and with like malice and evil intent, did refuse to furnish or cause
to be furnished food, either of a quality or quantity sufficient to preserve health
and sustain life, and did refuse and neglect to furnish wood sufficieut for cooking in summer, and to keep the said prisoners warm in winter, and did compel
the said prisoners to subsist upon unwholesome food, and that in limited quantities, entirely inadequate to sustain health, which he well knew; and did compel
the said prisoners to use unwholesome water, reeking with the filth and garbage
of the prison and prison guard and the offal and drainage of the cook-house of
said prison, whereby the prisoners became greatly reduced in theirbodily
strength and emaciated and injured in their bodily health; their minds impaired
and their intellects broken, and many of them, to wit, the number of ten thousand,
whose names are unknown, sickened and died by reason thereof, which he, the
said Henry Wirz, then and there well knew and intended, and so knowing and
evilly intending, did refuse and neglect to provide proper lodgings, food, or nqurishment for the sick ancl necessary medicine and medical attendance for the
restoration of tLC'ir health, and did knowingly, wilfully, and maliciously, in fur-
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therance of his evil designs, permit them to languish and die from want of care
and proper treatment; and the said Henry Wirz, still pur2Uing his evil purposes, did permit to remain in the said prison, among the emaciated sick and
languishing living, the bodies of the dead, until they became corrupt and loathsome and filled the air with fetid and noxious exhalations, and thereby greatly
increased the unwholesomeness of the prison, insomuch that great numbers of
said prisoners, to wit, the number of one thousand, whose names are unknown,
sickened and died by reason thereof. And the said Henry Wirz, still pursuing
his wicked and cruel purpose, wholly disregarding the usages of civilized warfare, did, at the time and place aforesaid, maliciously and wilfully subject the
prisoners aforesaid to cruel, unusual, and infamous punishment upon slight, trivial,
and ficticious pretences, by fastening large balls of iron to their feet, and binding
large numbers of the prisoners aforesaid closely together, with large chains
around their necks and feet, so that they walked with the greatest difficulty,
and, being so confined, were subjected to the burning rays of the sun, often without food or drink for hours, and even days, from which said cruel treatment
large numbers, to wit, the number of one hundred, whose names are unknown,
sickened, fainted, and died. And he. the said Wirz, did further cruelly treat
and injure said prisoners by maliciously confining them witn an instrument ofr
torture called "the stocks," thus depriving them of the use of their limbs, and
forcing them to lie, sit, and stand for many hours without the power of changing
position, and being without food or drink, in consequence of which many, to wit,
the number of thirty, whose names are unknown, sickened and died. And he,
the said Wirz, still wickedly pursuing his evil purpose, did establish and cause
to be designated within the prison enclosure containing said prison€rs a " dead
line," being a line around the inner face of the stockade or wall enclosing said
prison, and about twenty feet distant from and within said stockade; and having
so established said dead line, which was in many places an imaginary line, and
in many other places marked by insecure and shifting strips of bodhnsaailedi
upon the tops of small and insecure stakes or posts, he, the said Wirz, instructed
the prison guard stationed a:l\mnd the tup of said stockade ~o fire upon and kill
any of the prisoners aforesaid who might touch, fall upon, pass over or under ro
across the said "dead line;" pursuant to which said orders and instructions,
maliciously and needlessly given by said Wirz, the said prison guard did fire
upon and kill a large number of said prisoners, to wit, the number of about three
'hundred. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his evil purpose, did keep and use
ferocious and bloodthirsty beasts, dangerous to human life, called bloodhounds,
to ~unt down prisoners of war aforesaid who made their escape from his custody
and did then and there wilfully and maliciously suffer, incite, and encourage the
said beasts to seize, tear, mangle, and maim the bodies and limbs of said fugitive
prisoners of war, which said beasts, incited as aforesaid, then and there did,
whereby a large number of said prisoners of war who, during the time aforesaid,
made their escape and were recaptured, and were by the said be&3ts then and
there cruelly and inhumanly injured, in so much that many of said prisoners, to
wit, the number of about fifty, died. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his
wicked purpose, and still aiding in carrying out said conspiracy, did use and
cause to be used, for the pretended purposes of vaccination, impure and poisonous vaccine matter, which said impure and poisonous matter was then and there,
by the direction and order of said Wirz, maliciously, cruelly, and wickedly deposited in the arms of many of said prisoners, by reason of which large numbers
of them, to wit, one hundred, lost the use of their arms, and many of them, to
wit, about the number of two hundred, were so injured that the"y soon thereafter died. All of which be, the said Henry Wirz, well knew and maliciously
intended, and in aid of the then existing rebellion against the United States,
with the view to assist in weakening and impairing the armies of the United
States, and in furtherance of tbe said conspiracy, and with the full knowledge
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consent, and connivance of his co-conspirators afuresaid, he, the said Wirz, then.
and there did.
CHARGE 2.-Murder, in violation of the laws and customs of war.
Specification 1.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the eighth day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there
being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called
Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as
such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and he, the said Henry Wirz, a certain pistol called a revolver then and
there loaded and charged with gunpowder and bullets, which said pistol the
said Henry Wirz in his hand then there had and held to, against, and upon a
soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry vVirz's,
custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, then and there feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did shoot and discharge, inflieting upon
the body of the soldier aforesaid a mortal wound with the pistol aforesaid, in
consequence of which said mortal wound, murderously inflicted by the said
Henry \Virz, the said soldier thereafter, to wit, on the 9th day of July, A. D.
1864, died.
Specification 2.-Tn this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Uonfederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of September, A. D. 1864, then
alld there, being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said
so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war taken and
held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did jump
upon, stamp, kick, bruise, and otherwise injure with the heels of his boots, a
soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirzj,
custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, of which said stamping,
kicking, and bruising, maliciously done and inflicted by the said Wirz, he, the
said soldier, soon thereafter, to wit, on the 20th day of September, A.' D . 1864,
died.
Specification 3.-In this : that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the thirteenth day of June, A. D. 1864, then and there
being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said so-called
Confederate States, for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as
such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, foloniously and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and
he, the said Henry Wirz, a certain pistol called a revolver then and there loaded
and charged with gunpowder and bullets, which said pistol the said Henry Wirz
in his hand then and there had and held to, against, and upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as
a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, then and there, feloniously and of
his malice aforethought did shoot and discharge, inflicting upon the body of'
the soldier aforesaid a mortal wound with the pistol aforesaid, in consequence of
which said mortal wound, murderously inflicted by the said Henry Wirz, the
said soldier immediately, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.
Specification 4.-In this : that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the thirtieth day of May, A. D.1864, tben and there
being commandant of a priaon there located by the authority of the said so-called
Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and held as
such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and
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he, the said Henry Wirz, a certain pistol called a revolver then and there loaded
and charged with gunpowder and bullets, which said pistol the said Henry
Wirz in his band then and there had and held to, against, and upon a soldier
belonging to the army of the United States in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a· prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, then and there, feloniously
and of his malice aforethought, did shoot and discharge, inflicting upon the body
of the soldier aforesaid a mortal wound with the pistol aforesaid, in consequence
of which said mortal wound, murderously inflicted by the said Henry Wirz, the
said soldier, on the thirtieth day of May, A. D. 1864, died.
~,..'Peci.fication 5.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of August, A. D. 18G4, then
and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the
said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken
and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting
as said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did confine and
bind within an instrument of torture called ''the stocks," a soldier belonging to
the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a
prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, in consequence of which said cruel
treatment, maliciously and murderously inflicted as aforesaid, he the said soldier
soon thereafter, to wit, on the thirtieth day of August, A. D. 1864, died.
Specification 6.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the first day of February, 1865, then and there
being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said socalled Confederate States for the confinement of pris oners of war, taken and
held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did confine and
"nd within an instrument of torture called "the stocks," a soldier belonging to
the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a
prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, in consequence of which said cruel
treatment, maliciously and murderously inflicted as aforesaid, he, the said soldier, soon thereafter, to wit, on the sixth day of February, A. D. 1864, died.
Specification 7.-In this: that the s id Henry 'Virz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of July, A. D. 1864, then and
there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said
so-called Confed6rate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and
held as such fi·om the armies of the United States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did . fasten and
chain together several persons, soldiers belonging to the , army of the United
States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as prisoners of war, whose names
are unknown, binding the necks and feet of said prisoners closely together, and
compelling them to carry great burdens, to wit, large iron balls chained to their
feet, so that, in consequence of the said. cruel treahl}ent inflicted upon them by
the said Henry Wirz as aforesaid, one of said soldiers, a prisoner of war as
aforesaid, whose name is unknown, on the twenty-fifth day of July, A. D. 1864,
died.
Specification 8.-In this:· that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the fifteenth day of May, A. D. 1864, then and
there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said
so-called Confederate States for the confiuement of prisoners of war, taken and
held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did order
a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to
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the prison of which said Henry Wirz was commandant, as aforesaid, to fire
upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said
Henry Wjrz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in
pursuance of said order so as aforesaid, maliciow;:ly and murderously given as
aforesaid, he, the said rebel soldier, did, with a musket loaded with gunpowder
and bullet, then and there fire at the said soldier so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the musket aforesai(1, of
which he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.
Specijica#on 9.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the first day of ,July, A. D. 1864, then and there
being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said socalled Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and
held as such from the armies of the Uuited States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did order a rebel
soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to the
prison of which said Wirz was commandant as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier
belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of Baid
order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the
said rebel soldier, did, with a mu::;ket loaded with gunpowder and bullet~ then
and there fire at the said soldier so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflict ing upon him a mortal wound with the said musket, of which he, the said
prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.
Specification 10.-In this: that the said: Henry Wirz, an officer in the
military service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, on or about the twentieth day of August,
A. D. 1864, then and there being commandant of a prison there located by
the authority of the said so-cal1ed Confederate States for the confinement of
prisoners of war, taken and held as such from the armies of the United
States of America, while acting as said commandant, feloniously, and of his
malice aforethought, did order a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on
duty as a sentinel or guard to the prison of which said Wirz was commandant
as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States,
in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of said order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the said rehel soldier, did, with a musket loaded
with gunpowder and bullet, then and there fire at the said soldier so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the
said musket, of which he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day
aforesaid, died.
Specificat?"on 11.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at ..Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the first day of July, A. D. 1864, then and there
being commandant of a prison there located by the aathority of the said socalled Confederate St::~tes for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and
held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did cause, incite,
and urge certain ferocious and blood-thirsty animals called bloodhounds to pursue, attack, wound, and tear in piece~ a soldier belonging to the army of the
United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war,
whose name is unknown ; and, in consequence thereof~ the said bloodhounds
did then and there, with the knowledge, encouragement, and instigation of him,
the said Wirz, maliciously and murderou3ly given by him, attack and mortally
wound the said soldier, in consequence of which said mortal wound he, the said
prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the sixth day of July, A. D. 1864, died.
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Specification 12.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Andersonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or aLout the twenty-seventh day of July, A. D. ~864, then
and there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the
said so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken
and held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting
as said. commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did order a
rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then on duty as a sentinel or guard to
the prison of which ssid Wirz was commandant as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier
belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the said Henry Wirz's,
custody as a prisont?r of war, whose name is unknown; and, in pursuance of said
. order so as aforesaid, maliciously and murderously given as aforesaid, he, the
said rebel soldier, did, with a musket loaded with gunpowder and bullet, then
and there fire at the said soldier, so as aforesaid held as a prisoner of war, inflicting upon him a mortal wound with the said musket, of which said mortal wound
he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the day aforesaid, died.
Specification 13.-In this: that the said Henry Wirz an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States of America, at Anderaonville, in the
State of Georgia, on or about the third day of August, A. D. 1864:, then and
there being commandant of a prison there located by the authority of the said
so-called Confederate States for the confinement of prisoners of war, taken and
held as such from the armies of the United States of America, while acting as
said commandant, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, did make an
assault upon a soldier belonging to the army of the United States, in his, the
said Henry Wirz's, custody as a prisoner of war, whose name is unknown, and
with a pistol called a revolver, then and there held in the hands of the said
Wirz, did beat and bruise said soldier upon the head, shoulders, and breast,
inflicting thereby mortal wounds, from which said beating and bruising aforesaid, and mortal wounds caused thereby, the said soldier soon thereafter, to wit,
on the fourth day of August, A. D. 1864, died.
By order of the President of the United States.
N. P. CHIPMAN,
Colonel and Additional Aide-de- Camp, Judge Advocate.
Upon being arraigned the prisoner's counsel submitted the following pleas :
1. That he ought not to be held or tried, for any cause, by the government
of the United States, because, according to the terms of the surrender of the
rebel General Johnston, under whose command he was serving at the time, it
was agreed that all officers and men should be permitted to return to their
homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they
observed their obligations and the laws in force where they resided.
2. That he Bhould not be held to trial, or in custody, because at the time of
his arrest he was in the enjoyment of his liberty, and was promised by Captain
Noyes, of Major General Wilson's staff, that he should not be held as a prisc>ner, but that, after giving such verbal information to General Wilson as he was
able, he should have a safe conduct to his home, which promise was violated.
3. That the commission ~ad no jurisdiction to try him for the offences
charged; also that he had been, on the 21st of August, arraigned and put on
trial before the same tribunal, on the same charges, and could not be tried or
"put to answer" a second time therefor. Also, that the charges and specifications were too vague and indefinite, and did not make out an offence punishable
by the laws of war.
All these pleas were discussed at length on both sides, and were, after
deliberation, properly overruled by the commission. A plea of " not guilty" to
both charges and specifications thereto was then made. by the prisoner.
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The investigation of the matters alleged against the prisoner then commenced,
and continued until the 21st day of October, during which time one hundred
and forty-eight witnesses for the' prosecution and defence were examined, and a
large amount of documentary evidence found in the official papers captured at
Andersonville, and among the rebel archives at Richmond, was introduced.
One of the counsel for the defence then asked for an adjournment of two
weeks at least, to enable him to prepare an argument. The commission first
decided to adjourn ten days, and, upon his further petition, twelve days for this
purpose. He, however, declared that it was insufficient time, and thereupon
announced that be would submit the case without remark. After an adjournment of four clays an elaborate statement of the prisoner was submitte,d, which
was prepared by him, with the aid of an able assistaot, (the chief reporter of
the trial, who shows himseTf familiar with all the material facts,) which goes
over the whole case in explanation of certain acts averred, and in denial of the
proof or truth of all the others.
The closing address of the judge advocate immediately followed, and thereafter the court, it appears, having maturely considered the evidence adduced,
found the accused, Henry Wirz, as follows :
Of the specification to charge one, "guilty," after amending said specification
to read as follows :
In this: that he, the said Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate and conspire with them, the said Jefferson Davis, James A. Seddon, Howell Cobb,
John H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Isaiah H. White, W. S. Winder, W.
Shelby Reed, R. R. Stevenson, S. P. Moore,- Kerr, late hospital steward at
Andersonville, James Duncan, Wesley W. Turner, Benjamin Harris, and others
whose names are unknown, citizens of the United States aforesaid, and who
were then engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, maliciously,
traitorously, and in violation of the laws of war, to impair and injure the health
and to destroy the lives-by subjecting to torture and great suffering, by confining in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, by exposing to the inclemency
of winter and to the dews and burning sun of summer, by compelling the use of
impure water, and by furnishing insufficient and unwholesome food-of large
numbers of federal prisoners, to wit, the number of about forty-five thousand
soldiers in the military service of the Unit eel States of America, held as prisoners
of war at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, within the lines of the so-called
Confederate States, on or before the twenty-seventh clay of March, A. D. 1864,
and at divers times between that day and the tenth clay of April, A. D. 1865,
to the end that the armies of the United States might be weakened and impaired,
and the insurgents engaged in armed rebellion against the United States might
be aided and comforted. And he, the said Henry Wirz, an officer in the military
service of the so-called Confederate States, being then and the1:e commandant
of a military prison at Andersonville, in the State of Georgia, located by authority
of the so-called Confederate States, for the confinement of prisoners of war,
and as such commandant fully clothed with authority, and in duty bound, to
treat, care, and provide for such prisoners held as aforesaid, as were or might
be placed in his custody, according to the law of war, did, in furtherance of
such combination, confederation, and conspiracy, maliciously, wickedly, and
traitorously confine a large number of such prisoners of war, soldiers in the
military service of the United States, to the number of about forty-five thousand
men, in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, in a close and small area ~f
ground, wholly inadequate to their wants and destructive to their lwalth,.which
he well knew and intended ; and while there so confined, auring the time aforesaid, did, in furtherance of hiR evil design, and in aid of the said conspiracy,
wilfully and maliciously neglect to furnish tents, barracks, or other shelter sufficient for their protection from the inclemency of winter and the dews and
burning sun of summer, and with such evil intent did take and cause to be
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taken from them their clothing, blankets, camp equipage, and other property of
which they were possessed at the time of being placed in his custody; and
with like malice and evil intent, did refuse to furnish or cause to be furnished
food, either of a quality or quantity sufficient to preserve health and sustain
life; and did refuse and neglect to furnish wood sufficient for cooking in summer, and to keep the said prisoners warm in winter, and did compel the said
prisoners to subsist upon unwholesome food, and that in limited quantities
entirely inadequate to sustain health, which he well knew; and did compel the
said prisoners to use unwholesome water, reeking with the filth and garbage of
the prison and prison guard, and the offal and drainage of the cook-house of
said prison, whereby the prisoners became greatly reduced in their bodily
strength, and emaciated and injured in their bodily health; their minds
impaired, and their intellects broken; and many of them, to wit, about the
number of ten thousand, whose names are unknown, sickened and died by reason thereof, which he, the said Henry Wirz, then and there well knew and
intended; and so knowing and evilly intending, did refuse and neglect to provide proper lodgings, food, or nourishment for the sick, and necessary medicine
and medical attendance for the restoration of their health, and did knowingly,
wilfully, and maliciously, in furtherance of his evil designs, permit them to languish and die from want of care and proper treatment. And the said Henry
Wirz, still pursuing his evil purposes, did permit to remain in the said prison,
among the emaciated sick and languishing living, the bodies of the dead, until
they became corrupt and loathsome, and filled the air with fetid and noxious
exhalations, and thereby greatly increased the unwholesomeness of the prison,
insomuch that great numbers of said prisoners, whose names are unknown,
sickened and died by reason thereof. And the said Henry Wirz, still pursuing
his wicked and cruel purpose, wholly disregarding the usages of civilized warfare, did, at the time and place aforesaid, maliciously and wilfully subject the
prisoners aforesaid to cruel, unusual, and infamous punishment upon slight,
trivial, and fictitious pretences-by fastePing large balls of iron to their feet,
and binding large numbers of the prisoners aforesaid closely toge.ther, with large
chains around their necks and feet, so that they walked with the greatest difficulty; and, being so confined, were subjected to the burning rays of the sun,
often without food or drink for hours, and even days, from which said cruel
treatment large numbers, whose names are unknown, sickened, fainted, and
died. And he, the said Wirz, did further cruelly treat and injure said prisoners,
by maliciously tying them up by the thumbs and wilfully confining them
within au instrument of torture called "the stocks," thus depriving them of the
use of their limbs, and forcing them to lie, sit, and stand for many hours without the power of changing position, and being without food or drink, in consequence of which many, whose names are unknown, sickened and died. And he,
the said Wirz, still wickedly pursuing his evil purpose, did establish and cause
to be designated within the prison enclosure, containing said prisoners, a "dead
line," being a line around the inner face of the stockade, or wall, enclosing said
prison, and about twenty feet distant from 5md within said stockade; and having
so established said dead line, which was in some places an imaginary line, and
in other placee marked by insecure and shifting strips of boards nailed upon the
top of small and insecure stakes or posts, he, the said Wirz, instructed the
prison guard stationed around the top of said stockade to fire upon and kill any
of the prisoners aforesaid who might fall upon, pass over or under or across the
said "dead line." Pursuant to which said orders and instructions, maliciously
and needlessly given by said Wirz, the said prison guard did fire upon and kill
a number of said prisoners. And the said \iVirz, still pursuing his evil purpose,
did keep and use ferocious and bloodthirsty dogs, dangerous to human life, to
hunt down prisoners of war aforesaid who made their escape from his custody,
and did, then and there, wilfully and maliciously suffer, incite, and encourage
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the said dogs to seize, tear, mangle, and maim the bodies and limbs of said fugitive prisoners of war, which the said dogs, incited as aforesaid, then and there
did, whereby a number of said prisoners of war who, during the time aforesaid,
made their escape and were recaptured, died. And the said Wirz, still pursuing his wicked purpose, and still aiding in carrying out said conspiracy, did
cause to be used, for the pretended purposes of vaccination, impure and poisonous vaccine matter, which said impure and poisonous matter was then and
there, by the direction and order of said Wirz, maliciously, cruelly, and wickedly deposited in the arms of many of said prisoners, by reason of which large
numbers of them lost the use of their arms, and many of them were so injured
that they soon thereafter died. All of which he, the said Henry Wirz, well
knew and maliciously intended, and in aid of the then existing rebellion against
the United States, with the view to assist in weakening and impairing the
armies of the United States, and in furtherance of the said conspiracy, and
with the full knowledge, consent, and connivance of his co-conspirators aforesaid, he, the said Wirz, then and there did.
Of charge 1, "Guilty," after amending said charge to read as follows :
Maliciously, wilfully, and traitorously, and in the aid of the then existing armed
rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the twenty-seventh day
of March, A. D. 186-!, and on divers other days between that day and the tenth
day of April, 1865, combining, confederating, and conspiring, together with J efferson Davis, James A. Seddon, Howell Cobb, John H. Winder, Richard B.
Winder, Isaiah H. White, W. S. Winder, W. Shelby Reed, R. R. Stevenson,
S. P. Moore,-- Kerr, late hospital steward at Andersonville, James Duncan,
Wesley W. Turner, Benjamin Harris, and others unknown, to injure the health
and destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States, then
held and being prisoners of war within the lines of the so-called Confederate
States, and in the military prisons thereof, to the end that the armies of the
United States might be weakened and impaired, in violation of the laws and
customs of war.
Of specification 1 to charge 2, "Guilty," adding the words "or about" immediately before the phrase "the ninth day of July."
Of specification 2 to charge 2, '' Guilty."
Of specification 3 to charge 2, " Guilty," after striking out "June" and
inserting instead " September."
Of specification 4 to charge 2, " Not guilty."
Of specification 5 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out the phrase "on the
thirtieth day," and inserting instead the phrase "on or about the twenty-fifth
day."
Of specification 6 to charge 2, "Guilty," after striking out the word "first"
and inserting "fifteenth," and also striking out the phrase "on the sixth day"
and inserting instead the phrase ''on or about the sixteenth day."
Of specification 7 to charge 2," Guilty," after striking out the word "twentieth"
and inserting instead the word ''first," and also after inserting" or about" imme
diately before the phrase "the twenty-fifth day.''
Of specification 8 to charge 2, "Guilty."
Of specification 9 to charge 2, "Guilty."
Of specification 10 to charge 2, "Not guilty."
Of specification 11 to charge 2, ''Guilty," after striking out the word "first"
and inserting instead the word" sixth;" after striking out also the phrase "incite
and urge" and the phrase "encouragement and instigation," and by adding the
words ''or about" after the word "on" where it last occurs in the specificatiOn;
and also after striking out the phrase "animals called bloodhounds" and inserting the word "dogs;" aud also striking out the word "bloodhounds" where it
afterwards occurs and insert the word "dogs;" and also striking out the words
1
' given by him."
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Of specification 12 to charge 2, "Guilty."
o
Of specification 13 to charge 2, "Not guilty.''
Of the second charge, "Guilty."
And the court do therefore sentence him, the said Henry Wirz, to be banged
by the neck till be be dead, at such time and place as the President of the United
States may direct, two-thirds of the members of the court concurring herein.
LEW. WALLACE,
Major General and President if Commission.
N. P. CHIPMAN,
Colonel and A. A. D. G., Judge Advocate.
And the court also find the prisoner, Henry Wirz, guilty of having caused, in
a manner as alleged in specification 11 to charge 2, by means of dogs, the death
of three prisoners of war in his custody and soldiers of the United States, one
occurring on or about the fifteenth day of May, 1864; another occurring on or
about the eleventh day of July, 1864; another occurring on or about the first
day of September, 1864, but which finding, as here expressed, has not and did
not enter into the sentence of the court as before given.
LEW. -WALLACE,
Major Gene'ral and President if Commission.
N. P. CHIPMAN,
Colonel and A. A. D. C., Judge Advocate.
It is not necessary, for the purposes of this review, to go into an elaborate discussion of the questions involved in the findings on the 1st charge. From the
document of the procePdings, containing more than five thousand pages, presenting a mass of evidence bearing upon these questions, no brief summary can be
made which would do justice to the subject. The argument of the judge advocate sets forth an able and exhaustive examination of the material legal points
raised and proof established by the trial, and forms a part of the record. It may
be relied on as giving a full and just exposition of the matters which entered
into the deliberations of the court, and, as particularly applicable to this branch
of the case, reference is respectfully invited to pages 4838 to 5148. The opinion
is expressed that the conspiracy, as described in the findings above recited, was
clearly made out, and that the conclusions arrived at by the court could not, in
the light of the evidence this record contains, have been avoided.
Language fails in an attempt to denounce, even in faint terms, the diabolical
combination for the destruction and death, by cruel and fiendishly ingenious
processes, of helpless prisoners of war who might fall into their hands, which
this record shows was plotted and deliberately entered upon, and, as far as time
permitted, accomplished by the rebel authoritiea and their brutal underlings at
Andersonville prison. Criminal history presents no parallel to this monstrous
onspiracy, and from the whole catalogue of infamous devices within reach of
uman hands, a system for the murder of men more revolting in its details could
not have been planned. Upon the heads of those named by tJ.e court in its
finding the guilt of this immeasurable crime is fixed-a guilt so fearfully black
and horrible that the civilized world must be appalled by the spectacle.
'P There remains yet to be noticed the matters involved in the "second" charge.
The homicides alleged to have been committed under this charge, and which
tho comt found were committed, are of four classes: F1:rst, those cases of death
which resulted from the biting of dogs, (specification 11 ;) Second, cases of death
whiCh resulted from confinement in the stocks and chain gang, (specifications 5,
6, 7 ;) TJ~ird, cases of prisoners killed by guards, pursuant to direct orders of
Wirz, given at the time, (specifications 8, 9, and 12 ;) and Fourth, cases of prisoners killed by \'Virz's own hand, (specifications 1, 2, 3.)
That all the deaths embraced in these four classes resulted from the causes
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and in the manner set forth in the specifications is conceived t~ be very clearly
established by the evidence adduced by the prosecution, and it is not deemed
necessary, in the absence of any contradictory testimony directly bearing on
these instances, to recite the evidence applicable to each, except it may be, briefly,
that relating to the fourth class (specifications 1, 2, 3) and some acts of a similar
character.
The testimony supporting the first specification is that of Felix de la Baume,
a Union soldier, who states that on or about the 8th of July, 1864, he was one
of a detachment of prisoners taken to Wirz's headquarters to be enrolled before
being sent into the prison; that one of his comrades was attacked with epilepsy,
and some of his companions, by permission of the guard, ran to the creek for
water; that he, the witness, heard a shot fired, and on turning, saw vVirz fire
two more, wounding two prisoners, one of whom the witness never saw nor heard
of afterwards, and the other of whom he saw carried up to Wirz's headquarters
in a dying condition, the wound being in the breast.
There is also the testimony of George Conway, who states that on or about
the 11th of July, 1864, he saw Wirz shoot a Union prisoner within the stockade
as he was stooping to pick up his cup, which had fallen under the dead line, and
that the man died almost instantly.
Which of these two cases (either being, it is conceived, sufficient to sustain
the allegation) the court relied on does not certainly appear.
In support of the second specification, Martin E. Hogan testifies that some
time in September, when the prisoners were being removed from Andersonville
to Millen, he saw Wirz take a prisoner, who was worn out with hunger and
disease, by the coat collar, and, because he could not walk faster, wrench him
back and stamp upon1 him with his boots; that the man was borne past him
(witness) bleeding from his mouth and nose, and died in a short time.
The third specification is supported by the testimony of George W. Gray,
who shtes that about the middle of September, 1864, he and a comrade, named
William Stewart, a private belonging to a Minnesota regiment, went out of the
stockade in charge of a guard to carry a dead body, and that after laying it in
the dead-house they were on their way back to the stockade, when
'rz rode
up to them and asked "by what authority they were out there;" that S ewart replied they were out there by proper authority, whereu'pon Wirz drew his revolver
and shot Stewart, the ball taking effect in his breast and killing him instantly;
and that the guard then took from his body some twenty or thirty dollars, which
Wirz received and rode away.
· Further evidence in regard to Wirz killing certain prisoners was presented;
but the dates given by the witnesses show the murders to have been other than
those alleged in the specifications. They will be referred to as illustrating the
character of the prisoner and establishing a frequency and repetition of like
crimes.
James H. Davidson testified that in April, as he remembered, Wirz came into
the stockade one day and a lame man went up to him and asked him a question,
wherEupon Wirz "turned around" and shot him, and he died.
'l'homas C. Alcoke states that one day (the witness seems to have no knowledge or recollection of dates) Wirz came into the stockade and a man asked !Jim
permission to go out and get some fresh air; that Wirz asked him "what he
meant," and that after a few more words had passed between them, Wirz "wheeled
around," pulled out a revolver, and shot him down, the ball taking effect in his
breast, and death occurring about three hours afterwards. It also appears by
this witness trhat when he remonstrated Wirz told him he "had better look out"
or he "would be put in the same place," and that soon after Wirz came in with
a guard and put him in irons.
Hugh R. Snee testified that some time in September, 1864, a party of Union
prisoners were to be exchanged under an arrangement between General Sher-
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man and the rebel Hood; that they were taken from the stockade after dark, as
the heat in the day was so great that the men would have fainted; that none
but able-bodied men were selected, it being stated, when they were called out,
that any one who could not walk eighteen miles a day would be shot; that notwithstanding tl1is, the men were so anxious to escape imprisonment that some
too weak to perform the day's travel came out. The witness states that three,
who belonged to some western regiments, were able to go but a short distance
before they fainted and fell out of the ranks, and were pushed one side by the
guard; that thereupon a man ran back, and, speaking in a voice he thought at
the time to be that of Captain Wirz, wanted to know why they were there; that
they replied they wished to get out of prison; whereupon the man said, "I'll
help you out, God damn you." Witness then heard six pistol-shots, followed
by a "cry as if some one was hurt," and immediately after a rebel lieutenant
carne past, remnrking "that it was a brutal act;" that "one of them was dead,"
and when a;:;ked who did it, replied "The captain."
The most prominent features of the defence, under this second charge, will
now be considered.
An attempt was made to prove that, during the whole of August and parts of
July and September, the prisoner was sick and confined to his bed, and could
not have committed the crimes charged to him in those months. In hia statement to the court, however, he made no reference to his absence-doubtless for
the reason that the testimony wa~ of too general and loose a character to set up
as contradictory to the explicit statements of numerous witnesses as to the
dates when the crimes recorded in the finding were committed-corroborated as
those statements were by official papers bearing his signature, showing that at
different times during those months he was in the performance of his ordinary
functions as commandant of the prison.
It was claimed that deaths resulting from the use of dogs in the capture of
e~caped prisoners were not crimes fastened upon Wirz, he not being present at
the pursuit, and therefore not responsible. But it appears to have been the fact
that this use of dogs was under Wirz's special direction; that the pursuit of
prisone was, in many instances, initiated under his immediate orders, and in
some ca" s captures were made. under his personal supervision. It was also
clearly proved that a part of each pack were ferocious dogs, dangerous to life,
so as to make it probable that tbe men, on whose track they were sent
would be killed. A man overtaken by these beasts, and desiring to surrender,
could not, by coming to a stand, save his life; the instinct of the dogs was for
human blood, and to surrender to them was death. A most shocking illustration will be given. rrwo soldiers had escaped, but were overtaken; the party
who captured them returned with but one, (who was so mangled that he died,)
and the chief of the party, known as Turner, exulted in accounting for the other,
stating that they "allowed the dogs to tear him in pieces, and left him in the
woods."
As applying to the question of criminal responsibility involved in this class
of homicides, the judge advocate referred the court to the well-settled principle of law, that it is not essential that the hand of the party should be the immediate occasion of the death, but that if it be shown that means 1.oere used
likely to occasion deatl~, and which did so occasion it, the party using such
means is to be held responsible for the consequences.
There is but. one of this class of homieides which enters into the :findings of
"guilty" under this charge. A discussion of the legal points involved is conceived to be needless, inasmuch as the charge is sustained by a conviction on
nine other distinct allegations of murder.
As to the deaths resulting from the use of stocks and chain-gangs, the defence
urged that the men wer{' placed therein for the purposes of discipline; that
they were commonly used for such purposes, and that their use at this place
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was attributable to those higher in authority than Wirz, to whose orders he was
subject. Upon this point it is to be observed that prisoners w~re put in these instruments of torture as punishment for having escaped, or having made attempts to
escape from their captors, which attempts, whether successful or not, it was
their right and duty as prisoners of war to make. Any punishment inflicted
upon them therefor by their captors was a violation of the laws of war, and
deaths resulting from such unlawful punishment are murders. This would be the
judgment of the law apart from some of the peculiar circumstances which surround these crimes, and which so decidedly indicate their true character, prominent among which is the often declared an£mu8 of the prisoner, showing conclusively that in these and kindred barbarities he was deliberately seeking to
sacrifice the lives of his victims. It was shown that these stocks and chaingangs were under Wirz's immediate and direct control; that he exercised full
authority in committing prisoners to both. While it may be, and probably is,
the fact that his action in this matter was sanctioned by the rebel Winder when
he was on duty at that place, it does not relieve the prisoner of responsibility
for the results.
In relation to the three homicides embraced in the third class, the prisoner
makes no special defence, except as to the killing of the man known as Chickamauga. He urges in his final statement that his order to the guard to shoot
this man was only intended as a menace. It is clear, however, from the testimony that this order in his ~ase, as in the others, was peremptory; and, according to his own version, it was not a command that could be construed by any
subordinate as merely a menace; moreover, it was distinctly proved to have been
accompanied by a threat that he wotlld shoot the guard if the guard did not
shoot this crippled soldier. He states further, and it is so found by the record,
that this poor man desired to be killed, it would seem, because he was suspected
by his comrades of having given information to the· prison-keeper of some attempts of prisoners to escape from the stockade. This fact, however, in no
degree palliates his murderer's guilt.
Of the homicides embraced in the fourth class (those committed directly by
his own hands) the prisoner's statement notices but one-that of Stewart, sworn
to by the witness Gray. It is asserted that the testimony of this witness is a
pure fabrication. But there is nothing found in the examination of the record
which casts a doubt on his veracity, and the court seems to have discovered
nothing in his manner on the stand to raise the question of his credibility.
As to all those cases not heretofore specially mentioned, the defence insists
that the allegations were too vague and indefinite, and that the testimony is insufficient to sustain them, and also that it is altogether improbable that such
murders could have been committed without coming to the knowledge of various
witnesses who stated that they had never heard of such crimes at Andersonville. No evidence being submitted which contradicts the concurrent and explicit statements of the witnesses who gave positive testimony of their perpetration, these murders are fastened to Wirz's hands.
Many points were raised by both sides relating to the admission of evidence
as the trial progressed. These were fully debated at the time. No discussion
of them here is deemed ne~essary, it not being found that competent proof material to the prisoner's defence on the specific offences of which the court pronounced him guilty was excluded. Much latitude seems to have been given
him. He was allowed to show special acts of kindness to prisoners, and to introduce declarations made by himself in explanation of his acts. Letters and
official reports, and oral testimony of his personal efforts, offered as indicating
his interest in and a care for the comfort of the prisoners, were also admitted.
It is shown that every witness asked for by the defence was subprenaed, except
certain rebel functionaries, who, for reasons stated at the time, did not appear
on the stand. But the judge advocate proposed that if the counsel for the de68 w
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fence would set forth according to the common rule, by affidavit, wlwt he ex~
pected and had reasort to belie,ve any witness who did not so appear would tes~
tify, it would be admitted of record that such witness would so testify. This
proposition was not accepted. One hundred and six witnesses were subpamaed
for the defence, of whom sixty~eight reported; but thirty~nine of these, many
of them soldiers of our army and sufferers at Andersonville, were discharged
by the prisoner's counsel without being put upon the stand.
A review of the proceedings leads to the opinion that no prejudice to the
legal rights of the prisoner can be successfully claimed to have resulted from
any decision which excluded testimony he desired to introduce. The trial is
believed to have been conducted in accordance with the regulations governing
military courts, and the record presents no error which can be held to invalidate the proceedings.
'rhe annals of our race present nowhere, and at no time, a darker field of crime
than that of Andersonville, and it is fortunate for the interests alike of public
justice and of historic truth that from this field the veil has been so faithfully and
so completely lifted. All the horrors of this pandemonium of the rebellion are
laid bare to us in the broad, steady light of the testimony of some hundred and
fifty witnesses, who spoke what they had seen and heard and suffered, and
whose evidence given under oath, and subjected to cross-examination and to
every other test which human experience has devised for the ascertainment of
truth, must be accepted as affording an immovable foundation for the sentence
pronounced.
The proof under the second charge shows that some of our soldiers, for mere
attempts to escape from their oppressors, were given to ferocious dogs to be torn
in pieces ; that others were confine i in stocks and chains till life yielded to the
torture; and that others were wantonly shot down at Wirz's bidding or by his
own hand. Here in the presence of thes-e pitiless murders of unarmed and
helpless men, so distinctly alleged and proved, Justice might well claim the
prisoner's life. There remain, however, to be contemplated crimes yet more
revolting, for which he and his co-conspirators must be held responsible.
The Andersonville prison recordA (made exhibits in this case) contain a roster
of over thirteen thousand (13,000) dead-buried, naked, maimed and putrid, in
one vast sepulc'hre. Of these, a surgeon of the rebel army, who was on duty
at this prison, testifies that at least three-fourths died of the treatment inflicted
on them while in confinement; and a surgeon of our own army, who was a
prisoner there, states that four-fifths died from this cause. Under this proof,
which has not been assailed, nearly ten thousand, if not more, of these deaths
must be charged directly to the account of Wirz and his associates. This
wide-spread sacrifice of life was not made suddenly, or under the influence
of wild, ungovernable passion, but was accomplished slowly and deliberately by
packing upwards of thirty thousand men, like cattle, in a fetid pen, a mere
cesspool, there to die for need of air to breathe, for want of ground on which to
lie, for lack of shelter from sun and rain, and from the slow agonizing process
of starvation, when air and space, and shelter and food were all within the
ready gift of their tormentors. This work of death seems to have been a saturnalia of enjoyment for the prisoner, who, amid these savage orgies, evinced
such exultation, and mingled with them such nameless blasphemy and ribald jests
as at times to exhibit him rather as a demon than a man. It was his continual
boast that by these barbarities he was destroying more Union soldiers than
rebel generals were butchering on the battle-field. He claimed to be doing
the work of the rebellion, and faithfully, in all his murderous cruelty and
baseness, did he represent its spirit. It is by looking upon the cemeteries
which have been filled from Libby, Belle Isle, Salisbury, Florence, and
Andersonville and other rebel prisons, and recalling the prolonged sufferings of
the patriots who are sleeping there, that we can best understand the inner and
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real life of the rebellion, and the hellish criminality and brutality of the traitors
who maintained it. For such crimes human power is absolutely impotent to
.
enforce any adequate atonement.
It may be added, in conclusion, that the court before which the prisoner was
tried was composed of officers high in rank, and eminent for their faithful services and probity of character, and that several of them were distinguished for
their legal attainments. The investigation of the case was conducted throughout with patience and impartiality, and the conclusion reached is one from which
the overwhelming volume of testimony left no escape. It is recommended that
the sentence be executed.
J. HOLT,
Judge Advocate General.
The Secretary of War respectfully submits the report of the Judge Advocate
General upon the case of Henry Wirz.
To the PRESIDENT.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
November 3, 1865.
The proceedings, finding, and sentence of the court in the within case are approved, and it is ordered that the sentence be carried into execution by the
officer commanding the department of Washington on Friday, the tenth day
November, 1865, between the hours of 6 o'clock a.m. and twelve o'clock noon.
ANDREW JOHNSON,
President if the United States.

REPORT OF GENERAL HITCHCOCK ON THE SUBJECT OF EXCHANGE.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. 0.,
November 22, 1865.
Sm : I have the honor to submit the following statement, as my general report for the current year, on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war;
in doing which I find it necessary to revert to some facts of a precedent date in
order that the subject may be the better understood.
At an early period of the rebellion, a cartel for the exchange of prisoners was
agreed upon in conformity with the authority of the President, as communicated to General Dix by the Secretary of War in the following despatch, which
contains on its face an important limitation, carefully guarding against any recognition of the rebel government, the object having expressly in view the humane purpose of extending relief to prisoners of war :
"WAR DEPARTMENT,
" Washington City, July 12, 1862.
"The President directs me to say that he authorizes you to negotiate a gen-eral exchange of prisoners with the enemy.
"You will take immediate measures for that purpose, observing proper caution
against any recognition of the rebel government, and confining the negotiation·
to the subject of exchange. The cartel between the United States and Great
Britain has been considered a proper regulation as to the relative exchange value·
of prisoners.
·
"EDWIN M. STANTON,
" Secretary if War;.
" Major General JOHN A. Dix, Fortress Monroe."
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The agreement, signed by General Dix on the part of the government, and
General Hill on the part of the rebels, was duly announced in public orders by
authority dated War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, September 25, 1862, a copy of which is hereunto annexed.
So long as the cartel for the exchange of prisoners was respected in the south,
it was faithfully observed by the government, and there is no doubt that its
faithful execution would have been continued by the government until the end
of the war, unless properly revoked by competent authority, if the rebel authorities had not most distinctly violated its terms, under circumstances: indeed, .
of great aggravation.
The first indication on the part of the rebels of a disposition to disregard the
cartel became public through a message by Jefferson Davis to the rebel congress, in which, after alluding to the proclamation of the President announcing
emancipation, he makes use of the following language:
''I shall, unless in your wisdom you deem some other course more expedient,
deliver to the several State authorities all commissioned officers of the United
States that may hereafter be captured by our forces in any of the States embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance vrith the
laws of those States providing for the punishment of crimi~als engaged in exciting servile insurrection."
This announcement of Mr. Davis was made January 12, 1863, and received
the modified approval of the rebel congress. as shown in the following sections
of an act approved May 1, 1863, to wit :
"SEc. 4. That every white person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as
such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms
against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who
shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack or
conflict in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and
shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of
the court.
" SEc. 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer or acting as such in the
service of the enemy, who shall, during the present war excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited, a servile insurrection, or who shall incite, or cause
to be incited, a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise
punished at the discretion <9f the court."

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"SEc. 7. All negroes and mulattoes who shall be engaged in war or be taken
in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States,
be delivered to the authorities of the State or States in which they shall be
captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such State
or States."
Whe~ the message just referred to became known to the President, he saw
at once the necessity of meeting it, and gave instructions to retain such rebel
officers as might be captured, in order to be in a position to check the rebel
government and restrain the execution of its avowed purpose, in violation of
the cartel.
This proceeding, initiated by the rebel government in violation of the cartel, ultimated in the cessation of exchanges, which, as the history of the matter
shows, became unavoidable, and was entirely due to the rebel government.
Coincident with the proceedings with regard to the exchange of prisoners of
war, the 1·ebels inaugurated a system of seizing uno:ffending citizens of the
United States, and subjecting them to maltreatment, in various ways, in order
to effect a particular object, which became apparent when a demand was made
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for their release. For this purpose quite a number of citizens of Pennsylvania.
were carried into captivity by General Lee, when he penetrated into that State
in 1S63.
When a demand was made for the release of this class of prisoners, it was
met by a most positive declaration that no citizen prisoner in rebel'hands should
be released unless the government would enter into an agreement with the rebel
authorities not to arrest any one on account of his opinions or on account of his
sympathy with the rebel cause; and this declaration was repeated again and
again by the rebel authorities whenever the government demanded the release
or exchang·e of said citizen prisoners.
It will require but the slightest glance at this subject to convince any one of
the utter impossibility of acquiescing in the demand of the rebel authorities,
as a pre-requisite to the release of the citizens thus held in bondage. Such an
agreement on the part of the United States would have been a virtual acknowledgment of the independence of the rebel government, and would have foreclosed all proceedings of the United States agl}.inst all persons whomsoever
engaged in the crime of trea.son and rebellion. It was absolutely impossible
to acquiesce in the demand of the South on that point, and this is the reason
why this class of prisoners was beyond the reach of the government, except
through the power of its armies, which finally settled the entire question by
putting an end to the rebellion itself.
At the commencement of the cessation of exchanges the rebels held a few
prisoners of war over and above the number of rebels held by the government,
but the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson threw the balance largely the
other way ; and, as the prisoners captured by General Grant and General
Banks were left in the south on parole, the rebel authorities determined to
make use of them, not merely in violation of the cartel, but in open contempt
of the laws of war. They first ordered that body of men to be assembled at a
place called Enterprise, in Mississippi, on pretence of facilitating measures for
their supplies, but in reality with the distinct purpose, as we are now compelled
to believe, of throwing them into the rebel ranks to meet the anticipated conflict
which, it was seen, was near at hand in East Tennessee, and which accordingly
took place at the memorable battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga; in which
battles many of the captured prisoners paroled in the south by Generals Grant
and Banks took part, without having been duly exchanged, although the rebel
authorities made an ex parte declaration of exchange in their favor without proper
authority, which was protested against by the United States.
It must be understood that the rebels might at any time have resumed the
system of exchange agreed upon in the cartel by receding from the assumed
right of disposing of captured Union officers as required in the act passed by
the rebel Congress, before alluded to, and agreeing to the exchange of colored
troops ; but they would never agree to acknowledge the right of colored troops
to treatment due to prisoners of war; and, as the government of the United States
had exercised the right of employing colored troops as a part of the force
against the rebels, their claim to such protection as the government could give
was one which did not admit of discussion.
When the rebels discovered that the suspension of exchanges was operating
against them, they resorted to the horrible expedient of subjecting the prisoners
they held to starvation and exposure to the elements, without the protection of
quarters or tents, after first robbing them of their money and most of their
clothing, and without regard to seasons or their inclemencies, in the hope of
forcing the government into a system of exchanges which should have the
effect, not only of leaving in their hands all of the colored prisoners they had
taken, but of throwing into their ranks the entire body of prisoners held by
the federal power, then greatly in excess over the prisoners held by the rebels ,
This fact is proved by the declarations of the Richmond papers, at the time
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when· a few exchanges were made, that the rebel agent, Colonel Ould, had nut
sent over the lines the number of prisoners equivalent to those received, but
only a proportionate number, the ratio being determined by Colonel Ould, in
view of the number of prisoners held in the south against those held in the
north-the claim to hold in reserve the colored prisoners in the south having
never been abandoned. This fact was further established by the official records
of the commissary general of prisoners, by which it appeared that, after sending several boat-loads of exchanged prisoners each way, the rebels were constantly falling in debt. Upon observing this fact, and noticing the publications
in Richmond, I called upon the commissary general of prisoners for a tabular
statement of the result, and the statement showed an indebtedness in our favor
of over five hundred men; which statement was handed to the Secretary of
War, who thereupon directed an oi·der to General Grant to assume the entire
control of the matter of exchangee, with authority to give such orders as he
might think proper on the subject. General Grant at once reverted to first
principles, and directed that Colonel Ould, or the rebel authorities, should be
notified that colored troops should be treated as prisoners of war when captured; and, as the rebels were not willing to accede to this requirement, no further exchanges were made.
U pou the receipt at the War Department of the first intelligence of the inhuman treatment to which our prisoners were subjected at Richmond, the Secretary
of War, without a moment's hesitation, gave instructions to our agent of exchange, at Fortress Monroe, to send forward supplies from the public stores for
their relief, and large quantities of provisions and clothing were accordingly
sent for distribution among the prisoners, and eve1·y possible effort was made to
afford that sort of relief, even at the hazard of large portions of the supplies
being wasted, or, what was worse, misappropriated to the benefit of our enemies,
who, it soon appeared, made use of these supplies for their own advantage,
leaving our prisoners still to suffer. But even this did not destroy the hope of
the Secretary that some portion of the supplies would, at least, be permitted to
reach its destination, and the orders to send that relief were left in force until
the Tebels themselves, shamed, perhaps, by the scandalous state of things, then
likely to become historical, refused to receive any further supplies through the
agents of the government.
In the mean time the sympathies of friends in the north were naturally a wakened,
and large quantities of supplies of all kinds were sent to FortrP.ss Monroe,
whence they were forwarded for the relief of the priscJners at Richmond; but
the moment they passed beyond the control of our agents they fell into the
hands of the most unprincipled and shameless scoundrels that ever disgraced
humanity. It is in proof that 1arge quantities of supplies furnished by the
benevolence of the north for the relief of suffering humanity in southern prisons,
were piled up in sight of the objects for whose relief those supplies were sent,
but beyond the line of the prison guards; and while the prisoners were thus in
sight of their own boxes, they were not only forbidden to touch them, but com
pelled to witness depredations upon them by the guards themselves, who feasted
upon their contents, leaving the victims of war a prey to that merciless barbarism
which will make one of the darkest pages in the history of a rebellion which will
itself remain an astonishment to all posterity for its almost causeless existence.
Many have supposed that it was in the power of the government to afford
relief to the prisoners in the south by a resort to retaliatory treatment of rebel
prisoners in the north. It is difficult to meet a suggestion of this kind by an
appeal to the instincts of civilized humanity, because the mere suggestion supposes the absence of those instincts, and implies a willingness to Sl 'e the public
sentiment degraded into barbarism, which would have put the nation itself on
the footing of savages, whose only excuse for their barbarity is their ignorance
and their exclusion from the civilized world. The day must come when every
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true American will be proud of the reflection that the government was strong
enough to crush the rebellion without losing the smallest element of its humanity
or its dignity, and stands before the world uuimpeached in its true honor and
~~
.
It may be observed that no one imagined, prospectively, the horrors which
came to light at Andersonville, the full enormity of which only became known
at the close of the military events which ended the war. Had they been known
when at their worst, the gove,rnment would have had the choice of but three
measures: first, the rebel prisoners might have been sent south, we to receive
in return such white prisoners as they might have held, leaving the colored
troops to their fate; second, a resort to retaliatory measures; or, lastly, for the
country to wage the war with increased zeal to bring it to a legitimate encl. No
man can doubt which of these plans the northern people would have approved,
if submitted to them, and the government only assumed to represent the people
in the question.
It ought to be mentioned here, as a beautiful illustration of the moral sublime,
that among the many memorials, some of them very numerously signed, which
reached the War Department, praying for relief to federal prisoners suffering in
the south, iu nearly all of them there was an express protest against a resort to
retaliation. And what was the real effect of the barbarity upon the prisoners
in the south 1 Certainly, it was most deplorable and shocking upon individuals
for the time being; but no one whose moral eyes are open can fail to see that it
became in many ways a signal step, under the guidance of Providence, for
bringing the rebel cause to destruction. It strengthened the feeling in the
north in favor of warlike and determined measures against rebellion; it sent
thousands into the army who took the :field resolutely determined to punish the
authors of a great crime against humanity. The enemy might almost literally
have felt that it is "a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God."
An erroneous opinion appears to have been circulated, more or less widely,
with regard to the number of colored federal troops who fell into the hands of
the enemy, which makes it important to state that the actual number thus exposed to injurious treatment was very much greater than has been commonly
supposed. This will sufficiently appear from the fact that, on the 21st of
January, 1865, Lieutenant 0. 0. Poppleton, adjutant of the 111th United States
colored infantry, addressed a letter, dated at Nashville, Tennessee, to Major
General Butler, in the following words, to wit :
"I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a Mobile paper (rebel) containing, over the signature of D. H. Maury, major general Confederate States
army, the names of five hundred and sixty-nine (56!>) soldiers belonging to the
106th, 110th, and lllth regiments of United States colored infantry, who were
taken prisoners by a force of the enemy, under Major General N. B. Forrest, at
Athens and Sulphur Branch Trestle, Alabama, on the 24th and 25th of September, 1864, and placed at work on the defences of Mobile, Alabama, by order
of the rebel authorities. Lieutenant William T. Lewis, adjutant 110th United
States colored infantry, has a paper of later date than this, containing the names
of nearly three hundred ( 300) more soldiers of the same command, also at work
on the defences of Mobile."
This is an official report from the adjutant of the 111 th regiment colored infantry, showing that there were then, in January, 1865, at work on the fortifications about J\Iobile :five hundred and sixty-nine (569) colored soldiers belonging to three regiments only; and a reference is made to another paper as being
at that time in the hands of another officer, an adjutant also of one of those regiments, embracing the names of "nearly three hundred (300) more soldiers of
the same command," making in all over eight hundred (800) colored soldiers of the
United States army at work, under rebel officers, on the fortifications around
Mobile alone.
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When the government determined to employ colored troops in its armjes, the
principle was recognized that they were entitled to protection; and, accordingly,
it was claimed that the class of troops referred to should receive such treatment
from the enemy as was due to other troops employed in the defence of the government. 1'he assertion of this principle did not depend upon the number of
colored troops who might at any one time be in the hands of the enemy. Every
consideration of honor and humanity required the assertion of this principle as
due to the troops employed in the service of the government; and, accordingly,
in various communications, when the subject required it, the government agents
connected with the duties of the exchange of prisonerd invariably set forward
the principle. But this did not prevent the exchange of prisoners, man for man
and officer for officer. The difficulty on this subject was due, £rst, to tl1e message of Mr. Davis to the rebel congress, already referred to, declaring his purpose to deliver to southern State authorities such white Union officers as might
be captured, for trial under State laws unknown alike to the laws of Congress
and to the laws of war; and, secondly, to the open contempt of the laws of war,
as also stated above, in the fact that the rebel authorities released from the obligations of their parole a number of rebel prisoners, and placed them in their
ranks without exchange.
Dming a brief period prior to the capture of Vicksburg, the rebels held more
prisoners of war than the government ; but after the date of that event the case
was reversed, and from that time forward the government made every e:ffort to
obtain exchanges-man for man and officer for officer-but without avail, the
rebel authorities persistently resisting applications 1:Ur exchange unless the government would release all rebel prisoners, after they had openly violated t:he
cartel themselves, claiming that the government should deliver to them all rebel
prisoners, while they, on their part, deClared their purpose of withholding from
exchange such colored prisoners as they might have in their possession.
It is important to observe here, that while this controversy was pending we
actually held, in prison depots in the north, about seventy thousand ( 70,000)
prisoners of war, over and above which we had a just and valid claim for more
than thirty thousand ( 30,000) men who had been captured and paroled in the
south, chiefly at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and who had never been properly
exchanged; making in all at least one hundred thousand (100,000) men whom
the rebel authorities wished to draw from us in exchange for about forty thousand ( 40,000) of the 'vhite troops of the United States; the effect of which
would have been to throw into the army of General Lee an effective force of
about sixty or seventy thousand men, in fine health and able in all respects to
be put immediately into tl!e field against General Grant's army, or with which
General Lee might have obtained a disposable force of some fifty or more thousand men for the purpose of entering the States of the north, and thereby possibly compelling General Grant to raise the siege of Richmond, or expose the
northern States to devastation by the enemy.
It was the desire of the rebel agent of exch11nge to avoid making special exchanges, in the hope of drawing from us the whole of the rebel prisoners of war
we held in return for inferior numbers held by the enemy. To accomplish that
object, the rebel commissioner or agent of exchange not only declined to make
exchanges on equal terms, in any considerable number, but refused to make special exchanges except under extraordinary influences brought to bear by the
friends of interested parties; and, in repeated instances, the rebel agent took
care to indorse, upon special applications, the express declaration that he neither
made nor countenanced such applications.
In consequence of this state of things, and while there was a hope of effecting general exchanges, only a few applications of a special character were forwarded over the lines ; but when it became apparent that a general exchange
could not be effected, I received your instructions to forward all special applica-
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tions for exchange, in order, as you explained the purpose at the time, to afford
every possible opportunity to extend rel1ef to as many individuals as might
have the good fortune to secure southern influences for that objeet; and great
numbers of such applications were sent over the lines, most of which, however,
were never heard from afterwards.
Another fact I beg to state in connexion with this subject, as a further illustration of the efforts of the department to extend relief to federal officers and
soldiers imprisoned south, to wit: The rebel authorities resorted to the system
of placing individuals in close confinement, in alleged retaliation for what on
our side was but the legitimate operation of the laws of war in the punishment
of spies and other offenders against those •ws. In the endeavor to afford relief
in a particular case of this kind, the rebel agent seized the opportunity of proposing the mutual release and exchange of all prisoners in close confinement,
although at that time we had no rebel prisoners thus confined except by due
course of law. This proposition was manifestly unfair, and a recovered ·letter
from the rebel agent has shown that he knew it was so. Nevertheless, the proposition was accepted by your orders ; and although it effected the release of
some criminals belonging to the rebel army, it carried relief to a number of federal officers and soldiers in the south who thus obtained liberation : the concession on your part having had in view the relief it promised, and, to some extent,
effected, in favor of a few of our officers and soldiers.
The recovered letter alluded to was dated at City Point, March 17, 1863, and
addressed to Brigadier General Winder, in the following words:
" SIR : A flag-of-truce boat has arrived with 350 political prisoners, General
Barrow and several other prominent men amongst them. I wish you to send
me, at four o'clock, Wednesday morning, all the military prisoners (except officers) and all the political prisoners you have. If any of the political prisoners
have on hand proqf enouglz, to convict them of being spies or of having committed other offences which should subject them to punishment, so state opposite
their names. Also, state whethet you think, under all circumstances, they should
be released. The arrangement I lwve made works largely in our favor. We get
rid of a set of miserable wretches, and receive some of the best material I ever
saw. Tell Captain Turner to put down on the list of political prisoners the
names of Edward G. Eggling and Eugenia Harmmermister. rrhe President is
anxious they should get off. They are here now. This, of course, is between
ourselves. If you have any female political prisoner whom you can send off
safely to keep her company, I would like you to send her. Twq hundred and
odd more political prisoners are on their way. I would be more full in my communication if I had time.
"Yours truly,
"R0l3ERT OULD, Agent qf Exchange.''
It should be noticed in this report that when the subject of exchange became
embarrassing, because of the unwillingness of the enemy to exchange man for
man, he demanding all of the rebel prisoners we held in exchange for the white
prisoners held by him, Major General Halleck, by the direction of the Secretary
of War, made an effort to obtain exchanges on equal terms. For this purpose
he sent a flag of truce to General Lee, then in force on the Rapidan, and proposed that species of exchange. But General Lee declined to act upon the proposition, and answered, evidently in accordance with instructions from Richmond,
that the subject of exchange was in the hands of a commissioner, and he preferred to have nothing to do with it.
As a further effort to obtain this class of exchanges, the Secretary
authorized various commanders, distant from Washington, to open communications with the enemy, and to effect exchanges whenever they could be made on
equal terms. In the midst of these difficulties I was painfully impressed with
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the impossibility of effecting exchanges on equal terms with Junge Ould; and
having understood that General Butler was of the opinion that, if empowered to
do so, he could make exchanges, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War and
proposed to withdraw from the position of commissioner of exchange in favor
of any officer who could accomplish so desirable a result ; upon which, however, the Secretary did not see fit to make an order. A few days after this I
was sent for from the War Office, where I found the Secretary in conversation
with General Halleck on the subject of exchanges. The Secretary then informed me that General Butler had expressed the opinion above stated, and that
several members of Congress had expressed a similar opinion with regard to
General Butler's ability to effect ex41.anges, if empowered to do so. I at once
said to the Secretary, " If General Butler is of opinion that he can make exchanges, I think, sir, you had better let him try." He then said that it was hi~
wish that I should go to Fortress Monroe and confer upon General Butler the
requisite power by his authority; and he thereupon wrote, in the presP-nce of
General Halleck and myself, the following order :
,, WAR DEPARTMENT,
" Washington, December 16, 1863.
"Major General HITCHCOCK, Commissioner o/ Exchange qf Prisone1·s:
"GEl\'ERAL: You will proceed immediately to Fortress Monroe, and take any
measures that may be practicable for the release, exchange, or relief of United
States officers and soldiers held as prisoners by the rebels.
"You are authorized and directed to confer with Major General Butler on the
subject, and may authorize him, as special agent, commissioner, or otherwise, to
procure their release or exchange upon any just terms not conflicting with principles on which the department has heretofore acted in reference to the exchange
of colored troops and their officers, and not surrendering to the rebels any prisoners without 'just equivalents. You may, if you deem it proper, relieve General Meredith, and direct him to report to the Adjutant General for orders.
"Yours truly,
"EDWIN M. STAN'rON,
" Secretary qf lVar."
Within half an hour after the writing of the above order I was on my way to
l!-.ortress Monroe, and on the morning of the 17th of December I reported to
General Butler. After stating the limitations under which he would be authorized to make exchanges, I requested him to prepare instructions for himself,
giving him the authority he desired, in accordance with the orders of the Secretary, stating that, when ready, I would sign them in the name of or with the
authority of the Secretary. In two or three hours thereafter I called again
upon General Butler, and made the instructions he had prepared official. They
contained the following paragraphs :
" You are hereby in!3tructed not to make any exchange which shall not return
to you man for man, officer for officer, of equal rank with those paroled and sent
forward by yourself, regarding, of course, for motives of humanity, in the earlier
exchanges, those officers and men on either side who have been the longest confined.
"Colored troops and their officers will be put upon an equality in making exchanges, as of right, with other troops.
"You are permitted, in conducting the exchange, to waive for the present the
consideration of the questions of parole and. excess now pending between the
confederate belligerent authorities and this government, leaving them untouched
as they stand until further interchange of views between those authorities and
yo.urself."
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rrhe above instructions to General Butler will show precisely the animus of
the Secretary of War on the subject of exchanges. He was perfectly willing
and anxious to make exchanges, man for man, officer for officer, and gave, as
must he seen, the fullest power to General Butler to effect those exchanges.
General Butler, in his conversation with me, expressed no desire to have any other
instructions or powers committed to him, and appeared to be very confident of
his ability to accomplish the desired result, giving me, in detail, many reasons
for that confidence. I returned to the city of Washington, and within a few
days the public prints announced General Butler's first attempt to make exchanges and the result. General Butler sent a boat-load of prisoners under a
flag of truce to City .Point, where they were offered for a like number of federal
troops. It appears that, when this was reported to the rebel government, violent indignation was expressed by the rebel authorities, on the alleged ground
that General Butler was an outlaw by the proclamation of Mr. Davis, and that
it was an insult to employ him to accomplish any result requiring any sort of
intercourse between him and the rebel authorities; but it was concluded that,
inasmuch as a certain number of their troops were actually witbin their lines as
returned prisoners of war, they should be received, and a like number of federal
prisoners should be exchanged for them ; but notice was given to our agent that
no more prisoners would be received in that manner, and it was reported at the
time that General Butler was informed that a flag of truce even should not protect him within the rebel lines.
When this was reported in Washington, the .President himself, in the presence
of the Secretary of War, declined to give any order on the subject, unwilling
to concede to the rebels the right to dictate what agents this government should
employ in its public business; but it was plain to be seen that the real object
of the rebel authorities was to avoid making equal exchanges of man for man
and officer for officer, their purpose being to deliver to us, as before stated, only
a proportionate number of prisoners held by them as against those held by us;
and because General Butler's instructions required the exchange of man for
man, made the employment of General Butler in the business of exchange a
pretext for refusing those equal exchanges. This was evident, because, in
point of fact, General Butler did not personally lppear in the business-that is,
he did not accompany the flag of truce-and, if there had been any disposition
on the part of the rebels to make equal exchanges, they knew those exchanges
would be made through the agency of another officer, and not personally by
General Butler; and thus the real purpose of the rebels becomes manifest, their
object being to draw from us all of their own troops in our hands, giving us in
exchange only such white troops of tbe federal forces as they might hold .
.After this experiment by General Butler, matters remained in SJISpense for
some time, no exchanges being made .
.At length two federal officers, who had escaped from rebel prisons, gave me
their opinion, in this city, that if we would send to City .Point, for exchange, a
body of three, four, or five hundred rebel officers, demanding a like number in
return, tbe feeling in the south, they believed, would be such that the rebel
authorities would not dare to refuse the exchange; and if that succeeded, they
would not dare thereafter to refuse to exchange private soldiers. I thought
very well of this suggestion, and addressed a note to the Secretary of War,
communicating it, and recommending its trial. The Secretary at once accepted
the suggestion, and directed General Canby, then on duty in the War Office, to
require General Butler to make that trial. But General Butler thought proper
to send a mixed boat-load of officers and men.
Here, then, was another effort to make exchanges on equal terms. The enemy
accepted tbe prisoners sent over the lines, but did not return a like number.
'fhis fact was publicly stated by the newspapers at Richmond, ftnd was con-
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firmed by official reports received at the office of General Hoffman, the commissary general of prisoners, after several boat-loads had passed. \Vhen the purpose of the rebel commissioner became apparent, not to make exchanges man for
man, but only in proportionate numbers, the fact, with the evidence for it, was
submitted to the Secretary of War, and then it was, as stated above, that General Grant was instructed to take the subject under his own supervision, with the
result already alluded to.
After General Butler took charge of the duties in connexion with the exchange
of prisoners, I was not officially advised of his proceedings, because, he being of
senior rank to myself, m~tde no reports to me; but in August, 1864, there was
published in the journals of the day a letter, over the signature of General Butler, of the highest importance in connexion with this subject. No official copy
was furnished to me, and I have never seen the letter of Judge Ould to which
it refers, the authenticity of which, however, is sufficiently vouched in the letter
of General Butler, which commences, addressed to Judge Ould, in these words:
"SIR: Your note to Major Mulford, assistant agent of exchange, under date of
the lOth of August, has been referred to me. You therein state that Major
l\Iulford has several times proposed to excltange prisoners rrspectively held by the
two bellige?·ents, officer for qfficer and man for man j and tlwt the ciffer has also
been made by other officials having clwrge of matters connected with the exchange
qf prisoners, and that this proposal has been hcretqfore declined b;lj the corifederate authorities. r.rhat you now consent to the above proposition, and agree to
deliver to you (Major Mulford) the prisoners held in captivity by the confederate
authorities, provided you agree to deliver an equal number of officers and men."
This letter, cited by General Butler from Colonel Ould, shows, conclusively, .
by whom the proposition for an equal exchange was originally made. It shows,
also, that it had been repeatedly made by the government, and bad been as
repeatedly refused by the rebel authorities.
The matter bad been placed in General Butler's hands, and he answered
Judge Ould's letter, asking some preliminary explanations, which I believe were
never made, and the opportunity of a final action upon Judge Ould's letter was
thus cut off by himself.
The reasons which induced~General Butler's action may no doubt be seen, in
part at least, in the letter he addressed to Judge Ould, which was published in
the journals of the day. I have never beard that the matter was referred to the
Secretary of War, and have never understood that he gave any order in the premises.
We learn from Generel Butler's letter that Judge Ould did not reaeh his conclusion in reference to Major Mulford's proposition until a period of eight months
had elapsed.
It is impossible to approach the subject of this report without being solemnly
impressed by a sense of the horrors inflicted upon the prisoners of war in the
south; but, in making the report, I have felt imperatively called upon to confine myself to facts connected immediately with the subject of exchanges, leaving inferences to be drawn by others. I attach hereto such official letters and
telegraphic despatches as have either originated in my office or have reached me,
as may throw light upon the subject of this report.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. A. HITOHOOUK,
Major Gen. Vols., Commzssioner for Exchange if P1·isone1·s,
Hon.

EDWIN

M.

STANTON,

Secretary if TVar.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

1085

Telegrams and letters accompanying the report of General Hitchcock on the subject of exchanges.

[General Orders, No. 142.]
vVAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFicE,
Washington, September 25, ltl62.
The following is the cartel under which prisoners are exchanged in the existing war with
the southern States :
HAXALL's LANDING ON JAMES ·RIVER, VA., July 22, 1862.
The undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent
to make arrangemeLts for a general exchange of prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles :
ARTICLE 1. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of war held by either party,
including those taken on private armed vessels known as privateers, shall be discharged upon
the conditions and terms following:
Prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer; privateers to be placed upon
the footing of officers and men of the navy.
Men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of a higher grade, and men
and officers of different services may be exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents:
A general commanding in chief or an admiral shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank
or for sixty privates or c0mmon seamen.
A flag officer or major general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for forty
p1ivates or common seamen.
A commodore carrying a broad pennant or a brigadier general shall be exchanged for officers
of equal rank or twenty privates or common seamen.
A captain in the navy or a colonel shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for
fifteen privates or common seamen.
A lieutenant colonel or a commander in the navy shall be exchanged for officers of equal
rank or for ten privates or common seamen.
A lieutenant commander or a major shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or for
eight privates or common seamen.
A lieutenant or a master in the navy or a captain in the army or marines shall be exchanged
for officers of equal rank or six privates or common seamen.
Master's mates in the navy or lieutenants and ensigns in the army shall be exchanged for
officers of equal rank or four privates or common seamen.
~idshipmen, warrant officers in the navy, masters of merchant vessels, commanders of
privateers, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank or three privates or common seame-n.
Second captains, lieutenants, or mates, of merchant vessels or privateers, and all petty
officers in the navy and all non-commissioned officers in the army or marines, shall be severally .exchanged for persons of equal rank or for two priva;_tes or common seamen; and private
sold1ers or common seamen shall be exchanged for each·other man for man.
ARTICLE 2. Local, State, civil, and militia rank held by persons not in actual military service will not be recognized, the basis of exchange being the grade actually held in the naval
and military service of the respective parties.
ARTICLE 3. If citizens held by either party on charges of disloyalty or any alleged civil
offence are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens. Captured sutlers, teamsters, and all
civilians in the actual service of either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar position.
ARTICLE 4. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture and
the prisoners now held and those hereafter taken to be transported to the points mutually agTeed
upon, at the expense of the capturing party. The surplus prisoners not exchanged shall not
be permitted to take up arms again, nor to serve as military police or constabulary force in
any fort, g·arrison, or field-work held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards of
prisons, depots, or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this cartel. The exchange is not to be considered complete
until the officer or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to whieh he
belongs.
AR'riCLE 5. Each party, upon the discharge of prisoners of the other party, is authorized to
discharge an equal number of their own officers and men from parole, furnishing at the same
time to the other party a list of their prisoners discharged and of their own officers and men
relieved from parole; thus enabling each party to relieve from parole such of their own officers and men as the party may choose. The lists thus mutually furnished will keep both
parties advised of the true condition of the exchange of prisoners.
ARTICLE 6. The stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation
during the continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners, the great principles involved being, 1st. An equitable exchange of prisoners, man for
man, officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged for officers of lower grade, or for
privates according to the scale of equivalents; 2d. That privateers and officers and men of
different services may be exchanged according to the same scale of equivalents; 3d. That
all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled in ten days from
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the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time ; if
not, as soon thereafter as practicable; 4th. That no officer, soldier, or employe in the service
of either party is to be considered as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has actually reached the lines of his friends; 5th. That the parole forbids the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard, or constabulary duty.
JOHN A. DIX,
Major General.
D. H. HILL,
Major Geneml C. S. A
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES.
ARTICLE 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter tall:en,
shall be sent with all reasonable despatch to A.M. Aikens's, below Dutch Gap, on the James
river, Virginia, or to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi river, in the State of Mississippi, and
there exchanged or paroled until such exchange can be effected, notice being previously given
by each party of the number of prisoners it will send, and the time when they will be delivered
at those points respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article to the contending parties so as to render the same
inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places, bearing as nearly ae may
be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said parties, shall be by mutual agreement substituted. But nothing in this article contained shall prevent the commanders of
two opposing armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole at other points
mutually agreed on by said commanders.
ARTICLE 8. For the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing articles of agreement, each
party will appoint two agents, to be called agents for the exchange of prisoners of war, whose
duty it shall be to communicate with each other, by correspondence or otherwise, to prepare
the lists of prisoneTs, to attend to the delivery of the prisoners at the places agreed on, and to
carry out promptly, effectually, and in good faith all the details and provisions of the said
articles of agreement.
ARTICLE 9. And in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing artjcles, it is mutually agreed that such misunderstanding shall not
interrupt the release of prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject
of friendly explanations, in order that the object of this agreement may neither be defeated
nor postponed.
JOHN A. DIX,
Major General.
D. H. HILL,
Majo1· Gene1·al C. S. A.
By order of the Secretary of War :
L. THOMAS,
Adjutant (Jeneral.

[Telegrams.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, .April21, 1862.
Major General JoHN E.- WooL, Commanding at Fortress Monroe:
The President cordially approves your response to Colonel Huger in respect to the exchange of prisoners. I would be very glad to effect an exchange for Colonels Corcoran and
"Wilcox· as soon as it can properly be done, and also to have all the rest at Richmond exchanged.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 18, 1862.
MajorGeneral McCLELLAN:
The Adjutant General has just submitted to me your telegram addressed to him and dated the
thirteenth instant, respecting the exchange of prisoners. This subject has for several months
been under the direction of General Wool, who had several negotiations with Howell Cobb
and General Huger. 'fhe last arrangement made was broken off, by the rebel authorities
den~ing Huger's authority to make the arrangement for Corcoran's exchange. It is be·
lieved that their real reason for breaking off was to obtain an arrangement tbut would secure
t~w release of General Buckner. The President has tor some days been considering the question .o f agreeing to a general exchange, but has not yet decided, because strong opposition is
manifested to the exchange of Buckner. I have ordered the Adjutant General to send you
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immediately, by mail, a copy of the correspondence between General "\Vool and General
Huger, which will enable you fully to understand the question in dispute when General Wool
left .E'ortress Monroe.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Sec1·etary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, July 8, 1862.

Major General DIX, Fortress Monroe:
General McClellan shortly before the late battles made an arrangement for the exchange
of prisoners taken on either side by the forces before Richmond. It is the desire of this department to carry the arrangement into effect. I wish you would communicate with him.
I also, with the consent of the President, whom you will consult, authorize you to negotiate
for a general exchange of all prisoners taken and held or paroled on both sides-the exchange to be on the principles of the cartel between the United States and Great Britain in
the last war with that power.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War .

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, July 14, 1862.

Major General JOHN A. DIX :
If there should be any failure or delay to effect a general exchange, I would be very glad
to have you arrange the exchange of Colonel John Kenly, 1st Maryland, for Colonel C. A.
Sugg, 50th Tennessee, if it can possibly be done.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secntary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, July 14, 1862.

Major General DIX, Fort Monroe:
Some place convenient to Fortress Monroe, as City Point, or such other as you may designate, can be fixed for the exchange of prisoners in the east.
Vicksburg or some adjacent point for exchange in the west.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Sec1·etary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, July 16, 1862.
Major General DIX, Fort Monroe:
You will please procure all the information you can respecting the names and condition
of our prisoners held by the rebels, and make report to this department after your interview
with General mll.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City; July 25, 1862.
Major General DIX, Fortress Monroe:
You and Major General Franklin have been appointed our agents for the exchange of prisoners. The agents appointed by the rebels will be at Aiken at twelve meridian to-morrow
where you will please meet them. Advise General McClellan whether you will be present
or not.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
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"\VAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, July 25, 1862.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
Major General Dix and Major General Franklin are appointed our agents for the exchange
of prisoners. If either qf them cannot attend, you may name some one to take his place.
General Dix has been notified of time and place of meeting.
EDWIN M. STANTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, July 25, 1862.
Major General Dix, Fortress Monroe:
The rolls of prisoners held by us are not on file in this department. They have been or·
dered to be made out with all despatch. The number of prisoners of war held by us js re·
ported to be over twenty thousand. The rolls will be ready in :::.s brief a time as possible. I
have named you and General Franklin as our agents of exchange. The eommissary general of prisoners thinks he can have the rolls in five clays. They will be transmitted to you
as soon as possible.
EDWIN M. S'I'ANTON,
Secretary of War.

"\VAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, July 25, 1862-6.50 p. m.
Major General DIX, Fortress Monroe :
A despatch from General McClellan states that the agent for exchange of prisoners on the
part of the confederates is to be at Aiken's to-morrow at twelve o'clock. I think you had
better g·o up and explain why our rolls of prisoners are not ready, and that they will be furnished and the prisoners sent on immediately. General McClellan can then appoint General
Franklin or some one else to act as agent, and General Halleck designate an agent at Vicksburg. It is important there should be no misunderstanding, and you can prevent it better
than any one else. Your visit to Point Lookout appears to be of minor importance than this.
EDWIN M. STANTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, July 29, 1862.
Major General DIX, Fortress Monroe:
Adjutant General Thomas will take the prisoners to be exchanged from Fort Delaware.
stopping at Fortress Monroe. He will consult with you respecting the course to be taken
with the prisoners referred to in your telegram.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

"\VAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, March 29, 1863.
Colonel LUDLOW, Fortress Monroe, Vi1·ginia:
General Burnside reports that the seventy-first Indiana, about seven hundred strong, •re
at Camp Morton awaiting exchange. Please say whether they have or have not been exchanged, and if not, procure their exchange as speedily as possible.
EDWIN M. STANTON.
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, 1lJarch 29, 1863.
C:olonel LUDLOW 1 Fortress Monroe:
The seventy-first Indiana was captured on the twenty·eighth of December last at Mul·
-draugh's Hill, Kentucky. Please get them exchanged as soon as possible.
EDWIN M. STANTON.
Secretary of War.
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WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, Ap1·il 10, 1863.
Colonel W. H. LUDLOW, Fort Monroe, Virginia :
Make the exchanges indicated in your telegram of this morning. Ask Mr. Ollld for information concerning a report of thirteen United States officers, said to be confined at Atlanta, Georgia, including Lieutenant Colonel Hopeman and Major Weidneer. They were
taken at Hartsville, Tennessee, December7. Report specially the result.
E. A. HITCHCOCK,
·Major General Volunteers, Commanding, ~c.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, 7TH ARMY CORPS,
Fort Monroe, Jnue 24, 1863.
CoLONEL: I enclose to you for vour information copies of correspondence in relation to
exchange of citizen prisoners, and which some time ago were submitted to the Secretary of
War, and has his approval.
You will see how impracticable at present exchanges of citizens are, and how little hope there
is of any speedy removal of obstacles. The only prospect I can now see of such removal is
a pressure upon the confederate authorities by the friends of the citizen prisoners we hold.
It required six months' hard labor for me to succeed in effecting the previous exchanges or
releases of our citizens held by the confederates.
I would recommend that you send here no more confederate citizens until I inform you of
some prospects of obtaining equivalents for them.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. H. LUDLOW,
Lieutenant Colonel and Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.
Colonel WM. HOFFMAN, Commissary General of Prisoners.
I send also copies of correspondence in relation to threatened retaliation on officers, which
has also received the approval of the Secretary of War.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, \VAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Virginia, May 22, 1863.
SIR: In several of your iate communications you have appealed to me for the release of
political prisoners held by us. I am ready to deliver every one of them when you do the
same charity. Until then not one of them shall be released except at our own pleasure. You
asked in a late communication for the release of the sheriff of Bourbon county. Are you aware
that you now hold some half dozen or more harmless and inoffensive old men as .hostages,
whom you do not even pretend to release, and yet ask the sheriff's deliverance 1 You have
now thousands of helpless non-combatants in your prisons, not arrested as dangerous persons to your armies, but incarcerated because it is supposed they are loyal to their own country.
Their number is increasing every day. I will listen to no proposition for the release of
non-combatants that is not based upon the deli?JM"Y of all whom you have in custody, coupled
tnith some distinct written understanding as to f1tture conduct in respect to such captures. If
this is not agreeable let God save the right. I hope there will be no further mistake between
us in regard to this matter. I trust I have made myself sufficiently distinct.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. OULD, Agent of Exchange.
Lieutenant Colonel WM. H. LUDLOW, Agent of Exchange.
NoTE.-The passage underscored in this letter refers to a claim on the part o£ the rebels
that the governr:::ent should not only release all non-combatants held as prisoners on account of the war, but should enter into an agreement to make no more arrests of that char·
acter; the effect of which would have been to relieve all citizens engaged in treason andre-·
hellion from all proceedings, as if no treason had been or could be committed.
E. A. HITCHCOCK,
Commissioner of Exchange
CoNFEDERTAE STATES oF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Virginia, May 22, J 863.
SIR: I perceive by the northern papers that Captains McGrow and Corbin were shot to
death with musketry on Friday, the 15th instant, at or near Sandusky, Ohio.
'l'bese were the cases which I brought to your attention when last I saw you. These men
were duly authorized to recruit within the limits of Kentucky. They were tried by a court69w
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martial u1-on the charge of recruiting within your lines. Th•y were sentenced to be shot,
and that sentence was approved by General Burnside and President Lincoln The confederate government has ordered that two captains now in our custody shall be selected for
execution in retaliation for this gross barbarity. The order will be speedily executed. Your
papers refer to other cases of parties condemned to death upon the same eharge, they are some
five or six in number. In view of the awful vortex into whieh things are plunging, I give
you notice that in the event of the execution of these persons, retaliations to an equal extent
at ]east will be visited upon your own officers, and. if that is found ineffectual, the number
will be increased. The Great Ruler of nations must judge who is responsible for the initia'
tion of this chapter of horrors.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. OULD,
Agent of Exchange.
Lieutenant Colonel WM. H. LUDLOW, Agent of Exchange.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT oF VIRGINIA, 7TH ARMY CoRPS,
Fort Monroe, May 25, 1863.
SIR: In reply to your communication of the 22~ in relation to citizen prisoners, I have to
state that I have demanded them, and not as you informed me '' appealed to you for them;"
you probably, however, mean the same thing. I have demanded them because I have delivered to you their equivalents with the understanding that you were to release them. I
bring to your mind the cases of Lewis and Scully; you distinctly and without reservation
told me that these men should be delivered on the day following the delivery to you of a
large number of your c.itizen prisoners. Their names were especially mentioned, and I have
not yet received them. I shall deliver to you no more political or citizen prisoners except at
our own pleasure, and no such agreement or understanding as you propose will be for a moment entertained.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. H. LUDLOW,
Lieutenant Colonel and Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.
Ron. RoBERT OULD,
Agent for Exchange of Prisoners.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, 7TH ARMY CORPS,
Fort Mon1·oe, Va., May 25, 1863.
SIR: Captains McGrow and Corbin were executed upon conviction of being spies. They
were also guilty ofrecruiting ·within our lines. Without waiting to know the facts or evidence
in these cases, for you have admitted that you were acting on mere general newspaper statements, which give neither facts nor evidence, orders have been given, as you inform me,
that two of our officers now in your custody are to be selected for execution in retaliation for
what you term "gross barbarity," and that the order will be speedily executed. I give you
formal notice that for each officer so executed one of your officers in our hands wm be immediately put to death, and if this number be not sufficient it will be increased. The United
States government has been most lenient in their treatment of prisoners who have fallen into
their hands. This leniency has been abused, and by your own admissions your officers and
men have come within our lines tor the purpose ostensibly of recruiting, but really as spies.
'rhey have been taken in citizens' dress, under all the circumstances clearly surrounding the
character of a spy, and in accepting such service they have taken upon themselves all its
responsibility and the consequences of capture, and yet you propose to select brave and honorable officers who have been captured in fair and open fight on the battle-field and barbarously put them to death in retaliation for the just punishment of spies.
I call to your mind, among numerous other instances the barbarous execution of the brave
men, who, under orders of General Mitchell, captured a locomotive and train and penetrated
with it into the interior of Georgia, for the sole purpose, as was and is well known, of destroying the railroad communications. They were executed as spies, and yet the United
States government bas not retaliated for this act.
Were I in your place, I should hardly dare to invoke the judgment of the Great Ruler of
nations upon the responsibility for the initiation ef this what you most properly term chapter
of horrors.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. H. LUDLOW,
Lieutenant Colonel and Agent for Exchange of P1·isoners.
Ron. ROBERT 0ULD,
Aentfor Exchange of Prisoners.
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[Telegram.-Sent 4.45 p. m.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, June 29, 1865.
Colonel LUDLOW, Commissioner of Exchange, Fortress Monroe:
You will exert yourself to procure the release of Richardson and Browne, Tribune reporters, captured at Vicksburg . Browne's health is said to be failing. If they are held as
hostages, or for any special reason, ascertain and report it.
EDWIN M. STANTON.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., February 5, 1864.
Sm.: A. D. Richardson and Julius Browne, correspondents of theN ew York Tribune, are
said to be prisoners in Richmond. I am induced to believe that we have some prisoners at
Nashville available for their exchange.
Will you be so good as to inform mew hetheryou can accomplish the release of the Tribune
correspondents, and what you desire may be done for that object?
Very respectfully, yom obedient servant,
E. A. HITCHCOCK,
Major General U. S. Vols., Comm'r for Exchange of Prisoners.
.
Major General B. F. BUTLER,
Commanding, S,c., Fort Monroe.

OFFICE OF CoMMISSIONER FOR ExcHANGE,
Fm·t Mom·oe, Va., February 9, 1864.
SIR: Your communication of the 3d instant was received. I shall make an effort tonegotiate an exchange of the New York Tribune correspondents with the rebel authorities by
the next flag-of-truce boat.
I have the honor, general, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major General and Commissioner for Exchange.
Major General E. A. HLTCHCOCK,
Commissioner for Exchange, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,
OFFICE COMM1Sl5IONER FOR EXCHANGE,
Fort Monroe, Va., April4, 1864.
SIR: Your communication in regard to James M. Brown, newspaper correspondentt has
beE-n received.
Application will be made to Commissioner Ould to procure his exchange.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major General and Commissioner for Exchange.
Colonel W. HoFFMAN,
Commissary General of Prisoners, Washington, D. C.
NOTE.-This was in answer to a renewed effort to effect a release in this case.
E. A. H., Commissioner of Exchange.

[Telegram.-Sent 4.2 p. m.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, November 11, 1863.
Brigadier General MEREDITH, Fortress Monroe:
You are authorized to transmit any funds that may be fmnishecl to you for the use of our
prisoners in Richmond, taking a receipt from the person to whom you deliver them for
transmission, and senuing a copy thereof to this department.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
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[Telegram.-Sent 6 p. m.]
WAR DEPAR'.rMENT,
Washington City, November 11, 1863.

C. C. Fur.TON, Esq., Baltimore, Maryland:
General Meredith has been instructed to transmit any funds that may be supplied for the
use of our prisoners in Richmond. The government cannot, of course, be responsible that
they will reach their destinaion Those who s9nd funds must run that risk.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

[Telegram.-Sent 11.30 a. m.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, December 2, 1863.
Brigadier General MEREDITH, Fortress Monroe, Virginia:
Yesterday I directed General Hitchcock to ascertain from you, first, whether supplies furnished by this government for our prisoners at Richmond were received and forwarded by
the rebel agent; and, second, whether supplies furnished by State agents would he received
by the rebel agents and forwarded. No answer has been received to these inquiries. You
will please immediately make a direct answer to both questions.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
I

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, February 10, 1864.
I do not think it expedient to send a flag-of-truce boat, with women and children, nor to
give advertisement in Baltimore, Washington, and elsewhere, at present, as you propose to
do. If there be any residents of Norfolk whom you want to send away for cause you are
authQrizod to do so, but not to put other persons across the lines.
Your proposed declaration of the exchange is, in the opinion of this department, irregular,
and ought not to be made, because it would be seized upon as a justification of the irregular
and improper course pursued by the rebels; and besides, from its indefiniteness, would not
afford protection to our own troops, and would lead to serious embarrassment in the final
arrangement of exchange, if one can be made. The reasons for this opinion are more particularly set forth in the reply furnished · to you by Major General Hitchcock upon this subject. I think that, upon consideration of that report, you will yourself be satisfied that
the proposed declaration of exchange is premature, and would afford serious advantages to
the rebels in the present controversy.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secntary of War.
Major General B. F. BuTLER, Fortress Monroe, Virginia.
True copy:

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, Feb1'UaTy 14, 1864.
Yesterday's Intelligencer contains an account of a recent interview between Mr. Fulton,
of the Baltimore American, and Commissioner Ould, at City Point, in which the latter stated
~hat, with a view of ameliorating the condition of the prisoners on both sides, he had made a
proposition to this government, two weeks previous, that a number of our surgeons should
be allowed to pass through their line.; to visit and remain with our prisoners wherever they
might be, and with full liberty of the City, and permission to go to any point, when necessary
for the performance of their duties. They would also be allowed to act as commissaries for
the prisoners, and to order through the lines such stores as they might deem neeessary, and
to receive and distribute them. In return he bad asked that the same privilege be granted
to their sice, and expressed surprise at not reeeiving any reply.
No proposition of this nature having been received here, the Secretary of War directs that
you report whether that or any other proposition from that source, not submitted to this
department, has been received by you; and if so, to submit them without delay.
By order" of the Secretary of War:
ED. R. S. CANBY, Brigadier Gcneml, A. A. G.
Major General B. F. BUTLER,
Comrnandi·, .g Department Virginia and North CaTalina, Fort Monroe, ViTginia.
'l'rue copy:

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

1093

[Telegram.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, March 10, 1864.
Major General B. F. BuTLER, Fortress Monroe:
You will please furnish to me a report of the number of prisoners delivered by you to the
enemy for exchange since you entered upon your present command, with the respective dates
of delivery, designating the names and rank of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and the names of the privates. Upon receiving the rolls, with this designation, Colonel
Hoffman, commissary of prisoners, will be ordered to designate the like number of our offieers
and men who may be declared exchanged. Those to be declared exchanged will be taken
from those who have been longest on parole. This is the mode in which declarations of exchange, under present circumstances, should be made.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War
True copy:

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

[Telegram. ]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, February 29, 1864.
Major General Bl.!TLER, Fortre-ss Monroe:
You may exercise your own discretion as to the time and number of officers to b~ sent
for exchange. Representations made by escaped officers led this department to the conclusion that if one or two hundred officers were sent to City Point by you, and offered in exchange for the same number of ours, the rebels would not dare to refuse; hence the order
was given you. But if you deem it more advantageous to the service to delay its execution,
you may do so.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
True copy:

A. E. H. JOHNSON.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Infield, Cnlpeper C. H., Va., April 17, 1864.
I have the honor herewith to enclose for your information a copy of my letter of instructions to Major General B. F. Butler, commanding department of Virginia and North Carolina, touching the exchange of prisoners.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obediel).t servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
•.
Hon. E. M. STAN'l'ON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Infield, Culpepe1' C. H., Va., April17, 1864.
GENERAL: Your report of negotiations with Mr. Ould, Confederate States agent, touching
the exchange of prisoners, has been referred to me by the Secretary of War, with directions
to furnish you such instructions on the subject as I may deem proper.
After a careful examination of your report, the only points on which I deem instructions
necessary are. 1. Touching the validity of the paroles of the prisoners captured at Vicksburg and Port
Hudson.
2. The status of colored prisoners.
As to the.first, no arrangement for the exchange of prisoners will be acceded to that does
not fully recognize the validity of these paroles, and provide for the release to us of a sufficient
number of prisoners now held by the confederate authorities to cancel any balance that may
be in our favor by virtue of these paroles. Until there are released to us an equal number of
officers and men as were captured and paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, not another
confederate prisoner of war will be paroled or exchanged.
As to the second, no distinction whatever will be made in the exchange between white and
eolored prisoners; the only question beinD', were they, at the time of their capture, in the
military service of the United States. If they were, the same terms as to treatment while
prisoners, and conditions of release and exchange, must be exacted and had iu. the case of
colored soldiers as iu. the case of white soldiers.

,•
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Non-acquiescence by the confederate authorities in both or either of these propositions
will be regarded as a refusal on their part to agree to the further exchange of prisoners, and
will be so treated by us.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
Major General B. F. BUTLER,
Corn'dg Dept. of Virginia and North Carolina, Fortress Monroe, Virginia.
[ Telegram.-Sent 3.45 p. m.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, }}Jay 4, 1864.
Major General BUTLER, Fortress Monroe:
The commissary of prisoners is preparing a declaration of exchange, which will be made
at once.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
True copy:
A. E. H. JOHNSON.
[Received cipher 7 a. m., August 22.]
UNTED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT,
City Point, Va., 5 p. rn., August 21, 1864.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:
Please inform General Foster that on no circumstances will he be authorized to make exchange of prisoners of war.
Exchanges simply re-enforce the enemy at once, whilst we do not get the benefit of those
received for two or three months, and lose the majority entirely. I telegraph this from just
hearing that some five or six hundred more prisoners had been sent to General Fsoter.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
[Telegram.-Received in cipher7 a.m., August 26.1
CITY PoiNT, VA., 7.30 p. m.,
August 25, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Cldef of Staff:
I see by the Richmond Examiner of to-day that General Canby is about exchanging the
prisoners captured at Fort Gaines. I hope General Canby will be instructed to make no
more exchanges. It is giving the enemy re-enforcements at a time when they are of immediate
importance to him.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General •

•
STEAMER NEW YORK, FLAG OF TRUCE,
Varina, Va., August 22, 1864.
SIR: Having been informed that Major Nathan Goff, a federal officer, is held by the confederate authorities in close confinement, said to be in retaliation for a prisoner similarly held
by the United States authorities, in the person of Major Thomas D. Armsly, Confederate
States army. I now propose the release and delivery to their respective governments of each
of the above-named parties, and in case you accept this proposition, will deliver to you, in
my next trip, Major Arm sly. Will you do it ?
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN E. MULFORD,
Major and Assistant Agent for Exchange.
Ron. R. OULD,
Agent for Exc!tange, Ric!trnond, Va.
(The following indorsement on the preceding letter.)

AUGUST 22, 1864.
I accept this proposition. I would further suggest that all difficulties connected with the
detention of officers and men, on both sides, in close confinement or irons, can be satisfactorily
adjusted on the basis herein indicated. Let all prisoner of war on each side be released from
confinement (dose) or irons, as the case may be, and either placed in the condition of other
prisoners, or sent to their respective homes for their equivalents.
R. OULD, Agent for Exchange.
True copy:
JOHN E. MULFORD,
Major and Assistant Agent for Exchange.
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WASHINGTON CITY, D. c.,
September 3, 1864.
SIR: The proposition of Colonel Ould of the 22d ultimo, indorsed upon a communication
hom yourself, transmitted to this office in the following words, to wit, that "all prisoners of
war, on each side, be released from confinement ( clvse) or irons as the case may be, and
either placed in the condition of other prisoners, or sent to their respective homes for their
equivalents," has been submitted this morning to the Secretary of War, who directs that it
be accepted.
Orders have been sent to Colonel Hoffman, Commissary General of Prisoners, to give immediate effect on our part to tHis accepted proposition, and you are requested so to advise Colonel
Ould, in order that no time may be lost in carrying the proposition into effect on his part.
There has been some delay here in order to make the necessary inquiries to ascertain the indi vi duals to be affected by the proposition, and I learn of but three prisoners on our side in the conc1ition presumed by the proposition, to wit: Daniel Davis, a lieutenant under sentence of a military court; Frank Battles, a captain under special instructions from the Commissary General
of Prisoners; and William McBlair, temporarily confined for an attempt to elude a hospital
guard. You can furnish Colonel Ould with this statement as an answer to his inquiry on the
subject.
We shall expect, of course, to be informed within reasonable time of the full completion of
this business on the part of Colonel Ould, and that all prisoners of war held in close confinement or in irons, in the south, are placed in the condition of other prisoners.
I take this occasion to remark that Colonel Ould appears to have been under a misapprehension with regard to the number of prisoners of war held in close confinement on this side,
as well as the reasons governing particular cases.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. A. HITCHCOCK,
Major Gen. Vols., Com'r for Exchange of Prisoners.
Major JOHN E. MULFORD.
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Va., September 12, 1864.
SIR: Your communication of the lOth instant, accepting a proposition made by me some
time ago, that "all prisoners of war on each side be released from confinement (close) or
irons, as the case may be, and either placed in the condition of other prisoners or sent to their
respective homes for their equivalents," has been received. You dJ not state whether these
parties are to be mutually surrendered, or to be held as prisoners of war. I would prefer that
they shall all be delivered, the party having the excess to receive proper equivalents. Please
inform me what is the understanding in this respect.
·
You are very much mistaken in supposing that there are only three persons held by the
federal authorities in close confinement or irons. Besides those named by you, there are
George P. Sims, W. P. Burgess, John Marrs, and Thomas M. Campbell, at Johnson's island,
and Captain Gordon at Fort Delaware. I was also notified that on the H3th of July last,
the commanding officer at Fort Delaware had been ordered by the Secretary of vVar to
place Captain James P. Brown, company K, Tennessee cavalry, 1st Lieutenant B. I. Brailford, company E, 1st Texas, 1st Lieutenant R. H. C. Bailey, company A, Foster's cavalry,
and 1st Lieutenant A. W. Dogier, company F, 6th South Carolina cavalry, in close confinement (in cells.) I am quite confident, also, that there is anum ber of our officers and soldiers
in close confinement in irons or at hard labor at Alton. I think some will also be found at
St.Louis and in other prisons east and west.
Since the receipt of your communication, I have received one from General Butler in relation
to the same subject-matter. He proposes to except from the operation of the agreement those
under charges or regularly convicted, before some competent tribunal, of offences lmown to
municipal laws, the laws of nations or of war. This offer I cannot accept. Have you one
confederate soldier in close confinement or in irons, who is not under charges or has not been
regularly convicted? Is there any probability that we will ever agree as to the true interpretation of the laws of nations or of war? We have not yet, and never will. I have no objection to the proposition as far as it relates to municipal laws, for the confederate government
has always held that soldiers are responsible to the proper authorities for crimes committed
by them either before or after capture.
I sincerely hope that in this matter we will have no misunderstanding. It is my desire
that all on both sides who are in close confinement or in irons, shall be immediately released
and put in the condition of other prisoners of war. I make no exception save when the
officer or soldier has offended against municipal laws. I will thank you to communicate the
proposition contained in this letter to General Hitchcock, and let me know at an early date
whether it is accepted by your government.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
RO. OULD, Agent of Exchange.
Major JOHN E. MULFORD,
Assistant Agent of Exchange.
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NoTE.-The difficulties implied or stated in this letter were all removed by order of the
Secretary of War in a general authority, which was afterwards carried out by specific orders
from Lieutenant General Grant, the object being, at every possible sacrifice, to relieve as
many Union prisoners as could be reached by the measure.
E. A. HITCHCOCK 1
Major Gen. Vols., Corn'r of Exchange.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, October 4, 1864.
By direction of the President a correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and
Mr. Mallory, in relation to the exchange of naval prisoners, has been referred to you, with
authority, in your discretion, to arrest or consummate the exchange under the supervision of
General Butler, and in accordance with the principles maintained by him in his correspondence with Mr. Ould. The correspondence, with a letter of instructions to you from the President, will be forwarded by special messenger.
EDWIN M STANTON, Secretary of War.
Lieutenant General GRANT.
A true copy:
A. E. H. JOHNSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, October 5, 1864.
I enclose you a copy of a correspondence in regard to a contemplated exchange of naval
prisoners through your lines, and not very distant from your headquarters. It only came to
the knowledge of the War Department and myself yesterday, and it gives us some uneasiness; I therefore send it to you with the statement, that as the numbers to be ex changed under
it are small, and so much bas already been done to effect the exchange, I hope you may find
it consistent to let it go forward under the general supervision of General Butler, and particularly in reference to the points he holds vital in exchanges; still you are at liberty to
arrest the whole operation if in your judgment the public good requires it.
Yours, truly,
A. LINCOLN.
Lieutenant General GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STA'TES ARMIES,
Washington, D. C., Jarma1·y 21, 1865.
SIR : I have authorized Colonel Mulford, agent of exchange, to renew negotiations for the
exchange of all prisoners now held by either party. The first interview between our agent
and Colonel Onld, rebel agent, has already been had, No doubt but what an arrangement
will be entered into. Indeed, on the strength of that interview, an exceedingly limited one
is now going on near Richmond.
Yours, truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieut. General .
We are sending supplies to our prisoners at least weekly. They arc received by officers
of our own selection, 1eleased federal prisoners, who distribute them as directed.
U.S. G.
Ron. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"WAR DEPARTMENT, October 15, 1864.
GENERAL: A communication signed Robert Ould, agent of exchange, dated October 7,
instant, mailed at Fortress Monroe, and addressed to me, is herewith referred to you, together
with a paper that accompanied it, bearing the same signature, dated October 6, and addressed
to Major John E. Mulford, assistant agent of exchange. You are authorized and instructed
to take such action in reference to such papers, and the subject-matter to which they relate,
as you may deem best adapted to the relief of our soldiers held as prisoners by the rebels.
You are also authorized to take any steps that you may deem proper to effect the releas;; aud
exchange of our soldiers, and all loyal persons, held as prisoners by the rebel authorities.
It is the desire of the President that no efforts, consistent with national safety and honor,
be spared to effect the prompt release of all soldiers and loyal persons in captivity to the
rebels as prisoners of war, or on any other grounds ; and the subject is committed to you,
with full authority to act in the premises as you shall deem right and proper.
By order of the President:
EDWIN M. STANTON, Sec1·etary of War.
Lieutenant General GRANT.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

1097

CoNFEDERATE STATES oF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Virginia, October 7, 1864.
SIR: On the 6th instant I addressed the accompanying letter to Major Jno. E. Mulford,
assistant agent of exchange. I think it proper to notify you that I have done so, in order
that you may be made acquainted at an early date with the views of the confederate authorities in relation to the matters to which that communication refer:;.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
RO. OULD, Agent of Exchan!(e.
Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
OCTOBER 15, 1864.
Referred to Lieutenant General Grant, with authority to act up<m the subject in such manner as he may deem proper, and with authority to take such measures as he deems consistent
with national honor and safety for the release of all soldiers and loyal persons held by the
rebels in captivity.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Ser:rctary of War.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond,' Virginia, October 6, 1864.
SIR: As it appears to be more than probable that a large number of prisoners will be held
in captivity by both belligerents during the coming winter, the cause of humanity to which,
though foes, we all owe a common allegiance, demands that some measures should be
adopted for the relief of such as are held by either party. To that end, I propose that each
government shall have the privilege of forwarding for the use and comfort of such of its
prisoners as are held by the other necessary articles of food and clothing. The manner of
their distribution, with all proper safeguards, can be agreed upon in the uture. A fair reciprocity is only asked. The articles that can be mutually sent can also be made the subject
of agreement. I propose that each may send necessary clothing and blankets, and rations
of meat, bread, coffee, sugar, tobacco, pickles, and vinegar. I would suggest that the receipt of the stores and their distribution among the prisoners for whom they are intended
might be authenticated by the certificate of the senior officer at the respective camps or depots. In order to carry out this arrangement with effectiveness, it would be necessary that
we should make purchases outside the lim1ts of the Confederate States, and then to ship
them to one of your ports. It would be impracticable to send the stores by your flag-of-truce
boats. Of course the supplies referred to in this communication are to be considered as being
in addition to such rations as are furnished by the government which has the prisoners in
custody. Neither belligerent is to be discharged from the obligation of feeding and clothing
the prisoners in its charge.
This is a matter of such grave importance that I sincerely trust an early and favorable
response will be made.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
RO. OULD, Agent of Exchange.
Major J OH:N E. MULFORD,
Assistant Agent of Exchange.

CITY PoiNT, YA., January 13, 1865.
CoLONEL: The letter of JudgeR. Ould, agent of exchange, Confederate States, of date
"Richmond, September 12, 1864," in answer to yours of the LOth of the same month, accepting the propositions made by him under date of August 22, 1864, that '' all prisoners of war
on each side be released from confinement, close or irons, as the case may be, and either
placed in the condition of other prisoners of war or sent to their respective homes for equivalent," bas been duly referred to me for my consideration and action, and I am of the opinion
that the proposition as made by Judge Ould, and accepted by the government through you,
is just and equa1ly fair and beneficial to both sides. You will, therefore, eommuuicate to
Judge Ould, without delay, that our government stands by its acceptance of his proposition
hereintofore referred to, without exceptiug from its operations any of the cases proposed by
General Butler aucl referred to in his (Judge Ould's) letter of September 12, that the parties
for whose release said agreement was made shall all be mutually delivered, the party having
the excess to receive proper equivalents, and that you are authorized to carry the agreement
into immediate effect on our side.
Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General,
Colonel JonN E. MuLFORD,
Assistant Agent of Exchange.
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[Telegram.-Received 12.20 p.m., 15th.]

CITY POINT, VA., January 15, 1865.
Major General N. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff:
Under the arrangement for the release and exchange of prisoners of war set forth in the
letter of which the following is a copy, Judge Ould has notified Colonel Mulford, assistant
agent of exchange, that orders have gone out for the release of all prisoners coming within
said agreement held by their side. You will therefore please direct all prisoners that come
within said agreement, held by us, to be released and sent to Fort Monroe, there to be detained subject to the orders of Colonel Mulford.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

[Telegram.-Received 6.10 p. m., January 16.]
CITY POINT, VA., January 16, 1865.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff:
My order to send prisoners to Fort Monroe does not include the five hundred sent to Morris
island.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 21, 1865.
SIR: In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 21st December,
calling for the correspondence in reference to the exchange of prisoners, I have the honor to
submit herewith the report of the Adjutant General, together with such communications upon
the subject as have not heretofore been published.
The correspondence of Major General Butler details the action in regard to the exchange of
prisoners under the authority conferred upon him by the order of the War Department.
On the 15th October the subject of excha,nges was placed under the direction of Lieutenant
General Grant, with full authority to take any steps he might deem proper to effect the release
and exchange of our soldiers and of loyal persons held as prisoners by the rebel authorities.
He was instructed that it was the desire of the President that no efforts, consistent with national safety and honor, should be spared to effect the prompt release of all soldiers and loyal
persons in captivity to the rebels as prisoners of war, or on any other grounds, and the subJect was committed to him with full authority to act .!n the premises as he should deem right
and proper. Under this authority, the subject of exchanges has from that time continued in
his charge, and such efforts have been made as he deemed proper to obtain the release of our
prisoners.
An arrangement was made for the supply of our prisoners-the articles to be distributed
under the direction of our own officers, paroled for that purpose ; and the corresponding privilege was extended to the rebel authorities. In order to afford every facility for relief, special
exchanges have been offered, whenever desired, on behalf of our prisoners. Such exchanges
have in a few instances been permitted by the rebel authorities, but in many others they have
been denied.
A large number of exchanges, including all the sick, has been effected within a recent period. The Commissary General of Prisoners has been directed to make a detailed report of all
the exchanges that have been accomplished since the general exchange ceased. It will b'e
furnished to the House of Representatives as soon as completed.
The last communication of General Grant gives reason to believe that a full and complete
exchange of all prisoners will speedily be made. It also appears from his statement that
weekly supplies are furnished to our prisoners and distributed by officers of our own selection. His letter is subjoined, as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
" Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.
" SIR: I have authorized Colonel Mulford, agent of exchange, to renew negotiations for
the exchange of all prisoners now held by either party. The first interview between our agent
and Colonel Ould, rebel agent, has already been had. No doubt but that an arrangement
will be entered into. Indeed, on the strength of that interview, an exchange-limited oneis now going on near Richmond.
"Yours truly,
"U. S. GRANT, Leutenant General.
'Ron. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
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"P. S.-We are sending supplies to our prisoners at least weekly. They are received by
officers of our own selection, (released federal prisoners,) who distribute them as directed.

"U. S. G."
Supplies furnished by friends of prisoners are also forwarded for distribution in the same
manner. The nature of the supplies authorized to be furnished by individuals is specified in
the annexed order of the department.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
Ron. SCHUYLER CoLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

[Received 12.25 a. m., 6th February, in cipher.]
CITY POINT, VA., February 5, 1865-11.30 p. m.
Will you please say to the President that Lieutenant Markleit has been released from prison
and is now on his way north.
Arrang·ements for exchange of all prisoners are now complete and exchanges will go on
rapidly. All but two of those who were in close confinement in Richmond are now on the
steamer New York.
I am also in receipt of communication from General Hayes, acknowledging receipt of supplies of clothing for our prisoners, and the completion of arrangE)ments for transportation and
distribution.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General,
Ron. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
NOTE.-This has the appearance of being a special case, but it was a trial case, persevered
in with the view of securing the release of all of the same class, and which was accomplished.
E. A. HITCHCOCK,
Major Gen. of Vols., Com'r of Exchange.

rTelegram.-Received in cipher, 2 p. m., 16th.]
CITY POINT, VA., February 16, 1865-12 m.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff:
Our prisoners will probably be delivered to us as fast as they possibly can be got through
without reference to the numbers receivetl from us. To expedite their delivery I have authorized those west of the Mississippi to be delivered to any point on the river, those in the
southwest at Mobile, and those in North Carolina at Wilmington or Richmond. Their equivalents will be delivered on the .James river.
Please notify Canby and Schofield of this and direct them to receive all prisoners delivered
to them. General Canby had better send all that are delivered on the Mississippi to Benton
barracks to be paid and furloughed. Those received at Mobile can be sent either there or to
Annapolis, according to the direction transports may be taking at the time of their delivery.
Sch0field of course will send all he receives toA nnapolis.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

[Telegram.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, Ap1·il 9, 1865.

Lieutenant General GRANT :
Some thousands of our prisoners in the hands of the rebels are still undelivered. Can any
arrangement be made to hasten their release?
EDWIN M. STANTON, ~ecretary of War.
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Report

of Lieutenant

General U. S. Grant.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U~ITED STATES,
"fVasl~ington, D. C., July 22,

1865.
SIR : I have the honor to submit the following report of tl1e operations of the
armies of the United States from th~ date of my appointment to command the
same:
From an early period in the rebellion I bad been impressed with the idea
that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into
the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were
far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we bad a vast territory with a
population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and milroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.
rr'he armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert,
like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to
great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops
from east to west, re-enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough
large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and
do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question
whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by
these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.
From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that
would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and
south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.
I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable
against the arm~d force of the enemy; preventing him from using the sam~
force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and
the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carry·
ing on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of
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the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there
:should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal f:lection of
our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.
These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen,
and who have to pay the pecuniary 'cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I
have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what
I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country.
At the date when this report begins the situation of the contending forces
was about as follows : The Mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal
troops from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was
also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the MissiRsippi, north
of that stream. A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote from the river,
were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the
Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, 'i.ouisiana, and
Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of
prob~bly not less than 80,000 effective men that could have been brought into
the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The
let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than
one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the onehalf, or 40,000 men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri,
Arkansas, and along the Mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much
of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep
navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it.
To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of
'rennesSP.P.. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Georgi.a, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force
at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac river, a small area
about the mouth of James river covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort
Monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the Potomac lying along the
Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had
been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina;
Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal,
in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and
Pen8acola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. 'The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General
Sherman and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory
occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy.
Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to ,guard every foot of
road or river used in supplying our armies. In the soath a reign of military
despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a
soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost
his entire strength into the field.
The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi
into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. LRe and J. E. Johnston, his
ablest and best generals. 'l,he army commanded by Lee occupied the south
bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched,
covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the
Potomac. 'I,he army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position
at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great
importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major General W. 'T.
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Sherman. In addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in northeast Mississippi ; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah
valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports
where we had no foothold upon land.
'These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the
main objective points of the campaign.
Major General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the
military division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east
of the Mississippi river to the Alleghanies, and the department of Arkansas,
west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating
against Johnston.
Major General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the army
of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements
of all our armies.
General Sl'\erman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break
it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy,,in his
front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability,
while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him if it was in the power
of the army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions were not
given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign,
and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest
extent possible.
Major General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up R ed river against
Shreveportt Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my appointment
to command,) was notified by me on the 15th of March of the importance it was
that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found
that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would
send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the
abandonment of the main object of the Red river expedition, for this force was
necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition prove
successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red river with such force as he
might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood
of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory
unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be
a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would
be if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other
movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from
Arkansas, as suggested by him, (General Banks,) instead of a demonstration,
as Steele thought advisable.
On the 21st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions,
he was instructed as follows :
"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence
of the Red river to General Steele and the navy.
'' 2d. That you abandon Texas entirely with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande.
This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken
from the colored troops.
"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi river, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can be resumed west of the river. According to your last return this would give
you a force of over thirty thousand (:ffective men with which to move against Mobile. To
this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here
stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say,
concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against
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Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in
making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two Qr more iron-elacls
will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which
to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his co-operation,
and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should
be your base, but, from your long service in the Gulf department, you will know best about
the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elFewbere, untl you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is, that you commence the
concer,Lration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secresy of what you intend doing,
and start at the earliest possible moment.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"MttJOr General N. P. BANKS."

Major General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective
point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his movement two plans
presented themselves : One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his
right flank; the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee
would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid.
But if we took this route all we did would have to be done whilst the rations
we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could
not be directed how to co-operate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station
could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York o:r
James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.
The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major General B. :I!...,. Butler:
"FORT MONROE, VA., April 2, 1864.
"GENERAL: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a
day as practicable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all the armies in the field, as
far as this object can be accomplished.
"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many
units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken fi·om the
enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving
to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby
reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of
a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being
the greater ob~ -acts towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is
desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington
with the army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it
impossible tu unite these forces at the beginning· of any move. I propose, therefore, what
comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The army of the Potomac will act
from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces
from your command that can be spared trom garrison duty-I should say not less than twenty
thousand effective men-to operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being your
objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men ti·om
South Carolina, under Major General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major
General W. P. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field
from your own department.
"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops
on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other
forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.
"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify,
or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as
you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.
"The fact that has already been stated-that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point
and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the Potomac-must
be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the
James river as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in
Richmond, the army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the tw{)
armies would become a unit.
"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however
you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you so as to cut the railroad about Hick's
ford about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.
" You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders details and instructions you may give for the execution of this OTder.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
'Major General B. F. BUTLER."
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On the 1eth, these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the 19th, in
order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of General Meade,
he was informed that I expected him to move from ],ort Monroe the same day
that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th
of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and Richmond if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I
would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the
James river; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on
the south side so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I
would form the junction there; thllt circumstances might make this course
advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far
up the so1,1th side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the
receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least
detain as large a force as possible.
In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was
desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from
the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for
the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies
operating against them.
A very considerable force under command of Major General Sigel was so
held for the protection of West Virginia, and the fi·ontiers of Maryland and
Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields
without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the
enemy, they could act directly to their front and give better protection than if
lying idle in garrison. By such movement they would either compel the enemy
to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication,
or he would lose them.
General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into
two expeditions, to move fi·om Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel
was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly
and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about
seven thousanil men. rl'he one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar
creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threat-en
the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while
General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and
move down the ':rennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, des~roy
ing the New river bridge and the salt-works at Saltville, V a.
Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were de1ayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and the roads
favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later
than the 4th of May.
My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture
the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should
succeed in his movement against Richmond, aR that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired
result in the east. H he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting,
either to compel Lee to retreat or to so cripple him that he could not detach a
large force to go north and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It
was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, bef'ore starting on
the campaign, that it · was my intention to put both their armies south of the
James river, in case of faiiure to destroy Lee without it.
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Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at l!..,orir Monroe,
and in convr.rsation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession
of Pet~rsburg and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible.
Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was
re-enforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the army of
the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach· from
hi~ army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to
the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of
James river.
I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as
possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the army of the
Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him 1 and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. 'rhe campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His
commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him , in rank, has
drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle
him to, and which he would otherwise have received.
The movement of the army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across
the Rapidan, (the 5th and 6th corps crossing at Germania ford, and the 2d
corps at United States ford, the cavalry, under Major General8heridan, moving
in advance,) with the greate!.' part of its trains, numbering about 4,000 wagons,
meeting with but slight opposition. 'I'he average distance travelled by the
troops that day was about twelve miles. 'I'his 1 regarded as a great success,
and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained,
that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large~ well-appointed and
ably-commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a
hostile country and protE:octed. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the 5th,
Major General G. K. vVarren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenehmentt'l near Mine Run. 'rhe battle raged furiously all day, the
whole army beir;g brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon
the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the
road s, was done with commendable promptness.
General Burnside, with the 9th corps, was, at the time the army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock
river and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with inRtructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was
secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This
crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the
morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness
tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles,
crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large
proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,
unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was
a remarkable march.
'l'he battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the Gth, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each
army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of
the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank,
capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But
the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the
morning of the 7th reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind
his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field.
From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied
him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwith70 w
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standing his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his
works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force betweei1 him
and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right
flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced towards Spottsylvan1a Court-House, the 5th corps moving on the most direct road. But the
enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line,
was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th General Warren met a force of
the enemy which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain
time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily
driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the
9th General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. rrhe 9th, lOth, and 11th were spent in manreuvring and
fighting, without decisive results. A-mong the killed on the 9th was that able
and distinguiBhed soldier Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the 6th
army corps. Major General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early
on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position.
The 2d corps, .Major ·General Hancock commanding, carried a salie.nt of his line,
capturing most of Johnston's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not
prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consl}med in
manreuvring and awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements from Washi11gton.
Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court-House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement
to the North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th. I.ate
in the afternoon of the 19th Bwell's corps came out of its works on our extreme
right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was
commenced. But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of
us, and took position behind it. The 5th corps reached the North Anna on the
afternoon of the ;23d, closely followed by the 6th corps. 'l'he 2d and 9th corps
got up about the same time, the 2d holding the railroad bridge and the 9th
lying between that and Jericho ford. General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposilion. Soon after getting
into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great
slaughter. On the 25th General Sheridan rejoined the army of the Potomac
from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the
depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies
of rations, and many miles of railroad track; recaptured about four hundrecl of
our men, on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the
enemy's cavalry at Yellow 1'avern; carried the first line of worl.;s around.
Richmond, (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault) re·
crossed to the north bank of the Chiekahominy at Meadow's Bridge, under
heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's lauding, on the James river,
where he communicated with General Butler. This mid had the effect of
drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, and making it comparatively
easy to guard our trains.
General Butler moved his main force up the James river, in pursuance of instructiQns, vn the 4th of .May, General Gillmore having joined him with the lOth
corps. At the same time he sent a force of 1,800 cavalry, by way of '\Vest
Point, to form a junction ·with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force
of 3,000 cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the
roads south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th he occupied, without
opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a
complete surprise. On the 6th he was in position with his main army, and
commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the
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Petersburg and Richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting.
On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, Ma.y 9, 1864.
"Our operations may be summed up in a few ·words. vVith I, 700 cavalry we have
aclvancecl up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely brought them to our
present posiLion. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets
towards Richmond.
''General Kautz with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same clay with our
movement up James river, forced the Blackwater, burned the railroad bridg·e at Stony creek,
below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's force at that point.
"\Ve have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got
a position which with proper supplies we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I
have ordered up the supplies.
"Beauregard with a large portion of his force was left south by the cutting of the railroads
by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing
and wounding many and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.
"General Grant will not be troubled with any further re-enforcements to L ee from Beauregard's force.
"BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
"Major Geneml.
"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secreta1·y of War."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of
the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small
loss. The time thus consumed from the Gth lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard
to collect his loose forceE in North and South Carolina and bring them to the
defence of those places. On the 16th the enemy attacked General Butler in
his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into
his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the
enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus coveriug his railroads, the city,
and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of
great Eecurity, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a compar::ttively small force of the enemy to hold it there.
On the 12th neneral Kautz with his cavalry was started on a raid against
the Danville railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Ohoht
stations, destroying them, the railroad track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence
crossing to the South Side road, struck it at Wilson's, vVellsville, and Black
and W bite stations, destroying the road and station-houses ; thence he proceeded
to City Point, which he reached on the 18th.
On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Entler, the
enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, ·attacked
Plymouth, N. 0., commanded by General H. vV. Wessels, and our gunboats
there, and after severe fighting the place was carried by assault and the entire
garrison and armament captured. 'l'he gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the
Miami disabled.
'rhe army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself
up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most if not all
the re-enforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the army of
the Potomac. In addition to this re-enforcement, a very considerable one,
probably not less than 15,000 men, was obtained by calling in the scattered
troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia.
'l'lle position at Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was 'difficult
to 0pcrate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all
available forceE~, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained, and accordingly, on the 22cl, 1 directed that they be sent forward, under command of
Major General W. :b~. Smith, to join the army of the Potomac.
On the 24th of May the 9th army corps, commanded by Major General A. E.
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Burnside, was assigned to the army of the Potomac, and from this time forward
constituted a portion of Major General Meade's command.
Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his
previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the
North Anna, and moved via Hanovertown to turn the enemy's position by his
right.
Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and
the 6th corps led the advance; crossed the Pamunky river at Hanovertown
after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a
severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Haw's shop. On t.he 29th
and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and
Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickabominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked
our left, but was repulsed with very considern.ble loss. Au attack was immediately ordered by General l\fPade along his whole line, which resultecl in
driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.
On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad
bridges over the South Anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved
by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which bad just arrived, via
White House, from General Butler's army.
On the 1st day of June an attack was made at 5 p. m. by the 6th corps and
the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the
enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps and in front of
General Smith. Dnring the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each
of the eorps not engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss
in every inEtance. That night he made several assaultR to regain what he bad
lost in the day, but failed. r.rhe ~d was spent in getting troops into position for
an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's
works, in the hope of driving him from his position. Iu this attempt our loss
was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively
light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James
which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses.
I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they
inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete
overthrow of the rebellion.
From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was
impossib"le by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. I
was still in a condition to either move by his left flank and invest Richmond
from the north side, or continue my move by his right Hank to the south side of
the James. \Vhile the former might have been better as a covering for \Vashington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Frederickslmrg railroad-a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our
strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to t'upply the army, and
would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side
of the James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of
Richmond if posEible. r.rhen, after destroying his lines of communication north
of the James river, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee ,in
Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the
\'Vilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importauce to
run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive bebind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and
nhere, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. \Vithout a greater
sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I
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had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold
substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable
circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to
Charlottesville and Gordonsville, to effectually break up the railroad connexion
between Richmond and the Shenandoah valley and Lynchburg; and, when the
cavalry got weU off, to move the army ·to the south side of the James river, by
the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply
except by the canaL
On the 7th two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the
expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, with instructions to Hunter,
whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to She6dan's,
and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of
the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.
On the lOth of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General
Gillmore, and cavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg if possible,
and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. 'rhe cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the
town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore finding the works which he
approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hnndred without attempting one.
Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to
Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water, via the
White House, to reach there in advance of the army of the Potomac. '.rhis
was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming
aware of our intention, could re-enforce the place.
'l'he movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the
12th; one division of cavalry, under General \Vilson, and the 5th corps crossed
the Ohickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak swamp, to
cover the crossinga of the other corp3. 'rhe advance corps reached James river,
at Wilcox'il landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th.
During three long years the armies of the Potomac and northern Virginia had
been confront~ng each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without
materially changing the vantage-ground of either. 'l'he southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they
had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted
they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been
fought, were by them Ret down as failures on our part, and victories for them.
Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome
by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness,
Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were
on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to
make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably
not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the WildernesR, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack it was in the open field.
rrhe details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the
soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major General
:lUeade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.
Duriug the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to James river,
the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow
roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new
base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot,
therefore, be a warded to the q uarterrnaster and commissary departments for
the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of
the chief quartermaster, Brigadier General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to
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occupy all the available roads between the army and our water base, and but
little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.
'rhe movement of the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General
Sigel, commenced on the first of May. General Crook, who had the immediate
command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving
one, composed of cavalry, to General Averill. They crossed the mountains by
separate routes. Averill struck the Tennessee and Virginia railroad, near
Wytheville, on the lOth, and proceeding to New river and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New river
bridge, formin~ a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel
moved up the Shenandoah valley, met the enemy at New Market 011 the 15th,
and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind
Cedar creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I
asked his removal from command, and Major General Hunter was appointed to
supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following despatches to
Major General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:
.,, NEAR SPO'l'TSYLVANIA CouRT HousE, VA., liiay 20, 1864.
"The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the
branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better
for General Hunter to move m that direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his
own, he will be doing good service.
*
*
*
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"MaJor General H. W. HALLECR."
"JERICHO FORD, VA., 111ay 25, 1864.
"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on
the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for
weeks. Completing this, he could find his ·way back to his orig·inal base, or from about
Gordonsville join this army.
"U.S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General H. '\V. HALLECR."

Geueral Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and moving up the Shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and after a
battle of ten hours routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle
1,500 men, 3 pieces of artillery, and 300 stand of small-arms. On the 8th of
the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averill at Staunton,
from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place
he reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very
successful, and but for the ilifficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance
stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would no doubt have
captured that (to the enemy,) important point. The destruction of the enemy's
supplies and manufactories was very great. 'l'o meet this movement under
General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of
which reached Lynchburg a short.time before Hunter. After some skirmishing
on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing t0 a want of ammunition to giYe
battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition
left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost
to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north.
Had General Hunter moved by way of CharlotteRville, instead of Lexington,
as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have
covered the Shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have
seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance
of the James river canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken exception to the
operations of General Hunter, and I am not now disposed to find fault with
him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of
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his instructions and the interests of the service. rrhe promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.
To return to the army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossing
the James river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at vVilcox's landing.
The laying of the pontoon bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th,
and the crossing of the remainder of the army was rapidly pushed forward by
both bridge and ferry.
After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by a steamer to Bermuda
Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg.
':rhe instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send
General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him
without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at
once to the army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to
Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done; that we could re-enforce
our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us.
General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near
Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason, that I have
never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his
main lines until near sundown. rl'hen, with a part of his command only, he
made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg from the Appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces
of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was abotrt 7 p. m. Between
the line thus captured and Petersburg there 'vere no other works, and there
was no evidence that the enemy had re-enforced Petersburg with a single brigade
from any source. The night was clear-the moon shining brightly-and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d
corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these
troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he
naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the
troops. But instead of taking these troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the· captured
works, which was done before midni.ght.
By the time I arrived t!Je next morning the enemy was in force. An attack
was ordered to be made at 6 o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith
and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th corps to get
up and into position. 'l'he attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until 6 o'clock the next morning, and resulted
in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the
right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several riec,es
of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.
The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in vvith
great vigor on the 17th and Hlth, but only resulted in forcing the enemy to an
interior line from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages in position
gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Petersburg toward the Southside railroad, as far as p(lssible, without attacking fortifications.
On the 6th the enemy, to re-enforce Petersburg; withdrew from a part of his
intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting no doubt to· get troops
from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could
discover H. General Butler, taking advantage of th)s, at once moved a force
on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised
of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the 6th·
corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's landing,
under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred
of which General Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position
in advance of his present line urged upon him.
·
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About 2 o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line
the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with his two
divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still
l10lding with a strong picket line the enemy's works. But instead of putting
these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt
and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between 4 and 5 o'clock in
the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and reoccupied his
old line.
On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected
by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the
James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the pontoon bridge with Bermuda
Hundred.
On the 19th General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the
Virginia Central railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near 'l'revillian
Station on the morning of the llth of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest di:ove hom the field in complete rout. He left his dead and
nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and
several hundred horses. On the 12th he de:stroyed the railroad from 'l'revillian
Station to Louisa Court House. This occupied until 3 o'clock p. m., when he
advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy re-enforced by
infantry. behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter
place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, however,
his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition
to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage, (the country
furnishing but inferior grazing,) and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he
withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his
1·eturn ma11ch, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking
up the depot at that place he moved to the James river, which he reached safely
after heavy fighting. He commenced crostling on the 25th, near Fort Pow.:.
hatan, without -further molestation, and rf'joined the army of the Potomac.
On the 22d General -W'ilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of
the Potomac, -and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the
,James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the
Weldon railroad at Ream's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of
the road and the Southside road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near
Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry,
he reached Burksville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there
destroyed the Danville railroad to Roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five
miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he
could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the
28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony
creek, where he bad a severe but not decisive engagement. 'I'hence he made a
detour from his left, with a view of reaching Ream's Station, (supposing it to
be in our possession.) At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains.
In this last encounter General Kautz, with a part of his command, became
separated, and made his way into our lines.
General Wilson, with the
remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway river and coming
in safely on our left and rear. 'l'he damage to the enemy in this expedition
more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connexion
by railroad with Richmond for several weeks.
- With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the
Anna rivers and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenan-
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doah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary
withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared.
in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the
night of the 2Gth of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps
and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the J amel:3 river and
joined the force General Butler had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven
from his intrenched position, with the lt,ss of four pieces of artillery. On the
28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to N ~w Market road, but in
getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting
lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. 1'he first
object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown
there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by
as~aulting Petersburg before he could get his furce back there. One division of
the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the
night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it
might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the
2d corps and Sheridan's cavalry were erossed over on the night of the 29th
and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four
and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a
regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps,
immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line
for some distanee to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of 1t,
but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they
done . this, I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have f~.tllen.
Other troops were immediatdy pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been
complete) and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus
held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withd.rawn,
but not without heavy loss. 'l'hus terminated in disaster what promised to be
the most successful assault of the campaign.
Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hnnter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha river, thus laying the Shenandoah
valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward,
and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha river, was directed
to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but
owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the
railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary,
therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this
purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond,
to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in
Hampton roads from the Gulf department, under orders issued immediately after
the ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The garrisons of
Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days men, and detachments from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore,
and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General \¥right, were
subsequently sent to vVashington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached
Martinsburg; General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated
across the Potomac at Shepardstown; and General Weber, commanding at
Harper's Ferry, crossed the river and occnpiedl\Iaryland heights. On the 6th
the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick
city. General Wallace with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter
mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great
promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of
the railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought
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the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it
detained the enemy and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach
vVashington with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th
corps, before him. }'~rom Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry
advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the lOth. On the 12th a reconnaissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and forcf'. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about 280 in killed
and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commence} retreating during tl1e night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraph, at 11.45 p. m. on the 12th, the assignment of
Major General H. G. Wright to the command of all the troops that could be made
available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should
get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the
last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th
the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp
skirmish occurred; and on the 20th General Averill encountered and defeated
a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.
Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,
I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against
Richmond, so tlmt they might be used in a movement against Lee before the
return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain
in the Shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy
had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed befo1·e the 6th and 19th
corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the 19th corps was excepted from
the order to return to the James.
About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon
Maryland and Pennsy lvsnia, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was ordered
back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down the valley,
and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Chambersburg and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland.
r.rhey were met and defeated by General Kelly, and with diminished numbers
escaped into the mountains of vVest Virginia. From the time of the first raid
the telegraph wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point,
making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It took
from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return answers back; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be
received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based,
causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have consid·
erably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations
against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To remedy
this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme
command of all the forces in the departments of West Virginia, Washington,
Susquehanna and the middle department, and I so recommended.
On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major
General Halleck, chief of staff, at vV ashington, with a view to his assignment
to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemy was
col;lcentrated in the neighborhood of WinchesteT, whilst our forces, under General
Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad, leaving· open to the enemy western Maryland and southern
Pennsylvania. From where I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the
movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. ·Therefore, on the 4th I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and
determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions:
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"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MD.,
"August 5, 1864-8 p.m.
"GENERAL: Concentrate all your available fo::-ce Without delay in the vicinity of Harper's
Ferry, leaving only sueh railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if by so doing time can be saved From
Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force,
push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him if driven south of
the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small
force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching nuder a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes.
In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from W asbington via Rock
ville may be taken into account.
"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering, at least, 5,000 men and horses. These will be instru0ted, in the absence of further
orders, to join you by the soutl1 side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start tomorro;v. In pushing up the Shenandoah Yalley, where it is expected you will have to go
first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take
all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command ; such as cannot be
consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the building·s should be destroyed-they should
ratlier be protected-but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist
among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them
at all hazards.
'·Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to d0 this you want to keep him
always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course be takes.
"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such
as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.
.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the ad vance reached Halltown that night.
Gen eral Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be
relieved from command~ I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at W nshington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at
Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained
at Monocacy, until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and,
after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of vYashington.
On the 7th of August the middle department and the departments of West
Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were constituted into the "Middle
military division," and Major General Sheridan was assigned to temporary
command of the same.
Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and vYilson, were
sent to Sheridan from the army of the Potomac. The first reached him at
Harper's .E'erry about the 11th of August.
Hi::> operations during the month of August and the fore part of September
were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe
skirmishes, principally by the cava-lry, in which we were generally successful,
'but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position
-the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan creek covering "'\Yinchester,
and our forces in front of Berrysville-that either coulJ bring on a battle at
any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of l\Iary land
and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed
to check him. Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. JI'inally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the
Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became
so indi:::pensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania
and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined
the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack
without knowing more than I did of General t\heridan's feelings as to what
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would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of Septembrr to
visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should
be done. I met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each
army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such
confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions
necessary-Go in l For the convenience of forage, the team:; for supplying the
army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked l1im if he could get out his teams
and Fmpplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His
reply was, that he could before daylight on ::M:onday. He was oft promptly to
time, and I may here add that the result was such that I have never since
deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.
Early on the morning of the 19th General Sheridan attacked General Early
at the crossing on the Opequan creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody
battle, lasting until 5 o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss,
carrying his entire position from Opequan creek to Winchester, capturing several
thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied and made a
stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked and again Jefeated with heavy loss on the 20th. Sheridan pursued him with great energy
through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army,
he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar creek.
Having received considerable re-enforcements, General Early again returned
to the valley, and on the 9th of October his cavalry encountered ours near
Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and 350 prisoners. On the night of the 18th the enemy crossed the mountains which separated the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the north fork,
and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and tl1e fog,
surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteHes which enfiladed our
whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but
were finally rallied between .Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture
General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived
on the fie.ld, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the
enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great
vigor. 'l'he enemy was defeated with great slaughter and the loss of most of
his artillery and trains and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The
wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lyncpburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this,
the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the Shenandoah valley. I was
now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the Potomac, and to send
one division from Sheridan's army to the army of the James, and another to
Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and
thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.
Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached
three divisions from Petersburg to re-enforce Early in the Shenandoah valley.
I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the army
of the Potomac, and·a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th
of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent
him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this
move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained
troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division,
(Kershaw's) of the three reputed detached, had gone.
The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th
and took possession of the Weldon railroad. During the day he had conside1·able fighting. 'J.1o regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated
and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On the
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night of the 20th the troops on the n:Jrth side of the James were withdrawn,
and Hancock and Gregg retnrned to the front of Petersburg. On the 25th the
2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Ream's Station destroying
the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our liue gave
way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.
By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from the City
Point and Petersburg railroad to the Weldon railroad, enabling us to supply,
without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg.
The exten:::;ion of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled the enemy
to so extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the
J anws for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the 28th the 1 Ot.h corps,
Major General Birney, and the 18th corps, Major General Ord commanding, of
General Bulter's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and
intrenchments below Chapin's farm, known as }-,ort Harrison, capturing fifteen
pieces of artillery and the New Market road and intrenchments. 'I' his success
was followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gillmore, immediately in front
of the Chapin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss.
Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported
by infantry, and reached the enemy'e inner line, but was unable to get further.
The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I
determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge
us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the
morning of the 30th General Mende sent out a reconnoissance, with a view to
attacking the enemy's line if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal
of troops to the north side. In this reconnaissance we captured and held the
enemy's works near Poplar Spring church. In the afternoon troops moving to
get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force,
and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured
works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy
with great loss.
On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the
James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and
the loss of all the artillery-eight ur nine pieces. This he followed up by an
attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter.
On the 13th a reconnaissance was Rent out by General Butler, with a view to
drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in
very heavy loss to us.
On the 27th the army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its
fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2d corps, followed by twl)
divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left
flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it
towards the South Side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry
reached the Boydton plank road, where it crosses Hatcher's run. At this point
we were six miles distant from the South Side railroad, which I had hoped by
this movement to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the
end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful
assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately
upon receiving a report that GenP.ral Warren had connected with General
Hancock, I returned to my l1eadqunrters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved
out across Hatcher's run, in the gap between Generals Hancock and 1-Varren,
which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General
Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to
meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy 1-vithin his works, and withclrew that night to his old position.
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In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstration on the
north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg road,
and also on the York River railroad. In the former he was unsuccessful; in
the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned,
and his forces withdrawn to their forme;· positions.
From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond,
until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of
communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send
south. .By the 7th of February our lines were extended to Hatcher's run, and
the vV eldon railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.
General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the armies
of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohiq, commanded, respectively, by Generals
Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding
the enemy's positions at Buzzard Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted,
General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, whilst Generals
'l'homas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north. Thi s movement
was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell brrck to his
fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.
A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late
on the 17th his rear guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. 'l'he next morning, however, he bad again disappeare<l. He
was vigorously pursued and was overtaken at Cassville on the J 9t.h, but, during the ensuing night, retreated across the Etowah. vVhilst these operations
were going on, General J efferMn C. Davis's division of Thomas's army was
sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery and its valuable mill s and
foundries. General Sherman having given his army a few days' rest at this
point, again put it in motiou on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turning the
difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the' 25th the ad,·ance, under
General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him b ack to New
Hope church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.
'l'he most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.
On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New
Hope church and re~reated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost
mountains. He was forced to yield the two last named places and concentrate
his army on Kenesaw, where, on ·the 27th, Generals 'l,homas and l\IcPherson
made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of July
Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning
of the 3d found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had ~ban
cloned Kenesaw and retreated across the Chattahoochie.
General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochie to give his men rest and
get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed
the Uhattahoochie, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and
drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded
General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensivedefensive policy, made several severe attack~ upon Sherman in the vicinity of
Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July.
About 1 p. m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of
the 'Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by
Major General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had
characterized him in the command of a corps or division.
In all these attacks the enemy was Tepulsed with great loss. ~-,inding il impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing his line of
communications across the Chattahoochie, movecl his main force round by the
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enemy s left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy
fi·om· his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and, after defeating the enemy
near Rough and Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to
the south, on the 2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his
campaign.
About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted to
cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton and driven into
East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro', and
Franklin, and was finally driven south of the '_rennesr:;ee. The damage done
by this raid was repaired in a few days.
During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined General
Sherman with a force of cavalry :fi·om Decatur, having made a successful raid
upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its branches near 0 pelika.
Cavalry raids were also made by Generals JHcCook, Garrard and Stoneman
to cut the remaining railroad communication with Atlanta. 'l'he first two were
successful-the latter disastrous.
General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,
skilful and brilliant. 'l'he history of his flank movements and battles during
that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by
anything in history.
Hi::; own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accompanying it,
give the details of that most successful campaign.
He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-tr::~ck railroad
from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire
distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it bad to be protected by
troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in northern Mississippi,
was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the momJtains of
Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon his line and destroy it beyond
the possibility of further use. 'ro guard against this danger Sherman left what
he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against l<.,orrest in West Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier
General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning of the lOth of J nne General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to
Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy.
By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of
communications. The persistency with which he followed up this success
exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the
mean time lVIajor General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the army of the
'rennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived
at 1\1empbi8 on their return from Red river, where they had done most excellent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately takfl the
offensive against Forrest. This he did with the prornptnes::; and effect which
has characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July he met the
enemy at Tupelo, 1\Iississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued
through t:lree days. Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy.
Having accompli8hed the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to
Memphis.
During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed
us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky,
and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S.
G. Hicks, 40th Illinois volunteers. Colonel H., · having but a small force,
withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and
drove him from the place.
On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General Buford,
summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kflntucky, to surrender, but received for
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1·eply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New .Jersey volunteers, that, being placed
there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all
enemies from it, surrender was out of the question.
On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,
garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry, and the 1st regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. 'l'he garrison fought bravely
until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by
assault ; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman
and merciless massacre of the garrison.
On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before
Paducah, but was again driven off.
Guerillas and raiderf-l, seemingly e1~boldened by Forrest's operations, were
also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. vVith a
force of from two to three thousand cavalry he entered the State through Pound
Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of .June he attacked and captured
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was overtaken by General
Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was :finally driven out
of the State. This notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near
Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General
Gillem.
In the absP.nce of official reports at .the commencement of the Red River
expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by
General Sherman under A. J. Smith, I am unable to g?ve the date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and
a detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the lOth of March
and reached the designated point on Red river one day earlier than that
appointed by General Banks. rrhe rebel forces at Fort De Russey, thinking
to defeat him~ left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open fie1 d; but,
while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed
forward to Fort De Russey, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured
it with its garrison-about 350 men, 11 pieces of artillery, and many ~mall-arms.
Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexandria,
which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st he had an engagement with
the enemy at Henderson Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing 210 prisoners
and 4 pieces of artillery.
On the 28th he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the r ebel General
Taylor at Cane river. By the 26th General Banks had assembled his whole
army at Alexandria and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of
AIJri.l6 he mGved frClm Grand E<:,ore. On the aftemo1.m. of tl1e 7th hi~:; advance
engaged the enemy near Pleasant Hill and drove him from the :field. On the
same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles be~ond Pleasant Hill, but
was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at Sabine Cross-roads anrl Peach
Hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of
artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night
General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on
the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night General
Banks continued his retrngrade movement to Grand Ecorc, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose
in getting Admiral Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the
rapid8, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their
return. At the suggestion of Coltmel (now Brigadier General) Bailey, and under
his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was
contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.
The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point Ooupee
near the end of·the month. The disastrous termination of this expedition, and
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H1e lateness of the season rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans
of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of-Mobile.
On the 23d of March Major General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th
army corps to co-operate with General Banks's expedition on Red river, and
reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy
before him, he was joined near Elkin's ferry, in Washita county, by General
Thayer, who had marched fi·om Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes,
in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he
occupied about the middle of April.
On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Rea river,
and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's mill, in Dallas county, General
Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas river. He left Camden on the
26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April
the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline river at Jenkins's ferry, but was
repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was about 600 in killed, wounded,
and prisoners.
Major General Canby, who had been assigned to the command' of the "military division of west Mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th
army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the
positions and lines of communications he then occupied.
Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General Canby
sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the
Mi1lsissippi rivAr. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Cbicot
on the 5th of June. Our loss was about 40 killed and 70 wounded.
In the latter part of July General Canby sent Major General Gordon Granger,
with such forces as hA could collect, to co-operate with Admiral Farragut against
the defences of Mobile bay. On the 8th of August Fort Gaines surrendered to
the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.
On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bombardment surrendered on the 23d. T,be total captares amounted to 1,464 prisoners and 104
pieces of artillery.
About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with
a force of about 10,000 men, bad reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade
l\iissouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join
Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time,
sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General
Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he
would be able to check Price and drive him back, while the forces under General
Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September
Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved
north to the Missouri river, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General
Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as
he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans's cavalry was
operating in his rear.
The enemy was brought t.o battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the loss
of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. He made
a precipitate retreat to northern Arkansas. T1 he impunity with which Price
was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to bow little purpose a superior force may
be used. T,here is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concen-·
trated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot
Knob.
September 20 the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee
near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the
71 w
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surrender, two regiments of re-enforcements arrived, and after a severe fignt were
compelled to surrender. :E,orrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the
garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on
the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near
Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th one column of Forrest's
command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in
the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in
the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on
the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without success. On the morning of
the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.
Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of
the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved
towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on every exertion
was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he
could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth,
l\1ississippi.
In September an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy
the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of October,
about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly
intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to
Kentucky.
General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in
camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and
supplying them for future service. r.rhe great length of road from Atlanta to
the Cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but
little rest.
During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which
was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole
country, disclol:ling the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to
fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that
had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive
could successfully und~rtake the offensive against the army that had so often
defeated it.
In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the
southwest of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching
the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.
General Sherman leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remaindet· of his
army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the constant
annoyance he would have wit"b. the roads to his rear if we attempted to hold
Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that
place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows:

•
"CENTREVILLE, GA., October 10-noon.
"Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa river, 12 miles below
Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobjle and Ohio road, had I not better execute the
plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, wHh the troops now jn
l'ennessee, to defend the State? He wHl have an ample force when the re-enforcements
ordered reach Nashville.
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General.
''Lieut. Gen. GRANT."
For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from
the letter sent by Colonel Porter : " I will therefore give my opinion, that your
army and Canby's should be re-enforced to the maximum ; that, after you get
Wilmingt0u you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed
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to hold the Mississippi river, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either
by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and
Charleston, to be ready as soon as VVilmington is sealed as to commerce, and
the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of
mine of date September 12, in answer to a despatch of his containing substantially
the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement
against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, &c.
"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864-11 a. m.
"Your despatch of October 10 received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt
the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston
roads to supply his base on the Tennessee river, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this
he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee river. If you were
to cut loose, I do not belit::ve you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by
all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would
probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage
upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at
Hood's army I would prefer that ; but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall
not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be indepenuent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am
afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from
going north. With -Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put
much more on the defensive than heretofore.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieut. General.
"Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN."
"KINGSTON, GA., October 11-11 a. m.
"Rood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is
now on the Coosa river, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and
I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments
along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively smaJl army. We cannot
remain here on the defensive. \Vith the 25,000 men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can
constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and .of
the couutry from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city-send back all my wounded
and worthless, and, with my effective army, m9ve through Georgia, smashing things, to the
sea. Rood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow
me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing
at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. 'The difference in war is full
twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochie.
"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General.
"Lieut. Gen. GRANT."
"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864-11.30 p. m.
"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be
made, holding the line of the Tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the
railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieut. General.
"Major Gen. W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the
coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads leading east and west
through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words,
cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our
gaining possession of the Mississippi river. General Sherman's plan virtually
effected this object.
General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean time to watch Hood. Becoming
satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand mountain,
General Sherman sent the 4th corps, :M:ajor General Stanley commanding, and
the 23d corps, Major General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to
report to Major General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command
of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry
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division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left
at his disposal, there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold th e line
of the Tennessee, or in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that
Sherman should start for the sea-coast.
Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he
commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out
point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he
marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his
own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such
as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his
movement, and sending Hood's army, the only considerable force he had west
of Richmond and east of the Mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.
How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met witb, the
condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort
McAllister, on the Savannah river, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st
of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.
Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi,
were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with
Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via Broad river, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. 'rhe expedition from Vicksburg,
under command of Brevet Brigadier General E. D. Osband, (colonel 3d United
States colored cavalry,) captured, on the 27th of November, and destroy ed the
Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black river, near
Canton, thirty miles of the road and two locomotives, besides large amounts of
stores. 'rhe expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results.
The expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of Brigadier General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand
men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad river
and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved
to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from
Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of 7 46
in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew.
On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the
Charleston and Savannah railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and T alifinny
rivers.
Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued l1is move northward, which
seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had 1 had the
power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under
which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's
army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place,
withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in
effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee river, near Florence.
On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Rieman, and captured a
gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries
above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three
gunboats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries
upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The
gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half
dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was conliUmed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north
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side of the Tennessee river, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th General Schofield, with the
advance of the 23d corps, reached Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone,
was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to
risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command
from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.
On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding
him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of re-enforcements.
The enemy coming up with our main force commanded by General Schofield,
at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon
until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle
.was 1,750 killed, 702 prisoners, and 3,800 wounded. Among his losses were
six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was
2,300. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am
satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General
Schofield fell back towards Nashville. 'rhis left the field to the enemy-not
lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned-so that General Thomas's whole force
might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.
As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the 'rennessee river,
and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to
send to General 'rhomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command and
such other troops as he could spare. 'rhe advance of this re-enforcement
reached Nashville on the 30th of November.
On the morning of the 15th of December General Thomas attacked Hood in
position, and, in a battle lasting tvm days, defeated and drove him from the
field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and
many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.
Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to
me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that
the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky.
I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there.
After urging upon General r:rhomas the necessity of immediately assuming the
offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching
Washington city, I received General Thomas's despatch announcing his attack
upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progreseed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied
but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before
Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his
whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry,
which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable
to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete
that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.
After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry
nnd infantry, to the Tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of
artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our advance
forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the
river.
About this time, the rains having set in heavily in r:rennessee and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General
Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee river. A small
force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania volunteers,
continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transpor-
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tation and the enemy's pontoon bridge. The details of these operations will be
found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.
A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major General Grierson, started from
Memphis on the 21st of Deeember. On the 25th he surprised and captured
Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for
Hood's army, 4,000 new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores.
On the morning of the ~8th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at
Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turniJ?g to the southwest,
he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories
and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine shops and public
property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5.
During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under
General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November he
attacked Genenl Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several
hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to
Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville,
but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions
of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals
Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station, to operate against Breckinridge,
and destroy or drive him into Virginia-destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and
the railroad int') Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement, capturing and
dispersing the 8nemy's forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struek
the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to
Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and 198 prisoners ; and destroyed
Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near
there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting,
among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit.
He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning ; but morning found
Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the
extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight
pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.
Wilmington, North Carclina, was the most important sea-coast port left to
the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and
other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic
value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of
·w ilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear
river was such that it required watching for so great a distance, that without
possession of the land north of New inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for
the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance.of blockade-runners.
To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force,
which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever
collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted
the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north ; and through the
imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of
service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter
part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and
went myself, in company with Major General Butler, to Hampton roads, where
we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time
of starting. A force of 6,500 men was regarded as sufficient. The time of
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starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by
the 6th of December, if not before. Learning on the 30th of November that
Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its
destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make
all arrangements for the departme of Major General Weitzel, who had been
designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained
one moment.
On the 6th of December the following instructions were given :
"CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864.
"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy
the port of Wilming·ton. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself.
There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence
of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except
in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be
taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land
between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should
such landing be effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding
the entrance to th e river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating
with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of. those places. These in our hands, the
navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort
Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march
and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second
will become a matter of after consideration.
"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of
the troops.
"Should the troops under General W eHzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher,
they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.
" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for
this enterpri~e, and the territory within which they were to operate, military
courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They
were so sent; but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never
received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence until
he read General Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure,
with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General
Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from
Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had re- ·
ceived all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea
that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of t.he powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.
'l'he importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay,
with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he
advised to so notify Admiral Porter.
'l'he expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the
place of rendezvous, off New inlet, ncar Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th.
Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort
to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted,
the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the
weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The
powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of
General Butler from Beaufort ; but it would seem from the notice taken of it
in the southern newspapers that the enemy were never enlightened as to the
object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press.
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On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a 1·econnoissance,
under Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, pushed up towards the fort. But before
receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in
direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarcation of the
troops and the return of the expedition.
The re-cmbarcation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.
On the 1·eturn of the expedition, officers and men-among them Brevet Major
General (then Brevet Brigadier General) M. R. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. \V.
Ross, - - regiment Vermont -volunteers, First Lieutenant G-eorge W. Walling
and Second Lieutenant G-eorge Simpson, 142d New York volunteers-voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in
their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss.
Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet
was still off l!...,o1·t Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper
leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that,
when tbe ti·oops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do. so also. Finding it had not, however, I ans,,~ered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral
Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to
take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major G-eneral (now Major General)
A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The t1·oops composing it consisted of
the same that composed the former, with the addition of a 'small brigade, numbering about 1,500, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found
necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition
the following instructions :
"CITY POINT, VA., January 3, 1865.
"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to y.:>ur command has been fitted out to renew the
attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fOit falls. You
will, then, proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear river,
and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North
Atlantic blockading squadron.
"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between
yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral
Porter freely and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service,
so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid
down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his
judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as
much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get
.a firm position on the spit ofland on which Fort Fisher is built, fi·om which you can operate
against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of reeeiving your supplies, and to
defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the aveuues left open
to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Port Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished or another plan of campaign is ordered fi·orn these
headquarters.
"My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their
fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Port Fisher, or cut it off ±i.·om supplies or re-enfOicements, while the river is in
possession of the enemy.
"A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent
to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.
"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assmed. \Vhen you find they
can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort :Monroe, to report
for orders.
" In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your commanc1 back to Beaufort, and report
tot hese headquarters for further instructiGns. You will not debark at Beaufort until so
directed.
"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore, and place
them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on
the vessel..; until you are heard from. Should you require them they ·will be sent to you.
"U. S. GR.ANT, Lieutenant General.
"Brevet Major General A. H. TERRY."
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Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp, (now brevet brigadier general,) who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned in orders as chief
engineer to this.
It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those
given for the first expedition; and that in neither instance was there an order
to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the
commanding officer.
The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving
on the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of
the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and
reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet the disemharcation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by 3 o'clock
p.m. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnaissance was pushed
to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken
possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might
be made from the fort. This reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the front of
the work had .been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the
15th the fort was assaulted, and after m0st desperate fighting was captured with
its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts
of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss
was-killed, 110; wounded, 536. On the 16th and 17th the enemy abandoned
and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape
Fear river.
At my request Major General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major General
E. 0. C. Ord assigned to the command of the department of Virginia and North
Carolina.
rrhe defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which
bad beaten and nearly destroyed the only army threatening it, I determined to
find other fields of operation for General Thomas's surplus troops-fields from
which they would co-operate with other movements. General r:rhomas was
therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications,
at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the 7th of January General Thomas
was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to
send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible.
This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps
reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort
:Fisher and Newbern. On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's
command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the 7th of
February the whole force was en route for its destination.
rrhe State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and
General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major
General Sherman. The ~olio wing instructions were given him:
"CITY PoiNT, VIRGINIA, January 31, 1865.
Your movements are intended as co-operative
with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be
a.ttaine~1 is to. se~ure \Vilming·ton. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving
mther from vV1lmmgton or Ne·wbern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to
re!'l'ch Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place
w1th the sea-coast-as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise
u~1der you has two objects: the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in
h1s march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As
soon, tb Tefor~, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you
can best u,;e for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation
of twenty days' rations and forage for 60,000 men and 20,000 animals. You will get of
these as many ns you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able
to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General
Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has
"GENERAL:
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taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will
also be necessary.
"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me
at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.
''The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own
command.
"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty to cut
loose from your base and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act
on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what
you purpose doing-. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to
you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro'
any time from the 22d to the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.
"If rolling stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from
Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other
mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On. this point I have informed you by
telegraph.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General J. M. ScHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied
by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of
things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to
what was best to be done.
Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah-his army entirely
foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the southern railroads
destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line
from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion-! sent orders to General Sherman,
on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with
necessary garrison to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to
City Point with the balance of his command.
On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and
utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great
difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to
transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as
much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him
to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few
days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date 16th
December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me
of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation.
Also that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to
Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but
that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah,
whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The
confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me
pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed
him, on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start, as he proposed,
without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina and join
the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could.
On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I l1ad ordered the
23d corps, Major General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about
21,000 men; that we had at Fort Fisher about 8,000 men; at Newbern about
4,000; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield would go there; if
not, he would be sent to Newbern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at
both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with
his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out;
and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with theiJ,l.
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In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral Porter,
moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear river. Fort Anderson, the
enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.
After fighting on the 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the
morning of the 22d, the enemy havingretreated towards Goldsboro' during the
night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two
columns-one from Wilmington, and the other from Newbern-and to repair the
railroads leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by
Cape Fear river, toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from
Newbern was attacked on the 8th of March at Wise's Forks, and driven back
with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 1 1th the enemy renewed his
attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell
back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse river was crossed and Kinston,
occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's bridge, on the Neuse river, ten miles above Goldsboro',
on the 22d.
By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in motion from
Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th ; thence moved
on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the
12th of March, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of
Cape Fear river. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'. He met a
forceof the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in the engagement was about 600. The enemy's
loss was much greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under
Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and
driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance,
ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his
troops on the defensive, intrenched himself, and awaited re-enforcements, which
were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been occupied. by General Schofield on the
21st, (crossing the Neuse river ten miles above there, at Cox's bridge, where
General Terry hatl got possession and. thrown a pontoon bridge, on the 22d.,)
thus forming a junction with the columns from Newbern and Wilmington.
Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South
Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February,
and occupied by our forces on the 18th.
On the morning of the 31st of January General Thomas was directed to send
a cavalry expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee, to penetrate
South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee, by
way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. Of
the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the
enemy could collect and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was
so late ~n making his start on this expedition, (and Sherman having passed out
of the State of South Carolina,) on the 27th of February I directed. General
r.rhomas to change his course, and ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could. 'l'his would keep
him between our garrisons in East T'ennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not
impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond he might
fall back to Lynchburg and. attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the
14th of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas:
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''CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.
"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior
of Alabama. His force will consist of about 20,000 men, besides A. J. Smith's command.
The ca.valry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available
cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army
has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion
consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in
the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congres'l said a few days since in a speech,
that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being
true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy,
and leave the advance from your stand-point easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you
prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The
object would be three-fold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible to insure
success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources ; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would
not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should
be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information
he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.
"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men
you can put into the field. If not more than 5, 000 men, however, all cavalry, I think it will
be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until tbe one letwing
Vicksburg bas been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start,
but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sourees
before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.
" To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon train as possible, relying
upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the
number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. .No guns or caissons should
be taken with less than eight horses.
''Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force ·you .think you will be
to send under these directions.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as
he could get it off.
I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the
armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city,
north of James river, should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the
bulk of his force from the Shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced
troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to re-enforce Sherman, if practicable,
whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore
telegraphed General Sheridan as follows :
" CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865-1 p. m.
"GENERAL: As soon as it is possible to travel I think you will have no difficulty about
reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad
and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry
should be left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you
might get there would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to
the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid~
with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five
thousand cavalry, ~;me from VickfSburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one
from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile bay with about thirty·
eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that
will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to o..ve.r;come great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where
was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as to the
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points he might be expected to move on this side of Charlotte, North Carolina.
In answer the following telegram was sent him :
"CITY PoiNT, VA., February 25, 1865.
''GENERAL: Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets
with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown,
S. C., and fit out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the necessity of g·oing to
that point has passed. I believe be has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his
way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you
would find him moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly
posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his
army to Wilmington or New bern.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two
divisions of cavalry, numbering about 5,000 each. On the 1st of March he
secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle
fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the
enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to W aynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnaissance, an immediate attack
was made, the position was carried, and 1,600 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery,
with horses and caissons complete, 200 wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and 17 battle flags, were captured. 'rhe prisoners, under an escort of
1,500 men, were sent back to Winchester. '11 hence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place
he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad
toward Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the
north and south forks of the Rivanna river, and awaiting the arrival of his
trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing
Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns,
he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River canal to New
.Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.
]from here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain
possession of the bridge across the James river at that place, but failed. '.rhe
enemy burned it on our approach. 'rhe enemy also burned the bridge across
the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad toward
Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court-House, sixteen miles from
Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market.
'l'he river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the
enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river
and get on the South Side railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court-House, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or
strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From
New Market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable,
to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia
on the lOth. Here he rested one day, and sent through by E~couts information
of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at
White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An infantry force
was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were
forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near
Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges
and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunky
to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.
Previous to this the following communication was sent to General 'l,homas :
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"CITY POINT, VA., March 7, 1865-9.30 a.m.
"GENERAL: I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville
could always be got f( ,rward as required. " Tith Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the
spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not thinlc
Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off
rolling stock that may be caught west of that.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen tl1at in 1\farch, 1865, General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under . General Dick
Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions-one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major General Wilson against
the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee under Major
General Stoneman towards Lynchburg-and assembling the remainder of his
available forces, preparatory to offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and
James were confronting the enemy under Lee in his defences of Richmond and
Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, 1·e-enforced by that of General
Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making preparations for a
'· spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the
:Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of
Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as
might prove necessary.
After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it
was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest
source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would. leave his strong
lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston,
before he was driven fi:om them by battle, or I was prepa1·ed to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March General Sheridan moved from WhiteHouse,
crossed the James river at Jones's landing, and formed a junction with the
army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move
General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Ohickahominy.
On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement of
the armies operating against Richmond were issued:
" CITY POINT, VA., March 24, 1865.
"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by
{)ur left for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at
the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads.
'fwo corps of the army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the
two roads crossing Hatcher's run nearest where the present line held by us strikes that
stream, both moving to-wards Dinwiddie Court-House.
"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies,
will move at the same time by the Weldon road and the Jerusalem plank road, turning
west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the ·whole column before
reaching Stony creek. General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry "Lelonging to the army of the
Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for
guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier General Benham,
to be added to the defences of City Point. Major General Parke will be left in command of
all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, _subject, of course, to
orders from the commander of the army of the Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left
intaGt to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held.
however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps
may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of
the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at
the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.
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"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them
as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the
Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the Potomac, and the colored division the
right column. During the movement Major General Weitzel will be left in command of all
the forces remaining behind from the army of the James.
"The movement of troops from the army of the James will commence on the night of the
27th instant. General Ord will leave behind tb.e minimum number of cavalry necessary for
picket duty, in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition from General Ord's
command will also be started trom Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under
Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from
Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The
crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the
Weldon road he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for
the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the
enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days'
rations in haversacks, and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible,
and to give the army of the James the same number of days' supply with the army of the
Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the te1:minus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will
carry, after taking· the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in
which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount
taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of
the army commanders.
"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced
at once. The reserves of the 9th corps shquld be massed as much as possible. Whilst I
would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be
ready, and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without
waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th eorps could follow
up, so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th
corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel
will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break throug·h at
any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great
promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached
largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their
local reserves, principally, tor the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for
abandoning all the line north of the James, except enclosed works-only to be abandoned,
however, aft.er a break is made in the lines of the enemy.
"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest
skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they hurl everything against
the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of
troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The
very fact of the enemy eoming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost
conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined
upon corps commanders that, in ease of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are
not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but
that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are
engaged. In like manner. I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the
enemy.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major Generals MEADE, ORD, and SHERIDAN."

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of
the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox river towards our left) and
carried J!'~ort Steadman, and a part of the line to the right and left ofit, established
themtielves and turned the guns of the fort against us; but our troops on either
flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was
driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded and 1,900 prisoners. Our
loss was 68 killed, 337 wounded, and 506 missing. General Meade at once
ordered the other c01ps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.
Pushing forward, tlley captured and held the enemy,s strongly intrenched
picket line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and 834 prisoners. The enemy
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made desperate· attempts to retake this line, but without success. Our loss in
front of these was 52 killed, 864 wounded, and 207 missing. 'The enemy's loss
in killed and wounded was far greater.
General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro',
and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at
0 ity Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he woB.ld be ready to move,
as he had previously written me, by the lOth of April, fully equipped and
rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his commanu to
bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond
and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten
Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston
or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville railroad,
striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies operating against
Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into
execution, if h~ received no further directions in the mean time. I explained to
him the movement I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March. That if
it should not prove as entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry
loose to destroy the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the
enemy of further supplies, and also prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and
Johnston's armies.
I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should brin~ the report that
the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming
most of the summer,. might become necessary. By moving out I would put
the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction
of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee ancl
Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might
otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered.
On the night of the 27th Major General Ord, with two divisions of the 24th
corps, Major General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps,
Brigadier General Birney commanding, and McKenzie's cavalry, took up his
line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the positi~m
assigned him near Hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th
the following instructions were given to General Sheridan :
"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.
''GENERAL: The 5th army corps wili move by the Vaughn road at 3~. m. to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about 9 a. m., having but about three miles to march to r each the point
designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie
Court-House. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the
5th corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and
rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his
intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should be come out and attack us,
or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way,
and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should
I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, y ou may
cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to
cross the South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach th e Danville road,
which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the South Side road,
west of Burkesville, and destroy that, in like manner.
''After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only
avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further
south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select
the latter course; get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to
meet you at Goldsboro'.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant 6-eneral.
"Major General P. H. SHERIDAN."
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On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court-House, and the left of our infantry line extended
to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank road. The
position of the troops, from left to right, was as follows : Sheridan, Warren,
Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.
Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of
Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed
the following communication to General Sheridan, having previously informed
him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he
received notice from me to do so :
"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.
"GENERAL: Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all
ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's run, whenever
tho forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's we pushed
forward to find the enemy's position. General (Jriffin was attacked near \vhere the Quaker
road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men.
Humphreys reached Dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.
"I now feel like ending the ma;tter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not
want you, thPrefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning
push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the
enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army
here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal officer at Cobb's Hill
reported, at 11.30 a. m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards
Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant Geneml.
"Major General P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such
torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy
roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan · advanced from
Dinwiduie Court-House towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in
force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton
plank road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left,
was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. General Humphreys drove
the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's
mills. Generals Ord, \V right, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to
determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. 'l,lJe two latter
reported favorably. 'l,he enemy confronting us, as he did, at every poin t from
Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and
could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,
therefore, to extend my line no further, but to re-enforce General Sheridan with
a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's
right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of
the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort
Steadman, particularly favored this. 'l'he enemy's intrenched picket line capttued by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close
together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other.
Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys' corps, to report
to General Sheridan ; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st General vVan·en reported favorably to getting possession of the vVhite Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was
·attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division
before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the third diYision,
when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d corps was immediately
sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of
the \Vhite Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his
72 w
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cavalry got possession of the l!-,ive Forks, but the enemy, after the affair with
the 5th corps, re-enforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry,
and forced him back tow:u·ds Dinwiddie Court-House. Her!'! General Sheridan
displayed great generalship. Iniltead of retreating with hiil whole command on
the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his
cavalry on foot, leaving ouly mounted men enough to take charg·e of the horses.
This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken
· country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to me
what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie
Court-House. General McKenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps
were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after, receiving a report from
Generall\.feade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road,
and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they
were so ordered at once. Tlms the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of
April, General Sheridan, re-enforced by General \Varrcn, drove the enemy
back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between f:i,OOO and
6,000 prisoners. About the close of this battle Brevc:,t Major General Charles
Griffin relieved .Major General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon
General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from hiR position and open the way for retreat. 'l'o guard against this, General Miles's division of Humphreys' corps was sent to re-enforce him, and a bombardment was
commenced and kept up until 4 o'clock in the morning, (April 2,) when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General vVright penetrated the lin es
with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him and to his left towards
Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was
clost;ly followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the
other division of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines
near Hatcher's Run. · Generals vVright and Ord immediately. swung to the
rjght, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while
General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General
Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main
line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line.
General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General
:M:iles to hi~ proper commFtnd. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most galLmt
charge, captured two strong, enclosed works-the most salient and commanding
south of Petersburg-thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. 'I'he enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated
westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by :M:iles's division. A severe engagement ensued and lasted until both his right and left
flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving
from Ford's 3tation towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General .Meade
from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving
in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main
road along the Appomattox river. During the night of the 2d the enemy
evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated toward Danville. On the
morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the
Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with
the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville along the South
Side road ; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. On the 4th
General Sheridan struck the Danville road near J etters ville, where he learned
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that Lee was at Amelia Court-House. He immediately intrenched himself and
awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.
On the morning of the 5th I addre.ssed Major General Sherman the following
communication :
"\VILSON'S STATIO~, Ap1·il 5, 1865.
"GEKERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the
remnant of his force. Sheridan, vvho was up with him last night, reports all that is left,
horse, foot, and dragoons, at 20,000, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number
one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very
few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, audlet us see if
we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. \Vhether it will be better for
you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you
receive this. R ebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"Major General \V. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west
of Jettersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry,
(the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching J etters·
ville,) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, whHe the 2d and 5th corps
pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several
pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville toward Farmville,
Eendi11g two regiments of infantry an.d a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet
Brigadier General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked
and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.
This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get
well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which the enemy immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the enemy
south of Sailor's creek, captured 16 pieces of artillery, .and about 400 wagons,
and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry
and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of 6,000 or 7,000 prisoners,
among whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and
General Ord's co~mand contributed greatly to the day's success.
On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one
diviBion, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court-House ; the 6th
corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville, and
the 2d corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had
crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit that
the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the
enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. 'rhe 6th corps and a
division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support.
Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from Ji-,armville :
"APRIL 7, 1865-.
"GENERAL: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the army of northern Virginia in this strug~le. I feel that it is so~
and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of
blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known
as the army of northern Virginia.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"General R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received, at ]"'armville, the
following:
"APRIL 7, 1865.
''GENERAL : I have received you:r note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion
you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern
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Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.
'' R. E. LEE, General.
"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediatrly replied:
''APRIL 8, 1865.
"GENERAL: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine or same date, asking the condition
on which I will accept the surrender of the army of northern Virginia, is just received. In
reply, I would say that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist
upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms
again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet
you, or will designa~e officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at
any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which
the surrender of the army of northern Virginia will be received.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
" General R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the Sth the pursuit was resumed. General Meade
followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry,
pushed straight for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord's command
and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's advance had considerable
fighting with the enemy's rear guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan st.r uck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured 25 pieces of artillery
a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army.
During this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee :
''APRIL 8, 1865.
"GENERAL: I received at a late hour your note <lf to-day. In mine of yesterday I did
not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern Virginia, but to ask tho terms of
your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call f ur the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to
know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a
view to surrender the army of northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should
be pleased to meet you at 10 a. m., to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond, between
the picket lines of the two armies.
"R. E. LEE, General.
"Lieutenant General U.S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and
immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:
''APRIL 9, 1865.
"GENERAL: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 a. m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state,
however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north
entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.
By the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands
of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping
that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c.,
• ",U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
"General R. E. LEE."

Oll. the morning of the 9th General Ord's command and the 5th corps
reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to
break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown in. Soon after
a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.
Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the following
from General Lee :
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'' APRIL n, 1865.
"GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket line, whither I had come
to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with referenee to the surr0nder of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with
the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.
"R. E. LEE, General.
"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is
set forth in the following correspondence:
"APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, VA., April 9, 1865.
"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I
propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern Virginia on the following terms, towit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an
officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may
designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental
commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public
property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive
them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage.
This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by
United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they
may reside.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
''General R. E. LEE."
"HEADQUARTERS ARlVIY OF NOR'l'HERN VIRGINIA, April9, 1865.
"GENERAL: I reeeived your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of
the army of northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as
those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.
' R. E. LEE, General.
"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT."

'The command of l\fajor General Gibbon, the 5th army r.orps under Griffin
and M:cKenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox Court-House
until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of
the public property. 'l'he remainder of the army immediately returned to the
vicinity of Burkesville.
General Lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example
to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands
of our ordnance officers.
On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly
against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and tl1rough Raleigh, which
place General Sherman occupied on the morning 0f the 13th. The day preceding news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.
On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and
General Johnston, which resulted, on the 18th, in an agreement for a suspension
of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of
the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st,
which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North
Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him to
Genrrnl Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into.
On the 26th another meeting between them wae agreed upon, to take place on
the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's
army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.
'I'he expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the
20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the rail~
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road at Wytheville, Chambersburg and Big Lick. The force striking it at
Big Lick pushed on to within a few mile:: of Lynchburg, destroying the important
bridges, while with the main force he effectually uestroyed it between New
river and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro' on theN orth Carolina railroad;
struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro' and
between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along
it, and captured 400 prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of
the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing 14 pieces of artillery and 1,364
prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this pJace he
destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence
he moved to Slatersville.
General Canby, who had .been directed in January to make preparations for
a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March. ':Che 16th corps, Major General
A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish river;
the 13th corps, under Major General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morg·an
and joined the 16th corps on Fish river, both moving thence on Spanish fort
and investing it on the 27th; while Major General Steele's command moved
from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected
a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe
bombardment of Spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April.
During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by
assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable.
These successes practically opened to us the Alabama river, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and 'vas taken possession of by onr forces on the morning of the 12th.
The expedition under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, consisting
of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until
March 22, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April
General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer
Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three
e;uns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba river. On the 2d he
<tttacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by :E'orrest with
seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval
foundry, machine shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand
pnsoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed 'l'uscaloosa. On the lOth
he croRscd the Alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to
General Canby marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th,
the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steamboats
fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and another
on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th.
At the former place we got fifteen hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns,
destroyed two gunboats, the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and
much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed ninet~en locomotives and three hundred cars.
On the 20th he took possession of :Macon, Georgia, with sixty fielcl-guns,
twelve hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by GAneral Howell Cobb.
General Wilson hearing that Jeff. Da\ris was trying to make his escape, sent
forces in pursuit, and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11.
On the 4th day of :May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby
all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.
A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby
Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for 'l'exas, and
Major General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th
day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith
~urrendered his entire command to Maior General Canby. 'l'his surrender did
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not tnke place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vicepresident; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army
and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property.
Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had b een surrendered to us by
agreement- among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person-and
the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to
proceed to 'l'exas were not changed.
There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat
the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on
our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not
mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing them,
and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported.
For information touching our Indi:m difficulties, I would respectfully refer
to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred.
It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the we3t and the east fight
battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting
qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. The
western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi valley, and received
the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in
North Carolina. The armies of the east commenced · their battles on the river
from which the army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the
final surrender of their old antagonist at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia.
The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all
sectional jealousies, (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much,) and
the cause of crimination and Tecrimination that might have followed had either
section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the United
States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy,
whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds
of valor.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant Geneml.
Ron. E . :M:. STAXTON,
Secretm·y qf TVar.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

November 18, 1865.
Official copy.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asnstant Adjutant General.
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Reports qf Major Generals Meade and Slteridan
Ricllmond and Petersburg.

if

tlle campaign bifore

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE PoTOMAC, April 30, 1865.
CoLONEL: I have the honor to submit herewith a succinct report of the
operations of this army in the recent campaign resulting in the evacuation of
Richmond and Petersburg, and terminating in the surrender of the army of
northern Virginia.
On the 29th ultimo, in pursuance of orders received from the lieutenant general commanding, the second and fifth corps were moved q_cross Hatcher's run,
the former by the Vaughan road, the latter by the old stage road crossing at
Perkins's. The second corps, holding the extreme left of the line before Peters ·
burg prior to moving, was relieved by Major General Gibbon, commanding two
divisions of the twenty-fourth corps.
l\iajor General Humphreys, commandinl!; second corps, was directed, after
crossing Hatcher's run, to take position with his right resting on Hatcher's run,
and his left extending to the Quaker road. Major General \Varren, commanding
fifth corps, was directed at first to take position at the intersection of the
Vaughan and Quaker roads, and subsequently, about noon of the 29th, he was
ordered to move up the Quaker road beyond Gravelly run.
These orders were duly executed, and by evening Major General Humphreys
was in position, his right resting ncar Dabney's mill, and his left near Gravelly
meeting-house, on the Quaker roa<.l. In taking this position Major General
Humphreys encountered but little opposition, meeting only a small force in a
line of rifle-pits, who were quickly driven out. Major General Wan·en was delayed in his movement by having to rebuild the bridge over Gravelly run.
The advance of his column, Brigadier G€neral Griffin's division, was attacked
about 4 p.m., when about a mile and a half beyond Gravelly run, by Bushrod
Johnson's division. A spirited engagement ensued, in which Griffin handsomely repulsed and drove the enemy, capturing over 100 prisoners.
On the 30th, Major General Hnmphreys again advanced, driving the enemy
into his main line of works, and by night occupying a line from the Crow
house, on Hatcher's run, to the intersection of the Dabney's mill and Boydton
plank roads.
Major General Warren during this day advanced on the Quaker road to its intersection with the Boydton plank, and pushed Ayres's division in a northwesterly
direction over to the 'Vhite Oak road. No fighting of any consequence occurred
this day except picket skirmishing and exchange of artillery shots from the respective lines, now close to each other.
During the r.ight of the 30th, Major General Humphreys, who had intrenched his line, was directed to relieve Griffin's division, fifth corps, by Miles's.
division, and Major General Warren was ordered to move both Crawford and
Griffin within supporting distance of Ayres, . whose position on the extre:we left
was considered likely to invite attack.
.
On the 31st, about 10 a. m., Ayres, under General Warren's orders, advanced
to dislodge the enemy in position on the White Oak road. Ayres's attack was.
unsucceEsful, and was followed by such a vigorous attack of the enemy that.
Ayres was compelled to fall back upon Crawford, who, in turn, was so strongly
pressed by the enemy as to force both eli visions back in considerable disorder
to the position occupied by Griffin, when the pursuit of the enemy ceased. Immediately on ascertaining the condition of affairs, Major General Humphreys
was ordered to move toW arren't> support, and that officer promptly sent .Miles's
division to attack in flank the force operating against W anen.
This movement wat> handsomely executed by Miles, who, attacking th e enemy vigorously, drove l1im back to his former position on the vVhite Oak road,
capturing several colors and many prisoners.
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In the mean time Warren advanced with Griffin's division, supported by such
portions of Ayres's and Crawford's divisions as could be rallied, and reg·aining
the position held by Ayres in the morning, Griffin attacked with Chamberlain's
brigade, driving the enemy and securing a lodgment on the White Oak road.
These operations over, hearing heavy firing to the left and rear, which was presumed to be the cavalry moving up from Dinwiddie Court House, Warren was
directed to send a brigade down the White Oak road to co-operate with the
cavalry. This brigade by night reached the crossing of Gravelly run, by the
road leading through J. Boisseau's, where, not meeting any enemy, it bivouacked.
During the night, having been directed to send support to l\fajor General
Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court House, Major General Warren was ordered to
move with his whole corps, two divisions by the White Oak road and one by the
Boydton plank road. Major General Humphreys was ordered to extend. his
left as far as practicable consistent with its security.
During the foregoing operations, the sixth and ninth corps remained in the
lines in front of Petersburg, with orders to watch the enemy closely, and, in the
event of the lines in their front being weakened, to attack.
On April 1, after 'consultation with the lieutenant general commanding, believing from the operations on his right that the enemy's lines on his left must
be thinly held, orders were sent to Major Generals vVright and Parke to
attack the next morning at 4. About 7 p.m., intelligence having been received of
the brilliant succet=s of the cavalry and fifth corps at Five Forks, orders were
sent to Generals Parke and Wright to open their batteries and press the enemy's picket line. At the same time, Miles's division, second corps, was detached to the support of Major General Sheridan, and Major General Humphreys
advised of the intended attacks of the twenty-fourth, sixth, and fifth corps, and
directed to hold his two remaining divisions ready to co-operate in the same,
should they prove successful.
On the 2d of April, Major General Wright attacked at 4 a.m., carrying everything before him, taking possession of the enemy's strong line of works, and
capturing many guns and prisoners. After carrying the enemy's line in his
front, and reaching the Boydton plank road, Major General Wright turned to his
left and swept down the enemy's line of intrenchments till near Hatcher's run,
where, meeting the head of the twenty-fourth corps, General \Vright retraced
his steps and advanced on the Boydton plank road towards Petersburg, encountering the enemy in an inner line of works immediately around the city. Major
General vYright deployed his corps confronting their works, in conjunction with
the twenty-fourth and part o£ the second corps.
Major General Parke's attack at 4 a. m. waR also successful, carrying the enemy's lines, capturing guns and prisoners, but the position of the ninth corps confronting that portion of the enemy's line, the longest held and most strongly fortified, it was found he held a second and inner line, which Major General Parke was
unable to carry. Receiving a de~patch during th'e morning from Major General
Parke, reporting his being pressed by the enemy, the troops left in City Point
defences, under Brigadier General Benham and Brevet Brigadier General Collis, were ordered up to General Parke's support; their prompt arrival enabling
them to render material assistance to General Parke in holding his lines.
So soon as Major General Wright's success "\vas reported, Major Gener<\1
Humphreys was ordered to advance with the remaining divisions of his corps;
Hays, on the right, advanced and captured a redoubt in front of the Crow
house, taking a gun and over 100 prisoners. Mott, on the left, on advancing
on the Boydton plank road, found the enemy's line evacuated. Hays and .M:ott
pushed forward and joined the sixth corps confronting the enemy. Early in the
morning Miles, reporting his return to his position on the White Oak road, was
ordered to advance on the Olairborne road simultaneously with l\1ott and Hays.
Miles perceiving the enemy were moving to his right, pursued and overtook him
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at Sutherland's station, where a sharp engagement took place, Uiles handling his
single division with great skill and gallantry, capturing several guns and many
prisoners. On receiving intelligence of l\Iilcs being engaged, Hays was sent
to his support, but did not reach the field till the action was over.
At 3 a. m. of the 2d of April, Major Generals Parke and Wright reported no
enemy in their front, when, on advancing, it was ascertained Petersburg was
evacuated.
Wilcox's division, ninth corps, was ordered to occupy the town, and the
second, sixth, and ninth corps immediately moved up the river, reaching that
night the vicinity of Sutherland's station.
.
The next three days} the 3d, 4th, and 5th, the pursuit was continued along the
river and Namozine roads-the fifth corps following the cavalry, and the second
and sixth following the fifth; the ninth having been detached to guard the
South Side railroad. The progress of the troops was greatly impeded by the
bad character of the road, the presence of the supply trains of the fifth corps
and cavalry, ancl by the frequent changes of position of the cavalry, to whom
the right of way was given. On the night of the 4th, receiving a despatch
from Major General Sheridan that his army was in position at Amelia Court
House, immediate orders were given for the resumption of the march by the
troops of the second and sixth corps, reaching J ettersville J;>etween 4 and 5 p.m.,
where the fifth corps was found intrenched expecting an attack. No attack
being made, on the morning of the Gth of April the three corps were moved in the
direction of Amelia Court House, with the intention of attacking the enemy if
found there; but soon after moving, intelligence was received that Lee had
moved from Amelia Court House towards Farmville. The directions of the
corps were changed, and the six corps moved from the right to the left. The
second corps was ordered to move on Deatonsville, and the fifth and sixth corps
to move iu parallel direction on the right and left respectively.
The second corps soon came up with the enemy and commenced a rear-guard
fight, which continued all day till evening, when the enemy was so crowded
in attempting to cross Sailor's creek that he had to abandon a large train.
Guns, colors, and prisoners were taken in these successful operations of the
second corps.
rrhe sixth corps, on the left of the second, came up with the enemy posted on
Sailor's creek. Major General Wright attacked with two divisions, and com• pletely routed the enemy. In this attack the cavalry under Major General
Sheridan, was opel'ating on the left of the sixth corps, whilst Humphreys was
pressing on the right. The reBult of the combined operations was the capture
of Lieutenant General Ewell and four other general officers, with most of
Ewell's corps.
The next day, tl:e 'i'th of April, the fifth corps was moved to the left towards
Prince Edward's Court House. rrhe second corps resumed th e direct pursuit
of the enemy, coming up with him at High bridge over the Appomattox. Here
the enemy made a feeble stand with his rear-guard, attempting to burn the railroad and common bridge. Being driven off by Humphreys, he succeeded in
bnrning three spans of the railroad bridge, but the common bridge was saved,
which Humphreys immediately crossed in pursuit, the enemy abandoning 18
guns at this point. Humphreys came up with the enemy at the intersection of
the High Bridge and Farmville roads, where he was found intrenched behind rail
breastworks, evidently making a stand to cover the withdrawal of his trains.
Before reaching this point Humphreys had detached Barl0w's division to the
left towards Farmville. Near Farmville Barlow found the enemy, who was
about evacuating the place, which operation was hastened by a successful attack of Barlow's.
\Vheu Humphreys ascertained the position of the enemy, Barlow was re-
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called, but did not reach Humphreys till evening, and after an unsuccessful assault had been made by part of Miles's division.
The sixth corps moved early in the morning towards Farmville, but finding
the road occupied, first by the cavalry and subsequently by the twenty-fourth
corps, it was too late in the afternoon before it reached that place, where it
was found the enemy had destroyed the bridg·e. On learning the p rlsition of
Humphreys, orders were sent to 'Vright trl cross and attack in support. Ry
great exertions a bridge for infantry was constructed, over which 'Vright
crossed, but it was nightfall before this could be effected.
The next day, April 8, the pursuit was continued on the Lynchburg stage
road. On the 9th, at 12 m., the head of the second corps, when within three
miles of Appomattox Court House, came up with the enemy. At the same
time I received a letter from General Lee, asking for a suspension of hostilities
pending negotiations for surrender. Soon after receiving this letter, Brigadier
General Forsyth, of General Sheridan's staff, came through the enemy's lines
and notified me a truce had been made by lVInjor General Ord, commanding the
troops on the other side of Appomattox Court Honse. In consequence of
this I replied to General Lee that I should suspend hostilities for two hours.
At the expiration of that time I received the instructions of the lieutenant general
commanding to continue the armistice until further orders, ann about 4 p. m. I received the welcome intelligence of the surrender of the army of northern Virginia.
It has been impossible, in the foregoing brief outline of operations, to do full
justice to the several corps engaged; for this purpose reference must be had to
the reports of corps and division commanders, which will be forwardecl as soon
as received. At the same time I would cbll attention to the handsome repulse
of the enemy by Griffin's division, fifth corps, on the 29th ultimo ; to the important part taken by the fifth corps in the battle of Five Forks; to the gallant
assault, on the 2d instant, by the sixth corps-in my judgment the decisive
movement of the campaign; to the successful attack of the sixth corps in the
battle of Sailor's creek; to the gallant assault, on the 2d instant, of the ninth
corps, and the firmnei'S and tenacity with which the :ulvantages then gained
were held against all assaults of the enemy ; to the brilliant attack of Miles's
division, second corps, at Sutherland's station; to the energetic pursuit and
attack of the enemy by the second corps, on the 6th instant, terminating in the
battle of Sailor's creek; and to the prompt pursuit the next day, with Kulow's
and l\Iiles's attacks, as all evincing the fact that this army, officers and men, all
nobly did their duty, and deserve the thanks of the country. Nothing could
exceed the cheerfulness with which all submitted to fatigue and privations
to secure the eoveted prize-the capture of the army of northern Virginia.
The absence of official reports precludes my forwanling any statement of
casualties, or lists of the captures of guns, colors, and prisoners. 1'o my staff,
general and personal, I am indebted, as I ever haYe been, for the most zealous
and faithful discharge of their duties.
Respectfully yours,
GEORGE G. MEADE,
lJfojor General U. 8. A., Commanding.
Colonel T. S. BowEns,
Assistant AdJutant General.

CAVALRY HEADt,tFAllTERS, May 16, 1865.
GENERAL : I have the honor to submit the following narmtive of the operations
of my command during the recent campaign in front of Petersburg and Richmond, terminating with the surrender of the rebel anny of northern Vi1ginia, at
Appomattox Court House, Virginia, on April 9, 1865.
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On March 26 my commaud, consisting of the first and third cavalry divisions,
under the immed :ate command of Brevet Major General vVesley :Merritt, crossed
the James river by the bridge at Jones's landing, having marched from vVinchester, in the Shenandoah valley, ·via vVhite House, on the Pamunkey river.
On March 27 this command went into camp near Hancock station, on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, and on the same ,day the second cavalry
division, which had beeu serving with the army of the Potomac, reported to me
under the command of Uajor General George Crook.
rrhe effective force of these three divisions was as follows : General Merritt's
command, first and thi1;d divisions, 5,700; General Crook's command, second
division, 3,300. Total effective force. 9,000.
\Vjth this force I moved out on the 29th March, in conjunction with the armies
operating agll.inst Richmond, and in the subsequent operations I was under the
immediate orders of the lieutenant general commanding·.
I moved by the way of Reams's station, on the Weldon railroad, and Malon's
crossing, on Rowanty creek, where we were obliged to construct a bridge.
At this point our advance encountered a small picket of the rebel cavalry and
drove it to the left across Stony creek, capturing a few prisoners, from whom,
and from my scouts I learned that the enemy's cavalry was at or near Stony
Creek depot, on the vVeldon r3ilroad, on our left flank and rear. Believing that
it would not attack me, and that by pushing on to Dinwiddie Court House I
could force it to make a wide detour. we continued the march, reaching the
Court House about 5 o'clock p.m., encountering only a small picket of the enemy,
which was driven away by our advance.
It was found necessary to order General Custer's division, which was marching in rear, to remain near l\falon's crossing, on the Rowantycreek, to assistand
protect our trains, which were greatly retarded by the almost impassable roads
of that miry section. The first and second divisions went into camp covering
the Vaughan, E~lat Foot, Boydton plank, and Five Forks roads, which all intersect at Dinwiddie Uourt House, rendering this an important point, and from whic
I was expected to make a cavalry raid on the South Side railroad, and thence
join General Sherman, or return to Petersburg, as circumstances might dictate.
However, during the night the lieutenant general sent me instructions to abandon the contemplated raid and act in concert with the infantry under his immediate command, and turn the right flank of Lee's army if possible.
Early on the morning of the 30th .March I directed General Merritt to send
the first division, Brigadier General Devin commanding, to gain possession of
the Five Forks on the vVhite Oak road, and directed General Crook to send
General Davies's brigade of his division to the support of General Devin.
Gregg's brigade, of Crook'.:; division, was held on the Boydton plank road,
and guarded the crossing of Stony creek, forcing the enemy's cavalry, that was
moving from Stony Creek depot to form a connexion with the right of their army,
to make a wide detour, as I bad anticipated, on the south roads of Stony creek
and west of Chamberlain's bed-a very fat :guing march in the bad condition of
tbe roads. A very heavy rain fell during this day, agg,r avating the swampy
nature of the ground, and rendering the movement's of troops almost impossible.
General Merritt's reconnaissance developed the enemy in strong force on the
vVhite Oak road in the vicinity of the Five Forks, and there was some heavy
skirmishing throughout the day. Next morning, March 31, General Merritt
advanced towards the Five Forks with the firstdivision, and meeting with considerable opposition, General Devins's brigade, of Crook's division, was ordered
to join him, while General Crook, advancing on the left with the two other
brigades of his division, encountered the enemy's cavalry at Chamberlain's creek,
at a point a little north and west of Dinwiddie, making demonstrations to cross.
Smith't; brigade wa;:; ordered to hold them in check and Gregg's brigade to a position on his right. The advance of the first division got possession of th e Five
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Forks, but in the mean time the fifth army corps, which had advanced towards
the White Oak fOad from the Vaughan road, was attacked and d1 iven rack, and,
withdrawing from that point, this force of the enemy marched rapidly from the
front of the firth corps to the Five Forks, drivi ng in our cavalry advance, and,
moving down on roads west of Chamberlain's creek, attacked General Smith's
brigade, but were unable to force his position. Abandoning the attempt to cross
in his front, this force of the enemy's infantry succeeded in effecting a crossing
higher up the creek, striking General Davies's brigade of the second division,
which, after a gallant fight, was forced back upon the left flank of the first division, thus partially isolating all this force from my main line covering Dinwiddie Court House.
Or:ders were at once given to Geaeral.Merritt to cross this detached force over
to the Boydton plank road, and march down to Dinwiddie Court House and
come into the line of battle. The enemy, deceived by this movement, followed
it up rapidly, making a left wheel, and presenting his rear to my line of battle.
When his line was nearly parallel to mine, General Gibbs's brigade of the first
division, and General Irvin Gregg's brigade of the second division, were ordered
to attack at once, and General Ouster was directed to bring up two of his brigades rapidly, leaving one brigade of his division with the traii1s that had not
yet reached Dinwiddie Court House. In the gallant attack made by Gibbs and
Gregg the enemy's wounded fell into onr hands, and he was forced to face by
the rear rank, and give up his movement, which, if continued, would have tFtken
in flank and rear the infantry line of the army of the Potomac. vVhen the enemy
had faced to meet this attack a very obatinate and handsomely contested battle
ensued, in which, with all his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, the enemy
was unable to drive five brigades of our cavalry, dismounted, from an open plain
in front of Dinwiddie Court House. 'l'he brunt of their cavalry attack was borne
by General Smith's brigade, which had so gallantly held the crossing of Chamberlain's creek in the morning. His command again held the enemy in check
with determined bravery, but the heavy force brought against his right flank
finally compelled him to abanJon his pm;ition on the creek, and fall back to the
main line immediately in front of Din widdiA Court House. As the enemy's infantry advanced to the attack, our cavalry threw up slight breastworks of rails
at some points along our lines, and when the enemy attempted to force this position they were handsomely repulsed, and gave up the attempt to gain possession
of the Uourt House. It was after dark when the firing ceased, and the enemy
lay on their arms that night not more than one hundred yards in front of our
lines. ':rhe commands of Generals Devin and Davies reached Dinwiddie Court
House without opposition by way of the Boydton plank road, but did not participate in the final action of the day. In this well-contested battle the most obstinate gallantry was displayed by my entire command. r_rhe brigades commanded by General Gibbs and Colonels Stagg and Fitzhugh, in the first division,
G€nerals Davies, Gregg, and Smith, in the second division, Colonels Pennington
and Capehart, in the third division, vied with each other in their determined
effurts to hold in check the superior force of the enemy ; and the skilful management of their troops in this peculiarly difficult country entitles the brigade
commanders to the highest commendation.
Generals Crook, ~ierritt, Ouster, and Devin, by their courage and ability,
sustained their commands, and executed the rapid movements of the day with
promptness and without confusion.
During the night of the 31st of l\'Iarch my headquarters were at Dinwiddie
Court House, and the Lieutenant General notified me that the fifth corps would
report to me, and should reach me by midnight. 'rhiE~ corps had been offered
to me on the 30th instant, but very much ~esiring the sixth corps, which had
been with me in the Shenandoah valley, I asked for it, but on account of the
.delay which would occur in moving that corps from its position in the lines in
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front of Petersburg, it could not be sent to me. I respectfully submit herewith
my brief accounts of the operations of the day, the response to which was the
ordering of the fifth corps to my ::mpport and my command, as alEo the despatch
of the Lieutenant G-eneral notifying me of his action. I understood that the fifth
corps, when ordered to report to me, was in position near S. Dabney's house, in
the angle betwern the Boydton road and the Five Forks road.
Had General \Varren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant
General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the
enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court House. Ayres'R division moved
down the Boydton plank road during the night, and in the morning moved west
via R. Boisseau's house, striking the Five Forks road about two and a half miles
north of Dinwiddie Court House. General Warren, with Griffin's and Crawford's
divisions, moved down .the road by Crnmp's house, coming into the Five Foi·ks,
near .T. Boisseau's hou~e, between 7 and S o'clock on the morning of the 1st of
April. l\Ieantime I moved my cavalry force at daylight against the enemy's lines
in my front, which gave way rapidly, moving off by the right flank and crossing
Chamberlain's creek. 'rhis hasty movement was accelerated by the discovery
that two cli,·isions of the fifth corps were in their rear, and that one division was
moving towards their left and rear.
The following were the instructions sent to General Warren:
"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,

"Dinwiddie C. H., ApTil l, 1865-3 a. m.

"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading to
}.,ive Forks, for thrEe-quarters of a mile, with General Ouster's division. The
enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A.
AdamR's house, which leads out across Chamberlain's ben or run. I understand
you have a division at J. Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line,
and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack
Omtcr at day light; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at day light
anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams's house,
and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the
road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the enemy's rear, and
in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not
fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.
"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major General.
"Major General WAnREN,
" Commanding

Fiftl~

ATmy Corps."

As they fell back the enemy were rapidly followed by General Merritt's t\\' o
divisions, General Devin on the right and General Ouster on the left; General
Crook in rear. During the remainder of the day General Crook's division held
the extreme left and rear, and was not seriously engaged.
I then determined that I would drive the enemy, with the cavalry, to the
Five Forks, press them inside of their works, and make a feint to turn their
right flank, and meanwhile quietly move up the fifth corps with a view to
attacking their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and clrive westward
those who might escape, thus isolating them from tlH:ir army at Petersburg.
Happily, this conception was successfully executed. About this time General
:McKenzie's division of cavalry, from the army of the James, reported to me,
and consisted of about 1,000 effective men. I directed General Warren to hold
fast at J. Boisseau's house, refresh his men, and be ready to move to the front
when required; and GenerallVlcKenzie was ordered to .rest in front of Dinwiddie Court House until further orders.
Meantime General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, and by
m p etuous charges drove them hom two lines of tern porary works ; General
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Custer guiding his advance on the widow Gilliam's honse and General Devin
on the main Five Forks road. 'l'he courage displayed by the cavalry officers
and men was superb, and about 2 o'clock the enemy was behind his works on
the vVhite Oak road, and his skirmish line drawn in. I then ordered up the
fifth corps on the main road, and sent Brevet l\fajor Gillispie, of the engineers, to
turn the head of the column off on the Gravelly Chnrch road, and put the corps
in position on this road obliquely to and at a poillt but a short distance from
the vVl1ite Oak road, and about one mile from the :E'ive Forks. Two divisions
of the corps were to form the front line, and one division 'vas to be held in reserve in column of regiments opposite the centre.
I then directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting
to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified him that the fifth corps would strike
the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's
works as soon as the fifth corps became engaged, and that would be determined
by the volleys of musketry. I then rode over to where the fifth corps \vas going
into position, and found them coming np very slowly. I was exceedingly anxious
to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back.
It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back
with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who bad fallen during
the day. In this connexion, I will say that General Warren did not exert
himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner
gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions
for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was in position, I
ordered an advance in the following formation: Ayres's division on the left in
double lines, Crawford's division on the right in double lines, and Griffin's division in reserve, behind Crawford, and the White Oak road was reached without
opposition.
While General Warren was getting into position I learned that the left of the
second corps of the army of the Potomac, on my right, had been swung around
from the direction of its line of battle until it fronted on the Boydton road, and
parallel to it, which afforded an opportunity to the enemy t::> march down the
• White Oak road and attack me in right and rear. General McKenzie was
therefore sent up the Crump road, with directions to gain the vVhite Oak road
if possible, but tu attack at all hazards any enemy found, and if successful, then
march down that road and join me. General McKenzie executed this with
courage and skill, attacking· a force of the enemy on the White Oak road, and
iriving it towards Petersburg. He then countermarched, and joined me on the
vVhite Oak road just as the fifth corps advanced to the attack, and I directed
him to swing round with the right of the infantry and gain possession of the
Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run. 'l'he fifth corps, on reaching the
White Oak road, made a left wheel, ancl burst on the enemy's left flank and
rear like a tornado, and pushed rapidly on, orders having been given that if the
enemy was routed there should be no halt to reform broken lines. As stated
before, the firing of the fifth corps was the signal to General Merritt to assault,
which was promptly responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried
at several points by our brave cavalrymen. The enemy were driven from their
strong line of works and completely routed, the fifth corps doubling up their left
flank in confusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White
Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them, and, riding into
their broken ranks, so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after
their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder. Between 5,000 and 6,000
prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward, and were
pursued until long after dark by Merritt's and McKenzie's cavalry for a distance
of six miles.
During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Wan·en. During
the engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy
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fire, and simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the
command of the fifth corps, authority for this action having been sent to me,
before the battle, unsolicited. 1-Vhen the pursuit was given up, I directed General Griffin, who had been ordered to assume command of the fifth corps, to
collect his corps at once, march two divisions back to Gravelly church, and put
th em into position at right angles to the White Oak road, facing towards Petersburg, while Bartlett's division, (Griffin's old,) covered the Ford road to Hatcher's
run. General Merritt's cavalry went into camp on the widow Gilliam's plantation, and General McKenzie took position on the Ford road at the crossing of
Hatcher's mn. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops in this
battle, and of the gallantry of their commanding officers, who appeared to realize
that the success of the campaign and fate of Lee's army depended upon it.
'I'hey merit the thanks of the country and reward of the government. r.ro
Generals Griffin, Ayres, Bartlett, and Cra.vford, of the fifth corps, and to Generals Merritt, Custer, Devin, and McKenzie, of the cavalry, great credit is due;
and to their subordinate commanders they will undoubtedly award the praise
which is due to them for the hearty co-operation, bravery, and ability which
were everywhere displayed. At daylight on the morning of April 2, General
Miles's division of the second corps reported to me, coming over from the Boydton
plank road. I ordered it to move up the White Oak road towards Petersburg,
and attack the enemy at the intersection of that road with the Claiborne road,
where he was in position in heavy force, and I followed General Miles immediately with two divisions of the fifth corps. Miles forced the enemy from this
position and pursued with great zeal, pushing him across Hatcher's run, and
following him up on the road to Sutherland's depot. On the r1orth side of the
run I overtook Mj!es, who was anxious to attack, and had a very fine and spirited
division. I gave him permission, but about this time General Humphreys came
up, and, receiving notice from General :Meade that General Humphreys would
take command of Miles's division, I relinquished it at once, and faced the fifth
corps by the rear. I afterwards regretted giving up this division, as I believe the
enemy could at that time have been crushed at Sutherland's depot. I returned ..
to Five Forks, and marched out the Ford road towards Hatcher's run.
'l'he cavalry had in the mean time beeB sent westward to cross Hatcher's run
and break up the enemy's cavalry, which had collected in considerable force
north of that stream, but they would not stand to fight, and our cavalry pursued
them in a direction due north to the N amozine road. Crossing Hatcher's run
with the fifth corps, the South Side railroad was struck at Ford's depot, meeting
no opposition, and the fifth corps marched rapidly toward Sutherland's depot,
in flank and rear of the enemy opposing Miles. As he approached that point
the force of the enemy fled before the fifth corps could reach them, retreating
along the main road by the Appomattox river, the cavalry and Crawford's division of the fifth corps engaging them slightly about dusk. On the morning of
the 3d our cavalry took up the pursuit, routing the enemy's cavalry, and capturing many prisoners. 'l'he enemy's infantry was encountered at Deep creek,
where a severe fight took place. The fifth corps followed up the cavalry rapidly,
picking up many prisoners and five pieces of abandoned artillery, and a number of
wagons. The fifth corps, ·with Crook's division of cavalry, encamped that night
(the 4th) at Deep creek, on the N amozine road, neither of these commands having
been engaged during the day. On the morning of the 4th General Crook was
ordered to strike the Danville railroad between J ettersville and Burke's station,
and then move up toward J etter8ville. The fifth corps moved rapidly to that
point, as I had learned from my scouts that the enemy was at Amelia Court
House, and everything indicated that they were collecting at that point. On arriving at J ettersville, about 5 o'clock p. m., I learned without doubt that Lee and
his army were at Amelia Court House.
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The 5th corps was at once ordered to intrench, with a view to holding Jetters ville until the main army could come up. It seems to me that this was the
only chance the army of northern Virginia had to save itself, which might have
been done had General Lee promptly attacked and driven back the comparatively
small force opposed to him and pursued his march to Burksville Junction. A
despatch from General Lee's chief commissary to the commissary at Danville
and Lynchburg, requiring two hundred thousand rations to be sent to meet the
army at Burksville, was here intercepted. So soon as I found that the entire
army of the enemy was concentrated at Amelia Court House, I forwarded promptly
aJJ the info1·mation 1 bad obtained to General Meade and the Lieutenant General.
On the morning of April5 General Crook was directed to send General Davies's
brigade to make a reconnaissance to Paine's Crossroads on our left and front, and
ascertain if the enemy was making any movement towards that flank to escape.
General Davies struck a train of one hundred and eighty wagons, escorted by a
considerable force of the enemy's cavalry, which he defeated, capturing five pieces
of artillery. He destroyed the wagons and brought in a large number of prisoners. Gregg's and Smith's brigades of the second division were sent out to
support Davies, and some heavy fighting- ensued, the enemy having sent a strong
force of infantry to attack and cut off Davies'8 brigade, which attempt was unsuccessful. During the afternoon, and after the arrival of the second corps at Jettersville, which General Meade requested me to put in position, he being ill, the
enemy demonstrated strot'lgly in front of J etters ville against Smith's and Gregg's
brigades of Crook's division of cavalry, but no serious attack was made. Early
on the morning of April 6 General Crook was ordered to move to the left to
Deatonsville, followed by Custer's and Devin's divisions of General Merritt's
command. The 5th corps had been rtturned to the command of General Meade
at his request. I afterwards regretted giving up the corps.
When near Deatonsville the enemy's trains were discovered moving in the
direction of Borksville or Farmville, escorted by heavy masses of infantry and
cavalry, and it soon became evident that the whole of Lee's army was attempt• ing to make its escape. Crook was at once ordered to attnck the trains, and, if
the enemy was too strong, one of the divisions would pass him while he held
fast and pressed the enemy, and attack at a point further on, and this division
was ordered to do the same, and so on, alternating, and this system of attack
would enable us finally to strike some weak point. This result was obtained
just south of Sailor's creek and on the high ground over that stream. Custer
took the road, and Crook and Devin coming up to his support, 16 pieces of artillery were captured and about 400 wagons destroyed, and many prisoners were
taken, and three divivions of the enemy's infantry were cut off from the line of
retreat. Meantime Colvnel Stagg, commanding the Michigan brigade of the
first division, was held at a point about two and a half miles south of Deatonsville, and with this force and a section of Miller's battery, which shelled the
trains with excellent effect while Colonel Stagg demonstrated to attack them,
thus keeping a large force of the enemy from moving against the rest of the
cavalry and holding them until the arrival of the 6th corps, which was marching to report to me. I felt so strongly the necessity of holding this large force
of the enemy that I gave permission to General Merritt to order Colonel Stagg''S
brigade to make a mounted charge against their lines, which was most gallantly
done, the men leaving many of their horses dead almost up to the enemy's works.
On the arrival of the head of the 6th corps the enemy commenced withdrawing. Major General Wright was ordered to put Seymour's division into
position at once and advance and carry the road, which was done at a point about
two miles or two miles and a half from Deatonsville. As soon as the road was in
our possession, Wright was directed to push General Seymour on, the enemy
falling back, skirmishing briskly. r.l'heir resistance growing stubborn, a halt was
called to get up Wheaton's d1vision of the 6th corps, which went into position
73
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on the left of the road, Seymour being on the right. Wheaton was orclerecl to
guide right, with his right connecting with Seymour's left and resting on the
road. I still felt the great importance of pushing the enemy, and was unwilling
to wait for Getty's division of the 6th corps to get up. I therefore ordered an
advance, sending word to General Humphreys, who was on the road to ourright,
and requesting him to push on, as I felt confident that we could break up the
enemy. It was apparent, from the absence of artillery fire and the manner in
which they gave way when pressed, that the force of the enemy opposed to
us was a heavy rear guard. The enemy was driven until our lines reached
Sailor's creek; and, from the north bank, I could see our cavalry on the high
ground above the creek and south of it, and the long line of smoke from the
burning Vtagons. A cavalryman, who, in a charge, cleared the enemy's works
and came through their lines, reported to me what was in front. I regret that
I have forgotten the name of this gallant young soldier .. As soon as General
Wright could get his artillery into position I ordered the attack to be made on
.the left, and sent Colonel Stagg's brigade of cavalry to strike and flank the extreme right of the enemy's line. 'rhe attack by the infantry was not executed
exactly as I had directed, and a portion of our line in the open ground was
broken by the terrible fire of the enemy, who were in position on commanding
ground south of the creek.
This attack by Wheaton's and Seymour's divisions was splendid, but no
more than I had reason to expect from the gallant 6th corps. The cavalry in
rear of the enemy attacked simultaneously, and the enemy, after a gallant resistance, were completely surrvunded, and nearly all threw down their arms and
surrendered. General Ewell, commanding the enemy's forces, and a number of
other general officers, fell into our hands, and a very large number of prif!oners.
I have never ascertained exactly how many prisoners were taken in this battle. Most of them fell into the hands of the cavalry, but they are no more entitled to claim them than the Gth corps, to which command equal credit is due
for the good results of this engagement. Both the cavalry and the 6th corps
encamped south of Sailor's creek that night, having followed up the small remnant of the enemy's forces for several miles. In reference to the participation
of the 6th corps in this action I desire to add that the Lieutenant General had
notified me that this corps would report to me. Major McClellan and Lieutenant
Colonel Franklin, of General Vv right's staff, had successively been sent forward
to report the progress of the corps in coming up, and on the arrival of Major General Wright he reported his corps to me, and from that time until after the battle
received my orders and obeyed them ; but after the engagement was over and
G l' neral Meade had communicated with General Wright, the latter declined to
make his report to me until directed to do so by the Lieutenant General.
On the 7th in~tant the pursuit was continued early in the morning by the
cavalry, General Crook in the advance. It was discovered that the enemy had
not been cut off by the army of the James, and under the belief that he would
. attempt to escape on the Danville road through Prince Edward Court House, General Merritt was ordered to move his two divisions to that point, passing around
the 1eft of the army of the James. General Crook continued the direct pursuit,
encountering the main body of the enemy at Farmville, and again on the north
side of the Appomattox, where the enemy's trains were attacked by General
Gregg, and a sharp fight with the enemy's infantry ensued, in which General
Gregg was unfortunately captured.
On arriving at Prince Ed ward Court House I found General McKenzie, with
his division of cavalry from the army of the James, and ordered him to cross
the bridge on the Buffalo river and make a reconnaissance to Prospect Station,
on the Lynchburg railroad, and ascertain if the enemy were moving past that
point. Meantim~ I beard from General Crook that the enemy had crossed to the
north side of the Appomattox, and General Meritt was then moved on and en-
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camped at Buffalo creek, and General Crook was ordered to recross the Appomattox and encamp at Prospect Station. On the morning of the 8th Merritt and
McKenzie continued the march to Prospect Station, and Merritt's and Crook's commands then moved on to Appomattox depot, a point on the Lynchburg railroad,
five miles south of Appomattox Court House. Shortly after the march commenced, Sergeant White, one of my scouts, notified me that there were fonr
trains of cars at Appomattox depot loaded with supplies for General Lee's army;
Generals Merritt and Crook were at once notified, and the command pushed on
briskly for twenty-eight miles. General Custer had the advance, and on nearing the depot skilfully threw a force in rear of the trains and captured them.
Without halting a moment he pushed on, driving the enemy (who had reached
the depot about the same time as our cavalry) in the direction of Appomattox
Uourt House, capturing many prisoners and 25 pieces of artillery, a hospital train,
and a large park of wagons. General Devin coming up, went in on the right of
Custer. 'rhe fighting continued till after dark, and the enemy being driven to
Appomattox Court House, I at once notified the Lieutenant General, and sent word
to Generals Ord and Gibbon, of the army of the James, and General Griffin, commanding the 5th corps, who were in rear, that if they pressed on there was now
no means of escape for the enemy, who bad reached "the last ditch." During
the night, although we knew tha;t the remnant of Lee's army was in our front,
we held fast with the cavalry to what we had gained, and ran the captured trains
back along the railroad to a point where they would be protected by our infantry
that was coming up. 'l'he 24th and 5th corps, and one division of the 25th
corps, arrived about daylight on the 9th at Appomattox depot.
After consulting with General Ord, who was in command of these corps, I
rode to the front, near Appomattox Court House, and just as the enemy in heavy
force was attacking the cavalry with the intention of breaking through our lines,
I directed the calvary, wh.ich was dismounted, to fall back, gradually resisting
the enemy, so as to give time for t 11e infantry to form its lines and march to the
attack, and when thi::; was done, to move off to the right flank and mount. This
was done, and th·e enemy discontinued his attack as soon as he caught sight of
our infantry. I moved briskly around the left of the enemy's line of battle,
which was falling back rapidly, (heavily pressed by the advance of the infantry,)
and was about to charge the trains and the confused mass of the enemy, when
a white flag was presented to General Custer, who had the advance, and who sent
the information to me at once that the enemy desired to surrender.
Riding over to the left at Appomattox Court House, I met Major General Hordon, of the rebel service, and Major General Wilcox. General Gordon :requested
a suspension of hostilities, pending negotiations for a surrender theu being held
between Lieutenant General Grant and General Lee. I notified him that I desired to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood, but as there was nothing
definitely settled in the correspondence, and as an attack had been made on my
lines with the view to escape, under the impression our force was only cavalry~
I must have some assurance of an intended surrender. This General Gordon
gave by saying that there was no doubt of the surrender of General Lee's army.
I then separated from him, with an agreement to meet these officers again in half'
an hour at Appomattox Court house. At the specified time, in company with
General Ord, who commanded the infantry, I again met this offi'cer, also•
Lieutenant General Longstreet, and received from them the same assurance, and
hostilities ceased until the arrival of Lieutenant General Grant.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. H. SHERIDAN, Major General.
Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS, Chiif if Staff.
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CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,
Dinwiddie Court House, Ma'rch 31, 1865.
The enemy's cavalry attacked me about 10 o'clock to~day on the road coming
in from the west and a little north of Dinwiddie Court House. This attack was
very handsomely repulsed by General Smith's brigade of Crook's division, and
the enemy was driven across Chamberlain's creek. Shortly afterwards the enemy's infantry attacked on the same creek in heavy force, and drove in General Davis's brigade, and advancing rapidly gained the forks of the road at J.
Boisseau's. 'l'his forced Devin, who was in advance, and Davies, to cross ·to
the Boydton road. General Gregg's brigade and General Gibbs'8 brigade, who
had been towards Dinwiddie, then attacked the enemy in the rear very handsomely. This stopped the march towards the left of our infantry, and finally
caused them to turn towards Dinwiddie and attack us in heavy force. ~".rhe enemy then again attacked at Chamberlain's creek and forced Smith's position.
At this time Capehart and Pennington's brigades of Custer's division came up
and a very handsome fight occurred.
'l1he enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie,
and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton road to join us.
'l1he opposing force was Pickett's division, vVise's independent brigade of infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's, Rosser's, and W. H. Lee's cavalry commands.
The men have behaved splendidly. Our loss in killed and wounded will probably number 450 men ; very few were lost as prisoners.
We have of the enemy a number of prisoners.
This force is too strong for us. I will hold on to Dinwiddie Court House until
I am compelled to leave.
Our fighting to-day was all dismounted.
P. H. SHERIDAN, Major General.
Lieutenant General GRANT,
Commanding Armies United States.

DABNEY MILLS,
March 31, 1865-10.05 p. m.
The 5th corps has been ordered to your support. 'l1 wo divisions will go by
.T. Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent
McKenzie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan road.
All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.
You w.ill assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and
use it to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has
fought so gallantly to-day.
U.S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.
O:fficiaJ copy:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Ass1"stant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GE~ERAL's OFFICE, November 18, 1865.

Major General W. T. Sherman's report qfthe campaign qf Atlanta.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Atlanta, Georgia, September 15, 1R64.
GE~ERAL: I have heretofore from day to day, by telegraph, kept the War
Department and the general-in-chief advi~ed of the progress of events, but now
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it becomes necessary to review the whole campaign which has resulted in the
capture and occupation of the city of Atlanta.
On the 14th day of 1\'Iarch, 1864, at Memphis, 'Tennessee, I received notice
from General Grant, at Nashville, that he had been commissioned lieutenan
general and commander-in chief of the armies of the United States, which would
compel him to go east, and that I had been appointed to succeed him as commander of the division of the Mississippi. He summoned me to Nashville for
a conference, and I took my departure the same day, and reached Nashville,
via Cairo, on the 17th, and accompanied him on his journey eastward as far as
Cincinnati. We had a full and complete understanding of the policy and plans
for the ensuing campaign, cuve1·mg a vast area of country, my part of which extended from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. I returned to Nashville, and on the
25th began a tour of inspection, visiting Athens, Decatur, Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; Chattanooga, Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. During this visit I had interviews with Major General McPherson, commanding
the army of the 'rennessee, at Huntsville; Major General Thomas, commanding
the army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; and Major General Schofield,
commanding the army of the Ohio, at Knoxville. We arranged in general terms
the lines of communication to be guarded, the strength of the several columns
and garrisons, and fixed the 1st day of May as the time when all things should
be ready. Leaving these officers to complete the details of organization and
preparation, I returned again to Nashville on the 2d of April, and gave my
personal attention to the question of supplies. I found the depots at Nashville
abundantly supplied and the railroads in very fair order, and that steps had already been taken to supply cars and locomotives to fill the new and increased
demands of the service, but the impoverished condition of the inhabitants of East
rrennessee, more especially in the region around about Chattanooga, had forced the
commanding officers of posts to issue food to the people. I was compelled to stop
this, for a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not feed the armies
and the people too, and otcourse the army had the preference, but I endeavored to
point the people to new channels of supply. At first my orders operated very
hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox wagons hauled
meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust
that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen
in the result a perfect justification of my course. At once the storehouses at
Chattanooga began to fill, so that by the 1st of May a very respectable quantity
of food and forage had been accumulated there, and from that day to this, stores
have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has
enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time, although the
enemy has succeeded more than once in breaking our road for many miles at
different points.
During the month of April I received from Lieutenant General Grant a map
with a letter of instructions, which is now at Nashville, but a copy will be procured, and made part of this report. Subsequently I received from him notice
that he would move from his camps about Culpeper, Virginia, on the 5th of
May, and he wanted me to do the same from Chattanooga. My troops were still
dispersed, and the cavalry, so necessary to our success, was yet collecting horses at
Nicholasville, Kentucky, and Columbus, Tennessee. On the 27th of April I put all
the troops in motion towards Chattanooga, and on the next day went there in person. My aim and purpose was to make the.m·my of the Cumberland 50,000 men,
that of the Tennessee 35,000, aud that of the Ohio 15,000. These figures were
approximated, but never reached, the army of the Tennessee, failing to receive certain divisions that were still kept on the Mississippi river, resulting from the unfavorable issue of the Red River expedition. But on the 1st day of May the effective strength of the several armies for offensive purposes was about as follows:
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ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAKD, MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS COMMANDING.

Infantry . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 568
Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 377
Cavalry.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 828
Total . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60, 773
Guns . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .
130
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MAJOR GENERAL M'PHERSON COMMANDING.

Infantry . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 22, 437
Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 404
Cavalry ..................................••...... , . . . . . . . . .
624
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 465
Guns . . . . . . • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
96
ARMY OF THE OHIO, MAJOR GENERAL SCHOFIELD COMMANDING.

Infantry .......•....•........................•............. 11, 183
Artillery ..................•................................
679
Cavalry ............................................... ..... . 1,697
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 559
Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . .
28
Grand aggregate number of troops, 98,797; guns, 254.
About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number
of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating fur the loss in
battle and from sickness. These armies were grouped on the morning of May
6, as follows: that of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold; that of the Tenne8see at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga; and that of the Ohio near Red Clay,
on the Georgia line, north of Dalton.
The enemy lay in and about Dalton, superior to me in cavalry, (Wheeler's,)
and with three corps of infantry and artillery, viz: Hardee's, Hood's, and Polk's,
the whole commanded by General Joseph Johnston, .of the confederate army. I
estimated the cavalry under Wheeler at about 10,000, and the infantry and
artillery at about 45,000 or 50,000 men.
To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge known as the Rocky ]'ace, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost, through which lny the railroad and wagon-road. It was narrow, well obstructed IJy abatis, and flooded
by water caused by dams across Mill creek. Batteries also commanded it in its
whole length from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at
the further end, like a traverse, directly across its debouche. It was, therefore,
necessary to turn it. On its north front the enemy bad a strong llne of works
behind Mill creek, so that my attention was at once directed to the south. In
that direction I found Snake Creek Gap, affording me a good practicable way
to reach Resaca, a point on the enemy's railroad line of communication, eighteen miles below Dalton. Accordingly I ordered General McPherson to move
rapidly from his position at Gordon's Mill, via Ship's Gap, Villanow, and. Snake
Creek Gap, directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton, and to
make a bold attack. After breaking the raHroad well, he was ordered to fall
back to a strong defensive position near Snake creek, and stand ready to fall
upon the enemy's flank when he retreated, as I judged he would. During the
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movement, General Thom!tS was to make a strong feint of attack in front, while
General Schofield pressed down from the north.
General Thomas moved from Ringgold on the 7th, occupying Tunnel Hill
facing the Buzzard Roost Gap, meeting with little opposition and pushing the
enemy's cavalry well through the gap. General McPherson reached Snake
Creek Gap on the 8th, completely surprising a brigade of cavalry which was
coming to watch and hold it, and on the 9th General Schofield pushed down
close on Dalton, from the north, whilst General Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard Roost and Rocky Faced Ridge, pushing it almost to a
battle. One division, General Newton's~ of the 4th corps, General Howard's,
carried the ridge, and turning suuth towards Dalton, found the crest too narrow
and too well protected by rock epaulments, to enable him to reach the gorge or
pass. Another division, General Geary's, of the 20th corps, General Hooker's,
also made a bold push for the summit, to the south of the pass, but the narrow road,
as it approached the summit, was too strong·ly held by the enemy to be carried.
This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, for
General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of Resaca
almost unopposed. He fc,und Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and
although there were many good roads leading from north to south, endangering
his left flank from the direction of Dalton, be could find no road by which he
could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly be fell back and took
strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the re~mlt, still appreciated the advantage gained, and on the lOth
ordered General 1.'homas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap
in support of General McPherson, and to follow with another corps, the 14th,
General Palmer's, leaving General Howard with the 4th corps-to continue to
threaten Dalton in front, whilst the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake
Creek Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the
same route, and on the 11th the whole army, excepting General Howard's corps,
and some cavalry left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west side of Rocky
Faced Ridge for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next day we moved againEtt
Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry; General Thomas to come up on his left and General Schofield on
his right. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross road
within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him and gave
the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders,
wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca and drove them within
their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of" bald" hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town.
General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp creek, and General Schofield
broke his way through the dense forest to General 1.'homas's left. Johnston
had left Dalton, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing
saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country,
which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible.
This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively
good roads constructed beforehand, pat tly from the topographical nature of the
country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the
14th of May we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp creek,
occupying the forts at Resaca, and his right on some high chestnut hills to the
north of the town. I at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the
Oostanaula at Lay's ferry in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the 16th
corps, commanded by General Sweeny, to cross and threaten Calhoun; also the
cavalry division of General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down
towards Rome, to cross the Oostanaula and break the railroad bdow Calhoun
and above Kingston if possible, and with the main army I pressed against
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Resaca at all pointtl. General McPherson got across Camp creek near its mouth
and made a lodgement close up to the enemy's works, on hills that commanded,
with short-range artillery:, the railroad and trussel bridges; and General 'l'homas
pressing dof"e along Camp creek valley, threw General Hooker's corps across
the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down it clDse to Resaca.
General Schofield came up cloRe on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during
the afternoon and evening of the 15th, during which General Hooker drove the
t>nemy from several strong hills, captured a four-gun battery and many prisoners.
That night .Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the
next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned.
The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on his heels,
General McPherson by Lay's ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads
to the left. We found in Resaca another four-gun battery and a good lot of
stores.
General McPherson during tl1e 16th got across at Lay's ferry. General
Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield
had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Fite's and FiEld's ferries across the Connasauga and Coosawattee rivers, which form the Oostanaula.
On the 17th all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we 'could
find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders a division, General Jeff. C.Davis,
along the west bank of the 00stanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found
signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day,
General Newton's division in the advance, had a pretty sharp encountrr with his
rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open, and well adapted to a grand battle. vVe made the proper dispositions. General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point
General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston to be in close support. On
the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville with strong forts, but as om
troops converged on him again he retreated in the night time across the Etowah
1iver, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in
complete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah river.
Holding General Thomas's army about Cassville, General McPherson's about
Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah bridge,
I gave the army a few days' rest and also time to bring forward supplies for the
next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got
possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy calibre. and its
valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges
across the Etowah river near Kingston, giving us the me1:1ns of crossing toward
the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would bold us in check at the
Allatoona Pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by -a
circuit to the right, and having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence
from onr railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the 23d put
the army in motion for Dallas."
General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene creek, neax
Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas ?Jia Van "\Vert. General Davis's division movea directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road via Euharlee and Burnt Hickory, whilst General
Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on General
'rbomas's left.
General 'l'homas's head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about
Burnt Hickory and captured a courier with a letter of General J olmston, sl1owing he bad detected the move and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The
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country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.
On the 25th of May General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for
Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. "Vhen
he approached the Pumpkin Vine creek, on the main Dallas road, he found arespectable force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed
them across the creek, saving the bridge, though on fire, and 'followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove
some distance until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's other two
divisions were on other roads, and he ordered them in, although the road l1e was
then following, by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north of Dallas
about four miles.
It was near 4 o'clock p. m. before General Hooker got his whole corps wrll
in hand, when he deployed two divisions and by my order made a bold push to
secure possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three
roads meet from Ackw01 th, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought,
and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church ; but having hastily thrown
up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was
unable to drive the enemy from those roads. By the next morning we found the
enemy well intrenched substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to
Marietta. We were consequently compelh~d to make dispositions on a larger
scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed toward.s
our left so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry
operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield. General McCook looked to our rear.
Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work towards our left, and when all things were ready to push for the railroad east of
Allatoona. In making our development before the enemy about New Hope
many severe, sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, dPtails of
which will be given at length in reports of subordinate commanders. On the 28th
General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General rrhomas,
in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend
still more to the left and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas.
Fortunately our men had erected good breastworks and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effPct, I rene.wed my orders to General McPherson to move to his left about five miles and occupy General Thomas's position in front of New Hope Chnrch, and Generals Thomas and
Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. 'rhis move
was effected with ease and safety on the 1st of June, and by pushing our left
well around we occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth,
after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the
east end of the pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to th(l
west end of the pass. Both of these commandB reached the points designated
without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the
Allatoona Pass.
Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the 4th of June had resolved to leave Johnston
in his intrenched position at New Hope Church and move to the railroad about
Ackworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily
to Ackworth and reached the railroad on the 6th of June. I at once examined
in person the Allatoona Pass and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necEssary orders for its defence and garrison, and as
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soon as the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah our stores came forward to our camps by rail.
At Ackworth General Blair overtook us on the 8th of June with two divisions
of the 17th corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry,
Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses
at Columbia. '!'his accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle
and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.
On the 9th of June, our communications to the rear being secure and supplies
ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty.
Kenesaw, the bold and striking Twin mountain, lay before us, with a high
range of chestnut hills trending off to the northeast, terminating to our view in
another peak called Brushy mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine mountair., and beyond it in the distance Lost mountain. All these,
though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound
in that region. Kenesaw, Pine mountain, and Lost mountain, form a triangle,
Pine mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost mountain the base, covering
perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On
each of these peaks the enemy had his signal stations. The summits were covered with batteries and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending.
The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors
of war; but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy I found him occupying a line full twelve milealong, more
than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move towards Marietta, his right on the railroad, General rrhomas on Kenesaw and Pine
mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost mountain; General Garrard's
cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, andGeneral McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.
By the 11th of June our lines were close up, and we made dispoRitions to
break the line between Kenesaw and Pine mountains. General Hooker was on
its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer
between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the 14th,
and on the morning of the 15th Pine mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals 'l'homas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly
intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushilijg our operations on the centre as vigorously
as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the
centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost mountain and the long
line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to
press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult
ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw
as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind
Nose's creek, covering his . railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled
him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly.
From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the
extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay
close up against his mountain town.
During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villanously bad; the
rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow wooded roads
mere mud gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but
our men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe and kept up an
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incessant picket firing galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance
our general lines closer and closer to the enemy.
Generall\IcPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw and working his left
forward, General Thomas swinging as it were on a grand left wheel, his left on
Kenesaw connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all the time
working to the Routh and east along the old Sandtown road. On the 22d, as
General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, the
enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General Williams's division of Gcl'leral Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Hascall's division of General Schofield's
army.
'I'he ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the
skirmish line, an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to
hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception,
yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his
dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair
of the "Kulp House." Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such
mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas
and the "Kulp House," and upon studying the ground I had no alternative in
my turn but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had
settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines.
All looked to me to "out flank." An army to be efficient mnst not settle
down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan
which prumises success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt
it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left centre; because, if I could thrust a strong head
of column through at that point by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one
half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right
and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either part, it could
be overwhelmed and destroyed. 'I'herefore, on the 24th of June, I ordered that
an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, giving
three days' notice for preparation and reconnoissance; one to be made near Little
Kenesaw by General McPherson's troop::;, and the other about a mile further
south by General Thomas's troops. The hour was fixed, and all the details given in Field Orders No. 28, of June 24. On the 27th of June the two assaults
were made at the time and in the manner presc1·ibed, and both failed, costing us
many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and 1\fcCook; Colonel Rice and others badly wounded. Our aggregate loss being near 3,000, whilst
we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed
breastworks. l!'ailure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston
that I would assault, and that boldly, and we also gained and held ground so
close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them.
It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strong on the enemy's left; and on the
1st of July I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by Generai Garrard's
cavalry iu front of Kenesaw, and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right
down to and threaten Nickajack creek and Turner's ferry across the Chattahoochee, and I abo pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.
General McPherson commenced his movement the night of July 2, and the
effect was instantaneous. The next morning Kenesaw was abandoned, and
with the fir::;t dawn of day I saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain top.
General 'l'lwmas's whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and turned
south in pur~:~uit toward the Chattahoochee. In person I entered .IHarietta at
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Sk in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacated the place. GenP-ral
Logan's corps of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was
ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in
flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the
Chattahoochee; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and
had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong tete du pr .nt at
the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna
camp-meeting gTound, five miles from Marietta.
Here General Thoma~ found him, his front covered by a good parapet, and
his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood creeks. Ordering a garrison
for Marietta, and General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, I overtook General 'rhomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July we pushed
a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's
pits and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack creek and about 'rurner's
ferry. 'rids had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone,
and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas's left flank resting
on it near Paice's ferry, General McPherson's right at mouth of Nickajack, and
General Schofield in reserve. The enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength,
covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochee.
Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the 5th demonstrated the strength
of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee ri \'er, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by means
of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.
To accomplish this result I judged it would be more easy of execution before
the enemy had made more thorough preparation or reg·ained fnll confidence,
and accordingly I ordered General Schofield across from his position on the
Sandtown road to Smyrna. camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near
the mouth of Soap's creek, and effect a lodgement on the east bank. 'l'his was
most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon
bridge and a trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgement on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time General Garrard moved rapidly on Roswell and destroyed the factories which had
supplied the rebel armies with cloth for years. Over one of these, the woollen
factory, the nominal owner displayed the l!"'rench flag, which "\vas not respected
of course. A neutral surely is no better than one of our own citizens, and we
do not permit our own citizens to fabricate cloth for hostile uses .
General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell and
hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and as I contemplated transferring the army of the 'renuessee from the extreme right to the left, I ordered General rl'homas to send a division of his infautry that was nearest up to Roswell
to hold the ford until General McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent and held the ford
until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was soon followed by General
McPherson's whole army. About the same time General Howard had also
built a bridge at Powers's ferry; two miles below, General Schofield had crossed
over and taken position on his right. Thus during the 9th we had secured
three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochee above the enemy,
with good roads leading to Atlanta, and Johnston abandoned his tete dupont,
burned his bridges, and left us undisputed masters north and west of the Chattahoochee at daylight of the lOth of July.
'rhis was one if not the chief object of the campaign, viz: the advancement
of our lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee; but Atlanta lay before us
only eight miles distant, and was too important a place in the hands of an enemy
to be left undisturbed with its magazines, stores, arsenals, work-shops, found-
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ries, &c., and more especially its railroads, which converge there from the four
great cardinal points. But the men had worked hard and needed rest, and we
accordingly took a short spell. But in anticipation of this contingency I had
collected a well-appointed force of cavalry, about 2,000 strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly south,
cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the
most direct route to Opelika. 1'here i~ but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of trade and travel between Georgia and Alabama and
Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika, and my purpose was to
break it up effectually and thereby cut off Johnston's army fi.·om that source of
supply and re-enforcement.
General Rousseau, commanding the district of 'l'ennessee, asked permission to
command the expedition, and received it. As soon as .Johnston was well across
the Chattahoochee, and as I had began to manreuvre on Atlanta, I gave the requisite notice, and General Rousseau started punctually on the lOth of .July. He
fulfilled his orders and instructions to the very letter, whipping the rebel General
Clanton en route; he passed through Talladega, and reached the railroad on
the 16th, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it well up to that
place ; also, three miles of the branch towards Columbus and two towards
West Point. He then turned north and brought his command safely to Marietta, arriving on the 22d, having sustained a trifling loss, not to exceed 30 men.
The main armies remained quiet in their camps on the Chattahoochee until
the 16th of July, but the time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona,
Marietta, and Vining's Station, strengthening the railroad guards and garrisons,
and in improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals
Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river to draw
attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance I
ordered it to commence on the 17th; General 'l'homas to cross at Powers's and
Paice's ferry bridges and to march by Buckhead; General Schofield was already
across at the mouth of Soaps's creek and to march by Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell straight against the Augusta
road at some point east of Decatur near Stone mountain. General Garrard's
cavalry acted with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook
watched the river and roads below the railroad. On the 17th the whole army
advanced fi·om their camps and formed a general line along the Old Peach 'l'ree
road.
Continuing·on a general right wheel General McPherson reached the Augusta
railroad on the 18th at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General
Garrard's cavalry and General Morgan L. Smith's infantry division of the 10th
CDrps, broke up a ~::~ection of about four miles, and General Schofield reached
the town of Decatur.
On the 19th General McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur, and
General Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta leading by Colonel Howard's
house and the distillery, and General Thomas crossed Peach Tree Cl'eek in force
by numerous bridges in the face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the
enemy in more or less force and skirmished heavily.
On the 20th all the armies had closed in, converging towards Atlanta, but as
a gap existed between Generals Schofield and 'l'homas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of General Thomas's army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving General Newton's division of the same
corps on the Bu~khead road. During the afternoon of the 20th, about 4 p. m.,
the enemy sallied from his works in force and fell in line of battle against our
right centre, composed of General Newton's division of General Howard's corps,
on the main Buckhead road, of General Hooker's corps next so~th, and General Johnston's division of General Palmer's corps. 1'he blow was sudden
and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily co\'ered his front
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by a line of rail piles which enabled him to meet and repul~e the attack on him.
General Hooker's ·whole corps was uncovered and had to fight on com oaratively
open ground, and it, too, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back to his
intrenchments, and the action in front of General Johnston was eomparatively
light, that division being well intrenched. 'rhe enemy left on the field over
500 dead, about 1,000 wounded, 7 stands of colors, and many prisoners. HiR
loss could not have fallen short of 5,000, whereas ours was covered by 1,500
killed, wounded, and missing; the greater loss fell on General Ho~ker's corps
from i ts exposed condition.
On the 2 tst we felt the enemy in his intrenched position, which was found to
crown the heights overlooking the comparatively open ground of the valley of
Peach Tree creek, his right beyond the Augusta road to the eaf't, and his left
well toward Turner's ferry on the Chattahoochee, at a general distauce from
Atlanta of about four miles.
On the morning of the 22d, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line was
found abandoned, and I confess I thought the fmemy had resolved to give us
Atlanta without further contest; but General Johnston had been relieved of his
command and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resnlved on, of
which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our advancing ranks swept
across the strong and well finished parapet of the enemy and closed in upon
Atlanta until we occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about two
miles' radius, when we again found him occupying in force a line of finished
redoubts, which had been prepared for more than a year, covering all the roads
leading into Atlanta; and we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts
with curtains strengthened by rifle trenches, abatis, and chevaux-defrise.
General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow
substantially the railroad, with the 15th corps, General Logan, the 17th, General Blair, on its left, and the 16th, General Dodge, on its right; but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the 1Gth corps, General
Dodge, was thrown out of line by the 15th connecting on the right with General :::lchofield near the Howard house. General McPherson, the night before,
had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad, where the 17th
corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position within easy view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown
out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it in strength
with batteries. 'l'he 16th corps, General Dodge, was ordered fi·om right to left
to occupy this position and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge
was moving by a diagonal path or wagon track leading from the D ecatur road
in the direction of General Blair's left flank.
About 10 a.m. I was in person with General Schofield examining the appearance of the enemy's lines opposite the distillery, where we attracted enough of
the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy was in Atlanta in force, and meant to fight, and had gone to a large dwelling close by,
known as the Howard house, where General McPherson joined me. He
described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops.
I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left I would extend to
the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He
then described the hill occupied by General Leggett's division of General Blair's
corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the
Augusta railroad on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his
disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to
use General Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up our
line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by
General :McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position. 'rhe general
remained with me until near noon, when some reports reaching us that indicated
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a movement of the enemy on that flank, he mounted and rode away with his
staff. I must here also state that the day before I had detached General Garrard's cavalry to go to Covington, on the Augusta road, forty-two miles east of
Atlanta, and from that point to send detachments to break the two important
bridges across the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, tributaries of Ocmulgee,
and General l\fcPherson had also left his wagon train at Decatur under a guard
of three regiments, commanded by Colonel (now General) Sprague. Soon after
General McPherson left me at the Howard house, as before described, I heard
the sounds of musketry to our left rear-at first mere pattering shots, but soon
they grew in volume, accompanied with artillery, and about the same time the
sound of guns was heard in the direction of Decatur. No doubt could longer
be entertained of the enemy's plan of action, which was to throw a superior
force on our left flank, whilst he held us with his forts in front, the only question being as to the amount of force he could employ at that point. I hastily
transmitted orders to all points of our centre and right to press forward and
give full employment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to
h0ld as large a force in reserve as. possible, awaiting developments. Not more
than half an hour after General McPherson had left me, viz., about 12~ m. of
the 22d, his adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Clark, rode up and reported
that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner; that he had ridden
from me to General Dodge's column, moving as heretofore described, and had
sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had
passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles
A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes
after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and
his horse had come out riderless, having two wounds. The suddenness of this
terrible calamity would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thoughts. I in3tantly despatched a staff officer to G-eneral
John A. Logan, commanding the 15th corps, to tell him what had happened;
that he must assume command of the army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the gTound already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General
Leggett the night before.
Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied
from Atlanta, and by a wide circuit to the east had struck General Blair's left
flank, enveloped it, and his left had swung around until it hit General Dodge
in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the old line of rebel
trench, but it was fashioned to fight outwards. A space of wooded ground of
near half a mile intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and
General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured, but the last order
ever given by General McPherson was to hurry a brigade (Colonel vVangelin's)
of the 15th corps across from the railroad to occupy this gap. It came across
on the double quick and checked the enemy. Whilst Hardee attacked in flank,
Stewart's corps was to attack in front directly out from the main works, but
fortunately their attacks were not simultaneous. The enemy swept across the
hill, which our men were then fortifying, and captured the pioneer company,
its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until
he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the 17th corps, who was
somewhat "in air," and forced to fight first from one side of the old rifte parapet
and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment, eo as to
form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the apex of the hill, which
was the only part that was deemed essential to our future plans. General Dodge
had canght and held well in check the enemy's right, and punished him severely,
capturing many prisoners. Smith (General Giles A.) had gradually given up
the extremity of his line and formed a new one, whose right connected with
General Leggett, and his left refused-facing southeast. On this ground, and
in this order, the men fought well and desperately for near four hours, checkiJJ.g
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and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at
the angle was terrible, and great credit is due both Generals Leggett and Giles
A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn figh~ng. The enemy made
no further progress on that flank, and by 4 p. m. had almost given up the
attempt. In the mean time \¥heeler's cavalry, unopposed, (for General Garrard was absent at Covington by my order,) had reached Decatur and attempted
to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel (now General) Sprague covered them
with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of Generals Schofield
and rl'homas, and not drawing back from Decatur until every wagon was safe
except three, which the teamsters had left, carrying off the mules. On our
extreme left the enemy had taken a complete battery of six guns, with its
horses, (Murray's,) of the regular army, as it was moving along unsupported
and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow, wooded road in that unguarded
space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on
the ridge above, but most of the men escaped to the bushes. He also got two
other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General
Giles A. Smith drew off his men in the manner heretofore described. About 4
p. m. there was quite a lull, during which the enemy felt forward on the railroad
and main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section
of guns, had been thrown forward as a kind of picket, and captured the two
guns. He then advanced rapidly and broke through our lines at that point,
which had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's
brigade, sent by General Logan's orders to the extreme left. The other brigade,
General Lightburn, which held this part of the line, fell back in some disorder
about four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, leaving the
enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, one of which, a 20-poundet·
Parrott battery of four guns, was most valuable to us, and separating General
Woods's and General Harrow's divisions of the 15th corps, that were on the
right and left of the railroad. Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connexion at that point, I ordered certain
batteries of General Schofield to be moved to a position somewhat commanding,
by a left flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within
sight and the woods beyond, to prevent his re-enforcing. I also sent orders to
General Logan, which he had already anticipated, to make the 15th corps regain
its lost ground at any cost, and instructed General Woods, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet down from where he
held it until he saved the batteries and recovered the lost ground. rrhe whole
was executed in superb style, at times our men and the enemy fighting across
the narrow parapet, but at last the enemy gave way and the 15th corps regained
its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were out of
view, and had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this
terminated the battle of the 22d, which cost us 3, 722 killed, wounded, and
prisoners.
But among the dead was Major General McPherson, whose body was recovered and brought to me in the heat of battle, and I had sent it in charge of his
personal stafl' back to Marietta, on its way to his northern home. He was a
noble youth of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness, that drew to him the affections of
all men. His sudden death devolved the command of the army of the Tennes8ee on the no less brave and gallant General Logan, who nobly sustained his
reputation and that of his ·veteran army, and avenged the death of his comrade
and commander. The enemy left on the field his dead and wounded and about
a thousand well prisoners. His dead alone are computed by General Logan at
3,240, of which number 2,200 were from actual count, and of these he delivered
to the enemy .under a flag of truce sent in by him (the enemy) 800 bodies. I
entertain no doubt that in the battle of July 22 the enemy sustained an aggre-
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gate loss of full 8,000 men. The next day General Garrard returned from
Covington, having succeeded perfectly in his mission, and destroyed the bridges
at Uleofauhatchee and Yellow rivers, beside burning a train of cars, a large
quantity of cotton, ( 2,000 bales,) and the depots of stores at Covington and
Conyer's Station, and bringing in 200 prisoners and some good horses, losing
but two men, one of whom was killed by accident. Having, therefore, sufficiently crippled the Augusta road, and rendered it useless to the enemy, I then
addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon road, over which, of necessity, came the stores and ammunition that alone maintained the rebel army in
Atlanta.
Generals Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments. I first ordered the army of the 'rennessee to
prepare to vacate its line and to shift by the right below Proctor's creek, and
General Schofield to extend up to the Augusta road.. About the same time
General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me
about 2,000 good cavalry, but of cour.:5e fatigued with its long and rapid march,
and ordering it to relieve General Stone,nan at the river about Sandtown, I
shifted General Stoneman to our left flank, and ordered all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon road, simultaneous with the movement of the
army of the rrennessee towards East Point. To accomplish this I gave General
Stoneman the command of his own and General Garrard's cavalry, making an
effective force of full 5,000 men, and to General McCook I gave his own and
the new cavalry brought by General Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harrison, of the eighth Indiana cavalry~ in the aggregate about 4,000.
These two well-appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the
left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by th<'l right on Fayetteville,
and on a certain night, viz: July 28, they were to meet on the Macon road,
near Lovejoy's, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated this
joint cavalry could whip all Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise fully accomplish its tnsk, and I think so still. I had the officers in command to meet
me, and explained the mpvement perfectly, and they entertained not a doubt of
perfect success. At the very moment almost of starting General Stoneman
addressed me a note aBking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking
the road, to be allowed, with his command proper, to proceed to Macon and
Anderson, and release our prisoners of war confined at those points. There
was somethiog most captivating in the idea, and the execution was within the
bounds of probability of success. I consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's
cavalry, which was embraced in his orders, and breaking the road, he might
attempt it with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to its
proper flank of the army. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. I have as yet no report from General Stoneman, who is a prisoner of
war at Macon, but I know that he despatched General Garrard's cavalry to
Flat Rock, for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, but
for some reason unknown to me he went off towards Covington, and did not
again communicate with General Garrard at Flat Rock. General Garrard
remained there until the 29th, skirmishing heavily with a part of Wheeler's
cavalry, and occupying their attention; but hearing nothing from General
Stoneman, he moved back to Conyer's, where, learniug that General Stoneman
had gone to Covington and south, on the east side of the Ocmulgee, he returned
and resumed his position on our left. It is known that General Stoneman kept
to the east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, sending detachments off to the east,
which did a large amount of damage to the railroad, burning the bridges of
Walnut creek and Oconee, and destroying a large number of cars and locomotives, and with his main fort:e appeared before Macon. He did not succeed in
crossing the Ocmulgee at Macon, or in approaching Andersonville, but retired
74
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in the direction whence he came, followed by various detachments of mounted
men under a General Iverson. He seems to have become hemmed in, and gave
consent to two-thirds of his force to escape back, whilst he held the enemy in
check with the remainder, about 700 men, and a section of light guns. One
brigade, Colonel Adams, carne in alrnoet intact. Another, commanded by Colonel
Capron, was surprised on the way back and scattered; many were captured
and killed, and the balance got in, mostly unarmed and afoot; and the General
himself surrendered his small command, and is now a prisoner at Macon. His
mistake was in not making the first concentration with Generals McCook and
Garrard near Lovejoy's, according to his orders, which is yet unexplained.
General McCook, in the execution of his part, went down the west bank of
the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge, with
which he was provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Palmetto
station of the West Point road, wh~re he tore up a section of track, leaving a
regiment to create a diversion towards Campbelltown; which regiment fulfilled
its duty and returned to camp by way of, and escorting back, the pontoon
bridge train. General McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he
found a large number of the wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta.
These he burned to the number of 500, killing 800 mules, and carrying along
others, and taking 250 prisoners, mostly quartermasters and men belonging to
the trains. He then pushed for the railroad, reaching it, at Lovejoy's Station,
at the time appointed. He burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and
continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accu·
rnulating force of the enemy. He could bear nothing of General Stoneman,
and finding his progress east too strongly opposed be moved south and west,
and reached Newman, on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry
force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, which bad been stopped by the break
he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him
in and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and cap·
tures and cut his way out, losing some 500 officers and men; among them a
most valuable officer, Colonel Harrison, who, when fighting his men as skir·
misherf! on foot, was overcome and made prisoner, and is now at Macon. He
cut his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed, and got to Marietta without further loss.
General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command,
which waR endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's.
But on the whole the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose
was to break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was on so limited a scale that I knew the damages would soon be repaired.
Pursuant to the general plan, the army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines
near the Decatur road during the night of July 26, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's creek, and south to prolong our line due
south, facing east. On that day, by appointment of the President of the
United States, Major GenPral Howard assumed the command of the army of
the 'l'ennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was
made en echelon, General Dodge's corps (16th) on the left nearest the enemy,
General Blair's corps (17th) next to come up on the right, and General Logan's
corps (15th) to come up on its right and refused as a flank, the whole to gain as
much ground due south from the flank already established on Proctor's creek
as was consistent with the proper strength. General Dodge's men got into
line in the evening of the 27th, and General Blair's came into line on his right
early on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house called
Ezra church, near some large open field by the poor-house, on a road known as
Bell's Ferry or Lickskillet road. Here the 15th corps, General Logan's, joined
on and refused along a ridge, well wooded, which partially commanded a view over
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the same fields. About 10 a.m. all the army was in position, and the men were
busy in throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which after a while
assumed the form of a parapet. The skill and rapi<iity with which our men
construct them is wonderful, and is something new in the art of war. I rode
along this whole line about that time, and as I approached Ezra church there
was considerable artillery firing enfilading the road in which I was riding,
killing an orderly's horse just behind my staff. I struck across an open field
to where General Howard was standing in the rear of the 15th corps, and
walked up to the ridge with General Morgan L. Smith to see if the battery
which enfiladed the main road and the line of rail piles could not be disposed
of, and heard General Smith give the necessary orders for the deployment of
one regiment forward and another to make a circuit to the right, when I returned
to where General Howard was, and remained there until 12 o'clock. During
this time there was nothing to indicate serious oattle, save the shelling by one
or at most two batteries from beyond the large field in front of the 15th corps.
Wishing to be well prepared to defeat the enemy if he repeated his game of
the 22d, I had, the night before, ordered General Davis's division of General
Palmer's corps, which, by the movement of the army of the Tennessee, had
been left, as it were, in reserve, to move down to Turner's ferry, and thence
towards White Hall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of General Howard's new line, hoping that in case of an attack this division would, in turn,
catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment. I explained it to General Huward, and bade him expect the arrival of such a force in
case of battle. Indeed, I expected to hear the fire of its skirmishers by noon.
General Davis was sick that day, and Brigadier General Morgan conunanded
the division, which had marched early for Turner's ferry, but many of the roads
laid down on our maps did not exist at all, and General Morgan was delayed
thereby. I rode back to make more particular inquiries as to this division,
and had just reached General Davis's headquarter's at Proctor's creek, when I
heard musketry open heavily on the right. 'rhe enemy had come out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, and formed his masses in the open fields behind a
swell of ground, and after the artillery firing I have described, advanced in parallel lines directly against the 15 :h corps, expecting to catch that flank in air.
His advance was m(:lgnificent, but founded in an error that cost him sadly, for
our men coolly and deliberately cut down his men, and in spite of the efforts of
the rebel officers his ranks broke and fled. But they were rallied again and
again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the rebel officers and
men reached our line of rail pil~s only to be killed or hauled over as prisoners.
These assaults occurred from noon until about 4 p. m., when the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands; as many as 642 dead
were counted and buried, and still others are known to have been buried which
were not counted by the regular detailed burial parties.
General Logan on this occasion was conspicuous, as on the 22d, his corps
being chief.ly engaged; but General Howard had drawn from the other corps,
16th and 17th, certain reserves which were near at hand but were not used.
Our entire loss is reported less than 600, whereas that of the enemy in killed
and wounded not less than 5,000. Had General Davis's divisinn come up on
the Bell's Ferry road, as I calculated, at any time before four o'clock, what was
simply a complete repulse would have been a disastrous rout to the enemy;
but I cannot attribute the failure to want of energy or intelligence, aud must
charge it, like many other things in this campaign, to the peculiar tangled nature of the forests, and absence of roads that would admit the rapid movement
of troops.
This affair terminated all efforts of the enemy to check our extensions by the
flank, which afterwards proceeded with comparative ease, but he met our exten.
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sions to the south by rapid and well-constructed forts and rifle-pits built between us and the railroad to and below East Point, remaining perfectly on the
defensive.
Finding that the right flank of the army of the Tennessee did not reach, I
was forced to shift General Schofield to that :flank also, and afterwards General
Palmer's corps of General Thomas's army. General Schofield moved from the
left on the 1st of August, and General Palmer's corps followed at once, taking
a line below Utoy creek, and General Schofield prolonged it to a point near East
Point. The enemy made no offensive opposition, but watched our movements
and extended his lines and parapets accordingly.
About thiE time several changes in important commands occurred which
Ehould be noted. General Hooker, offended that General Howard was preferred to him as successor to General McPherson, resigned his command of the
20th corps, to which General Slocum was appointed; but he was at Vicksburg,
and until he joined, the command of the corps devolved on General A. S. Williams, who handled it admirably. General Palmer also resigned the command
of the 14th corps, and General Jeff. U. Davis was appointed to his place. Major General D. S. Stanley had succeeded General Howard in command of the
4th corps.
From the 2d to the 5th we continued to extend to the right, demonstrating
strongly on the left and along our whole line. General Reilley's brigade of
General Cox's division, General Schofield's army, on the 5th, tried to bre~ k
through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy creek, but failed to carry
the position, losing about 400 men, who were caught in the entanglements and
abatis; but the next day the position was turned by General Rascal, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below
U toy creek. Still he did not gain the desired foothold on either the West
Point or Macon railroad. The enemy's line at that time must have been near
fifteen miles long, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. This he
was enabled to do by the use of· a large force of State militia, and his position
was so masked by the shape of ground that we were unable to discover the
wt·ak parts.
I had l>ecome satisfied that, to reach the Macon road, and thereby control .
the supplies for Atlanta, I would have to move the whole army; but, before
beginning, I ordered down from Chattanooga four 4~-inch rifled guns, to try
their effect. These arrived 0n the lOth, and "Were put to work night and day,
and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and creating confusion,
yet the enemy seemed determined to hold his forts even if the city were destroyed. On the ·16th of August I made my Orders No. 57, prescribing the
mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank, to begin
on the 18th. r.l1his movement contemplated the withdrawal of the 20th corps,
General Williams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and
the march of the main army to the West Point railroad, near Fairborn, and
afterwards to the Macon road, at or near Jonesboro', with our wagons loaded
with provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these
orders I learned that Wheeler, with a large mounted force of the enemy,
variously estimated from 6,000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east
and north, and had made his appe~nance on our lines of communication near
Adairsville, and had succeeded in capturing 900 of our beef cattle, and had
made a break of the railroad near Calhoun. I could not have asked · anything
better, for I had provided well against such a contingency, aud this detachment
left me superior to the enemy in cavalry. I suspended the execution of my
orders for the time being, and ordered General Kilpatrick to make up a wellappointed force of about 5,000 cavalry, and to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the 18th to the West Point road, and break it good
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near }..,airborn; then to proceed across to the Macon road, and tear it up
thoroughly, to avoid, as far as possible, the enemy's infantry, but to attack any
cavalry he could find. I thought this cavalry would save the necessity of
moving the main army across, and that in case of his success it would leave me
in better position to take full advantage of the result.
General Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed and broke the West Point
road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped
Ross's cavalry ann got possession of the railroad, which he held for five hours,
damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry which had
been despatched below Jonesboro' in cars was run back and disembarked, and
with Jackson's rebel cavalry made it impossible for him to continue his work.
He drew off to the east and made a circuit, and ~truck the railroad about Lovejoy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter
lines, when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of which
he brought in seventy, and captured a four-gun battery, which he destroyed,
except one gun, which he brought in. He estimated the damage done to the
road as enough to interrupt its use for ten days, after which ht:. returned by a
circuit north and east, reaching Decatur on the 22il. After an interview with
General Kilpatrick I was satisfied that whatever damage he had done would
not produce the result desired, and I renewed my orders for the movement of
the w-hole army. This iuvolved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta,
taking the field with our main force, and using it against the communications
of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments. All the army commanders
were at once notified to send their surplus wagons, incumbrances of all kinds,
and sick, back to our intrenched position at the bridge, and that the movement
would begin during the night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready,
the 4th corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on our extreme left and
marched to a position below Proctor's creek. 'l'he 20th corps, General Williams, moved back to the Chattahoochee. This movement was made without loss,
save a few thir1gs left in our camps by thoughtless officers or men. The night
of the 26th tbe movement continued, the army of the Tennessee drawing out
and moving rapidly by a circuit wt'll towards Sandtown and across Camp creek,
the army of the Cumberland below Utoy creek, General Schofield, remaining
in position. This was effected with the loss of but a single man in the army of
the Tl'nnessee, wounded by a shell from the enemy. 'rhe third move brought
the army of.the Tennessee on the West Point railroad, above :Fairborn, the army of
the Cumberland about Red Oak, and General Schofield closed in near Digs and
Mims. I then ordered one day's work to be expended in destroying that road,
and it was done with a will. 'l'welve and one-half miles were destroyed, the
ties burned, and the iron rails heated and tortured by the utmost ingenuity of
old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with trunks of trees, with
logs, rock, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes,
to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected
this work, and satisfied with its execution, I ordered the whole army to move
the next day eastward by several roads; General Howard, on the right, towards
Jonesboro', General 'I'homas, the centre, by Shoal Creek church, to Couch's, on
the Decatur and Fayettville road, and General Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's mills. An inspection of the map will show the strategic advantages of this
poeition. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge
or "divide" between the waters of Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and from East
Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. 'l'herefore the position I
have described, which had been well studied on paper, was my first" objective."
1t gave me '' inter1or lines," something, our enemy had enjoyed too long, and I
was anxious for once to get the imide track, and therefore my haste and desire
to secure it.
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The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the 29th. General
Thomas on the centre encountered little opposition or difficulty save what resulted fi·om the narrow road~ and reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East
Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point and came into position towards Rough-and-Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle,
had a greater distance to moYe. He encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly
to the crossing of Shoal creek, where the enemy also had artillery. Here a short
delay occurred and some cannonading and skirmishing, but General Howard
started them again and kept them moving, passed the Renfro Place, on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of that day, but
he wisely and well kept on and pushed on towards Jonesboro', saved the bridge
across Flint river, and did not halt until darkness compelled him. withi'n half a
mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the morning of August
31, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed
the 15th corps and disposed the 16th and 17th on its flanks. The men covered
their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act offensively or
defensively as the case called for.
I was that night with General Thomas at Couch's, and as s0on as I learned
that General Howard had passed Renfi·o's I directed General Thomas to send to
that place a division of General Jeff. C. Davis's corps, to move General Stanley's
corps in connexion with General Schofield towards Rough-and-Ready, and then
to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis's corps to feel
for the railroad. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward
and strike the railroad near Rough-and-Ready. r.rh~se movements were progressing during the 31st, when the enemy came out of his works at Jonesboro'
and attacked General Howard in position, as described. General Howard was
;:tdmirably situated to receive him, and repulsed the attack thoroughly. The
enemy attacked with Lee's and Hardee's corps, and after a contest of over two
hours withdrew, leaving over 400 dead on the ground, and his wounded, of which
about 300 were left in Jonesboro', could not have been much less than 2,500.
Hearing the sounds of battle at Jonesboro' about noon, orders were renewed to
push the other movements on the left and centre, and about 4 p.m. the reports arrived simultaneously that General Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at
Jonesboro', that General Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Roughand-Ready and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; that General
Stanley, of General Thomas's army, had also got the road below General Schofield
and was destroying its working south, and that General Baird, of General
Davis's corps, had struck it still lower down within four miles of Jonesboro'.
Orders Wtre at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesboro', General
Howard to keep the enemy busy whilst General Thomas should move down
from the north, with General Schofield on his left. I ali3o ordered the troops, as
they moved down, to continue the thorough destruction of the railroad, because
we had it then, and I did not know but that events might divert our attention.
General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to our rear, the north.
General Kilpatrick was sent south, down the west bank of Flint, with instructions
to attack or threaten the railroad below Jonesboro'. I expected the whole army
would close down on Jonesboro' by noon of the 1st of September. General
Davis's corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was on time and deployed,
facing south, his right in connexion with Gtmeral Howard, and his left on the
railroad. General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down along the
Rough-and-Ready road and along the railroad, breaking it as they came. When
General Davis joined to General Howard, General Blair's corps, on General
Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the
right, below Jonesboro', to act against that flank along with General Kilpatrick's
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cavalry. About 4 p. m. General Davis was all ready and assaulted the enemy's
lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners
the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun
batteries. · Repeated orders were sent to Ge~erals Stanley and Schoefild to hurry
up, but the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads are the reasons
assigned why these troops did not get well into position for attack before night
rendered further operations impossible. Of course the next morning the enemy
was gone, and had retreated south. About 2 o'clock that night the sounds of
heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty
miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid
firing of cannon and musketry. These continued for about an hour, and again
about 4 a. m. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer us,
and these sounds could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night
attack on Atlanta by General Slocum or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. Nevertheless, at daybreak, on finding the enemy gone from his lines at
Jonesboro', I ordered a general pursuit south, General Thomas following to the
left of the railroad, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield keeping
off about two miles to the east. We overtook the enemy again near Lovejoy's
station in a strong intrenched position, with his flanks well protected behind a
branch of Walnut creek to the right and a confluent of the Flint river to his left.
We pushed close np and reconnoitred the ground, and found he had evidently
halted to cover his communications with the McDonough and Fayetteville road.
Rumors began to arrive through prisoners captured that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September 1; that Hood had blown up his ammunttion
trains, which accounted for the sounds so plainly heard by us and which were
yet unexplained; that Stewart's corps was then retreating towards McDonough
and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to intm·pose and prevent their escape, and I was satisfied with the substantial success
already gained. Accordingly I ordered the work of destroying the railroad to
cease and the troops to be held in hand ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant
General Jeff. C. Davis's corps had been left above Jonesboro', and General
Garrard's cavalry was still further back, and the latter was ordered to send back
to Atlanta and ascertain the ex~tct trutr1 and the real situation of affairs. But
the same night, viz. of September 4, a courier arrived from General Slocum reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of
cars, and had retreated on the McDonough road. General Slocum had entered
and taken posses~ion on 2d of September.
The object of my movement against the railroad was therefore already reached
and concluded, and as it was idle to pursue our enemy in that wooded country
with a view to his capture, I gave orders on the 4th for the army to prepare to
move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th we drew back to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where we remained a day. On the 7th we moved to Roughand-Ready, seven !fi.iles, and the next day to the camps selected, viz: the army
of the Cumberland grouped around about Atlanta, the army of the 'Tennessee about
East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur, where the men now occupy clean
and healthy camps.
l have not yet received full or satisfactory accounts of Wheeler's operations
to our rear, further than that he broke the road about Calhoun and then made
his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Laibold held him in check until General
Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off. He then passed up into
East 'Tennessee, and made quite a stay at Athens, but on the first show of pur~uit he kept on north across the Little Tenness ee, and crossing the Holston near
/)trawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, and passed over towards
Sequatchee and :McMinnville. Thence he seems to have gone to .Murfreesboro'
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and Lebanon and across to Franklin. He may have committed damage to the
property of citizens, but bas injured us but little, the railroads being repahed
about as fast as he broke them. From Franklin he has been pursued towards
Florence, and out of the State, by Generals RousEeau, Steedman, and Granger,
but the amount of execution they have done to him is not yet reported. Our roads
and telegraph are all repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed.
I must bear full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break
has been made, the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired
generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising
rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost
before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges, those of
the Oostanimla, the Etowah, and Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures,
and were built in inconceivably short time almost out of material improvised on
the spot.
Colonel W.W. Wright, who has charge of the "construction and repairs,"
is not only a most skilful but a wonderfully ingenious, industrious, and zealous
officer, and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged
with running the trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked
in perfect harmony with the quartermasters and commissaries, bringing forward
abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted fo1·
provisions, forage, ammunition, or stores of any essential kind.
Colonel L. C. Easton, chief quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, chief
commissary, have also succeeded, in a manner surprising to all of us, in getting ·
forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better supplied than this, and I
commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt
by the Lieutenant General commanding, and by the military world at large, on this
than on any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign.
Captain T. G. Baylor, chief ordnance officer, bas in like manner kept the
army well supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Captain 0.
:M. Poe, chief engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more
important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions. My own
personal staff has be~n small but select.
Brigadier General W. F. Barry, an officer of enlarged capacity and great experience, bas filled the office of chief of artillery to perfection, and Lieutenant
Colonel E. D. Kittoe, chief medical inspector, has done everything possible to
give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I
have never seen the wounded removed from the fields of battle, cared for, and
afterwards sent to proper hoEpitals in the rear with more promptness, system,
care, and success, than during 1his whole campaign, covering over one hundred
days of actual battle and skirmish.
My aides-de-camp, Major J. C. McCoy, Captain L. :M. Dayton, and Captain
J. C. Audenried, have been ever zealous and most efficient, carrying my onlers
day and night to distant points of our extended lines with an intelligence and
zeal that insured the perfect working of machinery, covering from ten to twenty:five miles of ground, when the least error in the delivery and explanation of an
order would have produced confusion; whereas in great measure, owing to the
intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each other's tracks through a
difficult country of over a hundred and thirty-eight miles in length without confusion or trouble.
Captain Dayton has also fulfilled the duties of my adjutant general, making
all orders and carrying on the official correspondence.
rrhree inspectors general completed my staff: Brigadier General J. M. Corse,
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who has since been assigned the command of a division of the 16th corps at the
request of General Dodge; Lieutenant Colonel W. Warner, of the 76th Ohio,
and Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ewing, inspector general of thcl 15th corps, and
captain 13th United States regulars.
These officers, of singular energy and intelligence, have been of immense assistance to me in handling these large armies.
My three "armies in the field" were commanded by able office1 s, my equals in
rank and experience-Major General George H. 'rhomas, Major General J. M.
Schofield, and Major General 0. 0. Howard. With such commanders I had
only to indicate the object desired, and they accomplished it. I cannot overes~
tirnate their services to the country, and must express my deep and heartfelt
thanks that, coming together from different fields, with different interests, they
have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount
of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist.
I now enclose their reports, and those of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, a perusal of which will fill up the sketch which I have endeavored to
make. I also submit tabular statements of our losses in battle by wounds and
sickness; also, lists of prisoners captured, sent to the rear, and exchanged; also,
of the guns and materials of war captured, beside the important country, towns,
and arsenals of the enemy that we now "occupy and hold."
All of which is respectfuly submitted.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Maju1· General Commanding.
Major Generel H. ,V. HALLECK,
Cllief o/ Stajj; JYasllington, D. C.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 18, 1865.
Official copy :
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Major General W. T. Sllerman's report qftlte campaign qf Georgia.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MJSSIS~JPPI,
.ln tllejield, Sa-vannah, Georgia, January 1, 1865.
GENERAL: I have the honor to oHer my report of the operations of the armies
under my command since the occupation of Atlanta, in the early part of SeptE:>mber last, up to the present date.
As heretofore reported, in the month of September, the army of the Cumberland, .
Major General Thomas commanding, held the city of Atlanta; the army of the
'J1ennessee, Major General Howard commanding, grouped about East Point;
and the army of the Ohio, Major Gl:meral Schofield commanding, held Decatur.
Many changes occurred in the composition of these armies in consequence of the
expiration of the time of service of many of the regiments. 'The opportunity
was given to us to consolidate the fragments, reclothe and equip the men, and
make preparations for the future camvaign. I also availed myself of the occasion to strengthen the garrisons to our rear, to make our communications more
secure, and sent Wagner's division of the 4th corps, and Morgan's division of
the 14th corps, back to Chattanooga, and Corse's division of the 15th corps to
Rom€\. Also a thorough reconnaissance was made of Atlanta, and a new line
of works begun, which required a smaller garrison to hold.

•
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During this month, the enemy, whom we had left at Lovejoy's Station, moved
westward toward the Chattahoochee, taking position facing us and covering the
West Point railroad, about Palmetto Station. He also threw a pontoon bridge
·across the Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry detachments to the west, in the direction of Carrolton and Powder springs. About the same time President Davis
visited Macon, and his army at Palmetto, and made harangues referring to an
active campaign against us. Hood still remained in command of the confederate
forces, with Cheatham, S.D. Lee, and Stewart, commanding his three corps, and
Wheeler in command of his cavalry, which had been largely re-enforced.
My cavalry consisted of two divisions. One was stationed at Decatur, under
command of Brigadier General Garrard; the other, commanded by Brigadier
General Kilpatrick, was posted near Sandtown, with a pontoon bridge over the
Chattahoochee, from which he could watch any movement of the enemy towards
the west.
As soon as I became convinced that the enemy intended to assume the offensive, namely, September 28, I sent Major General Thomas, second in command,
to Nashville, to organize the new troops expected to arrive, and to make preliminary preparations to meet such an event.
About the 1st of October some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance
on the west of the Chattahoochee, and one of his infantry corps was reported
near Powder springs; and I received authentic intelligence that the rest of his
infantry was crossing to the west of the Chattahoochee. I at once made my orders that Atlanta and the Chattahoochee railroad bridge should be held by the
20th corps, Major General Slocum, and on the 4th of October put in motion the
15th and 17th corps, and the 4th, 14th, and 23d eorps, to Smyrna camp ground;
and on the 5th moved to the strong position about Kenesaw-: The enemy's cavalry had by a rapid movement got upon our railroad at Big Shanty, and broken
the line of telegraph and railroad, ancl with a division of infantry (French's) had
moved against Allatoona, where were stored about a million of rations. Its
redoubts were garrisoned by three small regiments under Colonel Tourtellotte,
4th Minnesota.
·
I had anticipated this movement, and had by signal and telegraph ordered
General Corse to re-enforce that post from Rome. General Corse had reached
Allatoona with a brigade during the night of the 4th, just in time to meet the
attack by Erench's division on the morning of the 5th. In person I reach-ed
Kenesaw mountain about 10 a. m. of the 5th, and could see the smoke of battle
and hear the faint sounds of artillery. 'l'he distance, eighteen miles, was too
great for me to make in time to share in the battle, but I directed the 23d
corps, Brigadier General Cox commanding, to move rapidly from the base
of Kenesaw, due west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas, threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona. I succeeded in getting a signal
message to General Corse during his fight, notifying him of my presence. The
defence of Allatoona by General Corse was admirably conducted, and the enemy
repulsed with heavy slaughter. His description of the defence is so graphic
that it leaves nothing for me to add; and the movement of General Cox had
the desired effect of causing the withdrawal of French's division rapidly in the
direction of Dallas. '
On the 6th and 7th I pushed my cavalry well toward Burnt Hickory and
Dallas, and dit1covered that the enemy had moved westward, and inferred that
he would attempt to break our railroad again in the neighborhood of Kingston.
Accordingly, on the mo·m ing of the 8th, I put the army in motion through
Allatoona Pass to Kingston, reaching that point on the lOth. There I learned
that the enemy had feigned on Rome, and was passing the Coosa river on a
pontoon bridge about eleven miles below Rome. I therefore, on the 11th, moved
to Rome, and pushed Garrard's cavalry and the 23d corps, under General Cox, across the Oostenaula, to threaten the flanks of the enemy passing
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north. Garrard's cavalry drove a cavalry brigade of the enemy to and beyond
the Narrows, leading into the valley of the Chattooga, c!lpturing two field-pieces
and takiug some prisoners. The enemy had moved with great rapidity, and made
his appearance at Resaca, and Hood had in person demanded its surrender.
I had from Kingston re-enforced Resaca by two regiments of tbe army of the Tennessee. I at first intended to move the army into the Cbattooga valley to interpose between the enemy and his line of retreat down the Coosa, but feared that
General Hood would in that event turn eastward by Spring Place, and down
the Federal road, and therefore moved against him at Resaca. Colonel Weaver,
at Resaca, afterward re-enforced by General Raum's brigade, had repulsed the '
enemy from Resaca, but he bad succeeded in breaking the railroad from Tilton
to Dalton, and as far north as the tunnel. Arriving at Resaca on the evening
of the 14th, I determined to strike Hood in flank, or force him to battle, and directed the army of the Tennessee, General Howard, to move to Snake Creek
Gap, which was held by the enemy, while General Stanley, with the 4th and
14th corps, moved by Tilton cross the mountains to the rear of Snake Creek
Gap, in the neighborhood of Villanow.
'rhe army of the Tennessee found the enemy occupying our old lines in Snake
Creek Gap, and on the 15th skirmished for the purpose of holding him there
until Stanley could get to his rear. But the enemy gave way about noon, and
was followed through the gap, escaping before General Stanley had reached
the further end of the pass. The next day, the 16th, the armies moved directly
toward Lafayette, with a view to cut off Hood's retreat. We found him intrenched in Ship's Gap, but the leading division (Wood's) of the 15th corps
rapidly carried the advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina
regiment, making them prisoners. The remaining eight companies escaped to
the main body near Lafayette. The next morning we pasf5ed over into the
valley of the Chattooga, the army of the Tennessee moving in pursuit, by Lafayette and Alpine, toward Blue pond; the army of the Cumberland, by Summerville and Melville Post Office, to Gaylesville, and the army of the Ohio and
Garrard's cavalry from Villanow, Dirttown valley, and Gover's Gap, to Gaylesvile.
Hood, however, was little incumbered with trains, and marched with great rapidity,
and had succeeded in getting into the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout range
abutting against the Coosa river, in the neighborhood of Gadsden. He evidently
wanted to avoid a fight.
On the 19th all the armies were grouped about Gaylesville, in the rich valley
of the Chattooga, aboun~ing in corn and meat, and I determined to pause in my
pursuit of the enemy, to watch his movements and live on the country. I hoped
that Hood would turn toward Guntersville and Bridgeport. The army of the
Tennessee was posted near Little river, with instructions to feel forward in suppurt of the cavalry, which was ordered to watch Hood in the neighborhood of
"'Will's valley, and to give me the earliest notice possible of his turning northward.
The army of the Ohio was po:::ted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon
acroos the Coosa, and to feel forward to Center lnd down in the direction of
Blue mountain. The army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at Gaylesville;
and all the troops were :i;Jstructed to draw heavily for supplies from the surrounding country. In the mean time communications were opened to Rome, and
a heavy force set to work in repairing the damages done to our railroads. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with provisions, but forage was scarce, and General Slocum was instructed to send strong foraging parties out in the direction
of South river and collect all the corn and fodder possible, and to put his own
trains in good condition for further service.
Hood's movement and strategy had demonstrated that he bad an army capable
of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open
fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away fi·om Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelmi11g him. 'ro remain on
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the defensive would have been bad policy for an army of so great value as the
one I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one of following biin to the southwest. I had previously
submitted to the commander-in-chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and
sallying forth fi·om Atlanta, through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more
of the great Atlantic seaports. This I renewed from Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events.
On the 26th of October, satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand mountain, I detached the 4th corps, Major General Stanley,
and ordered him to proceed to Chattanooga and report to Major General Thomas
at Nashville. Subsequently, on the 30th Ootober, I also detached the 23d
corps, Major General Schofield, with the same destination ; and delegated to
Major General Thomas full power over all the troops subject to my command,
except the four corps with which I designed to move into Georgia. This gave
him the two divisions under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, but en 'r oute for 'l'ennessee, the two corps named, and all the garrisons in Tennessee, as also all the
cavalry of my military division, except one division under Brigadier General
Kilpatrick, which was ordered to reudezvous at Marietta. Brevet Major General vVilson had arri1ved from the army of the Potomac to assume command of
the cavalry of my army, and I despatched him back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments, and orders as rapidly as possible to collect the cavalry
serving in Kentucky and 'rennessee, to mount, organize, and equip them, and
report to Major General Thomas for duty. These forces I judged would enable
General Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga back, including Nashville and Decatur, and give him an army with which he could successfully cope
with Hood should the latter cross the 'l'ennessee northward.
By the 1st of November Hood's army had moved from Gadsden and made
its appearance in the neighborhood of Decatur, where a feint was made; he
then ·passed on to Tuscumbia and laid a pontoon bridge opposite Florence. I
then began my preparations for the march through Georgia, having received the
sanction of the commander-in-chief for carrying into effect my plan, the details
of which were explained to all my corps commanders and beads of staff departments, with strict injunctions of secrecy. I had also communicated full details
to General Thomas, and had informed him I would not leave the neighborhood
of Kingston until he felt perfectly confident that he was entirely prepared to
cope with Hood, should he carry into effect his threatened invat1ion of Tennessee
and Kentucky. I estimated Hood's fvrce at 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.
I moved the army of the rl'ennessee by slow and easy marches on the south
of the Coosa back to the neig·hborhood of Smyrna camp ground, and the 14th
corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, to Kingston, whither I repaired in pert1on on
the 2d of November. From }hat point I directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for my contemplated march, all the sick and wounded, refugees,
&c., to be sent back to Chattanooga; and the four corps above mentioned, with
Kilpatrick's cavalry, were put in the most efficient condition possible for a long
and difficult march. rl'his operation crnsumed the time until the 11th of November, when everything being ready, I ordered General Corse, who still remained
at Rome, to destroy the bridges there, all foundries, mills, shops, warehouses,
or other property that could be useful to an enemy, and to move to Kingston.
At the same time the railroad in and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah
and the Chattahoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed. The garrisons from
Kingston northward were also ordered to draw back to Chattanooga, taking
with them all public property and aU railroad stock, and to take up the rails
from Resaca back, saving them, ready to be replaced whenever future interests
should demand. 'I'he railroad between the Etowah and the Oostenaula was left
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untouched, because I thought it more than probable we would find it necessary
to reoccupy the country as far forward as the line of the Etowah. Atlanta itself
is only of strategic value as long as it is a railroad centre; and as all the railroads
leading to it are destroyeil, as well as all its foundries, machine-shops, warehouses,
depots, &c., it 'is of no more value than any other point in north Georgia; whereas
the line of the E towah, by reason of its rivers and natural features, possesses an
importance which will always continue. From it all parts of Georgia and Alabama can be reached by armies marching with trains down the Coosa or the
Chattahoochee valleys.
On the 12 Lh of November my army stood detached and cut off from all communication with the rear. It was composed of four corps·-the 15th and 17th,
constituting the right wing, under Major General 0. 0. Howard; the 14th and
20th corps, constituting the left wing, under Major General H. W. Slocum; of
an aggregate strength of 60,000 infantry; one cavalry division, in aggregate
strength 5,500, under Brigadier Generctl Judson Kilpatrick, and the artillery
reduced to the minimum, one gun per thousand men.
The whole force was moved rapidly and grouped about Atlanta on the 14th
November. In the mean time Captain 0. M. Poe had thoroughly destroyed
Atlanta, save its mere dwelling-houses and churches, and the right wing, with
General Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the direction of Jonesboro'
and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the
Ocmulgee about Planters' Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon
in seven days, exclusive of the day of march. On the same day General Slocum
moved with the 20th corps by Decatur and Stone mountain, with orders to tear
up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the large and important
railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and turn suuth and reach
Milledgeville on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march. In person I
left Atlanta on the 16th, in company with the 14th corps, Brevet Major General
Jeff. C. Davis, by Li thonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville. All the troops were provided with good wagon trains, loaded with ammunition, and supplies approximating twenty days' bread, f,)rty days' sugar and
coffee, a double allowance of salt for forty days, and beef cattle equal to forty
days' supplies. The wagons were also supplied with about three days' forage,
in grain. All were instructed, by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain
this order of things as long as possible, living chiefly if not solely upon the
country, which I knew to abound in corn, sweet potatoes, and meats.
My fi~:st object was, of course, to place my army in the very heart of Georgia,
interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his
forces to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston.
All my calculations were fully realized. During the 22d General Kilpatrick
made a good feint on Macon, driving the enemy within his intrenchments, and
then drew back to Griswold ville, where Walcott's brigade of infantry joined
him to cover that flank, whilst Howard's trains were closing up and his men
scattered, breaking up railroads. The enemy came out of Macon and attacked
vValcott in position, but was so roughly handled that he ne,·er repeated the experiment. On the eighth day after leaving Atlanta, namely, on the 23d, General
Slocum occupied Milledgeville and the important bridge across the Oconee there,
and Generals Howard and Kilpatrick were in and about Gordon.
General Howard was then ordered to move eastward, destroying the railroad
thoroughly in his progress as far as Tennille Station, opposite Sandersville, and
General Slocum to move to Sandersville by two roads. General Kilpatrick was
ordered to Milledgeville, and thence move rapidly eastward, to break the railroad which leads from Millen to Augusta, then to turn upon Millen and rescue
our prisoners of war supposed to be confined at that place. I accompanied the
20th cor from Milledgeville to Sandersville, approaching which place, on the
25th, we found the bridges across Buffalo creek burned, which delayed us three
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hours. The next day we entered Sandersvilll', skirmishi11 g with Wheeler's
cavalry, which offered little opposition to the advance of the 20th and 14th
corps, entering the place almost at the same moment.
General Slocum was then ordered to tear up and destroy th e Georgia Central
railroad, from Station 13 (Tennille) to Station 10, near the crossing of Ogeechee;
one of his corps substantially following the railroad, the other by way of Louisville, in support of Kilpatrick's cavalry. In person I shifted to the right wing,
and accompanied the 17th corps, General Blair, on the sou th of the railroad, till
abreast of Station 9~, (Barton;) General Howard, in person, with the 15th corps,
keeping further to the right, and about one day's march ahead, ready to turn
against the flank of any enemy who should oppose our progress. At Barton I
learned that Kilpatrick's cavalry had reached the Augusta Tailroad about vV aynesboro', where he ascertained that our prisoners had been removed from Millen,
and therefore the purpose of rescuing them, upon which we had set our hearts,
was an impossibility. But as Wheeler's cavalry had hun g around him, and as
he had retired to Louisville to meet our infantry, in pursuance of my instructions not to risk battle unless at great advantage, I ordered him to leave his
wagons and all incumbrances with the left wing, and mov ing in the direction of
Augusta, if Wheeler gave him the opportunity, to indulge him with all the fighting he wanted. General Kilpatrick, supported by Baird's division of infantry
of the 14th corps, again moved in the direction of Waynesboro ', and encountering Wheeler in the neighborhood of Thomas's Station, attacked him in position,
driving him from three succeE<sive lines of barricades hand somely through
Waynesboro' and across Brier creek, the bridges over which be burned; and
then, with Baird's division, rejoined the left wing, which in th e mean time had
been marching by easy stages of ten miles a day in the direction of Lumpkin's
Station and Jacksonboro'.
rThe 17th corps took up the destruction of the railroad at the Ogeechee, near
Station 10, and continued it to Millen; the enemy offerin g little or no opposition, although preparation had seemingly been made at Millen.
On the 3d of D ecember the 17th corps, which I accompanied, was at Millen;
the 15th corps, General Howard, was south of the Ogeechee, opposite Station
7, (Scarboro';) the 20th corps, General Slocum, on the Augusta railroad, about
four miles north of Millen, near Buckhead church, and th e 14th corps, General
Jeff. G. Davis, in the neighborhood of Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta railroad. All wAre ordered to ma:rch in the direction of Savannah-the 15th corps
to continue south of the Ogcechee, the 17th to destroy the railroad as far as
Ogeechee church-and four days were allowed to reach the lin e from Ogeechee
church to the neighborhood of Halley's ferry, on the Savannah river. All the
columns reached their destinations on time, and continued to march on their several roads; General Davis following the Savannah river road, General Slocum
the middle road by way of ~pringfield, General Blair the railroad, and General
Howard still souLh and WEst of the Ogeechee, with orders to cross to the east
bank opposite "Eden Station," or Station No 2.
As we approached Savannah the country became more marshy and difficult,
and more obstructions were met, in the way of felled trees, where t.he roads
crossed the creek, swamps, or narrow causeways; but our pioneer companies were
well organized, and removed the obstruction in an incredibly short time. No
opposition from the enemy worth speaking of was encountered until the heads
of columns were within fifteen miles of Savannah, where all the roads leading
to the city were obstructed more or less by felled timber, with earthworks and
artillery. But these were easily turned and the enemy driven away, so that by
the lOth of December the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah.
rrhese followed substantially a swampy creek which empties into the Savannah
river about three miles above the city, across to the h ead of a corr ponding
stream which empties into the Little Ogeechee. These streams were singularly
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favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very marshy, and bordered by rice fields,
which were flooded either by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to
which were controlled and covered by his heavy artillery. The only approaches
to the city were by five narrow causeways, namely, the two railroads, and the
Augusta, the Louisville, and the Ogeechee dirt roads; all of which were commanded by heavy ordnance, too strong for us to fight with our light field-guns.
To assault an enemy of unknown strength at such a disadvantage appeared to
me unwise, especially as I bad so successfully brought my army, almost unscathed, so great a distance, and could surely attain the same result by the operation of time. I therefore instructed my army commanders to closely invest the
city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well the ground in their fronts,
respectively, whilst I gave my personal attention to opening communications
with our fleet, which I knew was waiting for us in Tybee, Wassaw, and Ossahaw sounds.
In approaching Savannah, General Slocum struck the Charleston railroad
near the bridge, and occupied the river bank as his left flank, where he had captured two of the enemy's river boats, and had prevented two others (gunboats)
from coming down the river to communicate with the city; while General Howard, by his right flank, had broken the Gulf railroad at }"leming's and way stations and occupied the railroad itself down to the Little Ogeecbee, near "Station
1 ;" so that no supplies could reach Savannah by any of its accustomed channels. We, on the contrary, possessed large herds of cattle, which we had
brought along or gathered in the country, and our wagons still contained a reasonable amount of breadstuffs and other necessaries, and the fino rice crops of
the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers furnished to our men and animals a. large
amount of rice and rice straw. We also held the country to the south and west
of the Ogeechee as foraging ground. Still, communication with the fleet was of
vital importance, and I directed General Kilpatrick to cross the Ogeechee by a
pontoon bridge, to reconnoitre Fort McAllister, and to proceed to St. Catherine's
sound, in the direction of Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication
with the fleet. General Howard had previously, by my direction, sent one of
his best scouts down the Ogeechee in a canoe for a like purpose. But more
than this was necessary. We wanted the vessels and their contents; and the
Ogeecbee river, a. navigable stream, close to the rear of our camps, was the proper
avenue of supply.
The enemy bad burned the road-bridge across the Ogeechee, just below the
mouth of the Canoochee, known as "King's bridge." '.rhis was reconstructed
in an incredibly short time, in the most substantial manner, by the 58th Indiana.,
Colonel Buel, under the direction of Captain Reese, of the engineer corps, and
on the morning of the 13th December the second division of the 15th corps,
under corrmand of Brigadier General Hazen, crossed the bridge to the west bank
of the Ogeechee and marched down with orders to carry by assault Fort McAllister, a strong enclosed redoubt, manned by two companies of artillery and three
of infantry, in all about 200 men, and mounting 23 guns en barbette, and one
mortar. General Hazen reached the vicinity of Fort McAllister about 1 p. m.,
deployed his division ab ..mt the place, with both flanks resting upon the river,
posted his skirmishers judiciously behind the trunks of trees whose branches had
been used for abatis, and about 5 p. m. assaulted the place with nine regiments
at three puints, all of them successfully. I witnessed the assault from a rice
mill on the opposite bank of the river, and can bear testimony to the handsome
manner in which it was accomplished.
Up to this time we had not communicated with our fleet. From the signal
station at the rice mill our officers had looked for two days over the rice fields
and salt marsh in the direction of Ossabaw sound, but could see nothing of it.
But while watching the preparations for the assault on Fort McAllister, we discovered in the distance what seemed to be the smoke-stack of a steamer, which
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became more and more distinct, until about the very moment of the assault she
was plaiuly visible below the fort, and our signal was answered. As soon as I
saw our colors fairly planted upon the walls of McAllister, in company with
General Howard I went in a small boat down to the fort and met General Hazen,
who had not yet communicated with the gunboat below, as it was shut out to
him by a point of timber. Determined to communicate that night, I got another
small boat and a crew and pulled down the river till I found the tug Dandelion,
Captain Williamson, United States navy, who informed me that Captain Duncan, who had been sent by General Howard, had succeeded in reaching Admiral
Dahlgren and General Foster, and that he was expecting them hourly in Ossahaw sound. After making communications to those officers, and a short communication to the War Department, I returned to Fort McAllister that night,
and before daylight was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's staff,
advising me that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee, near Fort McAllister, and was very anxious to meet me on board his boat. I accordingly
returned with him, and met General Foster on board the steamer Nemaha; and
after commltation determined to proceed with him down the sound in hopes to
meet Admiral Dahlgren. But we did not meet him until we reached W assaw
sound about noon. I there went on board the admiral's flag-ship, the Harvest
Moon, after haviug arranged with General Foster to send us from Hilton Head
some siege ordnance and some boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee river.
Admiral Dahlgren very kindly furnished me with all the data concerning his
fleet and the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels between tlJe sea
and Savannah. I explained to him how completely Savannah was invt:sted at
all points, save only the plank road on the South Carolina shore, known as the
"Union causeway," which I thought I could. reach from my left flank across
the Savannah river. I explai11ed to him 1hat if he would simply engage the
attention of the forts along Wilmington channel, at Beaulieu and Rosedew, I
thought I could carry the defences of Savannah by aRsault as soon as the heavy
ordnance arrived from Hilton Head. Ou the 15th the admiral carried me back
to Fort McAllister, whence I returned to our lines in the rear of Savannah.
Having received and carefully considered all the reports of division commanders, I determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as my heavy
ordnance came from Port Royal, first making a formal demand for surrender.
On the 17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns having reached King's
bridge, I proceeded in person to the headquarters of Major General Slocum,
on the Augusta road, and despatched thence into Savannah, by flag of truce, a
formal demand for the surrender of the place ; and on the following day received
an answer from General Hardee refusing to surrender.
In the mean time further reconnoissances from our left flank had demonstrated
that it was impracticable or unwise to push any considerable force across the
Savannah river, for the enemy held the river opposite the city with iron-clad
gunboats, and could destroy any pontoor1s laid down by us between Hutchinson's
island and the South Carolina shore, which would isolate any force sent over
from that flank. I therefore ordered General Slocum to get into position the
siege guns, and make all the preparations necessary to assault, and report to me
the earliest moment when he could be ready, whilst I should proceed rapidly
round by the right and make arrangements to occupy the Union cam:eway from
the direction of Port Royal. General Foster had already established a division
of troops on the peninsula or neck between the Coosawatchie and Tullifinney
rivers, at the head of Broad river, from which position he could reach the railroad with his artillery. I went to Port Royal in person, and made arrang·ements
to re-enforce that command by one or more divisions, under a proper officer, to
assault and carry the railroad, and thence turn toward Savannah until it occupied the causeway in question. I went on board the admiral's flag-ship, the
Harvest Moon, which put out to sea on the night of the 20th. But the wind
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was high, and increased during the night, so that the pilot judged Ossabaw bar
impassable, and ran into the 'rybee, whence we proceeded through the inland
channels into Wassaw sound, and thence through Romney marsh. But the ebb
tide caught the Harvest Moon and she was unable to make the passage. Admiral Dahlgren took me in his barge, and pulling in the direction of Vernon
river we met the army tug Red Legs, bearing a message from my adjutant, Captain
Dayton, of that morning, the 21st, to the effect that our troops were in possession
of the enemy's lines, and were advancing without opposition into Savannah,
the enemy having evacuatecl the place during the previous night.
Admiral Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon river in his barge, while I
transferred to the tug, in which I proceeded to Fort McAllister, and thence to
the rice-mill, and on the morning of the 22d rode into the city of Savannah,
already occupied by our troops.
I was very much disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his garrisl)n,
and had to content myself with the material fruits of victory without the cost
of life which woulcl have attended a general assault. The substantial results
will be more clearly set forth in the tabular statements of heavy ordnance and
other public property acquired, and it will suffice here to state that the important
city of Savannah, with its valuable harbor and river, was the chief object of the
campaign. With it we acquire all the forts and heavy ordnance in its vicinity,
with large stores of ammunition, shot and shells, cotton, rice, and other valuable
products of the country. We also gain locomotives and cars, which, though of
little use to us in the present condition of the railroads, .are a serious loss to the
enemy ; as well as four steamboats gained, and the loss to the enemy of the
iron-clad Savannah, one ram, and three transports, blown up or burned by them
the night before.
Formal demand having been made for the surrender, and having been refused,
I contend that everything within the line of the intrenchments belongs to the
United States, and I shall not. hesitate to use it, if necessary, for public purposes.
But inasmuch as the inhabitants generally have manifested a friendly disposition,
I shall disturb them as little as possible consistently with the military rights of
present and future military commanders, without remitting in the leaGt our just
rights as captors.
After having made the necesRary orders for the disposition of the troops in
and about Savannah, I ordered Captain 0. M. Poe, chief engineer, to make a
thorough examination of the enemy's works in and about Savannah, with a
view to making it conform to our future uses. New lines of defences will
be built, embracing the city proper, :E'orts Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski
retained, with slight modifications in their armanent and rear defences. All
the rest of the enemy's forts will be dismantled and destroyed, and their heavy
ordnance transferred to Hilton Head, where it can be more easily guarded.
Our base of supplies will be established in Savannah as soon as the very difficult
obstructions placed in the river can be partially removed. 'l'hese obstructions
at present offer a very serious impeJiment to the commerce of Savannah, consisting of crib-work of logs and timber heavily bolted together, and filled with
cobble stones which formerly paved the streets of Savannah. All the channels
below the city were found more or less filled with torpedoes, which l1ave been
removed by order of Admiral Dahlgren; so that Savannah already fulfils the
important part it was designed in our plans for the future.
In thus sketching the course of events connected with this campaign I have
purposely passed lightly over the march from Atlanta to the sea-shore, because
it was made in four or more columns, sometimes at a distance of fifteen or twenty
miles from each other, and it was impossible for me to attend but one. Therefore I have left it to the army and corps commanders to describe in their own
language the events which attended the march of their respective columns.
These reports are herewith submitted, and I beg to refer to them for further de75
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tails. I would merely sum up the advantages 'vhich I conceive have accrued
to us by this march.
Our former labors in north Georgia had demonstrated the truth that no large
army, carrying with it the necessary stores and baggage, can overtake and capture an inferior force of the enemy in his own country. Therefore no alternative
was left me but the one I adopted, namely, to divide my forces, and with the
one part act offensively against the enemy's resources, while with the other I
should act defensively, and invite the enemy to attack, risking the chances of
battle. In this conclusion I have been singularly sut>tained by the results.
General Hood, who, as I have heretofore described, had moved to the westward
near T'uscumbia, with a view to decoy me away from Georgia, finding himself
mistaken, was forced to choose either to pursue me, or to act offensively against
the other part left in Tennessee. He adopted the latter course; and General
Thomas has wisely and well fulfilled his part of the grand scheme in drawing
Hood well up into rrennessee until he could concentrate all his own troops and
then turn upon Hood, as he has done, and destroy or fatally cripple his army.
That part of my army is so far remoYed from me that I leave, with perfect confidence, its management and hi;;;tory to General Thomas.
I was thereby left with a well-appointed army to seYer the enemy's only remaining railroad communications eastward and westward, for over one hundred
miles, namely, the Georgia State railroad, which is broken up from Fairburn
Station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central railroad from Gordon clear
to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the latter road from Gordon to Eatonton,
and from Millen to Augusta, and the Savannah and Gulf railroad. We have
also consumed the corn and fodder in the region of country thirty miles on
either side of a line from ~-\.tlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle,
hogs, sheep; and poultry, and have carried away more than ten thousand horses
and mules, as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate tllc damage
done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at $100,000,000; at
least twenty millions of which has inured to our advantage, and the remainder
is simple waste and destruction. 'rhis may seem a hard species of warfare,
but it brings th0 sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or
indirectly instrumental in involvi11g u·s in its attendant calamities.
The campaign has also placed this branch of my army in a position from
which other great military results may be attempted, besides leaving in Tennessee and north .Alabama a force which is amply sufficient to meet all the chances
of war in that region of our country.
Since the capture of Atlant::.t my staff is unehanged, save that General Barry,
chief of artillery, has been absent, sick, since our leaving Kingston. Surgeon
Moore, United States aPny, is chief medical director, in place of Surgeon Kittoe,
relieved to resume his proper duties as a medical inspector. Major Hitchcock,
assistant adjutant general, has also been added to my staff, and has been uf
great assistance in the field and office. Captain Dayton still remains as my
adjutant general. All have, as formerly, fulfilled their parts to my entire satisfaction .
I n the body of my army I feel a just pride. Generals Howard and Slocum
are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough soldiers and patriots,
working day and night, not for themselves, but for their' country and their men.
General Kilpatrick. who commanded the cavalry of this army, has handled it
with spirit and dash to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the
enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns or wagon trains.
His report is full and graphic. All the division and brigade commanders
merit my personal and official thanks, and I shall spare no efforts to secure them
commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well. As to the rank and
file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves that I doubt if they want a
compliment from me; but I must do them the justice to say that whether called
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on to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions,
build bridges, make "corduroy," or tear up railroads, they have done it with
alacrity and a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A l !ttle loose in foraging,
they "did some things they ought not to have done," yet, on the whole, they
have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected,
and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging parties had encounters
with the enemy which would in ordinary times rank as respectable battles.
The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect,
that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was
a hostile city, filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with
less disorder, or more system, order, and good government. 'l'he same general
and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army which it
has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former occasions.
I avail myself of this occasion to express my heartfelt thanks to Admiral
Dahlgren and the officers and men of his fleet, as also to General Foster and
his command, for the hearty welcome given us on our arrival at the coast, and
for their steady and pl'ompt co-operation in aU measures tending to the result
' accomplished.
I Eend herewith a map of the country through which we have passed; reports
from General Howard, General Slocum, and General Kilpatrick, and their
subordinates, respectively, with the usual lists of captured property, killed,
wounded, and missing, prisoners of war taken and rescued; as ah;o eopies of all
papers illustrating the campaign; all of which are respectfully submitted by
Your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
JJiajor Gene-ral.
l\Iajor General H. ,V. HALLECK,
Cl~iif if Staff, 1Vashington Oity, D. C.
Official copy :
E. D. 'l'OWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 18, 1865.

JYiajor GeneTal William T. SlwrrJ?an' s nport

if the campaign if the Carolinas.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVlSJON OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Goldsboro', N. C., April 4, 1865.
GENERAL: I must now endeavor to group the events of the past three months
connected with the armies under my command, in order that you may have as
clear an understanding of the late campaign as the case admits of. 'l~he reports
of subordinate commanders will enable you to fillnp the picture.
I have heretofore explained how, in the progress of our arms, I was, enabled
to leave in the west an army under :Major General George H. r.rhomas, of
sufficient strength to meet emergencies in that quarter, while in person I
conducted another army, composed of the 14th, 15th, 17th, and 20th
corps, and Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, to . the Atlantic slope, aiming
to approach the grand theatre of war in Virginia by the time the season would
admit of military operations in that latitude. The first lodgement on the coast
was made at Savannah, strongly fortified and armed, and valuable to us as a
good sea-port with its navigable stream inland. Near a month was consumed
there in refit.ting the army, and in making the proper disp~sition of captured
property, and other local matters ; but by the 15th of January I was all ready
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to resume the march. Preliminary to this, General Howard, commanding the
right wing, was ordered to embark h is command at Thunilerbolt, transport it to
Beaufort, South Ca,rolina, and thence by the 15th of January make a lodgement
on the Charleston railroad, at or near Pocotaligo. This was accomplished
punctually, at little cost, by the 17th corps, Major General Blair, and a
depot for supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo creek, with
easy water communication back to Hilton Head.
The left wing, Major General Slocum, and the cavalry, Major General Kilpatrick, were ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and
Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, with a depot of supplies at Pnreysburg, or
Sister's ferry, on the Savannah river General Slocum had a good pontoon
bridge constructed opposite the city, and the" Union causeway'' leading through
the low rice-fields opposite Savannah was repaired and "corduroyed," but before the time appointed to start. the heavy rains of January had swelled the
river, broken the pontoon bridge, and overflowed the whole "bottom," so that
the causeway was four feet under water, and General Slocum was compelled to
look higher up for a passage over the Savannah river. He moved up to Sister's
ferry, but even there the river with its overflowed bottoms was near three
miles wide, and he did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during
the first week of February.
In the mean time General Grant had sent me Grover's division of the 19th
corps to garrison Savannah, and had drawn the 23d corps, Major General
Schofield, from 'Tennessee, and sent it to re-enforce the commands of Major
Generals 'l'erry and Palmer, operating on the coast of North Carolina, to prepare the way for my coming.
On the 18th of January l transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Major
General Foster, commanding the department of the south, imparted to him my
plans of operation, and instructed him bow to follow my movements inland by
occupying in succession the city of Charleston and such other points along the
sea-coast as would be of any military value to us. 'l'he combined naval and
land forces under Admiral Porter and General Terry had on the 15th of January captured Fort ~,isher and the rebel forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river,
giving me an additional point of security on the sea-coast. But I had already
resolved in my own mind, and had RO advised General Grant, that I would
undertake at one stride to make Gold:-; boro', and open communication with the
sea by the Newbern railroad, and had ordered Colonel W. W. Wright, superintendent of military railroads, to proceed in advance to Newbern, and to be
prepared to extend the railroad out from Newbern to Goldsboro' by the 15th of
March.
On the 19th of January all preparations were complete and the orders of
march given. My chief quartermaster and commissary, Generals Eaton and
Beckwith, were ordered to complete the supplies at Sister's ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to follow our movement coastwise, looking for my arrival at
Goldsboro', North Carolina, about March 15, and opening communication with
me from Morehead City.
On the 22d of January I embarked at Savannah for Hilton Head, where I
held a conference with Admiral Dcthlgren, United States navy, ::md Major
General Foster, commanding the department of the ~outh, and next day proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the 24th to Pocotaligo, where the 17th
corps, Major General Blair, was encamped. The 15th corps was somewhat
scattered-Woods's and Hazen's divisions at Beaufort, J olm E. Smith marching
from Savannah by the coast road, and Corse still at Savannah, cut off by the
storms and freshet in the river. On the 25th a demonstration was made against
the Combahee ferry and railroad bridge across the Salkehatchie, merely to
amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his defensive line
against our supposed objective, the city of Charleston. I reconnoitred the line
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in person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river so that water
stood in the swamps for a breadth of more than a mile, at a depth of from one
to twenty feet. Not having the remotest intention of approaching Charleston,
a comparatively small force w~s able, by seeming preparations to cross over, to
keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to contest our
advance on Charleston. On the 27t,h I rode to the camp of General Hatch's
division of Foster's command, on the Tullafuiney and Coosawhatchie rivers,
and directed those places to be evacuated, as no long·er of any use to us. That
division was then moved to Pocotaligo to keep up the feints alrPa.c1y begun,
until we should with the right wing move higher up and cross the Salkehatchie
about Rivers's or Broxton's bridge.
On the 29th I learned that the roads back of Savannah had at last become
sufficiently free o~ood to admit of General Slocum putting his wing in
motion, and that he was already approaching S ster's ferry, whither a gunboat,
the Pontiac, Captain Luce, kindly furnished by Admiral Dahlgren, had preceded him to cover the crossing. In the mean time three divisions of the 15th
corps had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the right wing had loaded its wagons
and was ready to start. I therefore directed General Howard to move one
corps, the 17th, along- the Salkehatchie, as high up as Rivers's bridge, and the
other, the 15th, by Hickory Hill, Loper's Cross-roads, Anglesey post office, and
Beaufort's bridge. Hatch's division was ordered to remain at Pocotaligo,
feigning at the Salkehatchie railroad bridge and ferry, until our movement
turned the enemy's position and forced him to fall behind the Edisto.
The 17th and 15th corps drew out of camp on the 31st of January, but the
real march began on the 1st of February. All the roads northward had for
weeks been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had, by details of negro laborers,
felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede our march. But
so well organized were our pioneer battalions, and so strong and intelligent our
men, that obstructions seemed only to quicken their progress. Felled trees
were removed and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could
close up. On the 2d of .February the 15th corps reached Loper's Cross-roads,
and the 17th was at Rivers's bridge. From Loper's Cross-roads I communicated with General Slocum, still struggling with the floods of the Savannah
river at Sister's ferry. He had two divisions of the 20th corps, General Williams, on the east bank, and was enabled to cross over on his pontoons the
cavalry of Kilpatrick. General Williams was ordered to Beaufort's bridge by
way of Lawtonville and Allandale, Kilpatrick to Blackville via Barnwell, and
General Slocum to hurry the crossing at Sister's ferry as much as possible, and
overtake the right wing on the South Carolina railroad. General Howard,
with the right wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie and push rapidly
for the South Carolina railroad at or near Mid way. The enemy held the line
of the S.alkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at Rivers's
and Beaufort's bridges. The 17th corps was ordered to carry Rivers's bridge,
and the 15th corps B eaufort's bridge. 'J1he former position was carried promptly
and skilfully by Mower's and Giles A. Smith's divisions of the 17th corps, on
the 3d of February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide, with
water varying from knee to shoulder deep. The weather was bitter cold, and
Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person, on foot, waded the
swamp, made a lodgement below the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade
which guarded it, driving· it in confusion and disorder towards Branchville. Our
casualties were one officer and seventeen men killed, and seventy men wounded,
who were sent to Pocotaligo. 'l'he line of the Salkehatchie being thus broken,
the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole
army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina railroad at Midway, Bamberg,
(or Lowry's Station,) and Graham's Station. The 17th corps, by threatening
Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railroad bridge and Walker's bridge
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below, across the Ediflto. All hands were at once set to work to destroy the railroad track. From the 7th to the 1Oth of February this work was thoroughly
prosecuted by the 17th corps, from the Edisto up to Bamberg, aml by the 15th
corps from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the mean time General Kilpatrick
had brought his cavalry rapidly by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned
towards Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta, but not to be drawn needlessly
into a serious battle. This he skilfully accomplished, skirmishing heavily
with ·wheeler's cavalry, £rst at Blackville and after·ward at Williston and Aiken.
General Williams, with two divisions of the 20th corps, marched to the South
Carolina railroad at Graham's Station, on the 8th, and General Slocum reached
Blackville on the lOth. The destruction of the railroad was continued by the
left wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By the 11th of :E'ebruary aU the
army was on the railroad from Mid way to Johnson's Station, thereby dividing
the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the
one hand, Aiken and Augusta on the other.
We then began the movement on Orangeburg. The 17th corps crossed the
South },ork of Edisto river at Binnaker's bridge, and moved straight for Orangeburg, while the 15th corps crossed at Holman's bridge and moved to Poplar
Springs in support. The left wing and cavalry were still at work on the railroad, with orders tu cross the South Edisto at New and Guidnard's bridges,
move to the Orangeburg and Edgefield road, and there await the result of the
attack on Orangeburg. On the 12th the 17th corps fouud the enemy intrenched
in front of the Orangeburg bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed
l1im, forcing him across the bridge, ·which was partially burned. Behind the
bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet, with
wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held one division (Giles A.
Smith's) close up to the Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two
miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding
Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged fi·om the swamp the enemy
gave ground, and Giles Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and
occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge, and by 4 p. m.
the whole corps was in Orangeburg and had begun the work of destruction on
the railroad. Blair was ordered to destroy this railroad effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the enemy across the Congaree and force him to burn the
bridges, which he did on the 14th; and without wasting time or labor on
Branchville or Charleston, which I knew the enemy could no longer hold, I
turned all the columns straight on Columbia.
The 17th corps followed the State road, and the 15th crossed the North
Edif:to f~om Poplar Springs at Schilling's bridge, above the mouth of " Cawcaw Swamp" creek, and took a country road which came into the State road at
Zeigler's. On the V5th the 15th corps found the enemy in a strong position at
Little Congaree bridge, (across Congaree creek,) with a tete dupont on th~ south
side, and a well·construcied fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with
artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level, and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles R. \V oods, who commanded the leading division, succeeded, however, in turning the flank of the tete
dupont by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and
foUo·wing up the retreating enemy promptly, he got possession of the bridge
and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by £re, and had
to be repaired for the pas>Jage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head
of the column could reach the bridge across Congaree river in front of Columbia.
That night the enemy ::belled our camps from a battery on the east side of the
Congaree, ab4)ve Granby. Early next morning (February lG) the head of
column reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too late to
save the £ne bridge which 8panned the river at that point. It was burned by
the enemy. While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front we conld see
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people running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of
cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of Captain De Grass's battery was firing
at their cavalry squads, but I checked his firing, limiting him to a few shots at
the unfinished State House walls, and a few shells at the railroad depot to
Ecatter the people who were seen carrying away sacks of corn and meal that
we needed. There was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. I directed
General Howard not to cross directly in front of Columbia, but to cross the
Saluda at the factory, three miles above, ancl aftenvctrd Broad river, so as to
approach Columbia from the north. Within an honr of the arrival of General
Howard's head of column at the river opposite Columbia, the head of column of
the left wing also appeared, and I directed General Slocum to cross the Saluda
at Zion church, and thence to take roads direct for \Vinnsboro', breaking up, en
1·oute, the railroads and bridges about Alston.
General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the factory, on the
16th, skirmishing with cavalry, and the same night made a flying bridge across
Broad river, about three miles above Columbia, by which he crossed over
Stone's brigade, of \-Voods's division, 15th corps. U ncler cover of this brigade
a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the 17th. I was in person at this
bridge, and at 11 a. m. learned that the mayor of Oolnmbia had come out in a
carriage and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone, twenty-fifth
Iowa infantry, commanding third brigade, first division, 15th corps. About the
same time a 5mall party of the 17th corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff,
and entered Columbia from a point immediately west. In anticipation of the
occupation of the city, I had made written orders to General Howard touching
the conduct of the troops. 'l'hese were to destroy absolutely all arsenals and
public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, depots, and
machinery useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges,
schools, asylums, and harmless private property. I was the firl3t to cross the
pontoon bridge, and in company with General Howard rode into tbe city. 'rhe
day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of
Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citize11s aJ?.d
soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General vV ade
Hampton, who commanded the confederate rear guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered that all cotton, public and private,
should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our making use of it.
Bales were piled everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were
blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow storm. . Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially
one in the very heart of the city, near the court-house, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day the 15th corps
passed through Columbia and out on the Camden road. 'The 17th did not
enter the town at all ; and, as I have before stated, the left wing and cavalry
did not come within two miles of the town.
Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smonlclering
fires, set by Hampton's order, ·were rekindled by the wind, and communicated ·
to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond
the control of the brigade on duty within the city. 'l he whole of '\Voods's
division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames which,
by midnight, had become unman:;tgeable, and raged until about 4 a. m., when the
wind subsiding they were got under control. l was up nearly all night, and saw
Generals Howard, Logan, \Voods, and others, laboring to save l10uses and protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and even of bedding and wearing
apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on
the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. Ancl
without hesitation I charge General '\-V acle Hampton with having burned his
own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a
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silly " Roman stoicism,'' but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint,
cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty workBd well to extingush
the flames ; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been
imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it
had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin .of
the capital of South Carolina. During the 18th and 19th the arsenal, railroad
depots, machine-shops, foundries, and other buildings were properly destroyed
by detailed working parties, and the railroad track torn up and destroyed down
to Kingsville and the Wateree bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsboro'.
At the same time the left wing and cavalry had crossed the Saluda and Broad
rivers, breaking up railroad about Alston, and as high up as the bridge across
Broad river on the Spartanburg road, the main body moving straight for Winnsboro', which General Slocum reached on the 21st of February. He caused the
railroad to be destroyed up to Blackstakes depot, and then turned to Rocky
Mount. on the Catawba river. The 20th corps reached Rocky Mount on the
22d, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed over during the 23d. Kilpatrick's
cavalry followed, and crossed over in a terrible rain during the night of the 23d,
and moved up to Lancaster, with orclers to keep up the delusion of a general
movement on Charlotte, North Carolina, to which General Beauregard and all
the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. I was also aware that
Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, was aiming to make a junction with
Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by our rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsboro'. From the 23d to the 2Gth we had heavy rains, swelling
the rivers and making the roads almost imrassable. The 20th corps reached
Hanging Rock on the :26th, and waited there for the 14th corps to get across
the Catawba. The heavy rains had so swollen the river that the pontoon
bridge broke, and General Davis had very bard work to restore it and get his
command acroes. At last he succeeded, and the left wing was all put in motion for Cheraw.
In the mean time the right wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsboro',
and thence turned for Peay's ferry, where it was crossed over the Catawba
before the heavy rains set in, the 17th corps moving straight on Cheraw via
Young's bridge, and the 15th corps by Tiller's and Kelly's bridges. }"'rom
this latter corps detachments were sent into Camden to burn the bridge over
the VV ateree, with the railroad depot, stores, &c. A small force of mounted
men under Captain Duncan was also despatched to make a dash and interrupt
the railroad from Charleston to Florence, but it met Butler's division of cavalry,
and after a sharp night skirmish on Mount Elon was compelled to return unsuccessful. Much bad road was encountered at Lynch's creek, which delayed
the right wing about the same length of time as the left wing had been at the
Catawba .
On the 2d of March the leading division of the 20th corps entered Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's division of cavalry, and the next day about noon
the 17th corps entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the Pedee, and
burning the bridge at that point. At Chera·w we found much ammunition and
many guns which had been brought from Charleston on the evacuation of that
city. These were destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down as
far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to
Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry, and returned, having
only broken up iu part the branch road from Florence to Cheraw.
Without unnecesr-:ary delay the columns were again put in motion, directed
on Fayetteville, North Carolina, the right wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw,
and the left wing and cavalry at Sneedsboro'. General Kilpatrick was ordered
to keep well on the left flank, and the 14th corps, moving by Love's bridge, was
given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The weather continued
.unfavorable and roads bad, but the 14th and 17th corps reached Fayetteville on
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the 11th of 1\farch, skirmishing with vVade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the
rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear river,
burning the bridge. During the march from the Pcdee General Kilpatrick had
kept his cavalry well on the left and exposed flank. During the night of the
9th lVIarch his three brigades were divided to picket the roads. General Hampton detecting this dashed in at daylight and gaine<.l possession of the camp of
Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and
Colonel Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General
Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by,
and by a prompt attack, well followed up, regained his artillery, horses, camp,
and everything save some prisoners whom the enemy carried off, leaving their
dead on the ground.
The 12th, 13th, and 14th werf. passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely
the United States arsenal and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly
belonged to the old Harper's ]-,erry United States arsenal. Every building wa~
knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up ancl
ruined by the first regiment Michigan engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel 0. lVI. Poe, chief engineer. Much valuable property of great
use to an enemy was here destroyed, or cast into the river.
Up to this period I had per ~ectly succeeded in interposing my superior army
between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the west, and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time
had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Har~ee had
also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear river ahead of me, and could therefore complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke, inN orth
Carolina. And the whole, under the command of the skilful and experienced
Joe Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable
enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the
.. last step necessary to complete the march I had undArtaken. Previous to
reaching Fayetteville I had despatched to vVilmington from Laurel Hill church
two of our best scouts with intelligence of our po::lition and my general plans.
Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and, on the morning of the 12th
of March, the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville
from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world.
On the same day this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and
General Schofield, at Newbern, my despatches, to the eff~ct that, on Wednesday,
the 15th, we would move for Goldsboro', feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them'
to march straight for Goldsboro', which I expected to reach about the 20th.
The same day the gunboat Eolus, Captain Y onng, United States navy, also
reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with
Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape
F.ear river, one opposite the town, the other three miles below . .
General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to, and beyond
Averyl'lboro'. He was to be followed by four divisions of the left wing;, with asfew wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining
divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Gold::;boro'. In
like manner General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort,
well to the right, toward Faison's depot and Goldsboro', and to hold four clivi·
sions, light, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion.
The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmire.
Almost every foot of it had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels.
Still time was so important that pnnctu~lly, according to order, the columns
moved out from Cape Fear river on \Vednesday, the 15th of M:arch. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the
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river or plank road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing hertvily
with the enemy's rear guard about three miles beyond, near 'I'aylor's Hole
creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade
of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning the column ad vancecl in
the same order, al).d developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, nnd cavalry,
in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off towurd
Goldsboro' through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map it was manifest
that Hardee, in retreating fi·om Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow swampy
neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, in hopes to hold me to save time for
the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, namely,
Raleigh ,Smithfield, or Goldsboro.' Hardee:s force was estimated at 20,000
men. It was necessary to di~lodge him that we might have the use of the
Goldsboro' road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible.
General Slocum was, therefore, ordered to press and carry the position, only
difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses
would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the
common pine barren.
'I'he 20th corps, General Williams; had the lead, and vY ard's division the
advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position
of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery armed as infantry, (Rhett's,) posted
across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Case's) by a
circuit to his left that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade,
which rapidly retreated back to a second line better built aud more strongly
held. A battery of artillery (Winniger's) well posted, under the immediate
direction of Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of 20th corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and on advancing Ward's division over this ground
General Williams captured 3 guns and 217 prisoners, of which 68 were wounded
and left in a home near by with a rebel officer, 4 men, and five days' rations.
One hundred and. eight rebel dead were buried by us. As "\Yard's division advanced, he developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was
deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis's
(14th) corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear. At the same time
Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to
draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and, in concert with
Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsboro' road. He got a brigade on the
road, but it was attacked by McLaws's rebel division furiously, and though it
fought well and bard, the brigade drew back to the flank of the infantry. The
whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that the next morning be was gone,
having retreated in a mil3erable stormy night over the worst of roads. "\Yard's
division of infantry followed to and through Averysboro', developing the fact that
Hardee bad retreated, not on Raleigh but on Smithfield. I had the night before
directed Kilpatrick to cross South river at a mill-dam to our right rear and
move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that of Aversyboro', at 12 officers and 65 men
killed and 4 77 wounded. We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his dead (108) left for us to bury. Leaving "\Yard's division to
keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a
bridge across the swollen South river, and took the Goldsboro' road, Kilpatrick
crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward,
watching that flank. In the mean time the wagon trains and guards, as also
Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roade toward B~ntonville and
Goldsboro'. 'I'he enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield,
and his cavalry retreated across our front in the same direction, burning the
bridges across l\Iill creek. I continued with the head of Slocum's column and

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

1195

camped the night of the 18th with him on the Goldsboro' road, twenty-seven
miles from Goldsboro', about five miles from Bentonville, and where the road from
Clinton to Smithfield crosl:'es the Goldsboro' road. Ho1varcl was at Lee's store
only two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward to where
the two roads came together and became common to Goldsboro'.
All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further
opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in
motion. I therefore directed Howard to move his right wing by tho new Goldsboro' road, which goes by way of Falling Creek church. I also left Slocum and
joined Howard's column with a view to open communication with General Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and 'l'erry from \Vilmington. I found General
How~rd's column well strung out, owing to the ·very bad roads, and did not
overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek church, with one
regiment forward to the cross roads near Cox's bridge across theN euse. I had
gone from Gemeral Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that l1is leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry, (Dibbre1l's,) which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers
came up, reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the
rebel army under General .Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the
two divisions guarding his wag~n trains, and Hazen's division of the 15th
corps, still back near Lee's store, to fight defensively until I could draw up
Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive Station, and with the remaining three
divisions of the 16th corps come up on .Johnston's left rear from the direction
of Cox's bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from
both Generals Schofield and 'l'erry. 'rhe former reported himself in possession
of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to
make Goldsboro' on the 21st; and Terry was at or near Faison's depot. Orders
were at once despatched to Schofield to push for Goldsboro' and to make dispositions to cross Little river in the direction of Smithfield, as far as Millard; to
General Terry to move to Cox's bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a
crossing; and to Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek church; and at
daylight the right wing, General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was
put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By subsequent reports I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March 18, and
first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by
infantry and artillery. rrhe enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage, and took three guns and caissons of General Carlin's division,
driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General
Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole confederate army, he promptly
deployed the two divisions of the 14th corps, General Davis, and rapidly
brought up on their left the two divisions of the 20th corps, General Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also carne up at the sound of artillery and massed
on the left. In this position the left wing received six distinct assaults by the
combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General .Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doinggood execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy
having- little or none .
.Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be
relieved by its co-operating columns. But he ''reckoned without his host." I
had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayettville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the 19th, General Slocum got up his wagon
train with ils guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the 15th corps,
which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. 'l'he right
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wing found rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious
opposition until our head of column encountered a considerable body behind a
barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the
battle-field of the day before. This body of cavalry was, ho';Yever, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the
15th corps, General LJgan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank,
and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a bastion, its salient on the main Goldsboro' road interposing between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east,
while the flanks rested on Mill creek, covering the road back to l::)mithfield.
General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution until he had made
strong connexion on his left with General Slocum. 'l'bis he soon accomplished,
and by 4 p. m. of the 20th a complete and strong line of battle confronted the
enero.y in his intrenched position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us
in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill creek and a single bridge to his rear.
Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage,
and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with skirmishers
alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and
to feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual, covered
by the endless swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty
wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and other impediments to be
grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro', holding the real army in close
contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside his parapets
and swampy obstructions.
Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the 21st of March. On the same
day General Schofield entered Goldsboro' with little or no opposition, and General 'I'erry had got possession of the Neuse river at Cox's bridge, ten miles
above, with a pontoontwidge laid and a brigade across, so that the three armies
were in actual connexion, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished.
On the 21st a steady rain prevailed, during which General Mower's division of the 17th corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right
around the enemy's flank, and had nearly reached the bridg·e across Mill creek,
·t.he only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course there was extreme
danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and, it might be, let
go his parapets to overwhelm i\lower. Accordingly I ordered at once a general
attack by our skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued,
during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connexion with his own
corps by moving to his left rear. Still he had developed a weakness in the
enemy's position of which advantage might have been taken'; but that night the
enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with
many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the
22d pursuit was made two miles beyond l\Iill creek, but checked by my order.
General Johnston had utterly failed in his attempt, and we remained in full
possession of the field of battle.
General Slocum Teporta the losses of the left wing about Bentonville at 9 offi~
cers anc1145 men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3 officers and
223 men missir.g, taken prisoners by the enemy; total, 1,24 7. He buried on
the field 167 rebel dead, and took 338 prisoners.
General Howard reports the losses of the right wing at 2 officers and 35 men
killed, 12 officers and 289 men wounded, andl officer and 60 men missing; total,
399. He also buried 100 rebel dead and took 1,287 prisoners.
The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of
which I have no report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville ·was 1,646.
I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults
on the left wing during the afternoon of the 19th; but as I have no data save
Lis dead and wounded left in our hands, I prefer to make no comparisons.
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Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the
21st, and had full possession of Goldsboro', the real "objective/' with its two
railroads back to the sea-ports of Wilmington and Beaufort, North Carolina.
rl'hese were being rapidly repaired by strong working parties directed by Colonel
W. W. Wright, of the railroad department. A large number of supplies had
already been brought forward to Kinston. to which place our wagons had been
sent to receive them. I therefore directed General Howard and t~e cavalry to
remain at Bentonville during the 22d, to bury the dead and remove the wounded,
and on the following day all the armies to move to the camps assigned them
about Goldsboro', there to rest and receive the clothing and. supplies of which
they stood in need. In person I went on the 22d to Cox's bridge to meet General Terry, whom I met for the first time, and on the following day rode into
Goldsboro', where I found General Schofield and his army. '.rhe left wing
came in during the same day and next morning, and the right 'iving followed
on the 24th, on which day the cavalry moved on Mount Olive Station and General Terry back to Faison's. On the 25th the -Newbern railroad vms finished
and the first train of cars came in, thus giving us the means of bringing from
the depot at M01ehead City full supplies to the army.
It was all-important that I should have an interview with the general-in-chief,
and presuming that he could not at this time leave City Point, I left General
Schofield in chief command, and proceeded with all expedition by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point, reaching General Grant's
headquarters on the evening of the 27th of March. I had the good fortune to
meet General Grant, the President, Generals Meade, Ord, and others of the
army of the Potomac, and soon learned the general state of the military world,
from which I had been in a great measure cut off since January. Having completed all necessary business, I re-embarked on the navy steamer Bat, Captain
Barnes, which Admiral Porter placed at my command, and returned via Hatteras
inlet and Newbern, reaching my own headquarters in Goldsboro' during the
night of the 30th. During my absence full supplies of clothing and food had
been brought to camp, and all things were working well.
I have thus rapidly sketched the progress of our columns from Savannah to
Goldsboro', but for more minute details must refer to the reports of subordinate
commanders and of staff officers, which are not yet ready, but will in due season be
forwarded and filed with this report. I cannot even ·w ith any degree of precision recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of
guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general terms, we have
traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro', with an average breadth of
forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats,
orn mea], &c. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters
to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my chief engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance
the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the
whole sea-coast from Savannah to New bern, North Carolina, with its forts, dockyards, gunboats, &c., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of this
march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take
an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. '!'his was
completely accomplished on the 21st of March by the junction of the three
armies and occupation of Goldsboro'.
In conclusion, I beg to express, in the most emphatic manner, my entire satisfaction with the tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen
their energy, zeal: or cheerfulness. It iF> impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recall an instance of bad temper
by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in the
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end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon an
concerned quite as much real honor and fame as "battles gained" or "cities
won," and I therefore commend all-generals, staff, officers and men-for these
high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones of obedience to orders and
the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned them "to the
front."
I J::wtve the honor to be your obedient servant,
.
·
W. T. SHERMAN,
Jll[ajm· Gencml, Commanding.
Major General H.
HALLECK,
Chiif qf Stojj; 1Vasltington City, D. C.

,y_

HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF NoRTH CAROLINA, ARMY OF THE OHio,
Goldsboro', N. 0., ApTil 3, 1865.
GE.'ii.ERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations
of the troops under my command since January 1, 1865, the date of my last
report addressed to l\Iajor General George H. Thomas, commanding department
of the Cumberland, under whose command I was then serving.
On the 2d of .January, 1S6f>, I marched with the 23d army corps from Columbia, Tennessee, and arrived at Clifton, on the Tennessee river, on the 8th, under 9rders to embark my troops at that point and move to Eastport, Mississippi.
But before the embarcation had commenced I received, January 14, an order
from the Lieutenant General commanding, through the chief of staff of the army,
to move with the 23d army corps to Annapolis, Maryland. Accordingly the
movement was commenced on the following day. The troops moved with their
artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati,
Ohio, and thence by rail to
ashington, District of Columbia, and Alexandria,
Virginia, a second order from vVa.shington having changed the destination from
Annapolis.
Although in mid-winter, anrl weather unusually severe, even for that season,
the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of
the troops. By the 31st of January the whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.
At Alexandria great and unavoidable delay was caused by the freezing of
the Potomac, which rendered its navigation impossible much of the time for
several weeks. Meanwhile I met the Lieutenant General commanding, at Fortress Monroe, and went with him to the mouth of Cape Fear river to consult
with Rear-Admiral Porter and Major General Terry relative to future operations. On my return to W aahington an order was issued from the War Department creating the department of North Carolina, and assigning me to its
command.
My instructions from the Lieutenant General commanding, as wen as those
received from you, through Major General Foster, made the ultimate object of
my operations the occupation of Goldsboro', the opening of railroad communication between that point and the sea-coast, the accumulation of supplies for
your army, and the junction of my force with your main army at or near Goldsboro'. Wilmington was made my first objective, because it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City in the event of our junction being made at
Goldsboro', as designed, and because its possession by us would be of great
value to you in case the movement of the enemy's main army or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of your army at sc,me point
further south than Goldsboro'.
As soon as it became possible to navigate the Potomac I started frnm Alex-
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andria with the third division 23d army corps, under command of Major General J. D. Co:x, and reached the mouth of Cape Fear river on the 9th of February, and landed upon the peninsula near :F'ort Fisher.
l\lajor General A. H. Terry, with about 8,000 men, then held a line across
the peninsula about two miles above the fort, and occupied Smithville and Fort
Caswell on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron, under RearAdmiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear river and off the coast, covering the flanks of General Terry's line.
The enemy occupied Fort Anderson on the west bank, with a collateral line
running to a large swamp about three-fourths of a mile distant, and a lina opposite Fort Anderson running across the peninsula from Cape Fear river to
Masonboro' sound. His position was impregnable against direct attack, and
could be turned only by crossing Masonboro' sound above his left or passing
around the swamp which covered his right. _
The force I then had seemed too small for so extended a movement as either
of those mentioned; but time being important, I determined to make th e attempt
without waiting for the arrival of more ofmy troops. On the 11th of February
I pushed forward General Terry's line, supported by General Cox's d ivision,
drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position, close enough to
the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. I then made preparation to send a fleet of navy boats and pontoons by sea to a point on the beach
above the enemy's position, while a force composed of General Cox's and General Ames's divisions was to march along the beach in the night to the point
where the boats were to land, haul them across the beach into the sound, and
cross the latter to the main land in rear of Hoke's position. The weathe1·, however, became so stormy as to relfder the execution of this plan impossible. On
the night of February 14, I attempted to move the pontoons upon their wagons
along the beach with the troops, but the unusually high tides caused by the
heavy sea-wind made it impracticable to reach the point of crossing before daylight in the morning, when our movement would be discovered by the enemy
before a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard night's
work the attempt was abandoned, and I turned attention to the enemy's right,
where I would not have to contend with the difficulties of both land and sea.
General Cox's and General Ames's divisions were crossed over to Smithville,
where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of General Couch's division,
which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road until
they encountered the enemy's position at :F ort Anderson and adjacent works.
Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while General Cox,
with his other two brigades and General Ames's division, started around the
swamp, covering the enemy's right, to strike the vVilmington road in rear of
Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The
enemy, warned by his cavalry of General Cox's movement, hastily abandoned
his works on both sides of the river during the night of :E'ebruary 19, and fell
back behind 'l'own creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered
by swamps, on the east. We thus gained possession of the main defences of
Cape Fear river and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance, and a
large amount of ammunition. Our loss was but trifling.
On the following day General Cox pursued the enemy to rrown creek, behind which he was found intrenched, and had destroyed the only bridge. General Terry also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force superior
to General 'l'erry's. General Ames's division was recrossed to the east bank
and joined General Terry in the night of the 19th.
.
On the :20th General Cox crossed Town creek below the enemy's position, by
the use of a single flat boat found in the stream, and by wading through swamps
reached the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two
pieces of artillery, 375 prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and dispersed
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the remainder. During the night General Cox rebuilt the bridge, crossed his ,
artillery, and the next morning pushed on toward Wilmington without opposition.
General Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force so that he could not send any to replace that which
Cox had destroyed. On the 21st General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's
pontoon bridge across Brunswick river, which he had attempted to destroy, put
a portion of his troops on to Eagle if'land, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear
above 1Vilmington. 'I'he enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton and
military and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops entered without opposition early on the morning of February 22, an~ General Terry pursued the enemy across Northeast river.
Our total loss in the operations from February 11 to the capture of Wilmington ·was about 200 officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy
was not less than 1,000 killed, wounded and prisoners; fifty-one pieces of heavy
ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into our
hands.
·
It affords me pleasure to acknowledge the cordial and constant co-operation of
the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, so far as the nature of the operations would admit
Having no rolling stock at Wilmington, and being nearly destitute of wagon
transportation. I was compelled to operate from Newbern alone for the capture
of Goldsboro'. I bad already sent to Newbern about 5,000 troops belonging to
the various corps of your army, and directed Brigadier General I. N. Palmer to
move, with as little delay as practicable, with all his available force toward
Kinston, to cover the workmen engaged in n~pairing the railroad. As soon as
Wilmington was seemed, I also sent General Ruger's division, 23d army
corps, which was then arriving at Uape Fear inlet, by sea to Morehead
City, to re-enforce the column moving from Newbern. On the 25th, finding that
General Palmer had not moved, as was expected, I sent J\fajo.r General Cox to
take command at New bern and push forward at once.
General Couch's division, which had nearly completed its debarcation when
Wilmington was captured, was brought to that place, and that division, with
General Cox's, temporarily commanded by Bdgadier General Riley, was prepared as rapidly as possible to join the column moving from Newbern by a land
march. These arrangements were made because of the scarcity of both land and
sea transportation. It was not until March 6 that I was able to obtain wagons
enough, including those belonging to General Terry's command, to move the
two divisions from Wilmington to Kinston.
On the 6th, General Couch started with the two divisions, second and third,
of the 23d corps, and marched, via Onslow and Richland's, for Kinston. On the same day I went by sea to Morehead City, and joined General Cox
beyond Newbern on the 8th. General Cox had advanced to "\-Vise's Forks,
about one and a half mile below Southwest creek, and the railroad was in
rapid process of reconstruction.
rrhe force in front of General Cox, which appeared to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind Southwest creek, and
General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, 15th Connecticut infantry, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been re-enforced by a portion of the old army of Tennessee, recrossed
the creek some distance a hove the Dover road, carne down in rear of Colonel
Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire coinmand, about
seven hundred men.
The enemy then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between General Carter's and General Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but was checked by General Ruger's division, which was just
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arriving upon the field. There was no engagement during the day beyond light
skirmishing, and the loRs on either side~ with the exception of the pri::>oners captured from Colonel Upham, was insignificant.
It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General
Cox, and -that re-enforcements were arriving as rapidly as they could be brought
~y rail, I directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them secm·ely, and await the arrival of General Qouch.
On the 9th the enemy pressed our lines strongly, and felt for its flanks.
Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made. On
the lOth the enemy having been largely re-enforced, and doubtless learning of
the approach of General Couch's column, made_a heavy attack upon General
Cox's left and centre, but was deci::;ively repulsed and with heavy loss. Both
attacks were met. mainly by General Ruger's division, a portio11 of that division
having been rapidly transferred from the centre to the left to meet the attack
there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attack on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the fi eld, leaving his
killed and wounded, also a large number of at ms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse and burnP-d the bridge. Our loss in
this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded; that of the enemy probably about fifteen hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Couch effe cted his junction with General Cnx on the following day.
Having no pontoon train I was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge
could be repaired, or the pontoons which bad juilt arrived from the north could
be brought by rail from Morehead City. 'l'he crossing was effected without opposition on the 14th, the enemy having aba.ndoned Kinston and moved rapidly
toward Smitb..field to join the force under ,Johnston, which was concentrating to
oppose your ad vance from l!..,ayetteville.
Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston I put a large force of troops to
work upon the railroad, in aid of the construction corps under Colonel Wright,
rebuilt the wagon bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward suppl ies preparatory to a further ad vance.
I moved from Kinston on the morning· of the 20th, and entered Goldsboro'
with but slight opposition on the evening of the 21st.
The portion of my command which had remained at Wilmington, under 1\Iajor General Terry, moved from that point :March 15, reached Faison's depot on
the 20th, and, in compliance with your orders, moved. from that point to Cox's
bridge, and secm·ed a crossing of the N ense on the 22d. Your plans for the
concentration of your entire army about this place having been fully accomplished on the 23d and 24th, I then had the honor of reporting to you in person and uniting my troops to their old comrades in arms after a separation of
near five months, marked by unparalleled marches and brilliant achievements,
which will ever furnish bright pages in military history, and, it is hoped, prove
decisive in their results upon the present rebellion.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. l\1. SCHOFIELD, 11!ajoT General.
l\Iajor General W. T. SHERMAN,

Oummanding Military Di·vision

if th.e 1liississippi.

ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Goldsboro', N. C., Marclt.. 31, 1865.
GE~ERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of the artillery of the
armies under your command c}uring the Carolina campaign of l!'cbruary and
March, 1865.
76 w
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In consideration of the peculiarities of the campaign, involving long and rapid
marches over bad roads, and at an inclement season of the year, the same precautions wl1ich were so advantageously taken for your Savannah campaign of
last autumn were again observed. The number of guns· was reduced to one
per thousand effective bayonets, and each artillery carriage was provided with
eight draught animals.
The whole number of field ·batteries was sixteen, comprising sixty-eight guns,
which were distributed and of calibres as follows:

----------------------------------------------·1-------- -------10
4
18
4
10
14
8
16
8
8
8
16

Right wing 5 15th army corps .. _________ .__________________
4
{ 17th army corps_. _____ ._._. ___ . __ ._ .. _.. _._ .... --..
Left wing 5 14th army corps ...... ------ ________ ---·-----··----~ 20th army corps ..... _.. _.... _........ _. _. . . . . . ----.
Cavalry division .... - ..... - .... -- ... --- ... -. -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- --.
TotaL __ ._. __ .. _.. __ . _______ . _______ . ·. ______________ .

4

30

4

4

34

68

Including the reserve supply, each gun was furnish ed with three hundred and
fifty ronnds of ammunition.
A careful and critical personal inspection, made a few days preceding our departure frpm Savannah, satisfied me that in all essentials the artillery was in
excellent condition for any kind of work. The results fully justified these expectations. During the whole march the artillery supplied itself, unaided by
infantry or cavalry, with provisionfl for its officers and men, forage for its animals, and to a great extent with fresh horses and mules captured in the country.
A tabular statement is appended to this report, showing the extent to which
·
this unusual artillery service waa performed.
No gun or artillery carriage of any description was abandoned, disabled,
or at any time even a temporary impediment to the march of the infantry columns--a fact the more creditable to the artillery, since in many places the roads
were of the worst possible description.
Although the nature of your operations did not, except at the battles of Averysboro' and Bentonville, call for any general use of artillery, yet in support of
skirmish lines, brushing away cavalry, and covering the crossings of several difficult and important rivers, it was advantageously used at the following-named
times and places, namely :
January 20, 1865, Pocotaligo, 17th army corps.
,January 22, 1865, Combahee, 15th army corps.
January 29, 1865, Robertsville, 20th army corps.
February 1, 1865. Hickory Hill, 15th army corps.
February 2, 1865, Lawtonville, 20th army corps.
February 2, 186:1, Whippy Swamp, 17th army corps.
:February 3, 186.5, "Store" at Duck creek, 15th army corps.
}-,ebruary 6, 1865,. Little Salkehatchie, L'1th army corps.
February 9, 1865, Binnaker's bridge, 17th army corps.
February 11, 1865, North Edisto, 17th army corp a.
February 15, 1865, Congaree creek, 15th army corps.
February 16, 1865, Columbia, 15th and 17th army corps.
February 17, 1865, Broad river, 15th army cqrps.
March 16, 1865, Little Rockfish creek, 15th army corps.
At the battle of Averysboro', March 16, the batteries of the 20th corps were
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promptly and judiciously posted by Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of
that corps, and by the precision and rapidity of their fire did most excellent service
in dislodging the enemy from his intrenched line, .and the consequent capture of
three of his guns.
·
At the battle of Bentonville, March 19, 20, and 21, it was the fortune of the
artillery to play a mqre conspicuous part. The batteries of the 14th and 20th
corps were hotly engaged on the 19th, and after the first temporary advantage
gained by the enemy, in which the 19th Indiana battery, not by any fault of its
own, lost three of its gun~, (one of which was recaptured next day,) they poured
in a fire so steady, rapid, and effective, that all of the enemy's frequently repeated assaults were successfully repulsed. On the 20th, and particularly on
the 21st, the batteries of the 15th corps lent most effieient aid in advancing our
own lines, in repelling the enemy's assaults. and in inflicting heavy loss upon
him. Both of these fields of battle gave abundant proof of the precision of our
artillery fire.
The following tabular statements will exhibit the amounts of provisions and
forage, and the number of animals captured by the unaided labors of the artillery, the casualities among officers, enlisted men, and animals, the expenditure
of ammunition, and the number of guns lost by us and captured from the enemy :
PROVISIONS, ANIMALS, FORAGE, ETC.
By what batteries pro-

cured.

Flour.

Corn
meal.

Bacon.

Beef,
&c.

Potatoes.

Corn.

Hay and Horses.
fodder.

l\fules.

- - - - - - - -1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Twentieth. army corps.-Fourteenth army corps..
Fifteenth army corps. - - .
Seventeenth army corps.

Pounds. Pounds. Pounds. Pounds.
8, 000 10, 000 25, 000 50,000
3, 000
5, 201)
4, 360
8, 065
4, 900
5, 700 23, 000
2, 300
2, qoo
3, 200 18, 000 . __ . _...

Pounds. Pounds.
50, 000
350, 000
219, 920
37, 440
499, 000
___ .. __ . 218, 000

Pounds.
300, 000
91, 800
90, 000
106, 000

96
53
50
50

602
85
63
33

~~----;s3

]7,9oo 24,"1oo -70,360 J6D.365 81,140 11,284,920 15s7, 800

CASUALTIES.
OFFICERS •

I

ENLISTED MEN.

.,;

]
~

HOHSES. liiULES.

.g

.,;

il1'::1

1::0
1'::1

::::·

·~

~

:@

0

-

.,;

"'
Q
-

~
~

"'1'::1

"Cl

1::0

::I

-~

~

:@

0

- --

-

.g
ai
Q ~
-

'd
1'::1

::I
0

~
-

.g
'd
;:1

~
~ ~
-::I
0

EXPENDITURE OF AMMU~ITION.
Command.

No. of rounds.
1, 007
832
l, 665

Total.. _____ ._ ••.•.•...••. __ ._ ... _.....• _... ___ •...••..••.... ______ ••••..••• _•• _....

3, 504
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GUNS CAPTURED AND LOST.
No. of guns captured
from enemy.

Columbia ..........•........................
Cheraw ................................... .
l!..,ayetteville .............•...................
Averysboro' .....•..........................•
Ben tons ................................... .

43
25
26
3

Total .............. ...................... .

97

No. of guns lost
by us.

2
2

Of these, all were serviceable, and about four-fifths were field guns of recent
and approved pattern.
If to the operations of yom armies, the legitimate fruits of which they really
are, be credited the guns captured at Charleston and 'Vilmington, (excluding from
the number of the latter those captured at l!..,ort l!..,isher and the other forts at the
mouth of Cape Fear river,) the total artillery captured during the past ten months
by troops under your immediate command will exceed 700 guns.
Throughout the campaign the ammunition, fuzes, and primers proved unusually good and reliable, the only fault observed being sand cracks and insufficient
bursting charges in a few of the 20-pounder Parrott projectiles, want of care in
the screwing of the Bohrmann fuze in 12-pounder projectiles, and insufficient bursting charges in many of the Hotchkiss 3-inch shell and case-shot. Ammunition
and fuzes received from St. Louis arsenal appear to be more complained of ( especially th.e fuzes) than that received from other places.
In conclusion I am gratified to be able to commend the officers and men for
attention to their duties in preparation for the field, and for good conduct after
entering it; for th8 details of which I respectfully invite attention to the sub-reports which will be laid before you.
The services of the following named officers give evidence of industry, intelligence, and gallant conduct, and entitle them to notice and reward, namely:
Major Osborn, 1st New York artillery, chief of artillery army of Tennessee;
1\Iajor Reynolds, 1st New York artillery, chief of artillery 20th army corps; Major
Waterhouse, 1st lllinois artillery, chief of artillery 17th army corps; Lieutenant
Colonel Ross, 1st Michigan artillery, chief of artillery 15th army ~orps; Major
Houghtaling, 1st Illinois artillery, chief of artillery 14th army corps.
I respectfully ask that each of these officers, who have also served faithfully
and creditably through the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, be recommended
for promotion by brevet.
rl'he officers of my staff, Major Dickson, inspector of artitlery; Captain Marshall, assistant adjutant general; Uaptain Merritt and Lieutenant Verplanck, aidesde-camp, at all times performed cheerfully and well the duties with which they
were charged.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
WILLIAM: F. BARRY,
BTev. Maj. Gen., CMef of ATtilleTy.
Major General W.· T. SHERMAN,
Commanding . 7J1ilitaTy
.
Division of tl~e Mississippi.
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1Vltecler to General Howard.
GRAHAM'S, S. 0., February 7, 1865.
GENERAL: I have the honor to propose that if the troops ·of your army be required to discontinue burning the houses of our citizens I will discontinue burning cotton.
As an earnest of the good faith in whieh my proposition is tendered I leave
at this place about 300 bales cotton unharmed, worth, in New York, over a quarter of a million, and in our currency one and a half million. I trust my having
commenced will cause you to use your influence to insure the acceptance of the
proposition by your whole army.
I trust that you will not deem it improper for me to ask that you will require
the troops under your command to discontinue the wanton destruction of property
not necessary for their sustenance.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
J. WHEELER,
llfajor General C. S. A.
Major General 0. 0. HowARD,
United States A1·my, Commanding, o/c.

Answer by General Sherman.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
1
In tlte field, February 8, 1865.
GENERAL : Yours, addressed to General Howard, is received by me. I hope
you will burn all cotton, and save us the trouble. \V e don't want it; and it has
proven a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will.
As to private houses, occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest
or disturb them, and I think ·m y orders are obeyed. Vacant honsPs, being of no
use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thoug·ht the«m of no use
to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them.
I am, with respect, yours truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,
lVIajor General, Commanding.
Major General J. WHEELER,
Commanding Cavalry Corps, Confederate Army.

General Sherman to 1Vade Hampton.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MrssiSSIPPt,
In thefield, February 24, 1865.
GENERAL: lt is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after captured and labelled, " death to all foragers. " Olle instance of a
lieutenant and seven men near Chesterville, and another of twenty, "near a
ravine eighty rods from the, main road, " about three miles from Feasterville.
I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in
like manner.
I hold about 1,000 prisoners captured in various ways and can stand it &s long
as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge,
and suggest that you give notice to the people at,large that every life taken by
them simply results in the death of one of your confederates.

•
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Of course you cannot question my right to "forage on the country." It is a
war right as old as history. The manner of exercisiug it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all
forag·ing. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or
provisions; therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this
is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men; but I cannot permit an enemy to judge, or punish with wholesale murder.
Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war; but they were
to be expected; and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow, and
made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our war right to forage, and my resolve to protect
my foragers to the extent of life for life.
I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

,V. T. SHERMAN,
Major Geneml United States Army.
Lieut. General WADE HAMPTON,
Commanding Cavalry Forces, C. S. A. ·

TVade Hampton to Geneml Sherman.

•

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FmLD, February 27, 1865.
GENERAL: Yom: communication of the .24th instant reached me to-day. In
it you state that it has been officially reported that your foraging parties are
" murdered" after capture. You go on to say that you have "ordered a silllilar number of prisoners in · om hands to be disposed of in like manner;" that
is to say, you have ordered a number of confederate soldiers to be" murdered."
Yon characterize your order in proper terms, for the public voice, even in your
own country, where it seldom dares to express itse.lf in vindication of truth,
honor, or justice, will surely agree with you in pronouncing you gui.lty of murder if your order is carried out. Before dismissing this portion of your letter
I beg to assure you that, for every soldier of mine ''murdered" by you, I shall
have executed at once two of yours, giving in all cases preference to any officers
who may be in my hands.
In reference to the statement you make regarding the death of your foragers,
I have only to say that I know nothing of it; that no orders given by me
authorize the killing of prisoners after capture; and I do not believe my men
killed any of yours, except under circumstances in which it was perfectly legitimate and proper that they should kill them. It is a part of the system of the
thieves, whom you designate as your foragers, to fire the dwellings of those
citizens whom they have robbed. 'J.1o check this inhuman system, which is
justly execrated by every civilized nation, I have directed my men to shoot
down all of your men who are caught burning houses. This order shall remain
in force so long as you .disgrace the profession of arms by allowing your men
to destroy private dwellings.
You say that I cannot, of course, question your right to forage on the country.
"It is a right as old as history." I do not, sir, question that right. But there
is a right older even than this, and one more inalienable-th0 right that every
man has to defend his home, and to protect those who are dependent on him;
and from my heart I wish that every old man and boy in my country, who can
fire a gun, would shoot down, as he would a wild beast, the men who are desolating their land, burning their homes and insulting their women.
You are pm:ticular in defining and claiming "war rights." May I ask if you
enumerate among these the right to fire upon a defenceless city without notice;
to burn· that city to the ground· after it bad been surrendered by the inhabitants
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who claimed, though in vain, that protection which is al~ays accJrded in civilized warfare to non-combatants; to fire the dwelling-houses of citizens after
robbing them, and to perpetrate even darker crimes than these-crimes too black
to be mentioned 1
You have permitted, if you have not rmlered, the commission of these offences
against humanity and the rules of war; you fired into the city of Columbia
without a word of warning after its surrender by the mayor, who demanded
protection to private property; you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amidst
its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely
to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the
lurid light of burning houses; and in more than one household there is an
agony far more bitter than that of death. The Indian scalped his victim regardless of age or sex, but, with all his barbarity, he always respected the petsons of his female captives. Yo,ur soldiers, more savage than the Indian,
insult those whose natural protectors are absent.
In conclusion, I have only to request that ~henever you have any of my
men "murdered" or "disposed of" -for the terms seem synonymous with youyou will let me hear of it, that I may know what action to take in the matter.
In the mean time I shall hold fifty-six of your men as hostages for those whom
you have ordered to be executed.
I am yours, &c.,
WADE HA~IPTON, Lie1ftenant General.
Major General W. T. SHERMAN, United States Army.
Official copy:
E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, Novenzber 18, 1865.

Major General Sherman's repo'l't

if Jol~nston's sur'l'ender,

.yc.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION oF THE MrssrssiPPI,
In tke.field, City Poznt, Vi?·ginia, May 9, 1865
GENERAL: My last official report brought the history of events, as connected
with the armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the 1st
of April, when the army of Ohio, Major General J . l\L Schofield commanding,
lay at Goldsboro' with detachments distributed so as to secure and cover our
routes of communication and supply back to the sea at Wilmington and Morehead City; Major General A. H . 'rerry, with the lOth corps, being at Faison's
depot; the army of the Tennessee, Major General 0. 0. Howard commanding, was
encamped to the right and front of Goldsboro', and the army of Georgia, :1\bjor
Genera1 H. W. Slocum commanding, to its left and front·; the cavalry, Brevet
Major General J. Kilpatrick commanding, at Mount Olive. All were busy in
repairing the wear and tear of our then recent and hard march from Savannah,
or in replenishing "clothing and stores necessary for a further progress.
I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States that the lOth of April would be the
earliest possible moment at which I could hope to have all things in readiness,
and we were compelled to use our railroads to the very highest possiLle limit in
ordm; to fulfil that promise. Owing to a mistake in the railroad department in
sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot gauge, we. were limited to the use
of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot-eight-and-a-half-inch gauge already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by l\lnjor
General Terry at Wilmington and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judi-
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cious use was made of these, and such industry displayed in the railroad man·
agement, by Generals Easton and Beckwith, and Colonel Wright and .Mr. Van
Dyne, that by the lOth of April our men were all reclad, the wagons reloaded,
and a fair amount of forage accumulated ahead.
In the mean time Major General George Stoneman, in command of a division
of cavalry operating from East Tennessee in connexion with Major General
George H. Thomas, in pursuance of my orders of January 21, 1865, had reached
the railroad about Greensboro', North Carolina, and had made sad havoc with it,
and had pushed ~long it to Salisbury, destroying en 'route bridges, culverts, de~
pots, and all kinds of rebel supplies 1 and had extended the break in the railroad
down to the Catawba bridge.
This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on
that road for supplies and as their ultimate line of retreat. Ml'ljor General J. H.
Wilson, also in command of the cavalry corps organized by himself under Spe·
cial Field Orders No.-, of October ~4, 1864, at Gaylesville, Albama, had started
from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight
into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he
had defeated General Hood at Nashville, Tennessee; but the roads being too
heavy for infantry, General Thomas had devolved that duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson, who, imbued with the proper spirit,
has struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning strength of the confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded
him abundance of supplies as long as he was in motion, namely, by r.ruscaloosa,
Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon. Though in communication with
him, I have not been able to receive as yet his full and detailed reports, which
will in due time be published and appreciated. Lieutenant General Grant, also
in immediate command of the armies about Richmond, had taken the initiative
in that magnificent campaign which, in less than ten days, compelled the evacuation of Richmond, and resulted in the destruction and surrender of the entire
rebel army o£ Virginia under command of General Lee.
r.rhe news of the battles about Petersburg reached me at Goldsboro' on the
6th of April. Up to that time my purpose was to move rapidly northward,
feigning on Raleigh and striking straight for Burksville, thereby interposing
between Johnston and Lee. But the auspicious events in Virginia had changed
the whole military problem, and in the expressive language of Lieutenant General Grant, "the confederate armies of Lee and Johnston" became the "strategic
points." General Grant was fully able to take care of the former, and my task
w_as to capture or destroy the latter. Johnston at that time, A]Jril 6, had his
army well in hand about Smithfield, interposing between me and Raleigh. I
estimated his infantry and artillery at 35,000, aucl his cavalry from 6,000 to
10,000. He was superior to me in cavalry, so that I held General Kilpatrick
in reserve at Mount Olive, with orders to recruit his horses and be ready to
make a sudden and rapid march on the lOth of April.
At day break of the day appointed all the heads of colunms were in motion
straight against the enemy, Major Genetal H. vV. Slocum taking the two direct
roads for t)mithfield; Major General 0. 0. Howard making a circuit by the right
and feigning up the Weldon road to disconcert the enemy's cavalry; Generals
'"l'erry and Kilpatrick moving· on the west side of the Neuse river and aiming to
reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh. General Schofield
followed General Slocum in support.
All the columns met, within six miles of Goldsborq', more or less cavalry, with
the usual rail barricades, which were swept before us as chaff, and by 10
a. m. of the 11th the 14th corps entered Smithfield, the 20th corps close
at hand. Johnsto-n had rapidly retreated across the Neuse river, and, having
his railroad to lighten up his trains, could retreat faster than we' could pursue.
'"l'he rains had also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

1209

to pass even ambulances. The enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield,
and as soon as possible Major General Slocum got up his pontoons and crossed
over a division of the 14th corps. We there heard of the surrender of Lee's
army at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, which was announced to the armies
in orders, and created universal joy. Not an officer or soldier of my armies but
expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of the armies of the Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that
held them so long in check, and their success gave new impulse to finish up
our task. Without a moment's hesitation we dropped our tr s and marched
rapidly in pursuit to and through Raleigh, reaching that place at 7.30 a. m. of
the 13th, in a heavy rain. The next day the cavalry pushed on through the
rain to Durham's Station, the 15th corps following as far as Morrisville
Station, and the 17th corps to Jones's Station. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his railroad as a line of retreat, by Hillsboro', Gre·e nsboro',
Salisbury, Charlotte, &c., I had turned the other columns across the bend of that
road towards Ashboro'. (See Special Field Orders No. 55.) The cavalry, Brevet
Major General J. Kilpatrick ~ommanding, was ordered to keep up a show of
pursuit towards the "Company's Shops," in Alamance county; .Major General 0.
0. Howard to turn to the left by Hackney's Crossroads, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence,
and Ashboro'; Major General H. W. Slocum to cross Cape }-.,ear river at Aven's
ferry, and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's Mills; Major General J . .M. Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, and with his spare
force to follow an intermediate route.
By the 15th, though the rains were incessant and the roads almost impracticable,
Major General Slocum had the lith corps, Brevet Major General Davis commanding, near Martha's Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cape Fear
river at Aven's ferry, with the 20th corps, Major General Mower commanding, in support, and Major General Howard had the 15th ·and 17th corps
stretched out on the ro::~.ds toward Pittsboro', whilst General Kilpatrick held
Durham's Station and Chapel Hill University.
Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads fi·om Hillsboro' to Greensboro', he himself at Greensboro'. Although out of place as to time, I here invite all
military critics who study the problems of war to take their maps and compare
the position of my army on the 15th and 16th of April, with that of General
Halleck about Burksville and Petersburg, Virginia, on ihe 26th of April, when,
according to his telegram to Secretary Stanton, he offered to relieve me of the
task of "cutting off Johnston's retreat." Major General Stoneman at the time
was at Statesville, and Johnston's only line of retreat was by Salisbury and
Charlotte. It may be that General Halleck's troops can outmarch mine, but there
is nothing in their past history to show it, or it may be that General Halleck can
inspire his troops with more energy of action. I doubt that also, save and except in
this single instance, when he knew the enemy was ready to surrender or disperse,
as advised by my letter of April 18, addressed to him when chief of staff at
Washington city, and delivered at Washington on the 21st instant by Major
Hitchcock, of my Rtaff.
'l'hus matters stood at the time I received .General Johnston's fiTst letter and
made my answer of April14, copies of which were sent with all ¥Xpedition to Lieutenant General Grant and the Secretary of War, with my letter of April 15. I
agreed to meet General Johnston in person at a point intermediate between our
pickets on the 17th at noon, provided the position of the troops remained statu quo.
I was both willing and anxious thus to consume a few days, as it would enable
Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to RalPigh.
Two bridges had to be built and twelve miles of new road made. We had
no iron except by taking up that on the branch from Goldsboro' to Weldon. Instead of losi11g by time I gained in every way, for every hour of delay possible
was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear and improve the condition of
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our wagon roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed and we
be forced to make the race of near two hundred miles to head off or catch Johnston's army, then retreating towards Charlotte.
At noon of the day appointed I met General Johnston fo1: the first time in my
life, although we bad been interchanging shots constantly since May,l863 .
Our interview was frank and soldier-like, and he gave me to understand that
furth er war on the part of the confederate troops was folly, that tile cause was lost,
and that every life sacrificed after the surrender of Lee's army was the highest possible crime. H dmitted that the terms conceded to General Lee were magnanimous and all he c~mld ask, but he did want some general concessions that would
enable him to allay the natural fears and anxiety of his followers, and enable
him to maintain his control over them until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes, thereby saving the State of North Uarolina the devastations inevitably to result fi·om turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot,
1
and our pursuit across the State.
He also wanted to embrace in the same general proposition the fate of all the
confederate armies that remained in existence. I never made any concession as
to his own army, or assumed to deal finally and authoritatively in regard to any
other, but it did seem to me that there was presented a chanGe for peace that
might be deemed valuable to the government of the United States, and was at
least worth the few days that would be consumed in reference.
'ro push an army whose commander had so frankly and honestly confessed his
inability to cope with me were cowardly and unworthy the brave men I led.·
Inasmuch as General Johnston did not feel authorized to pledge his power
over the armies in 'rexas, we adjourned to meet the next day at noon. I retnrned to Raleigh and conferred freely with all my general officers, every one of
whom urged me to conclude terms that might accomplish so complete and desirable an end. All dreaded the weary and laborious march after a fugitive and
dissolving army back towards Georgia, almost over the very country wher·e we
had toiled so long. There was but one opinion expressed, and if contrary ones
were entertained they were withheld, or indulged in only by that class who shun
the fight and the march, but are loudest, bravest, and fiercest when danger is past.
I again met General Johnston on the 18th, and we renewed the converation.
He satisfied me then of his power to disband the rebel armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as those in his immediate command,
namely, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia.
The points on which he expressed especial solicitude were, lest their States
were to be dismembered and denied representation in Congress, or any separate
political existence whatever, and that the absolute disarmit1g his men would
leave the south powerless and exposed to depredations by wicked bands of assassins and robbers.
President Lincoln's message of 1864; his amnesty proclamation; General Grant's
terms to General Lee, substantially extending the benefits of that proclamation
to all officers above the rank of colonel; the invitation to the Virginia legi8lature
to reassemble in Richmond by General Weitzel, with the approval of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant, then on the spot; a firm belief that I had been fighting
to re-establish the. Constitution of the United States; and last, and not least, the
general and universal desire to close a war any longer without organized resistance, were the leading facts that induced me to pen the "Memorandum" of
April 18, signed by myself and General Johnston.
It waR designed to be, and so expressed on its face, as a mere "basis" for
reference to the President of the United States and constitutional commanderin-chief, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow to dissipate the military power
of the confederacy which had threatened the national safety for years. It admitted
of modification, alteration, and change. It had no appearance of an 1ultimatum,
and by no false reasoning can it be construed into an usurpation of power on my
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part. I have my opinions on the questions involved, and I will stand by the mem
orandum; but this forms no part of a military report. Immediately on my return to
Raleig·b I despatched one of my staff, Major Hitchcock, to "\tV ashington, enjoining
him to be most prudent and careful to avoid the spies and informers that would
be sure to infest him by the way, and to say nothing to any body until the President could make known to me his wishes and policy in the matter.
The news of President Lincoln's assassination on the 14th of April (wrongly
reported to me by telegraph as having occurred on the 11th) reached me on the
17th, and was announced to my command on the same day in Special Field Orders
No 56. I was duly impressed with its horrible atrocity and probable effect upon
the country; but when the property and interests of millions still living were involved', I saw no good reason to change my Gourse, but thought rather to manifest
real respect for his memory by following after his death that policy which, if
living, I feel certain he would have approved, or at least not rejected with disdain.
Up to that hour I had never received one word ofinstruction, advice, or counsel
as to the "plan or policy" of government looking to a restoration of peace on
the part of the rebel States of the south. Whenever asked for an opinion on
the points involved, I had always evaded the subject. My letter to the mayor
of Atlanta has been published to the world, and I was not rebuked by the
War Department for it.
My letter to Mr. N--W--, at Savannah, was shown by me to Mr. Stanton
before its publication, and all that my memory retains of his answer is that he
said, like my letters generally, it was sufficiently" emphatic, and could not be misunderstood. "
Both these letters asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's proclama~
· tions and messages, when the people of the south had laid down their arms and
submitted to the lawful power of the United States, ipso facto the war was over
as to them; and furthermore, that if any State in rebellion would conform to the
Constitution of the United States, "cease war,'' elect senators atJd representa·
tives to Congress, if admitted, (of which each house of Congress alone is the judge,)
that State became instanter as much in the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor
was I rebuked for this expression, though it was universally known and com-·
mented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton, in person, at Savannah, speaking of the terrific expenses of the war and difficulty of realizing the money necessary for the daily wants of the government, impressed me most forcibly with the
necessity of bringing the war to a close as soon as possible for .financ-ial Teasons.
On the evening of April 23 Major Hitchcock reported his return to Morehead
City with despatches, of which fact General Johnston, at Hillsboro', was notified,
so as to be ready in the morning for an answer. At 6 o'clock a. m. on the 24th
Major Hitchcock arrived, accompanied by General Grant and members of his
staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of his coming over our exposed road for
prudential reasons.
I soon learned that the memorandum was disapproved, without reasons assigned,
and I was ordered to give the forty-eight hom's' notice, and resume hostilities
at the clo:::e of that time, governing myself by the substance of a despatch then
enclosed, dated March 3, 12 noon, at \Vashington, District of Coh{mhia, from·
Secretary Stanton to General Grant, at City Point, but not accompanied b'y any
part of the voluminous matter so liberally lavished on the public in the New York
journals of the 24th of April. That was the .first and only time I ever saw that
telegram, or had one word of instruction on the important matter involved in it;
and it doe§ seem stmt1ge to me that every bar-room loafer in New York can read
in the morning journals "official" matter that is withheld from a general whose
command extends from Kentucky to North Carolina.
\Yithin an hour a courier was riding from Durham'::; Station towards Hillsboro'
with notice to General Johnston of the suspension of the truce and renewing my
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demand for the surrender of the armies under his immediate command, (see two
letters, April 24, 6 a. m. ,) and at 12 noon I had the receipt of his picket officer.
I therefore published my Orders No. 62 to the troops, terminating the truce
at 12 m. on the 26th,•and ordered all to be in readiness to march at that hour
on the routes prescribed in Special Field Order No. 55, April 14, from the positions held April 18.
General Grant had orders from the President, through the Secretary of War,
to direct military movements, and I explained to him the exact position of the
troops, and he approved of it most emphatically; but he did not relieve me or express a wish to assume command. All things were in readiness, when, on the
evening of the 25th, I received another letter from General Johnston asking
another interview to renew negotiations.
General Grant not orily approved, but urged me to accept, and I appointed a
meeting at our former place at noon of the 26th, the very hour fixed for the renewal of hostilities. General Johnston was delayed by an accident to his train,
but at 2 p. m. arrived. 1Ve then consulted, concluded and signed the final terms
of capitulation.
'l'hese were taken by me back to Raleigh, submitted to General Grant, and met his immediate approval and signature. General Johnston
was not even aware of the presence of Geperal Grant at Raleigh at the time.
Thus was surrenderd to us the second great army of the so-called confederacy,
and though undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations which
preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by
the facts, I rejoice in saying it was accomplished without further ruin and devastation to the country, without the loss of a single life to those gallant men who
had followed me from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and without subjecting
brave men to the ungracious task of pursuing a fleeing foe that did not want to
fight. As for myself, I know my motives, and challenge the instance during
the past four years where an armed and defiant foe stood before me that I did
not go in for a fight, and I would blush for shame if I had ever insulted or struck
a fallen foe. 'l1 he instant the terms of surrender were approved by General
Grant, I made my Orders No. 65, assigning to each of my subordinate c·ommanders his share of the work, and with General Grant's approval, made Special Field
Orders No. 66, putting in motion my old army (no longer required in Carolina)
northward for Ricl1mond. General Grant left Raleigh at 9 a.m. of the 27th, and
I glory in the fact that during his three days' stay with me I did not detect in his
language or manner one particle of abatement in the confidence, respect, and affection that have existed between us throughout all the varied events of the past
war, and though we have honestly differed in opinion in other cases, as 'veil as
this, still we respected each other's honest convictions.
I still adhere to my then opinions, that by a few general concessions," glittering generalities," all of which in the end must and will be conceded to the organized States of the south, that this day there would not be an armed battalion
oppos~ to us within the broad area of the dominions of the United States.
Robbers and assassins must in any event result from the disbandment of large
armies, but even these should be and could be taken care of by the local civil
authorities without being made a charge on the national treasury. On the evening of the 28th, having concluded all business requiring my personal attention
at Raleigh, and having conferred with every army commander and delegated to
him the authority necessary for his future action, I despatched my headquarter
wagons by land along with the 17th corps, the office in charge of General
Webster from Newbern to Alexandria, Virginia, by sea, and in person, accompanied only by my personal staff, hastened to Savannah to direct matters in the
interior of South Carolina and Georgia. I had received across the rebel telegraph wires cipher despatches from General Wilson at Macon, to the effect that
he was in receipt of my Orders No. 65, and would send General Upton's division to Augusta, and General J\IcOook's division to Tallahassee, to receive the sur-
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render of those garrisons, take charge of the public property, and execute the paroles required by the terms of surrender. He reported a sufficiency of forage for
his horses in southwest Georgia, but asked me to send him a supply of clothing,
sugar, coffee, &c., by way of Augusta, Georgia, whence he could get it by rail.
I therefore went rapidly to Goldsboro' and WHmington, reaching the latter city
at 10 a. m. of the 29th, and the same day embarked forHilton Head in the blockade-runner Russia, Captain A. l\f. Smith. I found General Q. A. Gillmore,
commanding department of the south, at Hilton Head, on the evening of April
30, and ordered him to send to Augusta at once what clothing and small stores he
could spare for General Wilson, and to open up a line of certain communication
and supply with him at Macon. vVithin an hour the captured steamboats Jeff.
Davis and AmaZ'Jn, both adapted to the shallow and crooked navigation of the
Savannah river, were being loaded, the one at Savannah and the other at Hilton
Heacl. The former started up the river on the 1st of May, in charge of a very
intelligent officer (whose name I cannot recall) and 48 men, all the boat could
carry, with orders to occupy temporarily the United States arsenal at Augusta,
and to open up communication with General Wilson at Macon in the event that
General .McCook's division of cavalry was not already there. r:l'he Amazon
followed next d.ay, and General Gillmore had made the necessary orders for a
brigade of infantry, to be commanded by General Molyneaux, to follow by a land
march to Augusta as its permanent garrison.. Another brigade of infantry was
ordered to occupy Orangeburg, South Uarolina, the point furthest in the interior
that can at present be reached by rail from the sea-coast, (Charleston.)
On the 1st of May I went on to Savannah, where General Gillmore also joined
me, and the arrangments ordered for the occupation of Augusta were consummated.
At Savannah I found the city in the most admirable police, under direction of
Brevet Major General Grover, and the citizens manifested the most unqualified
joy to hear that, so far as they were concerned, the war was over. All classes,
Union men as well as former rebels, did not conceal, however, the apprehensions
naturally arising from a total ignorance of the political conditions to be attached
to their future state. Anything at all would be preferable to this dread uncertainty.
On the evening of the 2d of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for
the first time, received the New York papers of April 28, containing Secretary
Stanton's despatch of 9 a.m. of the 27th of April to General Dix, inclu<ling General Halleck's, from Richmon<l, of 9 p. m. of the night before, which seems to have
been rushed with extreme haste before an excited public, namely, morning of the
28th. You will observe from the dates that these despatches were running back
and forth from Richmond and Washington to New York, and there published,
while General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, North Carolina, adjusting,
to the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable rebel army in existence at the time east of the Mississippi river. Not
one word of intimation had been sent to me of the displeasure of the government with my official conduct, but only the naked disapproval of a skeleton
memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the United States.
The most objectionable features of my memorandum had already (April 24)
been published to the world in violation of official usage, and the contents of
my accompanying letters to Gtmeral Halleck, General Grant, and l\Ir. Stanton,
of even date, though at hand, were suppressed.
In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that Johnston's army
would not fight, but, if pushed, would "disband" and "scatter" into small and
dangerous guerilla parties as injurious to the interests of the United States as
to the rebels themselves; that all parties admitted that the rebel cause of the
south was abandoned; that the negro was free ; and that the temper of all was
most favorable to a lasting peace. I say all these opinions of mine were with-
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held from the pu1>lic with a 'seeming purpose; and I do contend that my official
experience and former services, as well ~s my past life and familiarity with the
people and geography of the south, entitled my opinions to at least a decent
respect.
Although this despatch (:M:r. Stanton's of April 27) was printed "official,"
it had come to me only in the questionable newspaper paragraph, headed
" Sherman's truce disregarded."
I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, namely, had sent
him supplies of. clothing and food, with clear and dietinct orders and instructions how to carry out in western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms
and paroling of prisoners made by General .Johnston's capitulation of .April 26,
and had properly and most opportunely ordered General Gillmore to occupy
Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value at all times, in peace
or war; but as the Secretary had taken upon himself to order my subordinate
generals to disobey my "orders," I explained to General Gillmore that I would
no longer confuse him o~ General Wilson with "orders" that might conflict
with those of the Secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but
in open disregard of me and of my lawful authority.
It now becomes my duty to paint, in jnstly severe character, the still more
offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's despatch of April26 to the
Secreta1y of War, embodied in his to General Dix of April27.
General Halleck bad been chiet of staff of the army at Washington, in which
capacity he muf't have received my official letter of April 18, wherein I wrote
clearly that 'if .J(Ihnston's army about Greensboro' were "pushed" it would
"disperse,'' un event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have
been sent from vVashington to Richmond to command the new military di vision of the .James, in assuming charge of which, on the 22d, he defines the limits of his a:uthority to be the "aepartment of Virginia, the army of the Potomac,
and such part of North Carolina as may not be occupied by the command if
Major General Sherman." (See his General Orders No. 1.) Four days later,
Ap1 il 26, h e reports to the Secretary that he has ordered Gene~als Meade, Sheridan, and Wdght to invade that part of North Carolina which was occupied by
my command, and pay "no regard to any truce or orders of" mine. They
were ordered to "puslb forward, regardless of any orders save those of ~ieuten
ant General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat." He knew at the time he
pen:r;ICd that despatch and made those orders, tl1at Johnston was not retreating·,
but was halted under a forty-eight hours' truce with me, and was labOTing to
surrender his command and prevent its dispersion into guerilla bands, and that
I had on the spot a magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all
purposes required by the occasion.
The plan of cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burksville and Danville is hardly worthy one of his military education and genius. "\Vhen he
cont~plated an act so questionable as the violation of a "truce" made by competent authority within his sphere of command, he should have gone himself
and not have E'ent subordinates, fo:r he knew I was bound in honor to difend
and maintain. my own truce and pledge of faith, even at the ·cost of many
lives.
I
When an officer pledges the faith of his government, he is bound to defend
it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly.
As to Davis and hie stolen treasure, did General I-Ia11eck, as chief of staff or
commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the facts
contained in his despatch to the Secretary 1 No, he did not. If the Secretary
of War wanted Davis caught, why not order it, instead of, by publishing in the
newspapers, putting him on his guard to hide away and escape 1 No orders or
instructious tQ catch Davis or his stolen treasure ever came to me; but, on the
contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of War rather preferred he
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should effect an .escape f1~om the country if made "unknown" to him. But
even on ti1is point I enclose a copy of my letter to Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston, sent him by a fleet steamer from vVilmington on the 25th of April, two
days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis's movements, designed doubtless to stimulate his'
troops to march their legs off to catch their treasure for tlwir own use.
I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the 26th, and had
acted on it bifore General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I don't
believe a word of the treasure story; it is absurd on its face, and General Halleck or anybody has my full permission to chase Jeff, Davis and cabinet, with
their stolen treasure, through any part of the country occupied by my command.
The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's despatch is wherein
he goes out of his way and advises that ~y subordinates, Generals Thomas,
Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sherman's" commands.
This is too much, and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for
words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sherman's
truce disregarded," authenticated as "official" by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and
published in the New York papers of April 28.
During the night of May 2, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business
in the department of the south, I began my return to meet my troops then
marching toward Richmond from Raleigh. On the morning of the 3d we ran
into Charleston harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren,
who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with
a courtesy and manliness that commanded my eutire respect and deep affection;
also General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his Tullafinnay camp, had
caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any
one who is not satisfied with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray
louder and deeper than ~ver that the country may in the long fu.ture be spared
any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city
should be ldt as a sample, so that centuries may pass away before that false
doctrine is again preached in our Union.
We left Ch::trlcston on the evening of the 3d of May, and hastened with all
possible speed back to Morehead City, which we reached at night of the 4th. I
immediately communicated by telegraph with General Schofield at Raleigh,
and learned from him the pleasing fact that the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to
countermand General Halleck's orders, and prevent his violating my truce, invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army
into fragments. General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the ver best
of his ability; and the officers charged with issuing the paroles at Greensboro'
reported about thirty thousand (30,000) already made, and that the greater part
of tbe North Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers,
but that all of them would doubtless come into some one of the military posts,
the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About eight lmndrerl
(800) of the rebel cavalry had gone south, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for Mexico. I would sincerely
advise that they be encouraged to go and stay; they would be a nuisance to any
civj]ized government, whether loose or in prison.
With the exception of some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's
disbanded men, all else in North Carolina was "quiet." 1Vhen to the number
of men surrendered at Greensboro' are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta,
and :Macon, vvith the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts,
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I have no doubt fifty thousand (50,000) m:med men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the capitulation made near Durham's Station, North
Carolina, on the 26th of April, and that, too, without the loss of a.single life to us.
Ou the 5th of l\Iay I received and here subjoin a further des'pa.tch from General Schdield, which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to
those made by nearly every officer in my command whose duty bring::; him in
contact with citizens. I leave you to do what you think expedient to provide
the military remedy.
[By telegraph.]
"RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1865.
"vYhen General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he smd the lines
had been extended to embrace this and other States south. r:rhe order, it seems,
has been modified so as to include only Virginia and TennetJsee. I think jt
would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. I hope the
government will make known its policy as the organ of State governments without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is
clone; the people are now in a mood to accept almost anything which promises
a definite settlement.
"'''hnt is to be done with the freedmen is the question of all, and is the allimporUmt.ques•ion. It requirP.s prompt and wi::;e ac,ion to prevent the negro
from bccomiug a huge eh·phant qn our hands. If I am to govern this S ate, it
is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot
be done too soon, for he will probably undo the most that I shall have done.
I shall be glad to hear from you freely when you have time to ·write.
"I vdll ::;end your message to 1Vilson at once.
"J. l\1. SCHOFIELD, ll!fajor Genentl.
"l\Iajor General W. 1'. SHERMAN,
"l.IIorehead City."

I give this desprttch entire, to demonstrate how intermingled have bchome
civil m·tttPrs wi,h the mllitary, and ho1Y almost impos•iLle it has become for an
officer in authority to act a pure military part.
There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier can deal
with no Other sort. The mart'hals and sheriffs ·with their posses (of which the
military may become a part) are the only proper officers to deal wi h civil criminals awl marauders. But I \\'ill not be drawn out in a discussion of this subject,
but iu~ 1 :-mce the case to show how dfficult is the task become to military officers,
""IYhen men of the rank, edncRtion, experience, nerve, and good SCll::lC ot' General
Schofield feel embarrassed by them.
General SchofielJ, at Ualeigh, has a well-appoin 1 od :mel wrll-disciplincd command, i'( in telegraph communication with the controlling pctrlt\ of hicl dep<trtmcn , and remote ones in the direction of Georgia, as well as with 1Vashing·Lon,
and has military pl)ssession of all strategic points.
In like manner General Gillmore is well situated in all respcc1 s except as to
rapid communication with the seat of the general govermnu1t. I leave him also
with every man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet pomwssion of every strat~g·ic point in his department; and General Wilson has iu the very heart of Georgia
the strongest, bc:::Jt appointed, and best equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my command; and he has now, by my recent action, opened to him a source
and route of supply by way of Savannah river that si\nplifies his military problem. so that I think I may with a clear conscience leave them and turn my attention once more to my special command, the army with which I have been
associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.
I hope and believe none of these commanders ·will ever have reason to reproach me for any "orders" they may have received from me, and the I)resident
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of the United States may be assured that all of them are in position, ready and
wHling to execute to the letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall
henceforth cease to give them any orders at all, for the occasion that made
them subordinate to me is past, and I shall confine my attention to the army
composed of the 15th and 17th, the 14th and 20th corps, unless the com-·
manding general of the armies of the United States orders otherwise.
At 4 p. m. of May 9 I reached Manchester, on the James river, opposite
Richmond, and found that all the four corps had arrived from Raleigh, and were
engaged in replenishing their wagons for the resumption of the march towards;
Alexandria.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
\V. 'I'. SHERMAN,
~1J1ajor General, Commanding.
General JoHN A. RAWLI.\!S,
CMif of Sta.if; Wasl~ington, D. C.
Official copy :
ADJUTA~T GE~ERAL's

E. D. 'l'OWNBEND,
Assistant AdJutant GenPral.
OFFICE, November 18, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION oF THE SouTHWEST,
New Orleans, Louisiana, July 16, 1865.
GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of
my command in the campaign from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, to
the armies in front of Petersburg, beginning February 27, and ending :M:arch
28.
The command consisted of the first and third divisions of cavalry, of the army
of the Shenanaoah, under the immediate command of Brevet Major General
·vr esley Merritt, Brevet Major General George A. Custer, commanding tl1e third
division, and Brigadier General T. C. Devin, the first. r:rhe following was the
effective force :

Ejj'ective force first and third ca~·al1·y di1Jis£ons, army if the Shenandoalz,
February 28, 1865.-MoJor Geneml lVeslcy JHerritt, chiif if cm.:alry.
Commissioned
officers.
First cavalry division, Brigadier General T. C.
Devin, commanding __ .. _________________ ..
One section (companies C and E) fourth United
States artillery _________ ........ ___ ..... --.
Third cavalry division, Brevet Major General
George .A. Custer, commanding_ ... _..... _. _
One section (company M) second United States
artillery. ___ ..... _. _. . . .................. TotaL_ .. _. __ . _..... .............................

260

Total.

Enlisted men.

4,787

2

52

240

4,600

1

45

503

9,484

I

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

9,987

On the morning of February 27, 1865, we marched from Winchester up thevalley pike with five days' rations in haversacks, and fifteen days' rations of
coffee, sugar and salt in wagons, thirty pounds of forage on each horse, one
77 w
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wagon for division hradquarters, eight mnbulances and our ammunition train.
No other wagous, except a pontoon train of eight boats, were permitted to
accompany the command.
My orders were to destroy the Virginia Crntral railroad, the James River
canal, capture Lynchburg, if practicable, and then join l\1ajor General Sherman
wherever he might be found in North Carolina, or return to "'\Vincbester, but in
joining General Sherman I must be governed by the po:3ition of affairs after the
· capture of Lynchburg.
'l'he command was in fine condition, but the weather was very bad, as the
spring thaw, with heavy rains had already come on.
The valley and surrounding mountains were covered with snow which was
fast disappearing, putting all the streams nearly past fording. On our first clay's
march we crossed Cedar creek, Tumbling river, and Tom's brook, and went
into camp at Woodstock, having marched thirty miles. At 6 o'clock in the
morning of the 28th instant the march was resumed through Edinburg and
across the north fork of the Shenandoah river and through Newmarket, going
into camp at Lacey's spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg; the crossing of
the north fork of the Shenandoah was by a pontoon bridge. Small bands of
guerillas hovered on our flanks during the day, but no effort was made to drive
them off, and no damage was clone by them; distance marched, twenty-nine
miles. The march was resumed at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, through
Harrisonburg and Mount Crawford, and camp pitched on :Thfidclle river at Kline's
mills. Guerillas hovered around us during the march, and at Mount Crawford
General Rosser, with two or three hundred cavalry, attempted to burn the bridge
over the middle fork of the Shenandoah, but did not succeed; two of Capehart's
regiments swam the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and routed him, driving
him rapidly to Kline's mills, the advance pushing almost to Staunton; but few
of the enemy were killed, thirty taken prisoners, and twenty ambuh.nces and
wagons with their contents were captured and destroyed; our loEs was five
men wounded. Kline's mills are seven miles from Staunton, where the headquarters of General Early were said to Lc. Not kno,ving but that he would
fight at Staunton, Colonel Stagg's brigade of General Devin's division was
ordered to destroy the railroad bridge over Christian's creek, between Staunton
and Waynesboro, to prevent his getting re-enforcements by rail, or in case he
would not stand to prevent him carrying off supplies and ordnance stores; the
bridge was burned, but Qeneral Early, learning of our approach, made hasty retreat to Waynesboro', leaving word in Staunton that he intended to fight at that
place. The next morning we entered Staunton. 'l'he question then arose in my
mind whether I should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, leaving General
Early in my rear, or go out and fight him with my cavalry against his infantry
aocl what cavalry he could collect, defeat him, and open a way through Rock
Fish Gap, and have everything itt my own hands for the accomplishment of that
portion of my instructions which directed the destruction of the Central railroad and James River canal. I decided upon the latter course, and General
Custer's division, (3d,) composed of Colonels Wells, Pennington, and Capehart's brigades, was directed to take up the pursuit, followed closely by General Devin's division, composed of General Gibbs's and Colonels Fitzhugh's and
Stagg's brigades. 'I'he rain had been pouring in torrents for two days and the
roads were bad beyond description; nevertheless the men pushed boldly on, although horses and men could scarcely be recognized for the mud which covered them. General Custer found General Early, as he ha1l promised, at
Waynesboro', in a well-chosen position, with two brigades of infantry and
some cavalry under General Rosser, the infantry occupying breastworks. Custer, without waiting for the enemy to get up his courage over the delay of a care.ful reconn.oissancc, made his dispositions for attack at once, 8ending three regi-
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mcnts around the left flank of the enemy, which was somewhat exposed by being advanced from instead of Testing upon the bank of the river in his immediate rear; he, with the other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, at a given signal, boldly attacked and impetuously carried the enemy's works, while the 8th New York and the 1st Connecticut cavalry, who
were formed in column of fours, charged over the breastwork and continued
the charge through the little town of Waynesboro', sabering a few men as they
went along, and did not stop until they had crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah river, which was immediately in General Early's rear, where they
formed as foragers, and with drawn sabres held the east bank of the stream.
The enemy threw down their arms and surrendered with cheers at the suddenness with which they were captured. 'The general officers present at this engagement were Generals Early, Long, Wharton, Lilley, and Rosser, and it has
always been a wonder to me how they escaped, unless they hid in obscure
places in the houses of the town. Colonel Capehart, with his brigade, continued the pursuit of the enemy's train which was stretched for miles over the
mountains, and the other two brigades pushed rapidly after him, with orders to
encamp on the east side of the Blne Ridge. 'l'he substantial results of this
brilliant fight were eleven pieces of artillery with horses and caissons complete, about two hundred wagons and teams, all loaded with subsistence, camp
and garrison equipage, ammunition and officers' baggage, seventeen battle-flags,
and sixteen hundred officers and enlisted men. 'I'he results in a military point
of view were very great, as the crossing of the Blue Riclg·e, covered with snow
as it was, at any other point would have been difficult. Before leaving Staunton
for Waynesboro' I obtained information of a large amount of rebel property at Swoop's depot, on the Lexington railroad, and sent a party to destroy it, which was done; a list of which property will be attached to this report. General Custer's division encamped at Brookfield, on the east side of the
Blue Ridge, General Devin's division remaining at VvayneEboro' . '1-,he next
morning the prisoners were sent back to Winchester under a guard of about
fifteen hundred men, commanded by Colonel J. H. r_rhompson, 1st New Hampshire cavalry. who safely reached that point, notwithstanding he was harassed
by General Rosser's command as far as the crossing of the north fork of the
Shenandoah near Mount Jackson, at which point General Rosser made a fierce
attack upon him and tried to rescue the prisoners, but he was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Thompson, who captured some of his men and finally arrived
at his destination with all his own prisoners and some of Rosser's men besides.
General Devin resumed his march at 6 a. m., leaving General GiLbs's brigade
to destroy the iron bridge over the south fork of the Shenandoah, and to burn and
destroy the captured wagons and their contents. General Custer moved on towards
Charlottesville, destroying much government property and subsistence at Greenwood depot and Ivy Station; also the railroad and the large bridge over .Meacham's
river, arriving at Charlottesville at 4 p. m., the mayor and several of the most
prominent citizens meeting him in the suburbs of the city and delivering up the
keys of the public buildings.
The roads from Waynesboro' to Charlottesville had, from the incessant rains
and spring thaws, become so terribly cut up, and the mud was of such a depth,
that it was impossible for our train to reach Charlottesville under two days. I
therefore notified the command that we would remain two days at this point for
the purpose of resting, refitting, and destroying the railroad; parties were sent
well out towards Gordonsville to break the railroad, and also about fifteen miles
towards Lynchburg for the same purpose, to prevent troops massing on me from
either Richmond or Lynchburg. A thorough and systematic destruction of the
railroads was then commeuced, including the large iron bridges over the north
and south forks of the Rivenna river, and the work was continued until the
evening of the 5th instant, when General Gibbs reported with our trains; forage
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and subsistence was found in great abundance in the vicinity of Oharlottsville.
Commodore Hollins of the confederate navy was killed while trying to escape
from a scouting party from General Custer's division. This necessary delay
forced me to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg, but trusty scouts had
been sent there to find out the state of affairs in that vicinity. vVhen the time
to start came I determined to separate into two columns, "ending General Devin's division, under immediate command of General Merritt, to Scottsville,
thence to march along the James River canill, destroying every lock as far as
Newmarket, while with Custer's division I pushed on up the Lynchburg railroad through North and South Gardens, destroying it as far as Amherst Court
House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg, and then moved across the country and
united with GenerallVIerritt's column at Newmarket.
General Merritt started on the morning of the 6th, first sending the 1st
Michigan cavalry, Colonel Maxwell commanding, down the Rivenna river to
Palmyra and towards Columbia, with directions to rejoin him at Scottsville.
General Merritt thoroughly accomplished his orders, destroying all large :flour
mills, woollen factories, and manufacturing establishments, tearing up and demolishing all the locks on the James River canal from Scottsville to N ewmarket. I had directed him to try and obtain possession of the bridge across the
James river at Duiguidsville, intending to hold it :mel strike the South Side
railroad at Appomattox depot, and follow up its destruction to Farmville, where
the High Bridge crosses the Appomattox. A bold dash was made to secure
this bridge, but without avail, as the enemy had covered it with inflammable materials and set it on fire the instant their scouts signalled the approach of our
forces ; they also and by the same means burned the bridge across the James
river at Hard wicks ville, leaving me master of all the country north of the
James river. My eight pontoons would not reach half way across the river,
and my scouts from Lynchburg reported the enemy concentrating at that point
from the west, together with a portion of General Pickett's division from Richmond and Fitz Lee's cavalry. It was here that I fully determined to join the
armies of the Lieutenant General in front of Petersburg, instead of going back
to Winchester, and also make a more complete destruction of the James River
canal and the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads connecting Richmond with Lynchburg and Gordonsville. I now had all the advantage, and by
hurrying quickly down the canal and destroying it as near Richmond as Goochland or beyond, and then moving up to the railroad and i!estroying it as close
up to the city as possible in the same manner I did towards Lynchburg, I
felt convinced I was striking a hard blow by de:::troying the means of supply
to the rebel capital, and, to a certain extent, the army of northern Virginia,
besides leaving the troops now concentrating at Lynchburg withoui anything
to oppose them, and forcing them to return to Richmond. 'l'his conception was
at once decided upon and Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade was ordered to proceed to
Goochland and beyond, immediately, destroying every loc:k upon the canal and
cutting the banks wherever practicable. 'l'he next morning the entire command
moved from Newmarket down the canal, leisurely and completely destroying
the locks and banks about the aqueducts, and in some places cutting the banks;
the rain and mud still impeded us, and the command, particularly the transportation, was much worn and fatigued; however, by replacing our worn-out mules
with those captured from General Early's trains, and with the assistance of
nearly two thousand negroes who attached themselves to the command, we
managed to get along in very good shape, reaching Columbia on the evening of
the lOth instant, at which place we were rejoined by Colonel Fitzhugh's
brigade.
Colonel Fitzhugh had destroyed the canal about eight miles east of Goochland, thereby reducing it to a very small length. At Columbia we took one
day's rest, and I here sent a communication to the Lieutenant General command·
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ing the armies, notifying him of our success, position, and condition, and requesting supplies to be sent to vVhite House. My anxiety now was to be
able to cross the Pamunkey. I felt confident that the enemy would march out
a heavy force and try to destroy my command and prevent me from crossing the
river. The railroad from Richmond to Gordonsville was still intact, and to go
south of the Pamunkey river, and between it and Richmond, I regarded as too
hazardous, and I was fearful that the enemy might use it to get on my flank
and rear. General Ouster was therefore directed to strike the railroad at Frederick's Hall and General Merritt at Louisa Court House. General Ouster was
ordered to thoroughly destroy the track towards Richmond as far as Beaver
Dam, while General Merritt did the same thing from Louisa Court House to Frederick's Hall. While at this latter place Major Young's scouts from Richmond
notified me of preparations Leing made there to prevent me fi·om getting to the
James river, and that Pickett's division of infantry was coming back from
Lynchburg via the Southside railroad, as was also the cavalry, but that no advance from Richmond had yet taken place. I at once determined that there
was no way to stop me unless General Longstreet marched directly for the
White House, and that he would be unable to do so if I pushed boldly on towards Richmond, as he would be forced to come out and meet me near Ashland,
then I could withdraw, cro~s South and North Anna and march to White House
on north side of the Pamunkey. It proved true. · But, to divert from the narrative, when General Ouster struck Frederick's Hall Station he entered it so suddenly that he captured the telegraph office with all the despatches. Among them
was one from Lieutenant General Early to General Lee, stating that he had
been informed that Sheridan's forces were approaching Goochland, and that he
intended to move up with two hundred cavalry which he had, and attack them
in the flank at daylight. General Ouster immediately ordered a regiment of
cavalry in pursuit of this bold party, which in about two hours it ovm·took, attacked, and captured or dispersed iu every direction, Lieutenant General Early
escaping on a side road with five or six orderlies and two staff officers; he was,
however, closely followed by a small detachment, and his staff officers captured,
he barely escaping over the South Anna with a single orderly, and the next
day he made his way to Richmond, after a campaign in the Shenandoah valley
in which be lost nearly the whole of his army, together with his batlle-flags,
and nearly every piece of artillery which his troops opened upon us, and also a
large part of his transportation. But to resume: General Custer in the morning of the 14th instant was directed to push down the Negro-foot road and cross
the South Anna. He sent his scouting parties up to within eleven miles of Richmond, where they burned a hospital train. 'l'he object of this move was to divert the attention of the enemy from the North and South Anna bridges and
bridges over Little river, which lVIerritt was ordered to destroy with Devin's division; Uuster's main column meanwhile being held at the N ep·o-foot crossing
of the South Anna. General Merritt was ordered to follow the railroad to Hanover Junction, cross the Little river, and go into camp on the north bank of South
Anna. In the attack upon the railroad bridge over the South Anna, the 5th
United States cavalry charged up to the bridge, dismounted, dashed across it,
and drove away the company of artillery who tried to defend it, and turned
their own guns-four 20-pounder Parrotts-upon them. I here received a
despatch from the Lieutenant General that supplies were at the White House
for me, and one brigade of infantry; and also captured the following despatch,
which led me to doubt whether General Longstreet had yet determined in his
own mind where I was going:
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JuNCTIO~,

Jl;lard 14-11.25.

[By telegraph from Richmond.]
OoLO~EL HAsKELL: General Longstreet desires you to follow the enemy
if he goes east, until he crosses the Rapidan or Blue Ridge. If he goes towards
the Peninsula follow as far as you can.
By order of Lieutenant General Ewell :
T. 0. CHES'l'NEY,
Assistant Adjutant Geneml.
Next morning General Ouster was ordered to move by the Negro-foot crossing of the South Anna, and thence to Ashland, and General Devin was
ordered to proceed to the same point. This developed the situation. The
prisoners captured in front of Ashland reported Longstreet, with Pickett's and
Johnson's divisions and Fitz Lee's cavalry, on the Ashland road, in the direction of Richmond, and four miles from Ashland. My course was now clear
and the feint successful. General Devin was quickly ordered to the north
side of the South APJ.na and Gen~ral Custer was ordered to follow, sending
Colonel Pennington's brigade to amuse the enemy, cover his front, and
gradually fall back. 'l'he whole command was, meanwhile, ordered to cross
the North Anna and go into camp at Carmel church, anu at daylight take up
the line of march for White House, via Mangohick church I then knew I
could get to White House before the enemy, and that he could not operate
upon the Ohickahominy, as it would be too close to the lines of the army of the
James. The eneiny, finding that he had made a mistake, moYen rapidly,
during the night, towards the Pamunkey, through Hanover Court House, but
forgot his pontoon trains and could not cross the river; it would have made no
difference, however, as I then could have gotten to the -White House without
question.
At daylight on the morning of the 16th we leisurely resumed the march to
White House, encamping at Mangohick church. On the 17th we marched to
and encamped at Prince William Court House. On the 18th we reached
Indiantown and on the 19th crossed the Pamunkey, at White House, on the
railroad bridge, which had been repaired by Lieutenant Colonel Babcock, of
Lieutenant General Grant's staff; we here found supplies in abundance.
The amount of private and public property collected for the use of the enemy,
and destroyed, and the destruction of lines of communication and supplies w~s
very great and beyond estimating.
Every bridge on the Central railroad, between Richmond and Lynchburg,
except the one over the Ohickahominy and that over the James river at Lynchburg, and many of the culverts, were destroyed. The James River canal was
disabled beyond any immediate repair. There, perhaps, never was a march
where nature offered such impediments and shrouded herself in such gloom as
upon this. Incessant rain, deep and almost impassable streams, swamps and
mud were overcome with a constant cheerfulness on the part of the troops that
was truly admirable. Both officers and men appeared buoyed up by the
thought that we had completed our work in the valley of the Shenandoah, and
that we were on our way to help our brothers in arms in front of Petersburg
in the final struggle.
Our loss in horses was considerable, almost entirely from hoof-rot. After
refitting at White House until the 24thinstant we resumed our march, crossing the Ohickahominy at .J ones's bridge, and arriving at and crossing the James
1·iver on the evening of .March 25, and on the following day, by direction of
the Lieutenant General, went into camp at Hancock's Station, on the railroad
in front of Petersburg. 1'he whole number of prisoners captured on the march
was about sixteen hundred, but some of them we were obliged to parole, as
they were unable to keep up with the column, though, after the first three days,
our marches did not average over eighteen miles per clay.
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To General 1\Ierritt, chief of cavalry, Generals Custer and T. C. Devin,
division commander.s, Generals Gibbs and vVells and Colonels Fitzhugh, Capebart, Stagg, and Pennington, brigacle commanders, my staff, and every officer
and man of the 1st and 3d cavalry divisions, I return my sincere thanks for p)).triotic, unmurmuring, and soldierly conduct.
'l'o l\Iajor H. I-I. Young, of my staff, chief of scouts, and the thirty or forty
men of his com man! w bo took their liveB in their hands, cheerfully going whel;ever ordered, to obtain that great essential of success-information-I tender
my gratitude. Ten of . these men were lost. Our entire loss during the march
did not exceed one hundred men ; and some of these we left by the wayside,
unable to bear the fatigues of the march.
·
'l'his report should be regarded as the preface of my report of operations in
front of Petersburg and ltichmond, as my command only rested one day before
its commencement.
I forward herewith list of priwners captured, and property destroyed.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. H. SHERIDAN, JYiajor Geneml.
Brevet 1\Iajor General J OH~ A. RAWLINS,
CMif if Staff, Washington, D. C.
Official:
E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GE.\TERAL's OFFICE, Noumber 18, 1865.

JJiajor General G. H. Tlwmas's report if tlte operations if the army under
his commandfrom September 1, 1864, to January 20, 1865.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CuMBERLAND,
Eastport, Mississippi, January 20, 1865.
CoLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from
the date of the occupation of Atlanta, Georgia, as follows :
From the 7th to the 30th of September the 4th, 14t.h, and 20th army corps,
composing the army of the Cumberland, remained quietly in camp around the
city of Atlanta. The enemy was reported posted in the neighborhood of
Jonesboro'. During the greater portion of the above-mentioned period an
armistice existed between the two armies for the purpose of exchanging prisoners captured on both sides during the preceding campaign.
About the 20th of September the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed
the Tennessee river near '\Vaterloo, Alabama, and appeared in front of Athens,
Alabama, on the 23d, after having destroyed a portion of the railroad between
the latter place and Decatur, Alabama. Considerable skirmishing took place,
and the garrison, Colonel Campbell, 110th United States colored troops, commanding, withdrew into the fort. By nightfllll the town was completely invested, and the quartermaster and commissary buildings destroyed by the
enemy. On the morning of the 24th the enemy opened on the fort with a
12-pounder battery, firing from two directions, north and west, which was
answered by the artillery of the garrison. Later two flags of truce were received, clemandin~ a surrender, which was declined by Colonel Campbell, when
he was reqneRted to grant Major General Forrest a personal interview, and
complied with the request. At this interview Colonel Campbell allowed himself
to become convinced by the rebel . commander that it was useless to contend
against the largely superior force of the enemy confronting him, and was induced to surrender his command. The garrison, at the time, consiRted of 450
men belonging to the 106th, llOth, and lllth United States colored troops,
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and about 150 men of the 3d Tennessee cavalry. Thirty minutes after the
evacuation of the fort re-enforcements, consisting of the 18th J'llichigan and
102d Ohio regiments, arrived, and after a severe fight were also forced to yield.
Forrest then moved toward Pulaski, destroying the railroad as he advanced,
captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch rrrestle, and skirmished heavily all
day of the 27th with the garrison of Pulaski, but withdllew toward nightfall.
Major General Rousseau was present at Pulaa:k.i during the engagement, having
collected such troops as he could spare from other points of his command to
assist in staying the progress of the enemy in the destruction of our railroad
communications.
On the 29th Forrest withdrew from the immediate vicinity of the railroad,
after having thoroughly destroyed it from Athens to within five miles of Pulaski,
and on the same day the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad was cut ncar rrullahoma and Decherd by small parties from his command, sent out for the purpose; but the road was again in running order on the 30th. As l!~orrest
changed the scene of his operations from the Decatur railroad over to the one
leading to Chattanooga, General Rousseau moved rapidly by rail around through
Nashville to rrnllahoma, and prepared for his reception. On the same day
(29th September) 5,000 men from the district of the Etowah, Major General
J. B. Steedman commanding, crossed to the north of the Tennessee riYer to
check Forrest's movements and protect and keep open the communication by
rail with Chattanooga.
Newton's division, 4th corps, was ordered from Atlanta September 26, and
replaced Steedman's command at Chattanooga on the 28th. Morgan's division,
of the 14th corps, started from Atlanta for the same purpose on the 29th of
September, and to re-enforce the troops operating against 1.!-,orrest.
In compliance with verbal instructions from Major General Sherman, I left
Atlanta with Morgan's division to take imme~iate charge of affairs in Tennessee, and reached Nashville October 3.
On the withdrawal of Forrest's troops from Athens, a garrison was sent to
reoccupy the post by Brigadier General R. S. GrangEr, commanding district of
northern Alabama, who also sent a scouting party from Huntsville toward
Fayetteville to locate the enemy. This party aecertained that ]~orrest passed
through Fayetteville on the night ~of the 29th, and moved toward Decherd.
. After passing :Fayetteville, however, he divided his forces, part going south
through New Market toward Huntsville, and the remainder, under Forrest in
person, moved through Lynchburg towards Columbia. The first column, 4,000
strong, under Buford, appeared in front of Huntsville during the evening of the
30th, and immediately sent in a summons to the garrison to surrender, which the
latter refused to do. The enemy remained throughout the night in the vicinity
of the town, and repeated the demand for its surrender on the morning of
October ] , and, meeting with an answer similar to the one received on the night
previous, he moved off in the direction of Athens, which place was attacked by
him at about 3 p. m. without effect, the garrison holding its own nobly. 'l'he
second column (under Forrest in person, and estimated at 3,000 men) made its
appearance near Columbia on th e morning of the l st, but did not attack that
place.
During these operations of Forrest in l\Iiddle Tennessee, small parties of the
enemy made their appearance in the neighborhood of 1\fcl\Iinn~Ville and Liberty,
but made no serious demonstrations.
Morgan's division, of the 14th army corps, which started from Atlanta on the
29th of September, .a.·eached SteYenson during the morning of the 1st of October, and pushed on towards Huntsville immediately, reaching that place during
the night, and set out for Athens at an early hour on the morning of the 2d,
repairing the railroad as it advanced. The enemy, under Buford, resumed the
attack on Athens on the 2d, but was again handsomely repulsed by the garri-
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son.'. con.sistii?g of the 73d Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Slade commanding.
Fa1lmg m thJS second attempt, Buf01:d moved off toward Elk river, pursued by
a small force of our cavalry belongrng to General Granger's command. The
other column, under :b,orrest, started from near Columbia on the morning of the
3d, and moved off in the direction of Mount Pleasant, paroling all his prisoners
before his departure. During his stay in the neighborhood he destroyed about
:five miles of railroad between Carter's creek and Spring Hill, including three
bridges. rrhe enemy's intention to make good his escape to the south side of
the rrennessee river being now evident, directions were given to General Morgan,
at Athens, to move with hit~ division toward Bainbridge, and endeavor to secure
the crossing at that place in advance of Forrest, while General Rousseau,
already on the way to Columbia from NashviHe with a force of 4,000 mounted
men, hastily collected together, was to push after the enemy through Mount
Pleasant, and press him in the rear. Croxton's brigade of cavalry started from
Farmington, and, moving through Lewisburg, pursued a southwesterly course
towards Lawrenceburg. The above was the position of the troops on the moming of October 3. On the 8ame day information reached me that Major General
Washburne, with 3,000 cavalry and 1,500 infantry, was moving up the Tennessee river to participate in the operations against Forrest. Directions were
sent him on the 4th to leave his infantry at .T ohnsonville, move with his cavalry
by water to Clifton, and thence across the country toward Pulaski, joining General Rousseau's column at that point Lieutenant Commander Forrest, United
States navy, commanding the naval force on the upper Tennessee, was requested to send some gun boats down the river to Elorence, Alabama, and
endeavor to prevent the enemy crossing in that vicinity, if the high stage of
water then prevailing in the Tennessee would admit of his crossing the upper
shoals with his gunboats.
Morgan's division rt:ached Rogersville during the evening of the 4th, having
been delayed by high water in crossing Elk river; and on the same night Forrest passed through Lawrenceburg. A report was received to the effect that
Buford's command succeeded in crossing the Tennessee river at Brown's ferry
on the 3d instant.
On the 6th General 'Vashburne reached Waynesboro', still moving eastward,
and on the same day General Morgan came up with the enemy's rear guard at
Shoal Creek bridge, and skirmished with it slightly, but still not in time to prevent the main body of the enemy from safely effecting a crossing of the 'rennessee at Bainbridge. Thus both columns of the enemy succeeded in escaping,
although closely pursued by our forces. On the 8th directions were sent to
General Rousseau to destroy all ferry-boats and other means of crossing the
river, and then move his command below }-,lorence to await further orders. At
the same time General Morgan ·was directed to return to Athens.
Pending these operations in Tennessee the whole aspect of affairs about
Atlanta had undergone a change. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee river,
and had sent one corps of his army to destroy the railroad between Alatoona
and Marietta, which he had effectually accomplished for a distance of over
twenty miles, interrupting all communication between the forces in 'rennessee
and the main army with General Sherman in Georgia. He then moved around
south of Rome to the west side of the Coosa river, and, taking a northeasterly
course, marched toward Summerville and Lafayette, threatening Chattanooga
and Bridgeport.
·
The following dispositions were made on the 11th : Croxton's cavalry brigade was to move to some point sufficiently near his supplies at Athens, and not
too far removed from the rrenn(tssee river to protect its crossings from Decatur
down as far as Eastport; Morgan's division, of the 14th corps, to move without
delay from Athens to Chattanooga by rail, and Steedman's command following
Morgan's from Decatur to Bridgeport. General Rousseau's troops were re-
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called from below Florence, and ordered to cuncentrate at Athens without
delay. The district of northern Alabama, comprising the posts of Decatur,
Huntsville, Stevenson, and intermediate points, was left with its ordinary garrisons, and our whole attention turned toward Hood's movements in northern
Georgia.
On the 12th the en8my's cavalry attacked Resaca, bnt the place was resolutely held by \Vatkins's brigade of cavalry, and the railroad bridge saved from
destruction. 'rhe same day Brigadier General Wagner reported from Chattanooga the enemy's cavalry, 250 strong, had occupied La Fayette, Georgia;
whereupon directions were sent him to call in the detachments at 'l'unnel Hill,
Ringgold, and intermediate points along the railroad between there and Chattanooga, and quietly make preparations to defend his post. On the 13th one
corps of Hood's army appeared in front of Dalton, and a summon s to surrender,
signed by Hood in person, was sent in to Colonel John son, 44th United States
colored troops, comman.Jing the garrison. Colonel Johnson being convinced of
the uselessness of contending against so overwhelming a force of the enemy,
and knowing there was no succor at hand, complied with the demand.
On the 14th Morgan's division reached Chattanooga, and General Steedman's
command arrivccl at Bridgeport, where he received orders to proceed to Chattanooga.
After remaining at Dalton one day, during which he destroyed about five
miles of railroad, the enemy moved off to the westwal·d, through Nickajack Gap,
to rejoin the remainder of Hood's army near Summerville, to which point he
had been followed by General Sherman with the 4th, 14th, 15th, and 17th
corps, the 20th corps having been len behind at Atlanta to hold the place.
In compliance with instructions from Major General Sherman, Morgan's division, of the 14th corps, and Wagner's, of the 4th, were sent from Chattanooga
to rejoin their respective commands at Summerville.
A force of 1,500 men was set to work under the direction of Colonel W. W.
\V right, chief engineer United States military railroads, to repair the railroad
south of Uhattanooga, there being twenty-four miles of rails and ties totally
destroyed, besides several important bridges carried away by high water; yet,
with characteristic energy on the part of Colonel Wright and Captain J. C.
Van Duzer, superintendent of military telegraph, the repairs were rapidly carried forward. '.relegraphic communication with Atlanta was restored on the
21st, and trains commenced running regularly on the 28th. On the latter date
the enemy was at Gadsden, Alabama, whilst General Sherman's forces were at
Gaylesville, both armies rmnaining inactive and watchful of the other's movements. Whilst at the latter place Special Field Order No. 105, military division
of the Mississippi, was issued by General Sherman, and the substance of it sent
• to me by telegraph, as follows :
"In the event of military movements or the accidents of war separating the
general in command from his military division, Major General George H
'.rhomas, commanding the department of the Cumberland, will exercise command over all the troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence of the
general-in-chief."
A written communication, received a few days previous, in which I was instructed to remain in Tennessee and defend the line of the Tennessee river,
gave a detailed account of his plans for a campaign into the heart of Georgia.
'.rhe 14th and 20th corps of my command were to go with General Sherman,
the 4th corps remaining with me in Tennessee. 1\fy instructions were to pursue the enemy if he followed General Sherman's column, but, in any event, to
hold Tennessee. On the 26th the enemy's infantry made its appearance in
strong force in front of Decatur, Alabama, and during the afternoon attacked
the garrison, but not vigorously, and without effect. R e-enforcements, amounting to two full regiments, were sent from Chattanooga to General Granger at
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that point, and !Je was directed to hold his post at ,7!/ baz,zrds. On the 27tlz
the enemy commenced intrenclling his position around Decatur, working steadily
throughout the day, and skirmishing continually, but no artillery was used. At
night their camp-fires showed a heavy force. Under cover of the darkness,
and with a strong column, the enemy drove in our pickets and established a
line of rifle-pits within five hundred yards of the town. On the 28th a sortie
was made by a part of the garrison, which advanced under cover of the guns
of the fort down the river-bank and around to the rear of the enemy's pits,
clearing them of their occupants and capturing 120 prisoners belonging to
Cheatham's division, besides killing and wounding a number. The same day
the 14th United States colored troops, Colonel Morgan commanding, carried
one of the enemy's batteries up the river, after driving off the supports; the
guns were spiked, and the command returned to Decatur. Our loss was three
officers killed, and several officers and men wounded.
General Granger estimated the force opposing him at one corps, ·and his scouts
informed him there was also a corps at vV arrenton, Alabama, with Russell's brigade of cavalry at Guntersville on the river; Roddy's c1ivision of cavalry was
picketing the south side of the Tennessel3 from Decatur to Tnscumbia, and Forrest, with the main cavalry forcf', was reported at Corinth, Mississippi, with
outposts at Eastport and along the west bank of the 'Tennessee. On the
29th General Granger reported the enemy in his front to be withdrawing from
Decatur toward Courtland. The same clay General Croxton, commanding a
brigade of cavalry picketing the north bank of the river, reported the enemy
cros~:;ing at the mouth of Cypress creek, two miles below Fiorence, stating at the
same time that he would move with all the force he coulc! spare to drive the
enemy back. Directions were sent to General Hatch, commanding a division
of cavalry at Clifton, on the east bank of the '.rennessee, to move to the support
of Croxton at Florence, impressing upon both commanders the necessity of keeping the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river until the 4th corps,
already on its way from General Sherman in Georgia, could arrive and get into
position to meet him.
Hood's plans had now become evident, and from information gained through
prisoners, d~serters and other sources, his intention was to cross into Middle
Tennessee. To enable him to supply his army, he had been repairing the Mobile and Ohio railroad for some time previous, and trains were now running as
far north as Corinth and thence east to Cherokee Station, bringing his supplies
by that route from Selma and Montgomery.
The advance division (Wood's) of the 4th corps reached Athens on the
31st, the other two divisions of the corps following along rapidly. ':rhe 23d
corps, Major General J. .M. Schofield commanding, having been ordered
by .Major General Sherman to take post at Resaca and report to me for orders,
was immediately ordered by me to Pulaski, (as soon as I learned Hood had appeared in force on the south side of the '.rennessee,) and was also on its wayr
moving in rear of the 4th corps.
'l'he enemy effected a lodgement for his infantry on the north side of the Tennessee, about three miles above Florence, on the 31st, notwithstanding Croxton's
endeavors to drive him back, and his cavalry in heavy force pressed Croxton
across Shoal creek to its east bank. Orders were immediately sent to General
Stanley to concentrate the 4th corps at Pulaski and await further instructinns. In the mean time Forrest was moving east1vard from Corinth, Mississippi,
and from Paris, '.rennessee, making his appearance on the 28th at Fort Heiman.
an earthwork on the west bank of the '.rennessee, about seventy-five miles from
Paducah, where he captured gunbent No. 55 and two transports on the 31st,
having previously burned the steamer Empress. His force was composed of
seventeen regiments of cavalry with nine pieces of artillery. On the 2d he had
succeeded in planting batteries above and below Johnsonville, (one of our bases
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of supplies on the Tennessee river, and the western terminus of the Northwestern railroad,) completely blockading the river and isolating at that place three
gunboats, eight transports, and about a dozen barges. The garrison was composed of about 1;000 men of the forty-thi~·d Wisconsin, twelfth United States
colored troops, and a detachment of the eleventh Tennessee cavalry, all under
command of Colonel C. R. Thompson, twelfth United States colored troops.
'l~he naval forces, under command of Lieutenant E. :M. King, attacked the enemy's batteries below Johnsonville, but were repulsed after a severe contest, but
not before they recaptured from the enemy one of the transports above mentioned, having on board two 20-pounder Parrott guns, and a considerable quan
tity of quartermaster's stores, and forcing the enemy to destroy the gunboat
No. 55, captured on the 31st.
On the 4th the enemy opened on the gunboats, transports, and on the town,
from batteries _posted on the opposite bank of the river, to which the artillery
of the garrison and the gunboats gave a brisk response. 'l,he latter becoming
disabled, and as great fears were entertained of their being seized by the enemy,
it was resolved to fire them, as also the transports, to prevent their falling into
his hands. In carrying this into operation, the flames spread to the buildings
of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, and also to a large amount
of stores on the levee, soon converting the whole into a mass of ruins. The
loss to the government, as far as estimated, is set down at one and a half million of dollars, of which about three hundred thousand dollars belongs to the
subsistence department, and the remainder to the quartermaster's department. I
believe there was no cause to apprehend that the enemy could effect a crossing
at Johnsonville, a"S.d the destruction of public property was consequently unnecessary.
On the morning of the 5th the enemy again opened fire on the garrison, and
after a furious cannonade of more than an hour's duration withdrew from his
position across the river and disappeared. He crossed the Tennessee above
Johnsonville by means of two large flat-boats constructed by his men and two
small boats belonging to one of the gunboats, and then moved off in the direction
of Clifton. Major General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps,
arrived in Nashville on the 5th, and was immediately started towards Johnsonville by rail, reaching that place the same night and finding the enemy had
already retreated. Directions were then sent General Schofield to leave a sufficiently strong force for the defence of that post, and with the balance of his command proceed to carry out the instructions already given him, namely, to join
the 4th corps at Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in the vicinity,
watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee as much
as possible, without risking a general engagement, until 1\fajor General A. J.
Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and Major General J. H. Wilson
could have time to remount the cavalry regiments dismounted to furnish horses
for Kil;>atrick's division, which was to accompany General Sherman in his
march through Georgia.
At this time I found myself confronted by the army which, under General
J. E. Johnston, had so skilfully resisted the advance of the whole active army
of the military division of the lVIississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, reenforced by a well equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over twelve
thousand men, led by one of the boldest and most successful cavalry commanders in the rebel army.
My information from all sources confirmed the reported strength stated of
Hood's army to be from forty to forty-five thousand infantry, and from twelve
to fifteen thousand cavalry. My effective force at this time consisted of the
4th corps, about twelve thousand, under Major General D. S. Stanley; the
23d corps, about ten thousand, under Major General J. M. Schofield; Hatcher's
division of cavalry, about four thousand; Croxton's brigade, twenty-five hun-
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dred, and Capron's brigade of about twelve hundred. 'rhe balance of my
force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at .Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications and hold the posts above named, if attacked, until they could b~
re-enforced, as up to this time it was impossible to determine which course Hood
would take-advance on Nashville, or turn toward Huntsville. Under these
circumstances it was manifestly best to act on the defensive until sufficiently reenforced to justify taking the offensive.
My plans and wishes were fully explained to Gener:.tl Schofield, and, as subsequent events showed, properly app1·eciated and executed by him.
From the 1st to the lOth of November the enemy's position at 1!-,lorence had
remained materially unchanged. He had laid a pontoon bridge by mooring it
to the piers of the old railroad bridge, at that place, and had crossed over one
corps of infantry (S.D. Lee's) and two divisions of cavalry; the other two corps
(Stuart's and Cheatham's) were still on the south side of the river. His cavalry
had pushed out to Shoal creek, skirmishing continually with Hatch's and Croxton's commands along the line of that stream, but showing no disposition to
advance beyond.
General Sherman's uncertain position at Kingston, Georgia, where he still
remained in camp, had much to do with detaining the enemy, doubtless causing
considerable sp.::culation as to his future movements. On the 12th of November
communication with General Sherman was severed, the last despatch from him
leaving Cartersville, Georgia, at 2.25 p.m. on that date. He had started on his
great expedition from Atlanta to the sea-board, leaving me to guard Tennessee
or to pursue the enemy if he followed the commanding general's column. It
was therefore with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at Florence,
to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General Sherman's
movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the defensive in rrennessee, or take the offensive in Alabama.
The enemy's position at Florence remained unchanged up to th!'l 17th November, when he moved Cheatham's corps to the north side of the river with
Stuart's corps preparing to follow. The same day part of the enemy's infantry,
said to be Lee's corps, moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough's mill, on
Shoal creek, skirmishing at that point with Hatcher's cavalry, and then fell
back a short distance to some bluffs, where it went into camp.
The possibility of Hood's forces following General Sherman was now at an
end, and I quietly took measures to act on the defensive. Two divisions of infantry, under :Major General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me
from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in the department, and detachments collected from points of minor importance, would
swell my command, when concentrated, to an army nearly as large as that of the
enemy. Had the enemy delayed his advance a week or ten days longer I would
have been ready to meet him at some point south of Duck river, but Hood commenced his advance on the 19th, moving on parallel roads from 1!-,lorence towards
"\Vayuesboro, and shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the 22d.
:My only resource then was to retire slowly towards my re-enforcements, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible, to gain time for re-enforcements
to arrive and concentrate.
General Schofield commenced removing the public property from Pulaski
preparatory to falling back towards Columbia. Two divisions of Stanley's corps
had already reached Lynnville, a point fifteen miles north of Pulaski, to cover
the passage of the wagons and protect the railroad. Capron's brigade of cavalry
was at 1\Iount Pleasant, covering the approach to Uolumbia from that direction;
and in addition to the regular garrison there was at Columbia a brigade of
Ruger's division, 23d army corps. I directed the two remaining brigades of

1230

REPORT OP THE SECRETARY OP WAR.

Ruger'R division, then at Johnsonville, also to move, one by railroad around
through Nashville to Columbia, the other by road via vVaverly to Centerville,
and occupy the crossings of Dnck river, near Columbia, WHliamsport, Gordon's
ferry, and Centreville.
S ince the departure of General Sherman about seven thousand men belonging
to his column had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents returning
to their commands and men returning from furlough. '_rhese men had been organized into brigades, to be made available at such points as they mighL be
needed. :My command h::td also been re-enforced by twenty new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose
terms of service had expired.
On the 23d, in accordance with directions previously given him, General
Granger commenced withdrawing the garrisons from Athens, D ecatur, and
Huntsville, Alabama, and moved off toward Stevenson, sending five new regiments of that force to Murfreesboro', and retaining at Stevenson the original troops
of his command. This movement was rapidly made by rail, ancl without
opposition on the part of the enemy. That same night General Schofield
evacuated Pulaski and movec1 towards Columbia, reporting himself in position
at that place on the 24th. 'I'he commanding officer at Johnsonville was
directed to evacuate that post after removing all public property, and retire
to Fort Donelsou, on the Cumberland, and thence to Clarksville. During the
24th and 25th the enemy sldrmished with General Schofield's troopR at Columbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry until the morning of the
26th, when his infantry came up and pressed our line strongly during that day
and the 27th, but without assaulting. As the enemy's movements showed an
undoubted intention to cross above or below the town, General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of Duck river during the night of the 27th and took up
a new position, where the command remained during the 28th, undisturbed.
'_rwo divisions of the 23d corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding
all the erossing·s in its vicinity, while Stanley's corps, posted in reserve on the
1!\·anklin pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy
should make to force a crossing; the cavalry, under command of Brevet l\fajor
General Wilson, held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry. About
2 a. m. on the 29th the enemy succeeded in pressing back General vVilson's
cavalry, and effected a crossing on the Lewisburg pike; at a later hour part of
his infantry crossed at Huey's mills, six miles above Columbia. Communication with the cavalry having been interrupted, and the line of retreat toward
}"'rankliu being threatened, General Schofield made preparations to withdraw to
Franklin ; General Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring
Hill, abo11t fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the
road open for the passage of the main force, and dispositions were made preparatory to a withdrawal, to meet any attack corning from the direction of
Huey's mills. General Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off
the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but later he was attacked by the
enemy's infantry and cavalry combined, who engaged him heavily and nearly
succeeded in dislodging him from the position, the engagement lasting until
dark. Although not attacked from the direction of Huey's mills, General
Schofield 'vas busily occupied all day at Columbia resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck river, which he successfully accomplished, repulsing· the
enemy many times with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of
the troops as soon as covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon
General Schofield, with Ruger's division, started to the relief of General Stanley, at Spring Hill, and when near that pl ace he came upon the enemy's cavalry,
but they were easily driven off. At Sp1·ing Ht!l tlw enemy was found bivouacking within eigl~t hundred yards if the 'r oad Posting a brigade to lwld
the pike at this point, General Schofield, with Ruger's division, pushed on to
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Thompson's station, three miles beyond, where l1e found the enemy's camp-fires
still burning, a cavalry force having· occupied the place at dark, but had disappeared on tbe arrival of our troops . General Ruger then.quietly took possession
of the cross-roads.
r.rhe withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia was s:1fely
effected after dark on the 29th ; Spring Hill was passed without molestation
about midnight, and, making a night march of twenty-five miles, the whole
command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the
30th, the cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, on the right or east of the infantry.
At }'ranklin General Schofield formed line of battle on the southern edge of
the town to await the coming of the enemy, and in the meamYhile hastened the
crossing of the trains to the north side of Harpeth river.
On the evacuation of Columbia orders were sent to Mnjor General Milroy, at
Tullahoma, to abandon that post and retire to Murfreesboro', joining forces with
General Rousseau at the latter place. General Milroy was instructed, however,
to maintain the garrison in the block-house at Elk River bridge. Nashville was
placed in a state of defence and the fortifications manned by the garrison, reenforced by a volunteer force which had been previously organized into a
division under Brevet Brigadier General J. L. Donaldson, fi·om the emplo_yes
of the quartermasters' and commissary departments. This latter force, aided
by railroad employes, the whole under the direction of Brigadier General
rrower, worked assiduously to construct additional defences. Major General
Steedman, with a command numbering 5,000, composed of detachments belonging to General Sherman's column, left behind at Chattanooga, (of which
mention has heretofore been made,) and also a brigade of colored t roops, started
from Chattanooga by rail on the 29th of November, and reached Cowan on the
morning of the 30th, where orders were sent him to proceed direct toNashville.
At an early hour on the morning of the 30th the advanee of Major General A. J.
Smith's command reached Nashville by transports fi·om St. Loum. My infantry force was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, although he still outnumbered me very greatly in effective cavalry, but as soon as a few thousand
of the latter arm could be mounted I should be in a condition to take the field
offensively and dispute the possession of Tennessee with Hood's army.
rrhe enemy followed closely after General Schofield's rear guard in the retreat to Franklin, and upon coming up with the main force formed rapidly and
advanced to assault our works, repeating attack after attack during the entire
afternoon, and as late as 10 p. m. hiR efforts to break our line were continued.
General Schofield's position was excellently chosen. with both flanks resting
on the river, and his men firmly held their ground against an overwhelming
enemy, who was repulsed in every assault along the whole line. Our loss, as
given by General Schofield in his report transmitted herewith, (and to which I
respectfully refer,) is 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 missing, making an
aggregate of 2,326. We captured and sent to Nashville 702 prisoners, including one general officer, and thirty-three stands of colors. Major General D. S.
Stanley, commanding 4th corps, was severely wounded at Franklin whilst engaged in rallying a portion of his command which had been temporarily overpowered by an overwhelming attack of the enemy. At the time of the battle
the enemy's loss was known to be severe, and was estimated at 5,000. The
exact figures were only obtained, however, on the re-occupation of Franklin by
our forces, after the battles of December 15 and 16, at Brentwood Hills, near
Nashville, and are given as follows: buried upon the field, 1,750; disabled and
placed in hospital at :E'ranklin, 3,800; which, with the 702 prisoners already reported, makes an aggregate loss to Hood's army of 6,252, among whom were
6 general officers killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. The important results of
this signal victory cannot be too highly appreciated, for it not only seriously
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checked the enemy's advance and gave General Schofield time to remove his
troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused deep depression
among the men of Hood's army, making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements.
·
Not willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accomplished the object of the day's operations, namely, to cover the withdrawal of
his trains, General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during the
night to Nashville, in front of which city line of battle was formed by noon of
the 1st December, on the heights immediately surrounding Nashville, with
Major General A . .J. Smith's command occupying the right, his right resting
on the Cumberland river, below the city; the 4th corps (Brigadier General
Wood temporarily in command) in the centre; and General Schofield's troops
(23d army corps) on the left, his left extending to the Nolensville pike. The
cavalry, under General Wilson, was directed to take post on the left of General Schofield, which would make secure the interval between his left and the
river above the city.
General Steedman's troops reached Nashvi1le about dark on the evening of
the 1st of December, taking up a position about a mile in advance of the left
centre of the main line, and on the left of theN olensville pike. r:I.'his position
being regarded as too much exposed, was changed on the 3d, when, the cavalry having been directed to take post on the north side of the river at Edgefield, G~neral Steedman occupied the space on the left of the line vacated by its
withdrawal.
During the afternoon of the 2d the enemy's cavalry in small parties engaged
our skirmishers, but it was only on the afternoon of the 3d that his infantry
made its appearance, when, crowding inour skirmishers, he commenced to establish his main line, which, on the morning of the 4th, we found be had succeeded
in doing, with his salient on the summit of Montgomery Hill, within six hundred yards of our cE:ntre, his main line occupying the high ground on the southeast side of. Brown's creek, and extending from the Nolensville pike-his extreme Tight-across the Franklin and Granny White pikes in a westerly direction to the hill8 south and southwest of Richland creek, and down that creek to
the Hillsboro' pike, with c4valry extending from both his fl.anks to the river.
Artillery was opened on him from several points on the line, without eliciting
any response.
The block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's creek, five miles north
of Murfreesboro', was attacked by Bates's division of Cheatham's corps on the
4th, but held out until assistance reached it from the garrison at Murfi·eesboro'.
The enemy ~sed. artillery to reduce the block-house, but although seventy-four
shots were fired at it, no material injury was done. Generall\'Iilroy coming up
with three regiments of infantry, four companies of the thirteenth Indiana cavalry,
and a section of artillery, attacked the enemy and drove him off. During the 5th
6th and 7th, Bates's division, re-enforced by a division from Lee's corps and 2,500
of Forrest's cavalry, demonstrated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', garrisoned by about 8,000 men, under command of General Rousseau.
The enemy showing an unwillingness to make a direct assault, General Milroy,
with seven regiments of infantry, was sent out on the Sth to engage him. He was
found a short distance from the place on the Wilkerson pike, posted behind rail
breastworks, was attacked and routed, our troops capturing 20 7 prisoners and two
guns, with a loss of 30 killed and 175 wounded. On the same day Buford's cavalry entered the town of Murfreesboro', after having shelled it vigorously, but he
was speedily driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery.
On retiring from before Murfreesboro' the enemy's cavalry moved northward
to Lebanon and along the bank of the Cumberland in that vicinity, threatening
to cross to the nortli side of the river and interrupt our railroad communication
with Louisville, at that time our only source ofsupplies, the enemy having block-
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aded the river below Nashville b.y batteries along the shore. The navy department was requested to patrol the Cumberland above and below Nashville with
the gunboats then in the river, to prevent the enemy from crossing, which was
cordially and effectually complied with by Lieutenant Commanding Le Roy
Fitch, commanding eleventh division Mississippi squadron. At the same time
General Wilson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin to guard the country in that
vicinity.
The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and, with
the exception of occasional picket firing, nothing of importance occurred from
the 3d to tlte 15th December. In the mean while I was preparing to take the
offensive without delay; the cavalry was being remounted under the direction
of General Wilson as rapidly as possible, and new transportation furnished
where it was required.
During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy under Breckinridge,
Duke, and Vaughn was operating in the eastern portion of the State against
Generals Ammen and Gillem. On the 13th November, at midnight, Breckinridge, with a force estimated at 3,000, attacked General Gillem near Morristown,
routing him and capturing his art.llery, besides taking several hundred prisoners;
the remainder of the command., about 1,000 in number, escaped to Strawberry
Plains, and thence to Knoxville. General Gillem's force consisted of 1,500
men, composing three regiments of Tennessee cavalry and six guns, belong.ing formerly to the fourth divisjon of cavalry, army of the Cumberland, but had
been detached from my command at the instance of Governor Andrew Johnson,
and were then operating independently under Brigadier General Gillem. From
a want of co-operation between the officers directly under my control and General
Gillem may be attributed in a great measure the cause of the latter's misfortune.
Following up his success, Breckinridge continued moving southward through
Strawberry Plains, to the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, but on the 18th
withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced. GeneralAmmen's troops, re-enforced
by 1,500 men hom Chattanooga, re-occupied Strawberry Plains on that day.
About this period Major General Stoneman, left at Louisville by General
Schofield to take charge of the department of the Ohio during his absence with
the army in the field, started for Knoxville to · take general _direction of affairs in
that section, having previously ordered Brevet l\1.ajor General Burbridge to
march with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumbei'land Gap, to
Gillem's relief. On his way through Nashville General Stoneman received instructions from me to concentrate as large a force as he could get in East Tennessee, move against Breckinridge, and either dPstroy his force or drive it into
Virginia, and, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad
from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering
his command. November 23 General Stoneman telegraphed from Knoxville
that the main force of the enemy was at New Market, eight miles north of
Strawberry Plains, and General Burbridge was moving on Cumberland Gap
from the interior of Kentucky, his advance expecting to reach Barboursville that
night. On the 6th of December, having received information fw:>m East Tennessee that Breckiuridge was falling back towards Virginia, General Stoneman
was again directed to pursue him, and destroy the railroad as far across the
State line as possible, say twenty-five miles.
Leaving him to carry out these instructions, I will return to the position at
Nashville.
Both armies were ice-bound for a week preYious to the 14th of December,
when the weather moderated. Being prepared to move, I called a meeting of
the corps commanders on the afternoon of that day, and having discussed the
plan of attack until thoroughly understood, the following Special ]"'ield Order
No. 342 was il:lsued:
"Paragraph IV. As soon as the state of the weather will admit of offensive
78
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operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following
order:
"Major General A. J. Smith, commanding a detachment of the army of the
Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Harding pike, in front of
his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left.
"Major General Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps, military division of
Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and support General Smith's
right, assisting, as far as possible, in carrying the left of the enemy's position,
and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable
opportunity occurs. Major General Wilson will also send one division on the
Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy, and ob~erve in the direction of
Bell's Landing, to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly
turned, when it will rejoin the main force.
"Brigadier General 'I,. J. vV ood, commanding 4th army corps, after leaving a
Atrong skirmish line in his works from Laurens's Hill to his extreme right, will
form the remainder of the 4th corps on the Hillsboro' pike to snpport General
Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position
on the Montgomery Hill.
"Major General Schofield, commanding 23d army corps, will replace Brigadier
General Kimball's division of the 4th corps with his troops. and occupy the
trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens's Hill with a strong skirmish line. He
will move with the remainder of · his force in front of the works and co-operate
with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the
enemy.
"Major General Steedman, commanding district of the Etowah, will occupy
the interior line in rear of his present position, stretcl1ing from the reservoir on
the Cumberland river to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the
remainder of his force in its pre~ent position, to act according to the exigencies
which may arise during these operations.
"Brigadier General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville,
will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill 210 to the extreme right,
including the enclosed work on the Hyde's },erry road.
"The quartermaster's troops, under command of Brigadier General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the
battery on hill 210.
"The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major
General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defence of Nashville
during the operations around the city.
" Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 a. m. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable."
On the morning of the 15th of December, the weather being favorable, the
army was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of battle promulgated in the Special Field Order of the 14th. 'l,he formation of the troops
was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, a&
also by a denf¥l fog, which only lifted towards noon. The enemy was apparently
totally unaware of any intention on our part to attack his position, and more espe-cially did he seem not to expect any movement against his left flank. To divert
his attention still further from our real intentions, Major General Steedman had,
on the evening of the 14th, received orders to make a heavy demonstration with
his command against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville pike, which he
accomplished with great success and some loss, succeeding, however, in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his line, and inducing him to draw reenforcements from toward his eentre and left. As soon aR General Steedman
had completed his movement, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson
moved out along the Harding pike and commenced the grand movement of the
day by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across
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the Harding and Hillsboro' pikes. A division of cavalry (Johnson' d) was sent
at the same time to look after a battery of the enemy's on the Cumberland river
at Bell's Landing, eight miles below Nashville. General Johnson did not get
into position until late in the afternoon, when, in conjunction with the gun-boats
under Lieutenant Commander Le Roy Fitch, the enemy's battery was engaged
until after nightfall, and the place was found evacuated in the morning. The
remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe
in reserve, moving on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the
enemy along Richland creek, near Harding's bouse, and drove him back rapidly,
capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, &c., and continuing to advance, whilst
slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which
was splendidly carried by assault at 1 p. m. by a portion of Hatch's division,
dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt,
stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that
captured the first position, taking four more guns and about 300 prisoners. The
infantry, McArthur's division of General A. J. Smith's command, on the left of
the cavalry, participated in both of the above assaults, and indeed the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works;
as they reached the position nearly aimultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.
Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command
(the 23d corps) from the position in reserve to whieh it l1ad been assigned, over
to the right of General Smith. enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more
freely in. the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day.
The 4th corps, Brigadier General 'I'. J. Wood commanding, formeu on the
left of General A. J. Smith's command, and as soon as the latter had struck
the enemy's flank, assaulted the Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced position, at 1 p. m., which was most gallantly executed by the third brigade, second
division, Colonel P. Sidney Post, 59th Illinois, commanding, capturii?-g a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops,
(Brigadier General Garrard's division,) the 4th corps continued to advance,
and carried the enemy's entire line in its front by assault and captured several
pieces of artillery, about 500 prisoners, some stands of colors, and other material. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and forced
back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still holding his line
of retreat to Franklin by the main pike through Brentwood and by the Granny
White pike. Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running parallel to and east
of the Hillsboro' pike-Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the centre,
and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield; Steedman
holding the position he had gained early in the morning.
The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of
artillery and 1,200 prisoners, besides several hundred stands of small-arms and
about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back 5tt all points with heavy
loss, and our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was
unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original
plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to.
The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the
ground occupied at dark, whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at
an early hour on the morrow.
At 6 a.m. on the 16th Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers
across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to
the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driYing the enemy before him until
he came upon his new main line of works, constructed during the night, on
what is called Overton.'s Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the
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Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and formed his command on the left of General VVood, effectually
securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the
operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved on the right of
the 4th corps, (Wood's,) and establishing connexion with General Wood's
Tight, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained
in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward
and toward the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpe1.dicular
to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for
the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' pike, was dismounted and formed
on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th hnd succeeded
in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one
o his two outlets towards Franklin.
As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the
different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's
left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre was weak as compared
with either his right, at Overton's Hill, or his left, on the hills borderiug the
Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his
retreat from Franklin.
About 3 p. m. Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's
brigade of the same command, was ordered by General VV ood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who
· ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan (14th
United States colored troops) to co-operate in the movement. The ground on
which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed. to the
enemy's view, he, readily perceiving our intention, drew re-enforcements from
his left and centre to the threatened point. 'This movement of troops on the
part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right.
The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of
grape, canister, and musketry, our men moving steadily onward up the hill until
near the crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to
fall back, leaYing their dead and wounded-black and white indiscriminately
mingled-lying amid the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded.
General Wood readily reformed his command in the position it had previously
occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault.
Immediately following the effort of the 4th corps, Generals Smith and
Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective
fronts, C?-rrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen
places, and capturing all of his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among
the latter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of
Brentwood or Harpeth Hills.
General Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously
with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and, gaining firm possession
of the Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route.
Wood's and Steedman's troops hearing the shouts of victory coming from
the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill,
and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and
innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken,
fled in confusion through the Brentwood Pass, the 4th corps in a close pursuit,
which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene and the
troops rested from their labors.
As the 4th corps pursued the enemy on the 1!-,ranklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions of his command, and di-
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n~cted tl1em to pursue along the Granny White pike and endeavor to reach

Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came
upon the enemy's cavalry, under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind
barricades. 'The position was charged by the 12th Tenness~e cavalry, Colonel
Spalding commanding, and the enemy's lines broken, ecattering him in all
directions, and capturing quite a number of prisoners, among them Brigadier
General E. W. Rucker.
During the two days' operations there were 4,462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers of all grades from that of major genera], 53 pieces of artillery,
and thousands of small-arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all of his
dead and wounded.
Leaving directions for the collection of the captured property, and for the
care of the wounded left on the battle-field, the pursuit was continued at daylight on the 17th. The 4th corps pushed on towards 1!-,ranklin by the direct
pike, whilst the cavalry moved by the Granny White pike to its intersection
with the Franklin pike, and then took the advance.
Johnson's division of cavalry was sent by General Wilson direct to Harpeth
1·iver, on the Hillsboro' pike, with directions to cross and move rapidlytowards
Franklin. 'The 1pain cavalry column, with Knipe's division in advance, came
up with the enemy's rear guard strongly posted at Hollow 'Tree Gap, four
miles north of Franklin; the position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handeome1y carried, capturing 413 prisoners and 3 colors.
The enemy then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the
crossing of Harpeth river at that place ; but Johnson's division coming up
from below on the south side of the stream, forced him to retire from the river
bank, and our cavalry took possession of the town, capturing the enemy's hospitals, containing over 2,000 wounded, of whom about 200 were our own men.
The pmsuit was immediately continued, by Wilson, towards Uolumbia, the
enemy's rear guard slowly retiring before him to a distance of about five miles
south of .Franklin, where the enemy made a stand in some open fields just
north of vVest Harpeth river, and seemed to await our coming. Deploying
Knipe's division as skirmishers, with Hatch's in close support, General Wilson
ordered his body guard, the 4th United S tates cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges
commanding, to charge the enemy. l!..,orming on the pike in column of fours,
the gallant little command charged, with sabres drawn, breaking the enemy's
centre, whilst Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back his flanks, scattering the
whole command, and causing them to abandon their artillery. Darkuees
corning on during the engagement enabled a great many to escape, and put an
end to the day's operations.
The 4th corps, under General Wood, followed immediately in rear of the
cavalry as far as Harpeth river, where it found the bridges destroyed and too
much water on the fords for infantry to cross. A trestle bridge was hastily
constructed from such materials as lay at hand, but could not be made available
before nightfall. General Steedman's command moved in rear of General
'Vood, and camped near him on the banks of th!Cl Harpeth. Generals Smith
and Schofield marched with their corps along the Gra~1y White pike, and
camped for the night at its intersection with the Franklin pike. The trains
moved with their respective commands, ~arrying ten days' supplies and one
hundred rounds of ammunition.
On the 18th the pursuit of the enemy was continued by General Wilson,
who pushed on as far as Rutherford's creek, three miles from Columbia.
Wood's corps crossed to the south side of Harpeth river and closed up with
the cavalry. The enemy did not offer to make a Rtand during the day. On
arriving at Rutherford's creek the stream was found to be impassable on account of high water, and running a perfect torrent. A pontoon bridge, hastily
constructed at Nashville during the presence of the army at that place, was on
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its way to the front, but the bad condition of the roads, together with the incompleteness of the train itself, had retarded its arrival. I would here remark
that the splendid pontoon train properly belonging to my command, with its
trained corps of pontoniers, was absent with General Sherman.
During the 19th several unsuccessful efforts were made by the advanced
troops to cross Rutherford's creek, altl10ugh General Hatch succeeded in
lodging a few skirmishers on the south bank. The heavy rains of the pre.
ceding few days had inundated the whole country and rendered the roads
almost impassable. Smith's and Schofield's commands crossed to the south
siGe of Harpeth river, General Smith advancing to Spring Hill, whilst General
Schofield encamped at Franklin. On the morning of the 20th General Hatch
constructed a floating bridge from the debris of the old milroad bridge over
Rutherford's creek, and cros~ing his entire division pushed out for Columbia,
but found, on reaching Duck river, the enemy had succeeded the night before
in getting everything across, and had already removed his pontoon bridge;
Duck river was very much swollen and impassable without a bridge. During
the day General Wood improvised a foot bridge over Rutherford's creek, at the
old road bridge, and by nightfall had succeeded in crossing his infantry entire,
and one or two of his batteries, and moved forward to Duck river.
The pontoon train coming up to Rutherford's creek about noon of the 21st,
a bridge was laid during the afternoon and General Smith's troops were
enabled to cross. The weather had changed from dismal rain to bitter cold, very
materially retarding the work in laying the bridge, as the regiment of colored
troops to whom that duty was intrusted seemed to become unmanned by the cold
and totally unequal to the occasion. On the completion of the bridge at Rutherford's creek, sufficient material for a bridge over Duck river was hastily
pushed forward to that point, and the bridge constructed in time ~nough to
enable Wood to cross late in the afternoon of the 22d and get into position on
the Pulaski road, about two miles south of Columbia. The water in the river
fell rapidly during the construction of the bridge, necessitating frequent alterations and causing much delay. 'l'he enemy, in his hasty retreat, had thrown
into the stream several fine pieces of artillery, which were rapidly becoming
uncovered, and were subsequently removed.
:Kotwithstanding the many delays to which the command had been subjected,
I determined to continue the pursuit of Hood's shattered forces, and for this
purpose decided to use General Wilson's cavalry and General Wood's corps of
infantry, directing the infantry to move on the pike whilst the cavalry marched
on its either flank across the fields; the remainder of the_command, Smith's and
Schofield's corps, to move along more leisurely, and to be used as the occasion
demanded.
Forrest and his cavalry, :md such other detachments as had been seut off
from his main army w bilst besieging Nashville, bad[ rejoined Hood at Columbia.
He bad formed a powerful rear guard, made up of detachments from all his
organized force, numbering about 4,000 infantry, under General Walthall, and
all his available cavalry, under Forrest. 'Vith the exception of his rear guard,
Lis army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and
barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and
desert their cause to put an end to their sufferin~s. 'l1 he rear guard, however,
was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last.
During the 23d General Wilson was occupied crossing his command over
Duck river, but took the advance on the 24th, supported by General Wood,
and came up with the enemy just south of Lynnville, and also at Buford's Station, at both of which places the enemy made a short stand, but was speedily
dislodged, with a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our advance was so
rapid as to prevent the destruction of the bridges over Richland creek. Christmas
morning, the 25th, the enemy, with our cavalry at his heels, evacuated Pulaski,
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and was pursued towards Lamb's ferry, over au almost impracticable road and
through a country devoid of sustenance for man or beast. During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly intrenched at the head of a
heavily-wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the rqad, and into which
Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's skirmishers, and then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking; but before this could be
accomplished the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from
his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers, capturing and carrying
off one gun belonging to battery I, 4th United States artillery, which was not
recovered by us, notwithstanding th6 ground lost was almost immediately
regained. By nightfall the enemy was driven from his position, with a loss of
about fifty prisoners. The cavalry had moved so rapidly as to out-distance its
trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although
they continued uncomplainingly to pursue the enemy. General Wood's corps
kept well closed up on the cavalry, camping on the night of December 25 six
miles out from Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry road, and pursuing the same route
as the cavalry, reached Lexington, Alabama, thirty miles from Plllaski, on the
28th, on which date, having definitely ascertained that the enemy had made
good his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge, I directed further pursuit
to cease. At Pulaski the enemy's hospital, containing about 200 patients, fell
into our hands, and four guns were found in Richland creek. About a mile
south of the town he destroyed twenty wagons loaded with ammunition, belonging to Cheatham's corps, taking the animals belonging to the train to help pull
his pontoons. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge, and indeed back to Nashville, was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, small-arms, blankets, &c.,
showing most conclusively the disorder of the enemy's retreat.
Duri~1g the foregoing operations with the advance, Smith's and Schofield's
troops were in motion towards the front, General Smith's command reaching
Pulaski on the 27th, whilst General Schofield was directed to remain at Columbia fot· the time being.
On our at·riv::tl at Franklin, on the 18th, I gave directions to Ganeral Steedman to move with his command across the country from that point to Murfreesboro', on the Chattanooga railroad, from whence he was to proceed by rail to
Decatur, Alab ama, via Stevenson, being joined at Stevenson by Brigadier General R. S. Granger and the troops composing the garrisons of Huntsville, Athens,
and Decatur. Taking general direction of the whole force, his instructions
were to reoccupy the points in northern Alabama evacuated at the period of
Hood' s advance, then c1~oss the '£ennessee with the balance of his force and
threaten the ene my's railroad communications west of Florence.
General Steedman reoccupied Decatur on the 27th, and proceeded to carry
out the second portion of his instructions; finding, however, that the enemy
had already made good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee, and any
movement on his railroad would be useless.
On announcing the result of the battles to Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding l'Iississippi squadron, I requested him to send as much of his force
as he could spare around to Florence, on the '£ennessee river, and endeavor to
prevent Hood' s army from crossing at that point; which request was most cordially and promptly complied with. _He arrived at Chickasaw, Mississippi, on
the 24th, destroyed there a rebel battery, and captured two guns with caissons
at Florence Landing. He also announced the arrival at the latter place of sevet·al transports with provisions.
Immediately upon learning of the presence at Chickasaw, Mississippi, of the
gunboats and transports with provisions, I directed General Smith to march
overland from Pulaski to Clifton, via Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro', and take
post at Eastport, Mississippi. General Smith started for hi8 destination on the
29th of December.
On the 30th of December I announced to the army the successful completion
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of the campaign, and gave directions for· the disposition of the command, as
follows : Smith's corps to take post at Eastport, Mississippi; Wood's corps to
be concentrated at Huntsville and Athens, Alabama; Schofield's corps to proceed to Dalton, Georgia; and Wilson's cavalry, after sending one division to
Eastport, Mississippi. to concentrate
balance at or near Huntsville. On
reaching the several positions assigned to them, the differeut commands were to
go into winter quarters and recuperate for the spring campaign.
rl'be above not meeting the views of the general-in-chief, and being notified
by Major(General Halleck, chief of staff, United States army, that it was not
intended for the army in Tennessee to go into winter quarters, orders were
issued, on the 31st of December, for Generals Schofield, Smith, and Wilson to
concentrate their commands at Eastport, Mississippi, and that of General Wood
at Huntsville, Alabama, preparatory to a renewal of the campaign against the
enemy in Mississippi and Alabama.
During the active operations of the main army in Midd]e Tennessee, General Stoneman's fon~es in the northeastern portion of the State were also
very actively engaged in operating against Breckinridge, Duke and Vaughn.
Having quietly concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem at
Bean's Station, on the 12th of December General Stoneman started for Bristol,
his advance under General Gillem striking the enemy under Duke at Kingsport, on the north fork of the Holston 1·iver, killing, capturing or dispersing the
whole command. General Stoneman then sent General Burbridge to Bristol,
where he came upon the enemy under Vaughn, and skirmished with him until
the remainder of the troops-Gillem's column-came up, when Burbridge was
pushed on to Abingdon with instructions to send a force to cut the raih·oad at
some point between Saltville and Wytheville, in order to prevent re-enforcements coming from Lynchburg to the salt works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th, the enemy under Vaughn following on a Toad running parallel
to the one used by our forces. Having d~cided merely to make a demonstration against the salt works, and to push on with the main force after V anghn,
General Gillem struck the enemy at Marion early on the 16th, and after completely routing him, pmsued him to Wytheville, Vh·ginia, capturing all his artillery and trains, and 198 prisoners. Wytheville, with its stores and suppHes,
was destroyed, as also the extensive lead works near the town, and the railroad
bridges over Reedy ereek. General Stoneman then turned his attention towards Saltville, with its important salt works. The garrison of that place, reenforced by Giltner's, Crosby's and Witcher's commands, and the remnants of
Duke's, all under command of Breckinridge in person, followed our troops as
they moved on Wytheville, and on returning General Stoneman met them at
Marion, where he ~ade preparations to give Breckinridge battle, and disposed
his command so as to effectually assault the enemy in the morning, but Breckinridge retreated during the night, and was pursued a short distance into North
Carolina, our troops capturing some of his wagons and ca:i.ssons.
General Stoneman then moved on Saltville with his entire commantl., capturing at that place eight pieces of artillery and a large amount of ammunition of
all kinds, two locomotives, and quite a number of horses and mules. The extensive salt works were destroyed by breaking the kettles, filling the wells with
rubbish, and burning the buildings. His work accomplished, General Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by General Gillem's command, G(meral Burbridge's proceeding to Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap. The
country marched over was laid waste to prevent its being used again by the
enemy-all mills, factories, bridges, &c., being destroyed. The command had
everything to contend with as far as the weather and roads were concerned, yet
the troops_ bore up cheerfully throughout, and made each twenty-four hours an
average march of forty-two and a half miles.
The pursuit of Hood's retreating army was discontinued by my main forces on
the 29th December on reaching the Tennessee river; however, a force of cavalry
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numbering 600 men, made , up from detachments of the 15th Pennsylvania,
2d Michigan, lOth, 12th and 13th Indiana regiment~:~, under command of Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th J-)ennsylvania, operating with Steedman's column,
started from Decatur, Alabama, in the direction of Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi. 'l'he enemy's cavalry, under Roddy, was met at Leig'hton, with whom
Colonel Palmer skirmished and pressed back in small squads towards the mountains. Here it was ascertained that Hood's trains passed through Leighton on
the 28th December, and moved off toward Columbus, Mississippi. Avoiding
the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Palmer left Leighton on the 31st December, moved
rapidly vw La Grange and Russellville, and by the Cotton-gin road, and overtook the enemy's pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons and 78 pontoon boats,
when ten miles out from Russellville. This he destroyed. Having learned of
a large supply train on its way to Tuscaloosa, Colonel Palmer started on the
1st of January towards Aberdeen, Mississippi, with a view of cutting it ?ff, and
succeeded in surprising it about 10 p. m. on the same evening, just over the
line in Mississippi. 'rhe train consisted of 110 wagons and 500 mules, the former of which were burned, and the latter sabred or shot. Returning via 'l'ollgate, Alabama, and on the old military and Hacks burg roads, the enemy, under
.Roddy, Biffies and Russel, was met near Russellville ancl along Bear creek,
whilst another force under Armstrong was reported to be in pursuit of our forces.
Evading the force in his front by moving . off to the right, under cover of the
darkness, Colonel Palmer pushed for Moulton, coming upon Russel when wit.hin twelve miles of Moulton and near Thorn Hill, attacked him unexpectedly,
utterly routing him, and capturing some prisoners, besides burning five wagon~.
The command then proceeded to Decatur without molestation, and reached that
place on the 6th of January, after a march of two hundred and fifty miles. One
hundred and fifty prisoners were captured, and nearly 1,000 stand of arms de~
stroyed. Colonel Palmer's loss was one killed and two wounded.
General Hood, while investing Nashville, had sent into Kentucky a force of
cavalry numbering about 800 men, and two guns, under the command of Brigadier General Lyon, with instructions to operate against our railmad communications with Louisville. McCook's division of cavalry was detached on the
14th December and sent to Bowling Green and Franklin to protect the road.
After capturing Hopkinsville, Lyon was met by Lagrange's brigade near Greenburg, and after a sharp fight was thrown into confusion, losing one gun, some
prisoners aud wagons; the enemy succeeding, however, by making a wide detour 'oia Elizabethtown and Glasgow, in reaching the Cumberland river, and
crossing at Burkville, from where General Lyon proceeded, via McMinnville
and Winchester, rrennessee, to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Memphis and
Charleston railroad, and attacked the little garrison at Scottsboro' on the lOth of
January. Lyon was here again repulsed and his command scattered, our troops
pursuing him towards the Tennessee river, which, however, he, with about 200
of his men and his remaining piece of artillery, succeeding in crossing. The
rest of his command scattered in squads among the mountains. Colonel W. J.
Palmer, commanding 15th Pennsylvania cavalry, with 150 men, crossed the
river at Paint Rock and pursued Lyon to near Red Hill, on ~he road from
Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, at which place he surprised his camp during the
night of the 14th January, capturing Lyon himself, bis one piece of artillery,
and about 100 of his men with their horses. Lyon being in bed at the time of
his capture, asked his guard to permit him to dress himself, which was acceded
to, when, watching his opportunity, Lyon seized a pistol, shot the sentinel dead
upon the spot, and escaped in the darkness. This was the only casualty during
the expedition.
.
'l'o Colonel Palmer and his command is accorded the credit of giving Hood's
army the last blow of the campaign, at a distance of over two hundred miles
from where we first struck the enemy on the 15th December, near Nashville. .
'l'o all of my sub-commanders, (Major Generals Schofield, Stanley, Rousseau,
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Steedman, Smith, and Wilson, and Brigadier General T. J. V\r ood,) their officers
and men, I give expression of my thanks and gratitude for their generous selfsacrifice and manly endurance under the most trying circumstances and in all
instances. Too much praise cannot be accorded to an army which, hastily
made up from the fragments of three separate commands, can successfully contend against a force numerically greater than itself and of more thoroughly solid
organization, inflicting on it a most crushing defeat-almost an annihilation.
Receiving instructions unexpectedly from General Sherman in September to
repair to Tennessee and assume general control of the defences of our line of
communication in the rear of the army of the Mississippi, and not anticipating a
sepa~·ation from my immediate command, the greater number of my staff officers
were left behind at Atlanta, and did not have an opportunity to join me, after
General Sherman determined on making his march through Georgia, before the
communications were cut. I had with me Brigadier General W. D. Whipple, my
chief of staff; Surgeon G. E. Cooper, medical director; Captains Henry Stone,
Henry M. Oist, aud Robert H. Ramsey, assistant adjutants general; Captain
Henry Beman, acting chief commissary; Captains John P. Willard and S. C.
Kellogg, aides-de-camp; and Lieutenant M. Kelly, chief of couriers; all of whom
rendered important service during the battles of the 15th and 16th and during
the pursuit. I cordially commend their services to favorable consideration.
'rhere were captured from the enemy during the various actions of which the
foregoing report treats, 13,189 prisoners of war, including 7 general officers and
nearly 1,000 other officers of all grades, 72 pieces of serviceable artillery, and
- battle-flags. During the same period over 2,000 deserters from the enemy
were received, to whom the oath was administered. Our own losses will not
exceed 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.
I have the honor to transmit herewith a consolidated return of casualties,
the report of Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general, and that of
Captain A. Mordecai, chief of ordnance. That of Surgeon G. S. Cooper, medical director, will be forwarded as soon as he is enabled to complete it.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
MaJor General U. S. A., Command·ing.
Col. R. M. SAWYER, Ass't AdJ't General, Mil. Div. Mississippi.
OFFICE PROVO~T MARSHAL GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF THE Gt~MBRRLAND,

Nasltville, Tennessee, February 4, 1865.
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Report if 1·ebel deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, fiom September 7,
1 '364, up to 20th January, 1865.

Received.

-----------------1--------------

September7to30.......................... .••...
1
October ....... - .•... --- .. ----. _.. - _.-- ..... __ - ... ___ ..
November ... -.-- .. ---- __ .. __ ... ---- .... _... ____ .
1
December.-----··----··----·--------·----2
6
January 1 to 20 .. -------- ---· -------------5
15

6
8
3

70
96
68
281
660

........•...
. ---- .. ----. --- ... ----.
2
1
------ ..••.•

TotaL .............................. --7-231061,175

--2-~--1-

28
61

Grand total, 1,314.

Prisoners if war exchanged during the month if September, 1864.
Commissioned officers . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-commissioned officers........... . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Privates •....•. ·. . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . .

128
225
979

Total ..........•.............., . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1, 332

(Equivalent to 2,045 privates.)
Aggregate of prisoners of war captured from September 7, 1864, to January
20, 18G5, (inclusive,) 13,189.

Report if rebel deserters received outside if Nashville ojjice, from September 7,
1864 to January 20, 1865.
Date of reception.

Enlisted
men.

Officers.

From September 7 to September 30 ..... _... _................ _......... _...
From October 1 to October 31. ..... ------ ........ ____ .. .... ....
2
From November 1 to November 30 ------.. .... .....• ...... ...... ...... ....
:From December 1 to December 31.... .. .... .... .... .... .... .... ...... ....
18
From January 1 to January 31 .......... _................... _..
TotaL ..•....•........••••.•................. _.•....•..

20

75
146
80
14
558
1

873

Grand total, 893.

Aggregate of rebel deserters to whom the oath has been administered from
September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865, 2,207.
Respectfully submitted:
J. G. PARKHURST,
Colonel artd P. M. G.
OFFICE 0HIRF OF ORDNANCE, DEPARTME~T CuMBERLAND,

Nashville, Tennessee, February 5, 1865.
In compliance with your instructions of the 20th ultimo, I have
the honor to submit the following report of ordnance material captured from the
GENERAL:
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enemy by the army under your command, between the 1st October, 1864, and
the 20th January, 1865, all of which material has been received by the Ordnance department :
42 light 12-pounder guns, rebel model.
7 light 12-pounder guns United States model.
7 light 12-pounder howitzers, United States model.
3- 3-inch rifles, rebel model.
2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2.9-inch, United States model.
1 3-inch wrought-iron rifle, United States model.
2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, United States model.
59 field carriages and limbers, complete.
2 fi eld carriages and limbers without wheels.
2 :field carriag·es, no limbers.
16 field caissons and limbers.
4 fiPld caissons, no limbers.
3, 079 infantry small-arms of different models, no bayonets.
262 bayonets, of different models.
1, 208 cartridge-boxes, infantry.
238 cartridge-box plates.
234 cartridge-box belts.
141 cartridge-box belt-plates.
178 waist belts.
181 waist-belt plates.
166 bayonet scabbards.
364 cap pouches.
231 gun slings.
Of the above :
2 12-pounder guns, carriages and limbers, were captured by Major General
Millroy at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, December, 1864.
.
1 12-pounder howitzer, carriage, and limber, was captured by Colonel Palmer
from the rommand of the rebel General Lyon, near Huntsville, Alabama.
2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, carriages, and limbers, were captured by
Major General Steedman, near Decatur, Alabama.
3 1;~-pounder guns, carriages, and limbers; 1 10-pounder Parrott rifle and
carriage; 1 3-inch wrought-iron rifle and carriage, United States, were captured
at Columbia, Tennessee.
All the remaining artillery and carriages, and all the small-arms and accoutrements, were captured before Nashville, on the 15th and 16th D ecember, 1864.
'l'he larger number of ammunition chests captured were filled with ammunition in good condition, and six wagons, loaded with similar ammunition, were
captured before this place.
I am informed that there are, in addition to what are reported above, four
guns and carriages now at Pulaski, Tennessee, and three or four guns in the
Duck river, at Columbia, Tennessee, all captured from the enemy or abandoned
by him in his retreat to the 'l'ennessee river.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. MORDECAI,
Capta£n Ordnance, Cltiif of Ordnance Dep't Cumberland.
Major General G. H. 'I'HoMAS, U. S. A.,
Commanding DepaTtment of the Cumberland, Eastport, M iss.
Official copy:
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

E. D. TOW.NSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
November 18, 1865.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

Nashville, June 1, 1865.
GENERAL : I have the honor to report the operations of my command from
the date of the last report made by me, January 20, as follows :
General A. J. Smith's corps, at that period, was with me at Eastport., Mississippi; four divisions of General vVilson's cavalry were encamped on the
opposite or north bank of the 'rennessee river, at Waterloo and Gravelly Springs,
Alabama, and the 4th corps, Major General Stanley commanding, was stationed
at Huntsville, Alabama. This, with the ordinary garrisons of the country, composed my command.
The general-in-chief of the army having given up the intention of my continuing the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama, I received
an order by telegraph from Major General Halleck, chief of staff, to send
General A. J. Smith's command and five thousand of General vVilson's
cavalry by river, to report to Major General Canby, at New Orleans, for the
purpose of taking part in an expedition at that time preparing to operate against
Mobile. Smith's corps started from Eastport on the 6th of February, and
Knipe's divi sion of cavalry left Nashville on the 12th.
About the period of the departure of Smith's corps information was received,
through various sources, to the effect that part of the shattered remnants of
Hood's army, viz: Cheatham's and Lee's corps, were on their way from Mississippi to South Carolina, moving via Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, to re-enforce that portion of the enemy's army operating against General Sherman.
There remained in central Mississippi, under General Taylor, but one _corps of
the enemy's infantry, and about seven thousand of Forrest's cavalry, the headquarters of the command being at Meridian, Mississippi.
On the 6th of February a communication was received from Lieutenant
General Grant, directing an expedition, commanded by General Stoneman, to
be sent from East Tennessee to penetrate North Carolina, and well down towards Columbia, South Carolina, to destroy the enemy's railroads and military
resources in that section, and visit a portion of the State beyond th e control or
reach of General Sherman's column. As the movement was to be merely for
the purpose of destruction, directions were given General Stoneman to evade
any heavy engagements with the enemy's forces.
Again, on the 13th of Februa;ry, General Grant telegraphed me to prepare a
cavalry expedition, about ten thousand strong, to penetrate northern Alabama,
acting as a co-operative force to the movement on Mobile by General Canby.
Before leaving Eastport, Mississippi, I had directed General vVilson to get his
command in readiness for just such a campaign, of which the above was :simply
an outline-my instructions being for him to move on '.ruscaloosa, Selma, and
Montgomery, Alabama, and to capture those places if possible. After accomplishing which, he was to operate against any of the enemy's forces in the
direction of Mississippi, Mobile, or Macon, as circumstances might drmand.
The bad state of the roads, combined with the condition of the horses of his
command after completing the severe campaign in pursuit of Hood, prevented
any movement for the time being, and it was only on the 22d of March that
General Wilson, with Upton's, Long's, and McCook's divisions, could leave
Chickasaw, Alabama. Hatch's division remained at Eastport, Mississippi, and
R. W. Johnson's at Pulaski, Tennessee, it not being pos;:;ible to mount them
fully, to hold the country and prevent guerilla depredations.
When General Sherman was organizing his army for its march to the Atlantic
seaboard, in November, he issued an order directing me to assume control of all
the forces of the military division of the Mississippi not present with him and
the main army in Georgia. Based on that order, all the operations of the troops
within the limits af the above-mentioned military division have, during the
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interval, been made under my immediate direction, and I have been held responsible for their faithful execution.
On the 30th of :March General V\rilson's cavalry reached Elyton, after an
extremely difficult, toilsome, and exhausting march, on account of bad roads,
swollen streams, and the rough nature of the country, which had also been
almost entirely stripped of all subsistence for man or beast. At Elyton Croxton's brigade, of McCook's division, was detached and sent to capture and
destroy 'Tuscaloosa, and then march to rejoin the main body near Selma.
With the remainder of his command, General Wilson pushed rapidly forward
to Montevallo, where he destroyed five extensive iron works, and other valuable
property. On the outskirts of the town the enemy's cavalry was found in
force, attacked, routed, and pursued through Plantersville, leaving in our possession three pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. At 3 p. m., on
the 2d of April, General Wilson reached the immediate vicinity of Selma, and
rapidly formed Upton's and Long's divisions to attack the defences of the
town-Long attacking on the Summerfield road, and Upton across a swamp
deemed impassable by the enemy. Dismounting two regiments from each of
the brigades of Colonels Miller and Mintz, General Long and those two officers
gallantly leading their men in person, charged across an open field, five hundred
yards wide, over a stockade, which they tore up as they passed, through the
ditch and over the enemy's parapets, sweeping everything before them. Our
loss was forty-six killed and two hundred wounded; Colonel Dobbs, 4th Ohio,
among the former, and General Long and Colonels Miller and McCormick among
the latter. General Upton met with less resistance than Long-entered the
enemy's works and the town, capturing many prisoners. In the darkness and
coufusion following the assault Generals Forrest, Buford, Adams, Armstrong,
and others, made their escape. Lieutenant General Dick 'Taylor had left earlier
· in the afternoon. As the fruits of the victory, however, there remained 26 guns
and 2, 700 prisoners, besides large amounts of ordnance and other property of
great value. Twenty-five thousand bales of cotton had already been destroyed
by the enemy.
Gtneral Wilson remained at Selma from the 2d to the lOth of April, resting
his command and completing the destruction of the immense workshops, arsenals, and foundries, and waiting for Croxton to rejoin from his expedition to
Tuscaloosa, it having been ascertained, through the enemy, that he captured
Tuscaloosa and was moving to Selma via Eutaw. On the lOth General Wilson
crossed the Alabama river and moved towards Montgomery, receiving the surrender of that town, without a contest, on the 12th. The enemy burned eightyfive thousand bales of cotton before evacuating. At Montgomery five steamboats, several locomotives, one armory, and several foundries were destroyed.
On the 14th operations were resumed by Upton's division moving through
Mt. Meigs and Tuskegee towards Columbus, Georgia, and Colonel LaGrange,
with three regiments of his brigade, of McCook's division, marching along the
railroad to West Point via Opelika.
On the 16th General Upton, with about four hundred dismounted men, assaulted and carried the breastworks of Columbus, saving, by the impetuosity of
his attacks, the bridges over the Chattahoochee, and capturing fifty-two field
guns in position, besides twelve hundred prisoners. The rebel ram "Jackson,"
nearly Teady foT sea, and carrying an armament of six seven-inch guns,
fell into our hands and was destroyed, as well as the navy yard, foundries, the
arsenal and the armory, sword and· pistol factory, accoutrements, shops, papermills, four cotton factories, fifteen locomotives, two hundred cars, and an immense amount of cotton, all of which were burned. The same day, the 16th of
April, La Grange captured Fort 'raylor, at West Point, above Columbus, on the
Chattahoochee, after assaulting it on three sides, the defence being stubborn.
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Three hundred prisoners, three guns, and several battle-flags were taken, besides
a large quantity of supplies.
On the 18th the march towards 1\:facon was resumed, Mintz's (late Long's)
division leading. By a forced march the bridges across :E'lint river, fifty-four
miles from Columbus, were secured, compelling the abandonment by the enemy
of five field-guns and a large amount of machinery; forty prisoners were captured and two cotton factories destroyed. At 6 p.m., on the 20th of April, the
authorities of Macon, under protest, surrendered the city to the 17th Indiana, Colonel Mintz's advance regiment, claiming, under the provisions of an
armistice then reported existing between the forces of Generals Sherman and
Johnston, that the capture was contrary to the m~ages of war. General Wilson,
not being at hand when the surrender was made, when the case was reported to
him, with ~clmirable good judgment, declined to recognize the validity of the
claim asserted, as the city had been taken possession of by one of his subordinates before ·he (General Wilson) could be advised of the existence of an armistice, and he therefore held as prisoners of war Major Generals Howell Cobb and
G. W. Smith, and Brigadier Generals Mackall, Robertson, and Mercer. On the
21st General Wilson was notified by General Sherman, from Raleigh, North
Carolina, over the enemy's telegraph wires, and through the headquarters of
General Joseph Johnston, that the reported armistice was a reality, and that he
was to cease further operations.
To return to General Stoneman s expedition from East Tennessee. Owing ·
to the difficulty of procuring animals for his command and the bad condition of
the roads, General Stoneman was only enabled to start from Knoxville about
the 20th of March, simultaneously with General Wilson's departure from Chickasaw, Alabama. In the mean time General Sherman had captured Columbia,
South Carolina, and was moving northward into North Carolina. About this
period reports reached me of the possibility of the evacuation of Lee's army at
Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, and in that event, .of his forcing a passage
throug·h East Tennessee via Lynchburg and Knoxville. 'l'o guard against that
contingency, Stoneman was sent towards Lynchburg to flestroy the railroad and
military resources of that section and of western North Carolina. The 4th
army eorps was ordered to move from Huntsville, Alabama, as far up into East
Tennessee as it could supply itself, repairing the railroad as it ad vanccd, forming, in conjunction with rrillson's division of infantry, a strong support for General Stoneman's cavalry column in case it ehould find more of the enemy than
it could conveniently handle and be obliged to fall back.
With three brigades, Brown's, Miller's, and Palmer's, commanded by General
Gillem, General Stoneman moved, m·a Morrietown, Bull Gap, and thence eastward
up the Watauga, and across Iron mountain to Boone, North Carolina, which he
entered on the 1st of April, after killing or capturing about seventy-five homeguards. From Boone he crossed the Blue Ridge and wRnt to \Vilkesboro',
on the Yadkin, where supplies were obtained in abundance, after which he
changed his course towards southwestern Virginia.
A detachment was sent to Wytheville, and another to Salem, to destroy the
enemy's depots at those places, and the railroad, whilst the main body marched
on Christianburg and captured the place. 'l,he railroad to the eastward and
weetwarcl of the town was destroyed for a considerable distance. The party
sent to Wytheville captured that place after some fighting, and burned the railroad bridges over New river and several creeks, as well as the depots of supplies. The detachment sent to Salem did the same, and proceeded to within
four miles of Lynchburg, destroying as they advanced.
A railroad was never more thoroughly dismantled than was the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad from Wyth eville to near Lynchburg.
Concentrating his command General Stoneman returned to North Carolina,
via Jacksonville and Taylorsville, and went to Germantown, where Palmer's
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brigade was sent to Salem, North Carolina, to destroy the large cotton factories
located there, and burn the bridges on the railroad between Greensboro' and
Danville, and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin river, which was most
thoroughly accomplished, after some fighting, by which we captured. abopt four
hundred prisoners.
At Salem 7,000 bales of cotton were burned by our forces.
:E'rom Germantown the main body moved south to Salisbury, where they
found about 3,000 of the enemy defending the place, and drawn up in line of
battle behind Grant's creek, to await Stoneman's attack. \\Tithout hesitation,
a general charge was made by our men, resulting in the capture of all the enemy's artillery, fonrteen pieces, and 1,364 prisoners. The remainder scattered,
and were pursued.
During the two days following the troops were engaged destroying the immense depots of supplies of all kinds in Salisbury, aud burning all .the bridges
fur several miles on all the railroads leading out of the town.
On the afternoon of April 13 the command . moved westward to Statesville
and Lenoir, at which latter point General Stoneman left the troops to be disposed
of by General Gillem, and proceeded with the prisoners and captured artilleTy
to East Tennessee, reporting his arrival, on the 19th, at Greenville, and detai.ling the disposition of his troops, which was as follows: Palmer's brigade, with
headquarters at Lincolnton, North Carolina, to scout down the Catawba river
towards Charlotte; Brown's brigade, with headquarters at Morgantown, to connect with Palmer down the Catawba, and Miller's brigade, with General Gillem,
was to take post at Ashville, with directions to open up comrnun:ication through
to Greenville, East Tennessee. The object in leaving the cavalry on the other
side of the mountains being to obstruct, intercept, or disperse any troops of the
enemy going south, and to capture trains.
General Gillem followed the directions given him, and marched on Ashville,
with Miller's brigade, but was opposed at Swananoa Gap by a considerable
force of the enemy.
Leaving sufficient of his force to amuse them, with the balance he moved by
way of Howard's Gap, gained the enemy's rear and surprised and captured
his artillery; after which he made his appearance in front of Ashville, where he
was met by a flag of truce on the 23d, with the intelligence of the truce existing between Generals Sherman and Johnston, and bearing an order from General
Sherman to General Stoneman for the latter to go to the railroad station at
Durham's, or Hill::;boro', nearly two hundred miles distant, whereas the distance to Greenville, East 'rennessee, was but sixty. Coming to the conclusion
that the order was issued by General Sherman under the impres:;ion that the
cavalry division was still at Salisbury or Statesville, General Gillem determined
to move to Greenville,. 'rhe rebel General .Martin, with whom he communicated under flag of truce, demanded the rendition of the artillery captured,
which, of course, could not be granted, and in return General Gillem requested
the rebel commander to furnish his troops with three days' rations, as by the
terms of the armistice · they were requi.red to withdraw. Had it not been for
this, Ashville am:l its garrison would have fallen into our hands.
Up to that period I had not been officially notified of the existence of any
armistice between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, and the information only reached me through my sub commanders, Generals \Vilson and Stoneman, from .Macon, Georgia, and Greenville, East Tennessee, almost simultaneously. rrhe question naturally arose in my mind, whether the troops acting under
my direction by virtue of General Sherman's Special :Field Orders No. 105, series
of 1864, directing me to assume control of all the forces of the military division
of t~1e Mississippi "not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief," were
to be bound by an armistice or agreement made at a distance of several hundred
miles from where thos~ troops were operating, and of which they were advised
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through an enemy, then in such straightened circumstances that any ruse, honorable at least in war, was likely to be practiced by him to relieve himself from
his difficult position.
Then, again, General Sherman was operating with a movable column beyond
the limits of his territorial command, viz., the military division of the Mississippi, and far away from all direct communication with it, whereas "the troops
not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief" were operating under
special instructions, and not even in co-operation with General Sherman against
Johnston; but, on the contrary, General Stoneman was dismantling the country
to obstruct Lee's retreat, and General Wilson was moving· independently in
Georgia or co-operating with General Canby.
Before I could come to any conclusion how I should proceed under the circumstances, and without disrespect to my superior officer, General Sherman, lVIr.
Secretary Stanton telegraphed to me from Washington on the 27th of April,
and through me to my sub-commanders, to disregard all orders except those
coming from General Grant or myself, and to resume hostilities at once, sparing
no pains to press the enemy firmly, at the same time notifying me that General
Sherman's negotiations with Johnston had been disapproved.
Based on that notification the following dispositions were made with a view of
capturing President Davis and party, who, on the cessation of the armistice, had
started south from Charlotte, North Carolina, with an escort variously estimated
at from 500 to 2,000 picked cavalry, to endeavor to make his way to the transMississippi.
General Storr nan was directed to send the brigades of Miller, Brown, and
Palmer, then in western North Carolina, to concentrate at Anderson, South
Carolina, and scout down the Savannah river to Augusta, Georgia, if possible,
in search of the fugitives. General Gillem being absent, Colonel Palmer, 15th
Pennsylvania cavalry, took command of the expedition. By rapid marching
they succeeded in reaching and crossing the Savannah river in advance of Davis,
and so disposed the command as to effectually cut off his retreat towards Mississippi, and forced him to alter his route towards the Atlantic coast. General
Wilson, at Macon, Georgia, was also notified of the 1:1,ction taken at vV ashington
on General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston, and he was directed to resume hostilities at once-especially to endeavor to intercept Davis.
Scarcely were the above orders issued and in process of execution, when notification reach ed me of the surrender by Johnston of all the enemy's forces east
of the Chattahoochee river. General Wilson received similar notification from
General Sherman, direct through the enemy's territory, and immediately took
measures to receive the surrender of the enemy's establishments at Atlanta and
Augusta, and to occupy those points, detailing for that purpose BrevP-t Major
General Upton with his division. Genera] McCook was sent with a force to
occupy 'l'allnhassee, }"'lorida, and to receive the surrender of the troops in that
vicinity. 'I'hus a cordon of cavalry, more or less continuous, was extended
across the State of Georgia from northwest to southeast, and communication established through the late so-called southern confederacy. With characteristic
energy, Generals Wilson and Palmer had handbills printed and profusely circulated in all directions throughout the country, offering the President's reward for
the apprehension of Davis, and nothing could exc.eed the watchfulness exhibited
by their commands.
On the 3d of M:ay, Davis dismissed his escort at vVashington, Georgia, and
accompanied by about half a dozen followers, set out to endeavor to pass our
lines. Nothing definite was learned of the whereabouts of the fugitives until on
the evening of the 7th of May, the first Wisconsin cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel
HenJy Harndon commanding, with one hundred and fifty men, ascertained at
Dublin, on the Oconee river, fifty-five miles southeast from Macon, that Davis
and party had crossed the river at that point during the day, and had moved
79 w
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out on the Jacksonville road. At day light on the 8th Colonel Harndon continued the pursuit, finding the camp occupied by Davis on the evening previous,
between the forks of Alligator creek, which was reached just four hours after
it had been vacated. The trail was pursued as far as the ford over Gum
Swamp creek, Pulaski county, when darkness rendered it too indistinct to fol~
low, and the command encamped for the night, having marched forty miles that
day.
On the 9th Colonel Harndon pushed on to . the Ocmulgee river, crossed at
Brown's ferry, and went to Abbeville, where he ascertained Davis's train had
left that place at 1 a. m. that same day, and had gone towards Irwinsville, in
Irwin county. \Vith this information Colonel Harndon moved rapidly on towards the latter town, halting within a short distance of it to wait for day light,
in order to make certain of the capture.
Before leaving Abbeville, Colonel Harndon learning of the approach, from
the direction of Hawkinsville, of the 4th Michigan cavalry, Colonel Pritchard
commanding, went to meet that officer, and informed him of his close pursuit of
Davis; Colonel Pritchard stating in reply that he had been sent to Abbeville
also to watch for Davis. After Colonel Harndon's departure, Colonel Pritchard,
with part of his command, started for IrwinsvHle by a more direct route than
that used by the detachment of the 1st vVisconsin, arriving at Invinsville at 2
a. m. on the lOth, where, on inquiry, it was ascertained that there was a camp
about a mile from town on the other road leading to Abbeville. Approaching
cautiously, for fear it might be our own men, Colonel Pritchard sent a dismounted party to interpose between it and Abbeville, and thei waited for daylight to move forward and surprise the occupants. Daylight appearing, a rapid
advance was madP, and the encampment surprised, resulting in the captnre of
Jefferson Davis and family, John H. Regan, postmaster general of the so-called
confederacy, two aides-de-camp, the private secretary of Davis, four other officers, and eleven enlisted men.
Almost immediately after the completion of the above movement, Colonel
Harndon's men coming down the Abbeville road were hailed by the party sent
out during the night by Colonel Pritchard to secure the capture of the camp,
and on being challenged answered" friends," but fell back, under the impression
they had come upon an enemy; whereupon shots were exchanged before the
real position of affairs could be ascertained, resulting in the loss on one side of
two men killed and one wounded, and of three wounded on the other. Considerable feeling was caused by the manner in which the 4th Michigan effected
the apprehension of Davis, to the detriment of Colonel Harndon's party, but
great credit is justly due and should be given to the 1st vVisconsin cavalry for
the persistency of its pursuit, and it is only to be regretted they did not arrive
on the· ground in time to reap the benefit of their labors. For the full particulars of the operations of both detachments I have the pleasure of referring you
to the reports of Lieutenant Colonel Harndon, 1st Wisconsin, and Captain
Hathaway, 4th Michigan.
With the surrender of ,Johnston's army to General Sherman all the detachments of the confederate armies cast of the Chattahoochee signified their willingness to snrrender, except a few guerilla bands who were outlawed, special
directions being given to grant all such no quarter. On the 7th of May notification was received by me~ z_•za EastpoTt and Meridian~ Mississippi, of 1l1e surrender of General 'l'aylor's army to General Canby, at Citronnella, Alabama,
on the 4.th. No armed force of the enemy east of the Mississippi remaining
to interfere, I gave orders for the occupation by my fo.rces of such portions of
the reclaimed territory m; it was neces::;ary to hold whilst telegraphic and railroad communication was being restored, to the accomplishment of which the
people of the country zealously gave their assistance.
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May 16th General Grant, through his chief of staff, General Rawlins,
directed me to order to some point north of the Tennessee river all of Wilson's
cavalry except four thousand veterans, who are to remain at Macon, Augusta,
and Atlanta, Georgia ; those returning to be concentrated at some convenient
point in Tennessee or Kentucky, preparatory to being mustered out or otherwise disposed of. All cOiivalescents and others about the hospitals throughout
my command not requiring medical treatment have, by virtue of General Orders
No. 77, been mustered o.u t of service. The quartermaster, commissary, and
ordnance departments have all been reduced to the smallest scale consistent
with the demands of the service. During the past three months the defences
of all the posts within my command have been thoroughly inspected by Brigadier General Tower, inspector of fortifications military division of the Mississippi, whose reports, with drawings attached, I have the honor to forward
herewith.
For detailed accounts of the operations of the commands of Generals Stoneman and Wilson I invite the attention of the Lieutenant General commanding
to the reports of those officers, as well as to those of their subordinates, Generals Gillem, Palmer, and others. r.rbey have brought the cavalry arm of the
service to a state of efficiency unequalled in other armies for long and difficult
marches through the enemy's country, and particularly for self-reliance and
fortitude in assaulting strong positions which might well cause he.eitation in
veteran infantry.
Herewith I have the honor to forward the report of Brevet Brigadier General J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general of my command, giving the number of prisoners and deserters registered at his office during the period of which
the foregoing treats.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
lVJajor Gerteml U.S. A., Commanding.
Brigadier General J. A. RA WLTNS,
Ckiif of Staff, U. S. Anny.

Report of pTisoners of war received at office of the Provost JJ!J.arslzal GeneTal,
DepaTtment of the Cumberland, from January 21 to May 31, (inclusive,)
1865.

Captured.

- - -- - - - - - - - - -- 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

J auuary l to 31 ______ . ____ ..... _. . .
Pebruary .. __ ... ____ .. ___ .. _... ____
March .......... ---------·-·····--·

April ....... ···-··------------____

May

1

2
1 ....

1
1
3

2
2
3
17

6 ___ . ___ . ___ .
3 _. _.
6
3
1
1
26 ____ .... ____
6

5
17
9
61

85
l 02

93
584

-~~;~l·.·.·.·:::::::::::::::::::l~~~~~~~~ ~~~~
Grand total, 1, 122.
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Report of nbcl deserters received at .Nashville, Tennessee,from January 21 to
May 9, (inclusive,) 1865.
Commiss'd
officers.

Received.

Enlisted
men.

18

355
786
608
578

8

334

90

2,661

January 21 to 31 ................................•.........
February . _............ _.... _.... __ ... __ ..... __ .. ____ . ___ .
March ................................................... .
April ................................. - - .... -- ....... - .. -.
May 1 to 9 ............................................... .

18
23
23

TotaL ............................................. .
Grand total, 2, 751.

RepoTt if confede?·ate officers and enlisted men wlw voluntarily sun·endered
th.emselves, and who l1.ave taken tlw oatlt if a1legiance and been allowed to
'return to their h.omes,from May 10 to 31, ( inclusive,) 1865.
Officers . . . . . ............................................. _........ _... _..
Enlisted men ............................................... __ .......... __ .

486
3,559

Total ...................................... - . - ........ - ........... .

4,045

RepoTt

if rebel deserters 'received and

d£sposed if at Chattanooga office from
January 21 to May 31, (£nclusi1:e,) 1865.
Commiss'd
officers.

Received.

Enlisted
men.

January 1 to 31 ....................................................... .
February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
April................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
May ............................ - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
TotaL .......................................... ___ .

21
103
422

519
1,477

54

2,542

Grand total, 2, 596.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TilE CUMBERLAND,

Office Provost Mars/tal Gene1·al, Nashville, June 8, 1865.

Respectfully forvmrded for the information of the major general commanding.
J. G. PARKHURST,
Brevet Brigadier General and Provost Marshal General, S;c.

Official:

S. C. KELLOGG,
B1·evet Major and Aide-de-Camp.
ADJUTAN'r GENERAL's OFFICE, November

Official copy:

18, 1865.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
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arrnJJ under General Hunter

in liVest Virgim·a.
RICHMOND, August 10, 1865.
GENERAL: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to submit the
following statement in regard to the operations of the army of West Virginia,
while under your command, during the summer of 1864. I do so the more
cheerfully as I have perceived that the motives and results of those operations
have been less clearly understood and appreciated by the public than any other
of the important campaigns of the war.
I am the better prepared to make this statement as I served throughout the
campaign as your chief of staff, and, in that capacity, kept an accurate journal
of movements and events as they occm-red, and of the orders, motives, and information on which they were based. I was also, from long residence, travel,
and previous military campaigns, well acquainted with the whole country over
which these operations were conducted, and consequently may be supposed to
have an intelligent understanding concerning the propriety of the movements
made, and the practicability of those suggested.
I will commence by a brief explanation of the military position in the department of West Virginia when you took command.
Early in the spring of 1864 the forces heretofore scattered over this extensive department were concentrated at different points, prepared to co-operate in
the grand combined movement which had been arranged against the national
enemy. Simultaneously with the advance of General Grant on Richmond, and
that of General Sherman on Atlanta, the co-operating columns of the army of
West Virginia commenced their movements, charged with the accomplishment
of the most arduous and important secondary purposes of the campaign. r_t,heir
orders were to move upon the enemy's communications, destroy railroads, military depots, stores, supplies, and manufactories, crippling his resources in every
way practicable, to distract his attention from the vital centres of operation, and
to force him, if possible, to detach troops for the defence of distant points. As
the field of operations embraced in these orders was of immense extent, interrupted by chains of rugged and lofty mountains covered to a great extent with
impenetrable fore~ts, traversed by deep and rapid rivers, its topography and
even its general geography but little u erstood outside, the general commanding the department was allowed full discretion in arranging the plans for their
accomplishment.
The movement commenced under the orders of .i\fajor General Sigel, as follows : Brigadier General Crook with his division moved from Kanawha, striking
the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at New river, and destroying it for some
distance. He defeated the enemy's forces that opposecl him, capturing many
prisoners and valuable stores.
· Brigadier General Averell at the same time moved southward from Beverly,
with his division, menacing the salt works near Abingdon, ancl co-operating with
Crook in the destruction of the railroad. These forces then fell back to Lewisburg and Meadow Bluff, in Greenbrier county, awaiting further developments.
At the same time General Sigel, in person, took command of the force collected at Martinsburg, about eight thousand five hundred men of all arms, and
advancing southward was met at New Market, on the Staunton turnpike, and
defeated by the rebel forces under Breckinridge. On the following day, May
16, he retired to a position behind Cedar creek, about fifteen miles south of
Winchester. On the 21st of May General Sigel was relieved by Major General
Hunter, who assumed command of the department and the army in the field at
Cedar creek.
General Sigel having been assigned to the commancl of the reserves, stationed
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on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, made his headquarters at Martinsburg.
It was determined to resume the movement on Staunton immediately, and,
with a view to further operations from that point, orders were sent to Generals
Crook and Averell, then supposed to be in the vicinity of Meadow Bluff, to join
us at Staunton, by forced marches, moving lightly, and depending on the country
for subsistence as much as possible.
r.rhe column in the Shenandoah valley having been re-enforced to the extent
of supplying the losses in the New Market campaign, with baggage a,nd transportation reduced to the minimum allowan<?e, cut loose fro~ its communications,
and began its advance up the valley on the 26th of May. The force was about
eight thousand five hundred men of all arms, with twenty-one guns. The plan
of action proposed was, to fight and overthrow any enemy that stood in the way,
to seize upon Staunton, unite with Crook and Averell, and with the combined
force occupy Charlottesville, from whence we might easily operate with our cavalry against the James River canal, and by crossing the river cut off the South
Side railroad, thus cutting off the enemy from his chief source of supplies. rrhe
more extended plan of moving on Lynchburg by the valley route from Staunton,
or through the Piedmont counties of Nelson and Amherst, directly from Charlottesville, was discussed, but left for consideration after the first part of the
programme should be accomplished.
The occupation of Harrisonburg, the flank movement on Port Republic, the
brilliant and decisive victory at Piedmont, and the junction with the forces under
Crook and Averell, at Staunton, have all been described in a former report
rrhe result of the battle at Piedmont was the virtual annihilation of the enemy's
military power in West Virginia and the valley of the Shenandoah. All the
country west of the Blue Riege was at our mercy. As this country was the
source from which the enemy drew his principal supplies of meat, grain, forage,
salt, lead, and iron, we were well aware that its possession was essential to the
maintenance of his army, and that he would make the most desperate efforts to
regain it. He could not hope to do so without detaching a considerable force
from Lee's army, and to induce General Lee thus to weaken his army was one
of our principal objects in the movement. The following letter found on the
body of General William E. ,Jones, killed at Piedmont, indicates the views and
expectations of the enemy:
'' HEADQUAR~RS VALLEY DISTRICT, June 1, 1864.
"GE:\TERAL: This will be handed to you by General Meam;, of Shenandoah,
who goes to meet you at my request, and will state to you fully the condition
of affairs in the valley. I am holding out every inducement I can to Hunter to
follow me up as far as Mount Crawford. If he does, and we can get him 'on
a run,' we can ruin him. He is playing devilish cautions, however, and may
not take the bait.
" Colonel Jackson telegraped me last night that the enemy in Green brier wa~
moving, he believed, in the direction of Staunton. If so, I can, with North
river in my front, bold Hunter till you thrash Orook and Averell, and then we
can pay our respects jointly to l\1r. Hunter.
''Yours, respectfully,
"J. D. Il\1BODEN,
" Brigadie,r General.
"Brigadier General WM. E. JoNES,
" Commanding and en 1·oute, Lynchburg, Va."
Another paper contained an appeal from the officer in command at I"ynchburg.
setting forth the value of that place as a centre of communications and a depot
of supplies, and asking for more troops to defend it against a sudden raid of the
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Yankees. 1'his paper had been referred to General Jones by the Richmond
authorities, indicating thereby that the defence of Lynchburg devolved upon him.
Another suggestive paper was a telegram from Jefferson Davis to Jones,
urging him to guard especially against raids into the western portion of North
Carolina, intimating that they were to be dreaded for political as well as military reasons.
These proofs of the fears and weakness of the enemy, together with the
encouraging reports received from the north of General Grant's progress, induced
us to hope that the plan of an extensive and damaging campaign, discussed
at the outset, might now be successfully carried out. It was determined, therefore, to move on Lynchburg by way of Lexington and Buchanan, crossing the
Elue Ridge at the Peaks of Otter. From Lynchburg we cuuld operate against
the South Side and Danville railroads with our cavalry, cutting off the enemy's
only means of supvly, liberating the Union prisoners confined at Danville, and
rendering necessary the speedy evacuation of the rebel capital.
If General Lee was forced to detach a considerable forcl'l to oppose us, and
prevent the execution of these designs, an equally desirable and important object
would be accomplished; the main army of the rebellion would be weakened;
General Grant would be relieved to that extent, while we had always safe lines.
of retreat open to the westward through the passes of the mountains.
In addition to these considerations, the country, we found, afforded abundant
supplies for our troops, whilA the inhabitants were quiet and, in many instances,
even favorable to us. vVe had also assurances that in southwestern Virginia
and North Carolina we might hope for active assistance from the inhabitants.
Our progress, too, revealed a much larger amount of provisions and manufactories for producing material of war than we had expected, and the destruction
of this kind of property was immense.
Having sent back a convoy of prisoners, negroes, and refugees, with an
empty wagon train and a strong escort of men whose terms of service had
nearly expired, the army of ·west Virginia started southward from Staunton on
the lOth of June, moving up the valley by four parallel roads. On the 11th
we occupied Lexington, and there were overtaken by a supply train sent from
Martinsburg, containing commissary sto,.cs, clothing, and ammunition-this
latter being most essential, as our supply was short. Although these supplies
were most acceptable, this train, two hundred additional wagons, embarrassed
our movements considerably.
"While it was important that we should have moved from Lexington without
delay, we were detained, awaiting the arrival of General Duffie's eolumn of
cavalry, which marched on the road next to the Blue Ridge, and who did not
report until the 13th, in the afternoon. He had crossed the bridge at Tye river
Gap, struck the Charlottesville and Lynchburg railroad near Amherst Court
House, destroyed it to some extent, making considerable captures of men,
horses, and material. He was confused and detained by the difficult and intricate character of the country.
Upon examining these prisoners I was informed that Grant had received a
severe repulse; that Sheridan, who was moving to co-operate with us at the
head of the cavalry of the army of the Potomac, had been repulsed at Louisa
Court House and turned back ; that Breckinridge had re-enforced Vaughn at
Rockfish Gap with four or five thousand men, and that Ewell's whole corps was
advancing by the way of Charlottesville.
On the other hand we had news, from sources equally entitled to credit, that
Lynchburg was undefended, and that its inhabitants were fleeing in panic from
SheTidan's advance. Cut off from all reliable sources of information, the country filled with exaggerated and contrauictory rumors, it was determined to solve
the problem by a bold and decisive advance on Lynchburg.
1'he details of this movement through Buchanan, Peaks of Otter, and Liberty,
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the action at Quaker Church, and the handsome repulse uf the enemy's attack
in front of Lynchburg, have already been described in your official Teport. In
the last named action, which took place about the middle of the day on the 18th
of June, we took several prisoneTs belonging to Ewell's corps. '.rhe statement
of these men convinced us beyond a doubt that the army of the Potomac had
suffered a temporaTy check before Petersburg; that Sheridan had been foiled
in his attempt to open communication with us; and that General Lee had been
enabled to detach a large force of veteran troops, under Lieutenant General
Early, to operate against us ; that a portion of this force was engaged in the
battle then going on, and the remaining divisions were coming in rapidly, by
rail, from Charlottesville.
It was now evident that the army of "'\Vest Virginia was in a critical position.
Two hundred and fifty miles from its base, with ammunition nearly exhausted and commissariat entirely so, with little more than sixteen thousand
effective men, it was now actually engaged with a largely superior force-a
force which in the course of the afternoon would be swelled to over thirty thousand men. The greatest apprehension was felt, lest the enemy would renew
his attack in the course of the afternoon, as our ammunition was so nearly
spent that such an attack must have proved fatal. He had been so roughly
handled, however, that he determined to wait until the following morning, when,
with his whole force rested and refreshed, he could fall upon us more effectively.
'.rhat night our army, with its trains and material, was quietly withdrawn,
retiring by the Bedford turnpike, through Liberty and Buford's Gap to Salem,
on the Virginia and '.rennessee railroad. This retrograde from our hazardous
position was accomplished without loss and with but little annoyance from the
enemy. From Liberty to Salem, our route lay along the line of the railroad,
which we destroyed as we moved, arriving at Salem about sunrise on the morning of the 21st of June. After a short halt, we took the road across the mountains to the Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs, via New Castle and Sweet
Springs, arriving at the White Sulphur Oll the afternoon of the 24th.
This move into the mountains was necessary to disembarrass ourselves of the
enemy's cavalry, which had overtaken and followed us from Liberty, hanging
upon our rear and harassing our flanks, without doing us much actual damage,
however. After we entered the mountains, they disappeared entirely, and we
found ourselves at the White Sulphur with no enemy to contend with, except
the natural difficulties of the country and the scarcity of provisions.
The result of the campaign, thus far, had been eminently satisfactory; and
everything that had. been ordered or expected had been thoroughly accomplished, with but comparatively little loss.
About fifty miles of the Virginia Central railroad had been effectually destroyed; the Virginia and Tennessee road had been destroyed to 10ome extent
for the same distance ; an incredible amount of public property had been burned,
including canal-boats and railroad trains loaded with ordnance and commissary
stores, numerous extensive iron works, manufactories of saltpetre, musket
stocks, shoes, saddles, and artillery harness, woollen cloths and grain mills ;
about three thousand muskets and twenty pieces of cannon, with quantities of
shells and gunpowder, felJ into our hands, while immense quantities of provisions, cattle and horses were captured and used by the ariny. We had beaten
the enemy in every engagement, killing and wounding about two thousand of
his men, including officers of high rank, and capturing over two thousand prisoners. We had, by a movement of unparalleled audacity, menaced the vitals
of the rebellion and forced the leaders at Richmond to detach a formidable
corps for their defence and security.
The vast importance of this diversion, as proved by subsequent events, will
be satisfactorily established presently.
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These great results had been accomplished with but little loss of men or material on our part. About fifteen hundred men, killed, wounded and missing,
and eight guns disabled by a stealthy attack, while they were on the march, and
inadvertently left unguarded.
Considering its orders successfully carried out, the question now was to re·
turn the army of West Virginia to its base by the speediest route and in the
best condition for further active operations. At the council held at the White
Sulphur on the morning of June 25 three routes were proposed: one by the
Warm Springs valley, by a road running parallel with the valley of the Shenandoah. It was foreseen that Early would, in all probability, make a counter
raid against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, overthrow General Sigel's force
and do much mischief. It was urged that by marching down the parallel valley, via Warm Springs, }-,ranklin and Moorfield, we might arrive in time to
form a junction with Sigel, and prevent the anticipated raid. By way of objection to this route, it was argued that the distance to be marched was two
hundred and fifty miles, by bad roads, and through a region sparsely populated
and much wasted by war; the enemy having the advantage of shorter Jines,
better roads, aod a considerable use of railroads, could throw his force
ahead of us, block up our route by felled timber, attack us in flank through the
gaps in the mountains, and thus drive us still deeper into the rugged and inhospitable regions of the Alleghanies. The army, already fatigued with long
marches and suffering from irregular and limited supplies, must necessarily become more disorganized at every move-while the deficiency of ammunition
made it essential that we should avoid every possibility of a serious collision
with the enemy. These arguments were accepted as conclusive against the
proposed route. The acknowledged impossibility of obtaining supplies and the
long march were equally conclusive against the Beverley route. The route by
Kanawha offered an open and safe road; a million of rations within three duys' ·
march; a shorter march to Charleston, from whence, by steamboats and railways,
the troops could be transported to any point on our line where they might be
needed. It was shown that these advantages, the time required to reach the
desired point would be less, and that the troops would arrive well fed and
rested, instead of being worn out and exhausted, as they must be at the end of
a long march through an impoverished country.
The Kanawha route was adopted and the troops mo-ved, arriving at Charleston from the 30th of June to the 4th of July. On the afternoon of the 4th
the commanding general and staff arrived at Parkersburg, on the Ohio river,
and there were met with the information that Early had driven Sigel out of
Martinsburg, and occupied the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in strong
force. This intelligence was followed by an urgent request from the Secretary
of vVar to hurry the troops forward.
All the necessary steps had been already taken to expedite their movement
from Charleston, and whatever failure there may have been on the score of
promptness was owing to the low stnge of water in tl~e river. The continuance
of this unprecedented drought, produced results against which human foresight
could not have provided, and to overcome which human exertion was powerless.
The lightest draught boats used on the river and calculated to run at all seasons
continually grounded, and the troops we~e obliged to land and march round the
bars. This unfortunate circumstance so impeded !he movements that, in the
aggregate, four or five days were lost. All the resources of the railroad were
used to forward the troops arriving by the boats, and trains were running day
and night. On the evening of July 14 the general and staff arrived at Harper's 1!-,erry.
Early meanwhile had crossed into 1\faryland, fought the battle of Monocacy,
and while menacing Baltimore and Washington with his light cavalry, had retired into Virginia by way of Conrad's and Edwards's ferrries. Our ad nmced in
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fantry, a weak division under Sullivan, and some cavalry under Duffie, had
already been sent to harass the enemy's flank, as he moved across Loudon
county. Generals Crook and Averell, with a portion of their commands, were
in Martinsburg. General Wright with the 6th corps, and General Emory with
the 19th corps, were understood to be following the enemy, and moving in the
direction of Leesburg.
On the 15th, by telegram from Major General Halleck, the troops of the West
Virginia army were placed under the command of 1\Iajor General Wright, then
at Poolsville. By this order General Hunter, although still in command of the
department, was left without troops. Under this impression he wrote to President Lincoln, asking respectfully, but perc~mptorily, to be relieved of command.
The President replied, explaining that the order transferring the West Virginia
troops to the command of General Wright wai3 only intended to be temporary
in its effect, and to apply while those troops were necessarily serving outside
the department commanded by General Hunter. He concluded by a very
pressing and flattering request that he should retain his position. 1'his request was accepted by General Huntel' as a command.
Instead of retiring by way of Gordonsville, as was expected, Early moved
westward, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap, took position on the
turnpike road leading from Snicker's ferry to Winchester, his main body lying
around Berryville. General Wright followed him as far as the gap. On the 18th,
General Crook, then commanding the West Virginia troops, pushed across the
Shenandoah, and after a sharp action with the rebel Gordon's division, was driven
back with a loss of four hundred men-the enemy losing six hun.Jred. While
the sound of cannon indicated an engagement in the vicinity of Snicker's ferry,
Colonel Hays was ordered to move his brigade from Halltown by a road on the
west side of the Shenandoah and strike the enemy in flank.
Averell was ordered to move from Martinsburg upon Winchester. On the
20th Colonel Hays reported that his advance had been disputed by a strong
body of the enemy, and that, after a prolonged skirmish, he had fallen back to
Keys's ferry, being short of ammunition
General Averell with his cavalry and Duvall's infantry, in all twenty-three
hundred strong, attacked and routed a greatly superior force of the enemy near
Winchester, putting five hundred men !tors de combat and capturing four
guns. About this time Early retired from Berryville towards Front Royal and
Strasburg, and General Wright, with the 6th and 19th corps, returned to Washington. In the military movements since his arrival at Harper's Ferry General
Hunter had no control or rPsponsibility, except in ordering the minor co-operative moves under Hays and Averell.
Our information in regard to Early was, that he was strong and confident,
apparently ready for battle when we might seek it, but coolly awaiting his opportunity. His position in the valley of the Shenandoah was maintained for
the purpose of protecting the harvest in the fertile region which he covered, and
for the still more important object of preventing another advance on Lynchburg. His presence was also a continual menace to Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and the federal capital, and was thus calculated to create a diversion in favor of
Lee at Richmond. That the enemy would fail to use his advantageous position
to the utmost could hardly be supposed; the withdrawal of General Wright's
forces without a decisive action was therefore regretted as premature.
General Crook reported that the enemy's retreat from .Berryville was apparently in compliance with orders from rebel headquarters, anu evidently not
from weakness or the desire to avoid battle. A rumor of the fall of Atlanta
seemed to give color to the former idea. On the 23d f July a telegram from
the President was received, asking, if, "since the departure of General Wright,
General ·Hunter had force enough to hold the fmemy, should he return upon us 1"
It was answered that if the enemy should return in full force, we had not troops
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enough to hold him; but our best information indicated that he was falling back
under orders, and that Averell's cavalry had reconnoitred as far south as Strasburg
without discovering any force.
A telegram from General Halleck indicated General Grant's views in regard
to the valley. He desired that the line of the Potomac should be held with a view
to the protection of Washington, in case of necessity. The line of the Manassas Gap railroad and Cedar creek was suggested; it was considered more
judicious to establish a line nearer the base of supplies, and that of Aldie,
Snicker's Gap. Berryville, and Winchester was decided upon. It was the decided opinion of officers who had had experience in the valley of the Shenandoah, and were well acquainted with its topography, that there was no line of
defence which could be advantageously maintained against an army marching
from the south, and that the idea of holding it by fortified posts was equally
futile; they were liable to be penetrated and evaded with but little risk, even by
an inferior enemy, and liable to be cut off, isolated, and entrapped by a superior
force. 1'he difficulty of maintaining communications was almost insurmountable.
It was urged that the only mode of holding the line of the Potomac and the
valley of the Shenandoah securely, was to confront the enemy with a predominating force, and drive him out or destroy him.
,
In obedience to orders, General Crook (now major general by brevet) took
command of the forces in the field, and occupied Winchester with fourteen thousand men. On Sunday, 24th, General Early suddenly returned in heavy force,
and falling upon Crook, near Kernstown, defeated him, putting about a thousand
men kors de combat. General Crook fell back behind the Potomac, saving all
his guns and material.
On the 27th his command moved down on the Maryland side of the Potomac,
and took position in Pleasant valley, nearly opposite Harper's Ferry; Averell
reported the enemy crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, destroying the railroad and canal, and menacing both Cumberland and Chambersburg; General
Wright at Monocacy, with the 6th corps, and General Emory coming up with
the 19th.
On the 28th and 29th thew hole force crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry,
and took position in Halltown and vicinity. The combined force amounted to
about thirty thousand men, and along eighty or ninety guns. It was reported
that the enemy was crossing with all arms at vVilliamsport, and driving Averell
back on Chambersburg. ·'l'his was believed to be only a cavalry force, and
Early was supposed to be lying along the turnpike, between Martinsburg and
Winchester; his main force at Bunker Hill. It was proposed to attack him
between Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus cutting his army in two.
On Saturday, July 30, it was intensely hot; the trains of the 6th corps still
passing through towards Halltown. About mid-day we received news from
·washington that the enemy had entered Chambersburg, and that the remaining
divisions of the 19th corps were en route to re-enforce us. Immediately afterwards on1ers were issued directing the whole force to fall back to Middletown
valley, in Maryland; these orders, I understood, came from Washington. A
retrograde movement was immediately commenced, and by the following day the
whole army was in Maryland, with headquarters in Frederick city, leaving,
however, a strong garrison at Harper's Ferry, under the command of General
Howe. I have never been able to understand the motive of this movement, and
have always considered it a most unfortunate one. The position of our troops
at Halltown and Bolivar Heights was unassailable by such a force as Early
commanded. It was most convenient for active operations against the enemy in
any direction, and was believed to impose an effectual check on any movement
of his main body toward the invasion of Maryland or toward Washington by
way of Snicker's ferry, as was apprehended in some quarters. An attempt on
his part to move in either direction would have exposed his flank and rear to
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advantageous attack by our superior force, and have left his communications
entirely at our mercy. Our retrograde movement left the whole country open
to him.
August 1 we received information that McCausland had entered Chambersburg at the head of two thousand cavalry, and after burning and sacking the
town, moved westward, followed by Averell, with inferior force. Duffie was
ordered to unite with Averell in the pursuit.
August 2 information was received by telegraph from \iVasbington that a
heavy column of the enemy was moving on that city, via Rockville. Marching
orders were promptly issued, and subsequently countermanded, when it was
ascertained that the alarm had originated from the appearance of a squad of
United States cavalry scouting near Rockville. Headquarters were moved to
the 'Thomas Farm, on the east side of the Monocacy. News received that General Kelly had handsomely repulsed McCausland's attack on Cumberland;
Early's main body still lying between Martinsburg and Winchester; small
foraging parties of rebels crossing occasionally at Antietam ford, Shepherdstown,
and vVilliamsport.
August 4 General Howe telegraphs that the enemy are menacing Harper's
Ferry; General Emory, with the 19th corps, ten thousand strong, was sent
there during the night.
August 5, in the afternoon, General Grant in person visited headquarters,
and had n conference with General Hunter. It was understood that General
Phil. Sheridan was to be assigned to tho command of the troops in the departments of Washington, Susquehanna and West Virginia, and an official order to
that effect was promulgated a few days after. r:l'he troops were immediately
returned to their positions at Bolivar Heights and Halltown.
On the last day of August General Hunter, at his own oft-repeated request,
was officially relieved of command in West Virginia. At the same time, worn
out with fatigue and exposure, I resigned my commission in the volunteer service, and about the first of Septem her received an honorable discharge from the
department commander.
I have thus given a brief sketch of military movements and event:5 participated in by the army of West Virginia while under your command, from the
:21st day of May, 1864, to the 9th of August. I have always considered the
movement on Lynchburg as one of the boldest and best-conducted campaigns
of the war; that the motives which dictated it fully justified the hazard incurred,
and that the results obtained by very inadequate forces have been fully acknowledged by those who best understood their real value. Lieutenant General Grant handsomely acknowledges that "all bad been accomplished that was
possible under the circumstances, and more than could have been hoped for."
.Jefferson Davis, in his speech to the people of Georgia, after the fall of Atlanta,
informs them that "an audacious movement of the enemy up to the very walls
of Lynchburg had rendered it necessary that the government should send a
formidable body of troops to cover that vital point, which had otherwise been
intended for the relief of Atlanta." The vital importance of Lynch burg as a
reserve depot and proposed place of retreat, in case of the abandonment of
Richmond, was fully appreciated by the rebel authorities; by the United States
it was either not fully understood, or the approach deemed too hazardous.
When the enemy saw, therefore, their fatal weakness was dis~:tovered and the
approaches already reconnoitred, be was obliged to despatch a force to protect it
at all hazards; nearly one-third of the flower of Lee's army, under Early, was
detached for this purpose. Thus the great result was accomplished. Atlanta,
unrelieved, fell before the conquering arms of Sherman.. Lee's army, thus enfeebled, remained imprisoned in Richmond, and was never afterwards able to
hazard an active demonstration. Early's presence in the valley of the Shenandoah convinced the government of the United States of the only effectual
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policy to be pursued in that quarter.
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He was confronted by a superior army,

attacked. ane1 annibilated. The ~:>u.b~:>ectu.ent movement~:> of Gen~rah Grant and.
Sherman brought the war to a full and fortunate conclusion. While rejoicing in
the honors accorded to those great soldiers, whose fortune it has been to gather
in the glorious harvest, I still feel it my duty to claim a modest wreath for that
gallant army of West Virginia, which, through so much toil, danger and suffer·
ing, assisted in preparing the field for the reapers.
I am, general, with high respect, your obedient servant,
DAVID H. STROTHER,
Late Colonel of Volunteer Cavalry and Clz,ief of Staff.
Major General DAVID HuNTRR.
Official copy:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, No,v~mbe1· 18, 1865.

Report of Major Geneml B. F. Butler if operations against Fort Fislzer, 1864.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND N. CAROLINA,
Army if the James, in tlze field, January 3, 1865.
GENERAL: On the 7th of December last, in obedience to your orders, I moved
a force of about sixty-five hundred efficient men. consisting of General Ames's
division of the 24th corps, and General Paine's division of the 25th corps,
under command of Major General Weitzel, to an encampment near· Bermuda.
On the 8th the troops embarked for Fortress Monroe.
On the 9th, Friday, I reported to Rear-Admiral Porter that the army portion
of the conjoint expedition directed against Wilmington was ready to proceed.
We waited there Saturday the lOth, Sunday the 11th, and Monday the 12th.
On the 12th Rear-Admiral Porter informed me that the naval fleet would sail
on the 13th, but would be obliged to put into Beaufort to take on board ammunition for the monitors.
The expedition having become the subject of remark, fearing lest its destination should get to the enemy, in order to iHvert from it all attention, on the
morning of T\wsday the 13th, at 3 o'clock, I ordered the transport fleet to proceed up the Potomac during the day to Matthias Point, so as to be plainly visible to the scouts and signal men of the enemy on the northern neck, and to
retrace their course at night and anchor under the lee of Cape Charles.
Having given the navy thirty-six hours start, at 12 o'clock noon of the 14th,
"\Vednesday, I joined the transport fleet off Cape Henry, and put to sea, arriving at the place of rendezvous off New inlet, near :E'ort Fisher, on the evening
of the 15th, rnmrsday.
We there waited for the navy Friday the 16th, Saturday the 17th, and
Sunday the 18th, during which days we had the finest possible weather and
the smoothest sea.
On the evening of the 18th Admiral Porter came from Beaufort to the place
of rendezvous. rrhat evening the sea became rough, and on Monday, the 19th,
the wind Eprang up freshly, so that it was impossible to land, troops ; and by
the advice of Admiral Porter, communicated to me by letter, I directed the
transport fleet to rendezvous at Beaufort. This was a matter of necessity, because the transport fleet, being coaled and watered for ten days, had already
waited that time, to wit : from the 9th, the day on which we were ready to sail,
to the 19th.
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On the 20th, Tuesday; 21st, Wednesday; 22d, Thursday; and 23d, Friday,
it blew a gale. I was occupied in coaling and watering the transport fleet at
Beaufort.
The Baltic, having a large supply of coal, was enabled to remain at the place
-of rendezvous, with a brigade on board of twelve hundred men, and General
Ames reported to Admiral Porter that he would co-operate with him.
On the 23d I Rent Captain Clarke, of my staff, from Beaufort, on the fast-sailing armed steamer Chamberlain, to Admiral Porter to inform him that on the
evening of the 24th I would again be at the rendezvous with the transport fleet,
for the purpose of commencing the attack, the weather permitting.
At four o'clock on the evening of the 24th I came in sight of Fort Fisher,
and found the naval fleet engaged in bombarding it, the powder-vessel having
been exploded on the morning previous about one o'clock.
1'hrough General Weitzel I arranged with Admiral Porter to commence the
landing under the cover of the gunboats as early as eight o'clock the next
morning, if possible, as soon as the fire of the Half-Moon and Flag-pond Hill batteries had been silenced. These are up the shore some two or three miles
above Fort Fisher.
Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort
1!--,isher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the fort into Cape ]'ear
river, and then the troops could land and hold the beach without liability of
being shelled by the enemy's gunboats, (the '1_1allahassee being ·seen in the
·r iver.)
It is to be remarked that .Admiral Farragut, even, bad never taken a fort
except by running by and cutting it off from all pro:Spect of re-enforcements, as
at Fort Jackson and ]Tort Morgan, and that no case mated fort had been silenced
by naval fire during the war. 1'hat if the admiral would put his ship~ in
the river the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to
do Farragut at :Fort St. Philip. That at least the blockade of Wilmington
would be thus effectual, even if we did not capture the fort. To that the admiral replied that he should probably lose a boat by torpedoes if he attempted
to run by.
He was reminded that the army might lose five hundred men by the assault,
and that his boat would not weigh in the balance, even in a money point of view,
for a moment, with the lives of the men. The admiral declined going by, and
the expedition was deprived of that essential element of success.
At 12 o'clock noon of the 25th, Sunday, Captain Glisson, commanding the
covering divisions of the fleet, reported the batteries silenced and his vessels in
position to cover our landing.
The transport fleet, following my flag-ship, stood in within eight hundred
yards of the beach, and at once commenced debarking. The landing was successfully effected. Finding that the reconnoitring party just landed could hold
the shore, I determined to land a force with which an assault might be
attempted.
Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, who deserves well for his gallantry and
conduct, immediately pushed up his brigade within a few hundred yards of Fort
Fisher, capturing the Half-.M:oon battery and its men, who were taken off by
the boats of the navy.
This skirmish line advanced to within seventy-five yards of the fort, protected by the glacis which had been thrown up in such form as to give cover,
the garrison being completely kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy,
which was very rapid and continuous, their shells bursting over the work with
very considerable accuracy. At this time we lost ten men wounded on the
,skirmish line by the shells from the fleet.
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Quitting my flag-ship I went on board the Chamberlain and ran in within a
few hundred yards of the fort, so that it was plainly visible.
It appeared to be a square bastioned wOTk of very hig·h relief, say fifteen feet,
surrounded by a wet ditch some fifteen feet -..vide. I was protected from being
enveloped by an assaulting force by a stockade which extended from the fort
to the sea on the one side, and from the marshes of Cape Fear river to the
salient on the other.
No material damage to the f~rt as a defensive work had been done.
Seventeen heavy guns bore up the beach, protected from the fire of the navy
by traverses eight or ten feet high, which were undoubtedly bomb-proof shelters
for the garrison.
With the garrison kept within their bomb-proofs it was easy to maintl'l.in this
position; but the shells of the navy, which kept the enemy in their bombproofs, would keep my troops out. When those ceaeed falling the parapet was
fully manned.
Lieutenant Walling, of the one hundred and forty-second New York,
pressed up to the edge of the ditch and captured a flag which had been cut
down by a shell from the navy. It is a mistake, as was at first reported to me,
that any soldier entered the fort. An orderly was killed about a third of a mile
from the fort and his horse taken.
In the mean time the remainder of Ames's division had captured two hundred
.and eighteen men and ten commissioned officers of the North Carolina reserves
and other prisoners. From them I learned that Kirkland's and Hagood's
brigades of Hoke's division had left the front of the army of the James, near
Rithmond, and were then within two miles of the rear of my forces, and their
skirmishers were then actually engaged, and that the remainder of Hoke's
division had come the night before to Wilmington, and were then on the maTch.
if they had not already arrived.
I learned, also, that these troops had left Richmond on Tuesday, the 20th.
Knowing the strength of Hoke's division, I found a force opposed to me
outside of the works larger than my own.
In the mean time the weather assumed a threatening aspect. The surf began
to roll in so that the landing became difficult. At this time General Weitzel
reported to me that to assault the work, in his judgment, and in that of the experienced officers of his command who had been on the skirmish line, with any
prospect of success, was impossible.
rrhis opinion coincided with my own, and much as I regretted the necessity
of abandoning the attempt, yet the path of duty was plain. Not so strong a work
as Fort Fisher had been taken by assault during the war, and I had to guide me
the experience of Port Hudson, with its slaughtered thousands in the repulsed
assault, and the double assault of :E'ort Wagner, where thousands were sacrificed
in an attempt to take a work less strong than Fisher, after it had been subjected to a more continued and fully as severe fire. And in neither of the instances I have mentioned had the assaulting force in its rear, as I had, an army
of the enemy larger than itself.
I therefore ordered that no assault should be made, and that the troops should
re-embark.
While superintending the preparations for this the fire of the navy ceased.
Instantly the guns of the fort were fully manned, and a sharp fire of musketry,
grape and canister swept the plain over which the column must have advanced,
and the skirmish line was returning.
Working with what diligence we could, it was imposRible to get the troops
again on board before the sea ran so high as to render further re-embarcation,
or even the sending of supplies ashore, impossible. I lay by the shore until
€!even o'clock the next day, Monday, the 26th, when having made all proper
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dispositions for getting the troops on board, I gave orders to the transport fleet,
as fast as they were ready, to sail for Fortress l\'Ionroe, in obedience to my instructions hom the Lieutenant General.
I learned from deserters and prisoners captured, that the supposition upon
which the Lieutenant General directed the expedition, that vVilmington had been
denuded of troops to oppose General Sherman, was correct. ':l'hat at the time
when the army arrived off Wilmington, there were less than four hundred rrien
in the garrison of Fort Fisher, and less than a thousand within twenty miles.
But the delay of three clays of good weather, the 16th, 17th and 18th, waiting for the arrival of the navy, and the further delay from the terrible storm of
the 21st, 22d and 23cl, gave time for troops to be brought from Richmond, three
divisions of which were either there or on the road.
The instructions of the Lieutenant General to me did not contemplate a siege;
I had neither siege trains nor supplies for such a contingency.
r:rhe exigency of possible delay, for which the foresight of the commander of
the armies had provided, had arisen, to wit : the larger re-enforcement of the
garrison. ·T his, together with the fact that the navy had exhausted their supply of ammunition in the bombardment, left me with no alternative but to return with my troops to the army of the James.
'l_1he loss of the opportunity of Friday, Saturday and Sunday, the 16th, 17th
and 18th, was the immediate cause of the failure of the expedition.
It is not my province even to suggest blame to the navy for their delay of
four clays at Beaufort. I know none of the reasons which do or do not justify
it. It is to be presumed they are sufficient.
I am happy to bring to the attention of the Lieutenant General the excellent
behavior of the troops, both officers and men, which was all that could be desired.
I am under special obligations to Captain Glisson, of the Santiago de Cuba,
· for the able and efficient manner in which he covered our landing ; to Captain
Alden, of the Brooklyn, for his prompt assistance and the excellent gunnery
with which the Brooklyn cleared the shores of all opposers at the moment of
debarcation. Lieutenant . Farquhar, of the navy, having in charge the navy
boats which assisted in th n landing, deserves great credit for the energy and
skill with which he rnanag(·:l the boats through the rolling surf. Especial commendation is clue to Brigad i ~ r General Graham and the officers and men of his
naval brigade, for the organization of his boats and crews for landing, and the
untiring energy and industry with which they all labored in re-embarking the
troops during· the stormy night of the 25th and the days following. For this
and other meritorious services during the campaign since the first of May, which
have heretofore been brought to the notice of the Lieutenant General in my official reports, I would respectfully but earnestly recommend General Graham for
promotion.
The number of prisoners captured by us was three hund1ecl, including twelve
officers, two heavy rifled guM, two light guns, and six caissons.
The loss of the army was one man drowned, two men killed, one officer cap·
tured, who accidentally wandered through our picket's, and ten men wounded
while upon the picket line by the shells of the navy.
Always chary of mentioning with commendation the acts of my own personal
staff, yet I think the troops who saw it will agree to the cool courage and daring
of Lieutenant Sidney B. DeKay, aide-de-camp, in landing on the night of the
25th, and remaining aiding in re-embarcation on the 27th.
For the details of the landing and the operations, I beg leave to refer you to
the rer;orts of Major General Weitzel, commanding the division landed, which
are hereto appended.
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Trusting my action will meet with the approval of the Lieutenant General, this
report is respectfully submitted.
BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,

S. GRANT,
Armies if the United

Major General

Lieutenant General U.

Commanding

States.

Official copy:
E. D. TOWNSEND,

Asslstant Ad:Jutant General.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'R OFFICE, November 18, 1865.

Major General A. H. Terry's report

if the

capture

if

Fort Fisher.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FoRcEs oN FEDERAL PoiNT, N.C.,
January 25, 1865.
GE~ERAL: I have the honor to submit the following detailed report of the
operations which resulted in the capture of l!,ort Fisher and the occupation of
Fort Caswell, and the other works at the mouth of the Cape Fear river.
On the 2d instant I received from the Lieutenant General, in person, orders to
take command of the troops destined for the movement. '.rhey were 3,300
picked men from the second division of the 24th army corps, under Brigadier
General (now Brevet Major General) Adelbert Ames, the same number from
the third division of the 25th army corps, under command of Brigadier General
Charles J. Paine, 1,400 men from the second brigade of the first division of
of the 24th army corps, under Colonel (now Brevet Brigadier General) J. C.
Abbott, 7th New Hampshire volunteers, the 16th New York independent battery,
wjth four 3-inch guns, and light battery E, 3d United States artillery, with six
light 12-pounder guns. I was instructed to move them from their positions in
the lines on the north side of the James river to Bermuda landing, in time to
commence their embarcation on transport vessels at sunnse on the 4th instant.
In obedience to these orders, the movement commenced at noon of the 3d instant. 'rhe troops arrived at the landing at sunset, and there bivouacked for
the night.
'rhe transports did not arrive as soon as they were expected. 'I'he first of
them made its appearance late in the afternoon of the 4th. One of them, the
Atlantic, was of too heavy draught to come up the James; Curtis's brigade of
Ames's division was therefore placed on river steamboats and sent down the
river to be transferred to her.
The embarcation of the remainder of the force commenced at sunset of the
4th, and was completed at noon of the 5th instant; each vessel, as soon as it
was loaded, was sent to Fortress Monroe, and at 9 o'clock p. m. of the 5th the
whole fleet was collected in Hampton roads. The troops were all in heavy
marching order, with four days' rations from the morning of the 4th in their
haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes. No horses, wagons
or ambulances were taken ; the caissons of the artillery we1e left behind, but in addition to the ammunition in the limber chests, 150 rounds per gun, in packingboxes, were embarked.
I went down the river personally with the Lieutenant General, and on the
way received from him additional instructions, and the information that orders
had been given for the embarcation of a siege train, to consist of twenty 30pounder Parrott guns, four 100-pounder Parrotts, and twenty coehorn mortars,
80 w
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with a detail of artillerists and a company of engineers, so that in case siege operations should become necessary the men and material for it might be at band.
These troops, under the command of Brevet Brigadier General H. L. Abbott,
were to follow me to Beaufort, North Carolina, and await orders. It was not
until this time that I was informed that .l!.,ort Fisher was the point against which
we were to operate.
During the evening of the 5th orders were given for the transports to proceed
to sea at 4 o'clock the next morning, and accompanying these orders were sealed
letters, to be opened when off Cape Henry, directing them to rendezvous, in case
of separation from the flag-ship, at a point twenty-five miles off Beaufort, North
Carolina.
'rhe vessels sailed at the appointed hour. During the 6th instant a severe
storm arose which so much impeded our progress that it was not until the morning of the 8th that my own vessel arrived at the rendezvous ; all the others, excepting the flag-ship of General Paine, were still behind.. Leaving Brigadier
General Paine to assemble the other vessels as they should arrive, I went into
Beaufort harbor to communicate with Rear-Admiral Porter, commanding the
North Atlantic blockading squadron, with whose fleet the forces under my command were destined to co-operate.
During the 8th nearly all of the vessels arrived at the renilezvous ; some of
them required repairs to their hulls, damaged by the gale, some repairs to their
machin ery, others needed coal or water. These vessels were brought into the
harbor or to the outer anchorage, where their wants were supplied; all the
others remained, until t.he final sailing of the expedition, from hventy to twentyfive miles off the land. The weather continued so unfavorable as to afford no
prospect that we would be able to make a landing on the open beach of Federal
Point until Wednesday, the 11th. On that day Admiral Porter proposed to
start, but at high water there was still so much surf on the bar that the ironclads and other vessels of heavy draught could not be gotten over it ; our departure ~as therefore delayed till the next day.
On the morning tide of the 12th the vessels in the harbor passed out, and the
whole fleet of naval vessels and transports got under way for this place. As
we were leaving, the vessels containing General Abbott's command came in ,
sight. Orders were sent to them to follow us.
We did not arrive off Federal Point until nearly nightfall; consequently,
and in accordance with the decision of the admiral, the disembarcation of the
troops wa::< not commenced until the next morning. Our subsequent experience
fully justified the delay; it would have been extremely difficult to land the men
at night.
At 4 o'clock a.m. of the 13th, the in-shore division of naval vessels stood in
clo~e to the beach to cover the landing. The transports followed them and took
positions as nearly as possible in a line parallel to and about two hundred yards
outside of them. 'The iron-clads moved down to within range of the fort and
opened fire upon it. Another division was placed to the northward of the
landing place, so as to protect our men from any attack fi·om the direction of
Masonboro, inlet. At 8 o'clock nearly 200 boats, beside steam-tugs, were sent
from tbe navy to the transports, and the disembarcation of men, provisions,
tools, and ammunition simultaneously commenced.
At 3 o'clock p. m. nearly 8,000 men, with three days' rations in their haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes, six days' supply of hard
bread in bulk, 300,000 additional rounds of small-arm ammunition, and a sufficient number of intrenching tools had been safely landed. 'l'he surf on the
beach was still quite high, notwithstanding that the weather had become very
pleasant, and owing to it some of the men had their rations and ammunition
ruined by water; with this exception, no accident of any kind occurred.
As soon as the troops had commenced landing pickets were thrown out; they
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immediately encountered outposts of the enemy, and shots were exchanged with
them, but no serious engagement occurred. A few prisoners were taken, from
whom I learned that Hoke's rebel division, which it was supposed had been
sent further south, was still here, and that it was his outposts which we were
meeting.
The first object which I had in view after landing was to throw a strong
defensive line across the peninsula from the Cape Fear river to the sea, facing
Wilmington, so as to protect our rear from attack while we should be engaged
in operating against Fisher. Our maps indicated that a good position for such
a line would be found a short distance above the head of Myrtle sound, which
is a long, shallow piece of water separated from the ocean by a sand-spit of
about one hundred yards in width, and communicates with it by Masonboro' inlet.
It was supposed that the right flank of a line at that point would be protected
by the sound, and, being above its head, that we should by it control the beach
as far up as the inlet, and thus, in case of need, be able to land supplies in quiet
water there. Our landing place was selected with reference to this idea. An
examination made after we landed showed that the sound for a long distance
above its head was so shallow as to offer no obstacle to the passage of troops at
low tide, and as the further down the peninsula we should go the shorter would
be our line across it, it was determined to take up a position where the maps
showed a large pond occupying nearly one-third of the width of the peninsula
at about three miles from the fort. Shortly before 5 o'clock, leaving Abbott's
brigade to cover our stores, the troops were put in motion for the last-named
point. On arriving at it, the "pond" was found to be a sand-flat, sometimes
covered with water, giving no assistance to the defence of a line established
behind it. Nevertheless, it was determined to get a line across at this place, and
Paine's division, followed by two of Ames's brigades, made their way through.
The night was very dark, much of the ground was a marsh, and illy adapted
to the construction of works, and the distance was found to be too great to be
properly defended by the troops which could be spared from the :lirect attack
upon the fort. It was not until 9 o'clock p.m. that Paine succeeded in reaching
the river.
The ground still nearer the fort was then reconnoitred, and found to be much
better adapted to our purposes; accordingly, the troops were withdrawn from
their last position and established on a line about two miles from the work.
'rhey reached this final position at 2 o'clock a. m. of the 14th instant. 'I'ool.s
were immediately brought up and intrenchments were commenced. At 8 o'clock
a good breastwork, reaching from the river to the sea, and partially covered by
abatis, had been constructed, and was in a defensible condition. It was much.
improved afterward, but from this time our foothold on the peninsula was
secured.
Early in the morning of the 14th the landing of the artillery was commenced,
and by sunset all the light guns were gotten on shore. During the following
night they were placed on the line, most of them near the river, where the enemy,
in case he should attack us, would be least exposed to the fire of the gunboats.
Curtis's brigade of Ames's division was moved down toward Fisher during
the morning, and at noon his skirmishers, after capturing on their way a small
steamer which had come down the river with shells and forage for the garrison
of the fort, reached a small unfinished outwork in front of the west end of the
land front of the work.
General Curtis, Lieutenant Colonel (now Brevet Brigadier General) Comstock,
the chief engineer of the expedition, and myself, under the protection of the fire
of the fleet, made a careful reconnaissance of the work, getting within six
hundred yards of it. The report of General Comstock, which, with its accompanying map, is appended hereto, gives a full description of it and its condition
at that time.
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As the result of this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme difficulty
which might be expected in landing supplies and the material for a siege on the
open and often tempestuous beach, it was decided to attempt an assault the next
day, provided that in the mean time the fire of the navy should so far destroy
the palisades as to make one practicable.
This decision was communicated to Admiral Porter, who at once placed a
division of his vessels in a position to accomplish this last-named object. It
was arranged in consultation with him that a heavy bombardment from all the
vessels should commence early in the morning, and continue up to the moment
of the assault, and that even then it should not cease, but should be diverted
from the points of attack to other parts of the work.
It was dP-cided. that the assault should be made at 3 o'clock p.m.; that the
army should attack on the western half of the land face, and that a column of
sailors and marines should assault at the northeast bastion.
The fire of the navy continued during the night. At 8 o'clock a. m. of the
15th, all of the vessels, except a division left to aid in the defence of our northern line, moved into position, and a fire, magnificent alike for its power and
accuracy, was opened.
Ames's division had been selected for the assault. Paine was placed in command of the defensive line, having with him Abbott's brigade in addition to his
own division. Ames's first brigade-Curtis's-was already at the outwork
above mentioned, and in trenches close around it; his other two brigades,
Pennypacker's and Bell's, were moved at noon to within supporting distance of
him. At 2 o'clock preparations for the assault were commenced. Sixty sharpshooters from the 13th Indiana volunteers, armed with the Spencer repeating
carbine, and forty others, volunteers from Curtis 's brigade, the whole under
command of Lieutenant Colonel Zent, of the 13th Indiana, were thrown forward
at a run to within one hundred and seventy-five yards of the work. They were
provided with shovels, and soon dug pits for slu~lter, and commenced firing at
the parapet.
As soon as this movement commenced, the parapet of the fort was manned,
and the enemy's fire, both of musketry and artillery, opened.
As soon as the ,sharpshooters were iu position, Curtis's brigade was moved
forward by regiment at the double-quick into line at about four hundred and
seventy-five yard·s from the work. The men there lay down. This was accomplished under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, from which, however, they
soon sheltered themselves by digging shallow trenches.
When Curtis moved from the outwork, Pen~_lJpacker was brought up to it,
and Bell was brought into lirie two hundred yards in his rear. Finding that a
good cover for Curtis's men could be found on the reverse slope of a crest fifty
yards in the rear of the sharpshooters, they were again moved forward one
regiment at a time, and again covered themselves in trenches. Pennypacker
followed Curtis and occupied the ground vacated by him, and Bell was brought
up to the outwork.
It had been proposed to blow up and cut down the palisades; bags of powder,
with fuzes attached, had been prepared, and a party of volunteer axemen
organized; but the fire of the navy had been so effective during the preceding
night and morning that it was thought unnecessary to use the powder. The
axemen, however, were sent in with the leading brigade, and did good service by
making openings in portions of the palisading which the fire of the navy had
not been able to reach.
At 3.25 p. m. all the preparations were completed, the order to move forward
was given to Ames, and a concerted signal was made to Admiral Porter to
change the direction of his fire.
Curtis's brigade at once sprang from their trenches and dashed forward in
line; its left was exposed to a severe enfilading fire, and it obliqued to the right
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so as to envelop the left of the land front ; the ground over which it moved was
marshy and difficult, but it soon reached the palisades, passed through them,·
and effected a lodgement on the parapet. At the same time the column of
sailors and marines, under Fleet Captain K. R. Breese, advanced up the beach
in the most gallant manner and attacked the northeast bastion; but, exposed
to a murderous fire, they were unable to get up the parapet. After a severe
struggle and a heavy loss of valuable officers and men, it became apparent that
nothing could be effected at that point, and they were withurawn. When Ourtis moved forward, Ames directed Pennypacker to move up to the rear of the
sharpshooters, and brought Bell up to Pennypacker's last position, and as soon
as Curtis got a foothold on the parapet, sent Pennypacker in to his support. He
advanced, overlapping Curtis's right, and drove the enemy from the heavy palisading, which extended from the west end of the land face to the river, capturing a considerable number of prisoners; then pushing forward to their left, the
two brigades together drove the enemy from about one-quarter of the land face.
Ames then brought up Bell's brigade, and moved it between the work and the
river. On this side there was no regular parapet, but there was abundance of
cover afforded to the enemy by cavities from which sand had been taken for
the parapet, the ruins of barracks and storehouses, the large magazine, and by
traverses, behind which they stubbornly resisted our advance. Hand-to-hand
fighting of the most desperate character ensued, the huge traverses of the lai).d
face being used successively by the enemy as breastworks, over the tops of
which the contending parties £red in each other's faces. Nine of these were
carried, one after the other, by our men.
When Bell's brigade was ordered into action I foresaw that more troops would
probably be needed, and sent an order for Abbott's brigade to move down from
the north line, at the same time requesting Captain Breese to replace them with
his sailors and marines. I also directed General Paine to send me one of the
strollgest regiments of his own division ; these troops arrived at dusk and
reported to General Ames. At 6 o'clock Abbott's brigade went into the fort;
the regiment from Paine's division-the 27th United States colored troops,
Brevet Brigadier General A. M. Blackman commanding-was brought up to the
rear of the work, where it remained under fire for some time, and was then
withdrawn. Until 6 o'clock the fire of the navy continued upon that portion
of the work not occupied by us; after that time it was directed on the beach,
to prevent the coming up of re-enforcements, which it was thought might possibly be thrown over from ihe right bank of the river to Battery Buchanan. The
fighting· for the traverses continued till nearly 9 o'clock, two more of them being
carried; then a portion of Abbott's brigade drove the enemy from their last
remaining strongholds, and the occupation of the work was completed.
r:I.'he same brigade, with General Blackman's regiment, was immediately
pushed down the point to Battery Buchanan, whither many of the garrison had
fled. On reaching the battery all of the enemy who had not been previously
captured were made prisoners. At11ong them were Major General Whiting
and Oolon(jl Lamb, the commandant of the fort.
At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon Hoke advanced against our north line,
apparently with the design of attacking it; but if such was his intention, he
abandoned it after a skirmish with our pickets.
During the day Brevet Brigadier General H. L. Abbott, chief of artillery, was
busily engaged in landing artillery and ammunition, so that if the assault failed,
siege op(;lrations might at once be commenced.
Consequent to the fall of ~...,isher, the enemy, during the night of the 16th and
17th, blew up Fort Caswell, and abandoned both it and their very extensive
works on Smith's island, at Smithville and ReeYe's Point, thus placing in our
hands all the works erected to defend the mouth of the Cape Fear river.
In all the works were found 169 pieces of artillery, nearly all of which are
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heavy, over 2,000 stands of small-arms, considerable quantities of commissary
stores, and full supplies of ammunition. Our prisoners numbered 112 commissioned officers and 1,971 enlit~ted men.
I have no words to do justice to the behavior of both officers and men on this
occasion ; all that men could do they did. Better soldiers never fought. Of
General Ames I have already spoken in a letter recommending his promotion.
He commanded all the troops engaged and was constantly under fire. His
great coolness, good judgment, and skill were never more conspicuous than in
this assault. Brigadier General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker, B ell, and
.Abbott, the brigade commanders, led them with the utmost gallantry. Curtis
was wounded after fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand; Pennypacker, while
carrying the standard of one of his regiments, the first man in a charge over a
traverse. Bell was mortally wounded near the palisades.
Brigadier General Paine deserves high praise for the zeal and energy displayed by him in constructing our defensive line, a work absolutely essential to
our success.
Brevet Brigadier General Blackman deserves mention for the prompt manner
in which he brought his regiment up to the work, and afterwards followed up the
retreating enemy.
To Brevet Brigadier General C. B. Comstock, aide-de camp on the staff of the
Lieutenant General, I am under the deepest obHgations. .At every step of our
progress I received from him the most valuable assistance. For the final success
of our part of the operations the country is more indebted to him than to me.
Colonel George S. Dodge, chief quartermaster of the army of the James,
accompanied me as chief quartermaster of the force under my command. His
able and energetic performance of his multifarious duties was all that could be
wished for, and reflects the highest honor upon him.
Surgeon Norman S. Barnes, United States volunteers, medical director, and
Surgeon .A. J. H. Buzzell, third New Hampshire volunteers, medical inspector
of the expedition, discharged their laborious duties on the field and in the hospital in a• manner most creditable to their ability and humanity. I d sire to express my high appreciation of the services of these officers.
I shall have the honor to submit a supplemental report in reference to those
subordinate officers and enlisted men who distinguished themselves on this occasion.
I should signally fail to do my duty were I to omit to speak in terms of the
highest admiration of the part borne by the navy in our operations. In all
ranks, from .Admiral Porter to his seamen, there was the utmost desire not only
to do their proper work, but to facilitate in every possible manner the operations
of the land forces. 'l'o him and to the untiring efforts of his officers and men
we are indebted that our men, stores, tools, and ammunition were safely and
expeditiously landed, and that our wounded and prisoners were embarked for
transportation to the north; to the great accuracy and power of their fire it is
owing that we had not to confront a formidable artillery in the assault, and that
we were able, with but little loss, to push forward the men, preparatory to it, to
a point nearly as favorable for it as the one they would have occupied had siege
operations been undertaken and the work system'1tically approached. rrhe assault of the sailors and marines, although it failed, undoubtedly contributed somewhat to our success, and certainly nothing could surpass the p erfect skill with
which the fleet was handled by its commai1der. Every request which I made
to Admiral Porter was most cheerfully complied wirh, and the utmost harmouy
has existed be~ween us from the outset to the present time.
I forward herewith General Ames's report.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
.ALFRED H. TERRY, Major General.
Brigadier General J. A. RA WLINSt

Chief qf Stajj; City Point, Virginia.
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FoRcEs,
Fort Fisher, N. C., Janu1ry 27, 1865.
Sm: I have the honor to submit the following report of engineer operations
in connexion with the capture of Fort }..,isher, together with a sketch of that
work and another of the country in its vicinity. Fort Fisher is situated on the
peninsula between the Cape Fear river and the Atlantic ocean, about a mile and
a half northeast of Federal Point. For five miles north of Federal Point this peninsula is sandy and low, not rising more than fifteen feet above high tide, the
interior abounding in fresh-water swamps, often wooded and almost impassable,
while much of the dry land, till one gets within half a mile of Fort Fisher, is
covered with wood or low unde.!·growth, except a strip about three hundred yards
wide along the sea-shore. 'l'he landing of the troops composing the expedition
was effected on the sea-beach, about five miles north of Fort Fisher, on January
12, and Paine's division was at once pushed across to the Cape }...,ear river with
instructions to take up a line to be held against any attack from the direction
of Wilmington. This line on the morning of January 13 was already defensible, and was further strengthened during the day, while on the 14th a second
line was laid out and begun, under charge of Lieutenant J. H. Price, in rear
of its left. Pioneer companies were ore-anized in Ames's and Paine's divisions,
and as during the 14th the fire of the rebel gunboat Chickamaug·a killed and
wounded a number of our men, Lieutenant O'Keeffe, with his company of the
fifteenth regiment New York volunteer engineers, was directed to build a battery for two 30~pounder Parrots on the bank of the river to keep her off.
On the afternoon of January 14 a reconnaissance was pushed, unfler the direction of the lliajor general commanding, to within five hundred yards of Fort
Fisher, a small advanced work being taken possession of. This was at once
turned into a defensive line to be held against any attempt from Fort Fisher.
The reconnaissance showed that the palisading in front of the work had been
seriously injured by the navy fire; only nine gum'l could be seen on the land
front where sixteen had been counted on Christmas day. 'l'he steady though not
rapid fire of the navy prevented the enemy from using either artillery or musketry on the reconnoitring party. It seemed probable that troops could be got
up '"'ithin two hundred yards of the work without serious loss, and it was a matter of grave doubt whether the necessary ammunition could be supplied by the
open beach if regular approaches were determined on. It was decided to assault,
and the assault was made on the 15th, at half past three p.m., after three hours
of heavy navy fire, by three deployed brigades following one another at intervals of about three hundred yards, and each making its final rush for the west
eud of the land face from a rough rifle-pit about three hundred yards from the
work.
At the point attacked the palisading was less injared than elsewhere, it being
partially hidden, and it was necessary to use axes to cut and timbers to batter
it down, in order that troops might pass readily through it. Powder sacks
for blowing these palisades down had been prepared, but were not used. After
seven hours' fighting, gaining traverse by traveree, the work was won.
Fort }..,isher consists of two fronts-the first, or land-front, running across the
peninsula at this point, about seven hundred yards wide, is four hundred and
eighty yards in length; while the second, or sea-front, runs from the right of the
. first parallel to the beach to the mound battery, a distance of thirteen hundred
yards. The land front was intended to resist any attack from the north, the sea
front to prevent any of our naval vessels from running through New inlet or
landing troops on Federal Point.
1. Landfi·ont.-This front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear
river side, connected by a curtain, with a bastion on the ocean side. 'l'he parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with traverses
rising ten feet above it and running back on their tops, which were from eight

1272'

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

to twelve feet in thickness, to a distance of from thirty to forty feet from the
interior crest. The traverses on the left half bastion were about twenty-five feet
in length on top.
The earth for this heavy parapet and the enormous traverses at their inner
ends, more than thirty feet in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior ditch, but mainly .from the interior of the work. Between each pair of
traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this front
were only partially completed. A palisade, which is loopholed and has a banquette, runs in front of this face at a distance of about fifty feet in front of the
foot of the exterior slope from the Cape Fear river to the ocean, with a position
for a gun between the left of the front and the river, and another between the
right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle traverse on the curtain
was a bomb-proof postern, whose exteri<Jr opening was covered by a small redan
for two field-pieces, to give flank fire along the curtain. The traverses were
generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. The slopes of the work appear to
have been generally revetted with marsh sod, or covered with grass, and to have
had an inclination of forty-five degrees, or a little less. On those slopes most
exposed to navy fire the revetment or grassing has been entirely destroyed,
and the inclination reduced to thirty degrees.
The ends of traverses as they rise above the parapet are very ragged. Still
all damage done to the earthwork can be readily repaired, its strength bei11g
about the same as before the bombardment. The damage done by the navy fire
was, first to the palisades, which were so injured as in most places to be little
obstacle to assaulting troops; second, to guns and carriages. There were
originally on this front twenty-one heavy guns and three mortars. Of these threefourths were rendered unserviceable by injuries to either gun or carriage. The
gun in the right bastion, the field-pieces in front of the postern, and one or two
mortars were used against the assaulting troops.
There was a formidable system of torpedoes two hundred yards in advance
of this front, the torpedoes being about eighty feet apart, and each containing
about one hundred pounds of powder. They were connected with the fort by
three sets of wires; fortunately the set leading directly to those over which the
army moved, and the wire leading directly to those over which the navy
column moved had been cut by shells, and no torpedo was exploded.
2. Sea-front.-This front consie-ts of a series of batteries, mounting in all
twenty-four heavy guns, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry
parapet, 80 as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses
for the protection of the guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses
are also generally bomb-proofed. Captain M. Adams, fourth New Hampshire
volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. H. Price, fourth United States colored
troops, commanding pioneer companies of Ames's and Paine's divisions, and
:First Lieutenant K. S. O'Keeffe, commanding company of fifteenth New York
volunteer. engineers, have, with their commands, been of great service in the
construction of batteries and defensive works. First Lieutenant A. H. Knowlton, fourth New Hampshire volunteers, has rendered valuable assistance in
making sketches of Fort :Fisher, as also private Schultze, fifteenth New York
volunteer engineers.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. B. COMSTOCK,
Lieut. Col. and Brev. Brig. Gen., Chiif Engineer.
Major A. TERRY,
Assistant Adjutant General.
It may be added that in thirty bomb-proofs and magazines and their passages
there were fourteen thousand five hundred square feet of floor space, not including
th~ main magazine which \Yas exploded, and whose dimensions are unknown.
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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION 24TH ARMY CoRPS,

Fort Fishe'r, N. C., January 16, 1865.
I have the honor to submit the following report of the late moveme.nts and
operations of this division:
On the night of the 2d the division, which had just returned to its camp from
a demonstration against this point, received orders to prepare for a second expedition. It left camp on the 3d, and embarked on ocean transports at Bermuda Hundred, between the hours of 7 and 9 p. m. on the 4th instant.
The transport fleet sailed from Fortress Monroe on the morning of the 6th,
·and the troops disembarked some four miles north of Fort Fisher on the 13th
instant.
At 3 o'clock p. m. on the 15th we stormed Fort Fisher. Brevet Brigadier
General N. M. Curtis's brigade (the first) made a lodgement on the northwest
angle of the · fort. I immediately ordered up Colonel G. A. Pennypacker's
brigade, (the second.) 'rhe enemy was at once driven from behind the palisading extending from the fort to the river, and about one-third of the work, its
northwest angle, occupied by us. I then ordered up Colonel Bell's brigade
(the third) and moved it forward against and in rear of the sea-face of the work,
the ground being much obstructed by the ruins of the barracks, lumber, and
other rubbish; the enemy being protected by traverses, and taking advantage
of the cover afforded by magazines, &c., checked our advance.
Fighting of a most obstinate character continued till after dark, during which
time we made considerable advancement on the left and captured about four
hundred prisoners.
About 8 o'clock p. m. Colonel Abbott, with his brigade, complet~d tl1e occupation of the face of the work extending from the ocean to the river. A gen
eral advance was now made, and the fort occupied without opposition.
The conduct of the officers and men of this division was most gallant. Aided
by the fire of the navy and an attacking column of sailors and marines along
the sea-beach, we were able to pass over the open ground in front of the fort,
through the gaps in the palisading in the ditch made by the naval fire, and
finally to carry the work.
Where the name of every officer and man engaged in this desperate conflict
should be submitted, I shall at present only be able to give a few of those most
conspicuous. It is to be hoped they all may be properly rewarded.
Brevet Brigadier General N. M. Curtis, commanding first brigade, was prominent throughout the day for his bravery, coolness, and judgment. His services
cannot be overestimated. He fell a short time before dark, seriously wounded
in the head by a canister shot.
Colonel G. A. Pennypacker, commanding second brigade, was seriously
wounded while planting his colors on the third traverse of the work. This
officer was surpassed by none, and his absence during the day mo~t deeply felt
and seriously regretted.
Colonel L. Bell, commanding third brigade, was mortally wounded while
crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. He was an able and efficient
officer, one not easily replaced.
I here submit the names of the regimental commanders; and in connexion
with the brigade commanders is the credit due them for the heroic conduct of
their men.
Regimental commanders : First brigade, one hundred and forty- second New
York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel A. M. Barney; one hundred and seventeenth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel 1!\ H. Meyer; one hundred
and twelfth New York volunteers, Colonel J. F. Smith; third New York volun-
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teers, Lieutenant E. A. Behna. Second brigade, forty-eighth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Coan; seventy-sixth Pennsylvania volunteers,
Colonel J. S. Littell; forty-seventh New York volunteers, Captain J. M.
McDonald; two hundred and third Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel J W.
Moore; ninety-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, First Lieutenant J. Wainwright. Third brigade, one hundred and 1:3ixty-ninth New York volunteers,
Colonel Alonzo Alden; thirteenth Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel S. l\L
Zent; fourth New Hampshire volunteers, Captain J. H. Robrrts; one hundred
and fifteenth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel N.J. Johnson. Co1onel
J. W. Moore, two hundred and third Pennsylvania volunteers, behaved with the
most distinguished gallantry. He was killed while passing the second traverse
of the fort, in advance of his regiment, waving his colors. Few equalled, none
surpassed, this brave officer.
Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Zent, in command of the thirteenth Indiana, with
l1is own regiment and a detachment of volunteers from the first brigade, numbering in all one hundred men, deployed within two or three hundred yards of
the fort, and by their fire materially aided our advance.
Major J. R Lawrence, thirteenth Indiana volunteers, and Lieutenant C.)lonel
J. A. Colvin, one hundred and sixty-ninth New York volunteers, also behaved
in the most gallant manner, and rendered efficient service in collecting and
organizing the troops which had become separated from their commands in the
charge, and in leading them to positions where important advantages were gained.
Captain G. W. Huckins . fourth New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. Konig, seventh United States colored troops, aids on the staff of Colonel
L. Bell, commanding third brigade, were untiring in their labors, and rendered
valuable services in the absence of my staff officers, who had been stricken
down in tlte early part of the engagement.
Privates Alric Chapin and James Spring, company G, one hundred and fortysecond, D. 0. Hotchkiss, company A, and 0. R. Kingsland, company D, one
hundred and twelfth New York volunteers, volunteered to approach to a point
considerably in advance of our skirmish line, which they did do, and by this
step valuable information with reference to the ditch was gained. Privates
James Cadman, wounded; William Cabe, company B ; George Hoyt and S. R.
Porteus, company C; D. H. Morgan and Edward Petue, company E; E. H.
Cooper. company G, wounded ; Silas Baker, company H, missing; George
Merrill and William .T. McDuff, company I; Z. C. N eahel and Bruce
Anderson, company K, one hundred and forty-second New York volunteerF:,
volunteered to advance with the head of the column and cut down the palisading.
Copies of the reports of the brigade commanders will be forwarded. In them
will be found lir;ts of officers and men who particularly distinguished themselves.
It is recommended that medals be bestowed upon all enlisted men mentioned.
rro my staff officers I am particularly indebted for their zeal and gallantry
throughout t~e day; they were constantly passing to and fro, and exposed to
the hottest fire; I would respectfully recommend tbat they be brevetted for their
services : Captain Charles A. Carleton, assistant adjutant general; Captain A.
G. Lawrence, acting aide-de-camp; Captain H. C. Lockwood, aide-depcamp; .
Captain R. W. Dawson, assistant inspector general; Captain J. S. Mathews,
provost marshal ; Captain B. B. Keeler, mustering: officer.
Captain Lawrence was the first man through the palisading, and while extendiug his hand to receive a guidon which he intellded to place on the paritpet
of the work a shell exploded near him, taking off his left arm and seriously injuring his throat. He was afterward shot in the right arm. For his services
on this occasion as well as those on a former one I most earnestly urge his
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promotion. Captain Dawson was disabled by a wound in the left arm. To _
Captain Lockwood, General Whiting and Colonel Lamb surrendered with the
garrison at Fort Buchanan.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. AMES,
B1·igadter General Yol unteers.
Captain A. TERRY,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Official copy :
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 18, 1865.

Report

of

Jl!Iajor General W. 8. Rosecrans's operat1'ons against Price in the
department of Missouri.

OF :M:JS~OURI,
St. Louis, December 7, 1864.
CoLONEL: r_rhe commanding general of the military division is already
informed, by my current official despatches, of the principal incidents of the
late campaign against Price in this department; but it is proper that I should
submit a more detailed and connected report of the operations, for a correct
understanding of their extent and the importance of the results.
From early in the spring it was known, through the lodges of the 0. A. K 's
and other rebel sources, that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in
which he expected the co-operation of that order, and of rebels generally, and
by which he hop ed to obtain important military and political results. In pursuance of these plans, the lodges, with rebel recruiting officers and agents, sent
into Missouri clandestinely or under cover of the amnesty oath for that purpose, began an insurrection in Platte county on the 7th of July last. From
that time guerilla warfare raged in the river counties, west from Calloway on
the north, and from Cooper on the south side of the Missouri.
This department having been depleted of troops, permis~Sion was obtained to
raise volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation, anJ under it about five
complete and as many incomplete regiments of twelve-months volunteer infantry had been organized previously to the raid.
On the 3d of September General Washburn sounded the tocsin by information that the force under Shelby, at Batesville, Arkansas, was about to be
joined by Price for the invasion of our State. The ripening of the corn lent to
this additional color of probability, so that on the 6th Major General A. J.
Smith passing Cairo with a division of infantry on the way to General Sherman, I telegraphed General Halleck the state of affairs, requesting orders for this
division to halt at that point and wait until we could ascertain the designs of
the enemy.
The division was halted, and on the 9th General Smith received orders from
General Halleck to "operate against Price & Uo.;" but, deeming it impracticable to penetrate between one and two hundred miles into Arkansas with a
small column of infantry, in pursuit of a large mounted force, the exact whereabouts as well as intentions of which were still unknown, he decided to move
his command to a point near St. Louis, whence he could readily move by rail
or river, and await Price's movements.
From that time information accumulated showing the imminence of the raid:
HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTME~T
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On the 23d we 1·eceived certain information that Price had crossed the Arkansas with two divisions of mounted men, three batteries of artillery, a large wagon
train, carrying several thousand stand of small-arms, and was at or near Batesville, on White river. From this point, midway between the Mississippi and the
western boundary of the State, there are three practicable routes of invasion:
one by Pocahontas, into southeastern Missouri; another by West Plains and
Rolla or vicinity. norte, towards Jefferson City; a third by Cassville, north,
either through Springfield and Sedalia, or by the Kansas border, to the Missouri river. Strong military reasons favored the movement of their main force
by the central route, while a detachment should go by Pocahontas, and strip
southeastern Missouri. Under these circumstances my first object was to secure
our great depots at Springfield and Rolla, the hay cut during the summer, and
our train of government wagons, required to maintain the troops in the Springfield district. To do this, and, as far as possible, save the scanty agriculture of
the country from devastation, it was necessary to hold both Springfield and
Rolla. Indeed, to have abandoned these points would have been not only to
abandon the loyal people of those districts and their property to destruction,
but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains while moving them, capture our
stores, and beat our troops in detail.
Generals Sanborn and McNeill were therefore informed and ordered to place
the trains and public property of their districts under the protection of the fortifications at Springfield and Rolla, to put their forts in the best possible state
of defence, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including· citizens
and local militia, to the best advantage, and with all their efficient mounted
force to watch the enemy's motions, and report the earliest indications of the
direction of the coming storm. General Brown was ordered to concentrate qJl
troops from the west of the central district at Sedalia, to notify the citizen
guards, and see that neither they nor their arms were exposed to capture.
On the 24th Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington with five thousand men and four pieces of artillery. General Ewing
was ordered to concentrate the troops in the southern part of his district at Pilot
Knob and Cape Girardeau; and to verify the accuracy of this report, which
proved true, on the 26th General A. J. Smith, with two of his brigades, was
ordered to a point on the Iron Mountain railroad ''as far towards Pilot Knob
as he deemed compatible with certainty that his position would not be turned"
and the "enemy get between him and St. Louis." On the day before Sanborn had orders to move, with all his mounted force, to Rolla, it having become
evident that the enemy would not probably strike west of that point.
The safety of St. Louis was vital to us ; I therefore telegraphed Brigadier
General H. E. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who promised me assistance from
some regiments of returning "hundred-day volunteers," who, though they had
already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defence
of the city. rrhe enrolled militia of St. Louis, though but skeleton regiments,
were called out, and the citizens also requested to organize and arm. General
Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with directions to use his utmost exertions to
find out whether any more than Shelby's division was in southeast Missouri,
and to that end to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With a soldierly cornprehension of the importance of his duties, wbile reporting the current rumors
of the ndvance of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts, and held
his position until the ~7th, when he sustained a terrific assault, in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in the valley, surrounded by hills within cannon range,
which he held with about one thousand men, one-half raw troops-establishing,
beyond question, the presence of all Price'8 command in that quarter. He gloriously 1·epulsed, killing and wounding some fifteen hundred of the enemy,
and lost only twenty-eight killed and fifty-six wounded, as appears from his
report herewith. While Ewing's fight was going on, Shelby advanced on
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Potosi, and thence to Big River bridge, threatening General Smith's advance,
which withnrew from that point to within safer supporting distance of his main
position at De Soto.
Previous to and pending these events the guerilla warfare in North Missouri
had been waging with redoubled fury. Rebel agents, amnes.ty-oath takers, recruits, sympathizers, 0. A. K.'s, and traitors of every hue and stripe, had warmed
into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were busy
making clothes fur rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerillas; women's tongues were busy telling Union neighbors "their time was now coming."
General Fisk, with all his force, had been scouring the brush for weeks in the
river counties in pursuit of hostile bands, composed largely of recruits from
among that class of inhabitants who claim protection, yet decline to perform the
full duties of citizens, on the ground that they " never tuck no sides." A few
facts will convey some idea of this warfare carried on by confederate agents
here, while the agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism, Mason,
Slidell, and Mann, in Europe, have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom our government carries on the war with increasing ferocity, regardless df
the laws of civilized warfare. These gangs of rebels, whose families had been
living in peace among their loyal neighbors, committed the most cold-blooded
and diabolical murders, such as riding· up to a farm-house, asking· for water, and
while receiving it shooting down the giver, an aged, inoffensive farmer, because
he was a radical " Union man." In the single sub-district of Mexico the commanding officer furnished a list of near one hundred Union men who, in the
course of six weeks, had been kHled, maimed, or '' run off" because they were
radical " Union men" or d--d abolitionists . About the 1st of September
Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on theNorth Missouri road, took from
it twenty-two unarmed soldiers, many on sick~leave, and, after robbing, placed
them in a row and shot them in cold blood. Some of the bodies they scalped,
and put others across the track and ran the engine over them. On the 27th
this gang, with numbers swollen to three or four hundred, attacked Major Johnson, with about 120 men of the 39th Missouri volunteer infantry, raw recruits,
and after stampeding their horses, shot every man, most of them in cold blood.
Anderson, a few days later, was recognized by General Price at Booneville as
confederate captain, and, with a verbal admonition to behave him self, ordered
by Colonel McLane, chief of Price's staff, to proceed to north Missouri and
destroy the railroads, which orders were found on the miscreant when killed by
Lieutenant Uolonel Cox about the 27th of Octobe:l' ultimo.
On the 28th, when information of Ewing's fight and Price's pre:3ence at Pilot
Knob came to hand, General Smith, discovering the enemy on his front, moving
to west and north in pursuance of his orders to hold the most advanced p~sition
compatible with the certainty of keeping between the enemy and St. Loms, determined to leave De Soto and retire behind the Meramec, a stream which, at
from ten to fifteen miles south of St. Louis, offered considerable obstacles to the
passage of a hostile force with wagons and artillery. General Ewing, finding
Marmaduke's and Fagen's rebel divisions before him, and his position comJ11anded by a numerically superior artillery, acting on suggestions made when
discussinO' with him the possibilities of the position on the nigl1t of the 27th,
spiked hf.'cs heavy guns, blew up the magazine, ammunition, and supplies, a:1d,
with the field battery and remains of his command, retreated through the h1lls
towards the Meramec valley, hoping to reach a point on the railroad from whence
he could move to St. Louis. But, as will be seen from his report, the enemy
pursued him, harassed his rear on the march, which he directed along a ridge
where the enemy could not flank him, and overtook him near Harrison's Station, where, seizing ancl extending the ten;tporary defences constmcted by the
militia, he displayed such vigor that, after harassing him for thirty-six hours,
and making several attacks, on the approach of a detachment of Sanborn's cav-
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airy, the rebels left him, and he escaped, with all his command, to Rolla. The
enemy's strength and position thus developed, my first business was to secure
the points he best could strike-St. Louis. Jefferson City, and Rolla. General
Smith's 4,500 infantry, and the mounted force we could raise, 7th Kansas, just
in from Memphis, part of the 13th Missouri volunteer cavalry, Colonel Catherwood, and the recruits of Merrill's Horse, hastily mounted and organized, a total
of 1,500 men, w~re all the force we could place between St. Louis and an invading army of at least 15,000 mounted men, whose advance was within a day's
march of the city. Meanwhile Brigadier General Pike, ably seconded by Generals Wolfe and Miller, of the Enrolled Missouri militia, had assembled and armed
skeletons of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, lOth, 11th, 13th, and 52d regiments
of enrolled militia. r.rhe mayor and others, under the direction of the Hon. B.
Gratz Brown and Major Ledergerber, organized the citizens exempt from militia
duty, who volunteered for the defence of the city, into companies and regiments,
numbering, by the 30th, some four or five thousand men. The l32d, 134th,
138th, 140th, and 142d Illinois hundred-day volunteers also began to arrive on
the 30th, and were all in by October 1, and formed into a brigade, under Colonel
Wangelin, for the immediate defence of the city, beyond which they did not
wish to serve, as all of them were out over time, and many having desirable
offers as substitutes.
The enemy, moving up by Potosi, seemed to halt at Richwoods, about forty
miles southwest of St. Louis, in the hills between Big River and the Meramec,
as if concentrating for an attack on the city. This appeared the more possible
from the magnitude of his interest in it, and the fact that he did not show much
force in the Meramec valley even on the 30th. On that day Major General
Smith was ordered to occupy Kirkwood, which commands the Richwoods road
and crossing of the Meramec to St. Louis, his cavalry to reconnoitre south and
west, Colonel Merrill going as far as Franklin.
General Fisk, previously ordered to join General Brown with all his available
force, reached and reported from Jefferson City to-day. At the close of it,
news came that a brigade of rebel cavalry had burned the Moselle bridge, and
were moving north towards Franklin. General Smith was ordered to send a
brigade of infantry to support the cavalry at that point, and on the 1st of October Colonel Wolfe with his brigade reached Franklin, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove the enemy from the place, but not until he had burned the depot.
The rebels were now apparently at bay, with 1,500 cavalry and 4,500 infantry. General Smith was. not in condition to attempt offensive movements
against a force of 15,000 veteran mounted rebels, who could reach St. Louis from
any point in the Meramec valley where he might confront them in half the time
it would take his infantry to reach it. Our obvious policy under these c.ircumstances was to keep as close as possible to the enemy without risking St. Louis,
until General Mower's command should arrive from Arkansas, or at least we be
able to join to Smith's our mounted forces at Rolla. Every hour's deiay of the
enemy in the Meramec valley brought Mower nearer and increased our chance
{)f striking him, as it did the security of Jefferson City. On the 2d the enemy
was reported massing in the vicinity of Union, on the road either to Jefferson
'City or Rolla ,and General Smith was ordered to Franklin. But as the enemy's
movements appeared to tend westward, on the 3d General Smith was advanced
to Gray's summit, and General Pike moved to :E'ranklin. On the 4th General
Smith pushed his cavalry towards the Gasconade, advanced his infantry to Union,
followed up by General Pike's militia. On the 5th Price's command took
Herman, burned the Gasconade bridge, and was crossing that stream at the
old State road ford. General Smith followed him. General Mower reported
his arrival at Girardeau, out of supplies, his teams worn down, part of his cavalry dismounted and many horses unshod. Transports and supply boats were
. at once despatched, and on the 8th and 9th his command reached St. Louis,
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from whence the jnfantry was pushed forward by water as rapidly as the low
stage of the river would permit, to join General Smith. The cavalry under
Winslow re-shod and started by land from St. Louis on the lOth, towards Jefferson City, which point it reached on the 16th instant, one day in advance of
the infantry.
On the 6th the enemy began crossing the Osage at Ca.;;tle Rock and one or
two other fords under cover of his artillery, opposed by Colonel Phillips with
the available cavalry at Jefferson City. While thus engaged, Generals McNeil
and Sanborn reached Jefferson City, by a forced march, with all the mounted force
from Rolla, and uniting with Fisk and Brown, gave us a garrison there of 4,100
cavalry and 2,600 infantry, mostly the new and partially organized twelvemonths men, with a few citizens and militia. As this force, though capable of
giving a strong battle behind intrenchments, was not very for·midable to act offensively against a veteran force like that of the enemy, it was decided by General Fisk, the other three generals concurring, to oppose a moderate resistance
to the enemy's advance across the Moreau, a small stream with muddy banks
and bad bottom, four or five miles east of the city, and then to retire and receive
his attack at the defensive line, which with industry and good judgment had
been prepared by the entire laboring force, civil and military, at Jefferson City.
'rhe enemy burned the Osage bridge and crossed the river on the 6th.
On the 7th he advanced on the city, crossed the Moreau, after sharp fighting,
and developed a line of battle three or four miles long, east, south, and west of
the place. But after reconnoitring its apparently formidable intrenchments,
warned by his Pilot Knob experience in storming earthworks, he declined attacking, and, passing his train in rear, moved around, massing on the west, and
finally retiring.
On the 8th G-eneral Pleasonton, on his arrival at Jefferson under orders to
assume command, despatched General Sanborn with all the available cavalry,
4,100 men, to follow and harass the enemy until General Smith's command
could come up. General Smith was informed of the rebel failure at Jefferson,
and directed to move by the most expeditious route to that place, where Mower's
infantry were to join and the cavalry overtake him. He was to send all his
cavalry, under Culonel Catherwood, in advance to report to Pleasonton, who, on
its arrival, was to join Sanborn and assume direction of the provisional cavalry
division thus formed. General Pike, with his militia, was charged with the control of the country and the defences of our line of comrnunication from St. Louis
to Jefferson C1ty. Sanborn followed the 1·ebels, attacked their rear guard at
Versailles, where it was uncertain what conrse th ey would take ; found they
were going north towards Booneville, followed and drove them into line of battle
near that place, and, when he found himself nearly enveloped by their entire
army, fell back out of their reach to meet Catherwood's command and his provisions, which both arrived at California on the 14th. The enemy, taking advantage of this, crossed the Lamine at Scott's and Dug fords, and moved north
towards Arrow Rock. Sanborn immediately followed this movement by Georgetown bridge, keeping between the Pacific railroad and the line of the enemy's
march, and holding the line of the Blackwater, a western tributary of the Lamine, wh ile Price, crossing a part of Shelby's command at Arrow Rock, on the
Booneville ferry-boat, to the north side of the river, advanced on Glasgow, which
he captured after a seven hours' fight with a part of Colonel Harding's regiment, forty-third Missouri volunteer infantry, and small detachments of the 9th
Missouri State militia and seventeenth Illinois cavalry.
On the 17th our cavalry, following his westward movement, keeping south
of without pressi.ng him, until General Smith's and Mower's troops could be
brought up, kept the line of the Blackwater, and on the 17th reported thema
selves out of supplies and the enemy between Marshall and Waverly.
On the 17th Mower's infantry, except two small regiments, arrived at J ef-
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ferson City, and went at once by rail to Lamine bridge to join General Smith,
who, passing ,Jefferson by land on the 14th, had followed the cavalry movement to that point, taking charge of the supplies, which, in consequence of the
destruction of the bridge by the rebels, could go by rail no farther. Winslow's
cavalry, marching, reached Jefferson, the advance twenty miles beyond, at California, on the 16th, and was ordered to join General Pleasonton without delay.
On the 18th General Smith was ordered to move to Dunksbnrg, near the cavalry headquarters, taking five days' rations and leaving minimum garrisons to
guard and handle stores at Sedalia and Lamine bridge.
'rhe 19th found the movement accomplished, the cavalry with its centre near
Cook's store, its right behind the Blackwater, and its left near Kirkpatrick's
:Mills towards Warrensburg. 'l'he enemy apparently hesitated in the vicinity
of Marshall, as if uncertain whether to go west or double on his tracks between
Sedalia and Jefferson; but our cavalry advance, receding a few miles to meet
supplies and concentrate, on the 17th and 18th, seemed to decide his movement
towards Lexington, where General Curtis telegraphed me on the 19th the head
of his column had arrived, General Blunt, after a sharp skirmish, retiring towards
Independence. I informed General Curtis of our position; that our troops reported Price near Waverly; ad vised that Blunt check his advance at Wellington, and as soon as we were sure his main force was moving on Lexington we
would endeavor, by a forced march, to strike him in the flank.
To ascertain Price's real intentions, General Pleasonton was directed to make
a strong reconnaissance towards Waverly. The results of this reached me on
the morning of the 20th, and Pleasonton was directed at once to push the centre
of his cavalry co Lexington, and General Smith, with his infantry, to su.Jport
the movement. At 7 p . m . Pleasonton reported the enemy had left Lexington,
going west, and McNeil and Sanborn entering the town.
October 21, our cavalry advance followed the enemy to Fire Creek Prairie,
Brown's and Winslow's brigades reaching Lexington at 2 o'clock p.m., and the
infantry at 9 p. m. of the same day. General Curtis also reported a fight with
the enemy's entire force at the Little Blue from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m., and that to
prevent being flanked he should retire to the Big Blue, where his militia and
artillery were in strong position. Supposing the enemy could not cross the Big
Blue in the face of Curtis, I despatched General Pleasonton my belief til at he
would move south, and that while MeN eil's brigade should harass his rear, he,
with the other three brigades, should move towards Lone Jack, near which
would be Gen<'ral Smith's infantry, now marching from JJexingLon to Chapel
Hill. At 10 o'clock p. m., a despatch from Pleasonton informed me of the receipt of thrse conditional orders, and that the enemy, in full force, were moving
far to the west, followed by his cavalry.
October 22, Pleasonton's cavalry reached the Little Blue at 10 a. m.; found
the bridge de;:;troyed ; a temporary one was constructed, the enemy's skirmishers driven, the command crossed, when the enemy opened with artillery
and was steadily driven towards Independence, which place was taken by a
brilliant cavalry charge, in which Catherwood's regiment captured two guns complete. Near a hundred prisoners fell into our hands, and our troops pushed the
enemy's rear guard all night. At ~ p. m. Pleasonton reports, "All my brigades
have been engaged. The enemy have left forty killed and many sick and
wounded in my ha.uds. Heard nothing fi·om Curtis. If Smith can come up in
case we get a fight, it will be well. Have sent .M:cN eil's brigade to Little Santa
}..,e. Price is reported intrenched this side of the Big Blue. Fighting still
going on with an obstinate rear guard. Let Smith come to this place." Reluctantly General Smith was despatched to move to Independence, as requested,
the messenger reaching him at Chapel Hill as he was putting his column in motion to march there in response to a direct message from General Pleasonton
advising him of the posture of affairs.
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On the morning of the 23d Pleasonton began to move on the enemy at the
crossing of the Big Blue, where the fight opened at 7 a. m. and continued until
1 p. m., when Shelby, who had been fighting General Curtis's command, finding
Marmaduke and Fagan were giving way, turned on Pleasonton, and" for a moment shook Sanborn's brigade," but by the skilful use of Thurber's battery,
throwing double-shotted grape and canister, and the gallant charging of our troops
they were routed and fled southward, pushed by Generals Pleasonton and Ourtis that night beyond Little Santa Fe.
General Smith's command, arriving ~t Independence, at 5 p. m. was ordered
to move that night by a forced march to Hickman's mill, hoping it would
strike the enemy in flank while passing that point. Had he been ordered and
marched for that point instead of Independence the day before, General Smith
would have arrived in time to strike the enemy's compact columns and train
with 9,000 infantry and five batteries. But it was too late. He did not reach
the mill until long after not only the enemy's, but our own columns had passed
there. News from the cavalry fronts during the night showed that nothing remained but to push the enemy with our cavalry, allowing the infantry to follow
as best it could, to act as support in case of possible reverse to us or re-enforce,..
ments which were currently reported on their way to meet the enemy.
On the 24th, with the Kansas troops in advance, we pursued the enemy until
within fifteen miles of the trading post, when, at General Curtis's request, General Pleasanton's command took the lead, and at the end of sixty miles' march
overtook the rebels about midnight at the Marias des Oygnes ; began skirmishing, and on the 25th, at 4 a. m., opened on their bivouac with artillery, creating
the greatest consternation, following it up by an attack which drove them
promptly from the field, leaving in our hands horses, mules, wagons, arms, and
some prisoners. Our troops followed them in a running fight until 2 o'clock p.
m., when they came up with them at the Little Osage crossing, in position, with
eight pieces of artillery on their line of battle. With the instinct ofa true cavalry general, Pleasonton immediately ordered an attack by Benteen's and Phillips's brigades, which by a magnificent charge completely routed them, capturing
eight guns, two stands of colors, Major General Marmaduke, Brigadier General
Cabell, five colonels, other officers, and near one thousand prisoners, besides
wagons, small-arms, &c. Sanborn's brigade, which was a mile and a half behind,
and the Kansas troops, still further in rear, did not arrive in time to take part
in the battle; but Sanborn's brigade led in the pursuit of the routed enemy,
overtook them at a small stream a few miles beyond the battle-ground, charged
them in the timber, drove them across it into the open prairie, where they formed
in order of battle three miles deep. But such was the enthusiasm of the men of
this brigade when they reached the edge of the wood and saw this triple line,
they charged it without orders, knocked it in pieces, and chased the fugitives
until night closed the pursuit, and the enemy fled under cover of the darkness,
towards the Arkansas border. Besides the wagons captured during this day at
the Marias des Oygnes, on the way to and at the Little Osage, the enemy had destroyed many, including ammunition wagons, and for twenty-five or thirty miles
beyond the Osage battle-field, their route was strewn with debris of burning
wagons and other property. Pleasanton's cavalry had now been in motion almost
day and night for six days, during which it had marched at lea-st 204 miles and
fought four battles. It was pretty well exhausted and broken down, and went
into Fort Scott that night for food and a little rest. He reported to me the result
of his day's work-that the enemy was going at his utmost, and his own troops
were so broken down it would be impossible, without fresh horses, to strike the
enemy another great blow this side of the Arkansas, and recommended that
Generals Sanborn and MeN eil follow to support Curtis's troops in pursuit, so
long as there was any prospect of damaging the enemy, and then return to
Springfield and Rolla.
81 w
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On the receipt of the news of the enemy's rout, General Smith, whose command was out of provisions, was directed to move to Harrisonville, and thence
get supplies from Warrensburg, where one hundred wagons were waiting with
provisions for our command, sending thirty thousand rations to the cavalry.
Further reports of the enemy's condition satisfied me there would be no use of
breaking down any more of our horses, since General Curtis, whose cavalry
horses were fresher than ours, supported by Sanborn and McNeil, on their
way down the State line, would be more than ample to deal with any resistance
Price's command. would offer this side of the Arkansas.
Orders were accordingly given, and General Pleasonton returned with Phillips's brigade, the cannon, and part of the prisoners, to Warrensburg. The
Kansas troops and Benteen's brigade pursued the enemy's flying columns, a
part of whom made their last stand at Newtonia, Missouri, where General Blunt
overtook and attacked them on the 28th, but was being worsted when Sanborn,
having marched one hundred and two miles in thirty-six hours, arrived in time
to save the day. The enemy fled, making no further stand this side of the
Arkansas. In a country destitute of food for man and beast, five times defeated,
pursued four or five hundred miles with the loss of nearly all their artillery,
ammunition, and baggage train, demoralization and destitution and want of
supplies, would the rebels cross the Arkansas for supplies at the risk of falling
into the hands of Thayer's forces or Steele's cavalry; and if allowed, ,would
almost disintegrate and disband them on the way thither.
General Curtis thought pushing them was best, and accordingly followed,
although he did not again overtake them. At his urgent instance, against my
own judgment as well as that of Generals Sanborn and MeN eil, I pushed their
two brigades down to the Arkansas border, whence Sanborn sent an advance to
Fort Smith, reaching there on the morning of the 8th, to notify General 'rhayer
of the enemy's desperate condition, and the direction he had taken from Cane
Hill towards the Indian nation, between Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.
Meanwhile, at Sherman's request, followed by orders from the general-in-chief,
I directed Major General A. J. Smith to move his command by the most expeditious route to the Mississippi in the vicinity of St. Louis, there to embark and
proceed to Nashville and report to Major General George H. Thomas.
On the 3d of November I returned to St. Louis, to be there during the election, and on the receipt of the news of the enemy having crossed the Arkansas,
directed the cavalry to repair to their respective districts, and Winslow's cavalry
to move by the best route and join General Thomas at Nashville.
In entering into details, I have aimed to give the general commanding a sort
of military photograph of our daily condition and movements, as well for his
critical judgment as for history, omitting events of whatever magnitude, not
havi'ng a bearing on our movements, and most of the minor ones which did enter
into their determination. I trust that the precautions taken in advance of Price's
movements; the preparations before we knew where he was coming; the means
t'aken to secure our most important points, and occupy him until we could concentrate the forces to strike him with a certainty of success, outweighing any
damage he could meanwhile do us; the energy and activity in concentration;
vigor in pursuit and fiery gallantry of our troops iu battle, will receive the
approbation of the general commanding the military division.
It will appear from these · details and accompanying reports that our dismounted cavalry, infantry, and militia nobly performed their duty, watching,
marching, and fighting whenever and wh'3rever opportunity ofl'ered; that by
their aid in lwlding our depots and supporting our mounted force, we have
saved all our important posts, and most of the country from pillage, except a
belt of some twenty miles wide along the route of the invasion, and with less
than seven thousand effective cavalry have pursued, overtaken, beaten in several
engagements, and finally routed an invading cavalry variously estimated at
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from 15,000 to 26,000 men, re-enforced by six thousand armed recruits from
Missouri, taking from them ten pieces of artillery, two stands of colors, 1,958
prisoners of war, a large number of horses, mules, wagons, and small-arms;
compelled them to destroy most of their remaining wagons, train and plunder,
blasted all of the political schemes of the rebels and traitors who concerted with
Price to revolutionize Missouri, destroy Kansas, and turn the State and presidential election against the Union cause, and by our triumph in the late elections
have given to gallant and suffering Missouri the fairest prospect she has ever
yet seen of future freedom, peace, and prosperity-all the fruit of a campaign
of forty-eight days, in which most of our victorious troops had never before seen
a great cavalry battle. Rarely during this or any other war has cavalry dis~
played more persevering energy in pursuit, more impetuous courage and gal~
lantry in attacking, regardless of superior numbers, or had its efforts crowned
with greater fruits of success.
While paying a just tribute of thanks to all the officers and soldiers of the
cavalry, artillery, infantry, militia and citizen guards, who served during the
raid, for their prompt and cheerful obedience of all orders, whether to labor,
inarch, or fight, I must refer to the accompanying reports of their commanders
for special mentions of individual gallantry. Major General Pleasonton deserves
the thanks of the country for the able manner in which he handled and fought
the cavalry, and for the brilliant and fruitful victories he won over triple his
own force. I hope he may receive promotion in the regulat~ army. Major
General A. J. Smith deserves thanks for promptitude, energy, and perseverance
in all his movements, and for the good judgment displayed in his campaign.
Nor must I omit a tribute of admiration to those brave and true soldiers, who,
under Mower, followed Price from Arkansas, marching 300 miles in eighteen
days, and after goiug by boat from Cape Girardeau to Jefferson City, resumed
the pursuit, making another march of 462 miles before they embarked for
Nashville, to take part in the not doubtful contest before that city for the mastery of Middle rrennessee. The district commanders all deserve my thanks for
prompt and cordial co-operation in all measures, precautionary and preparatory,
for the raid.
General Ewing deserves special mention for military judgment, courage and
gallantry in holding Pilot Knob till he had certainty of the enemy's force, as
well as for the manner in which he withd.re'Y his troops to Rolla. General
:McNeil, for promptitude and energy in putting Rolla in a state of defence,
and for moving with all force to Jefferson City in time to succor it;
General Fisk, for the prompt and cheerful discharge of very trying administrative duties, and for his energy and good sense in preparing the defence of J efferson City, as in the subsequent repair of Lamine bridge. General Brown displayed energy and good sense in preparing the city for a good defence, and
General Sanborn for vigilance, energy and soldierly judgment, while commanding the cavalry advance between Jefferson City . and Dunks burg, as well as
throughout the campaign. Colonel J. V. Dubois, aide-de-camp, chief of staff;
Captain Henry, assistant quartermaster, of General Steele's staff~ volunteer
staff quartermaster in the field; Uaptain G. Schull, chief commissary; Surgeon P ..
V. Schenck, medical director in the field ; Captain Hoelcke, acting aide-decamp, engineer; Major Fisher, 5th Missouri State Militia, on engineer duty ; Captain J. F. Bennett, assistant adjutant general, and my personal aids, Major ]"'. S ..
Bond, aide-de-camp, and Captain R. S. rrhomas, aide-de-camp; Captain Hills,
12th Kansas militia, provost marshal, accompanied me during the campaign,.
and were zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of their respective duties;
Major McDermott, 1st Iowa cavalry, who, with his battalion of 1st Iowa cavalry, did such good service in North Missouri, and behaved very gallantly in the
pursuit of the. rebels from Jefferson City to Boonville, commanded the escort
from Sedalia, and deserves honorable mention. Brigadier General J. B. Gray,.
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adjutant general of Missouri, and Brigadier General Pike, of the enrolled, are
entitled to public thanks for their valuable and indefatigable services in connexion with the enrolled militia. Colonel F. J. Haines, commissary of subsistence, to whom all the armies, as well as the country, owe a debt of gratitude
for invaluable services, not likely to be overpaid, displayed his usual promptitude and foresight in providing for the wants of our troops and depots. Colonel
William Myers, chief quartermaster, in supplying animals, fitting up trains,
and providing for the wants of our troops, exhil>ited his characteristic care and
skill.
I must also mention the voluntary servires of those tried veterans, Colonel
Wangelin, of the 12th Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and Colonel Laibold, who
did all in their power to aid in the defence of St. Louis.
Senator B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Thomas, seconded by the efforts of many
patriotic citizens of all classes, did much to prepare for the defence of the city,
and deserve my thanks. I should be glad to call the general's attention to
many militia officers, such as General Craig, whose able management in the
northwest, in the absence of General Fisk ; Colonel Gale, who so promptly organized his militia regiment, 54th E. M. M., at Franklin, and many others scattered over the State, who rendered great service to the country.
But as the chief motive of these officers and the men of their commands was
their country's good, the consciousness of duty manfully performed must be
their chief reward, until the day comes when our children, pointing to them as
to others who have borne arms in this great national struggle, shall say, "there
go some of the men who helped to save our nation."
The accompanying reports show our total losses in this campaign were:
17 4 killed, of whom 116 were murdered at Centralia; 336 wounded; 171 prisoners, of whom many, if not all, are illegally paroled; 681 hors du combat.
Besides which, there were several small squads of prisoners illegally captured
and paroled in southeast :Missouri, and the troops at Glasgow, whose surrender
was, I think, justifiable, and possibly lawful.
W. S . .ROSECRANS, Major General.
Lieut. Col. CHRISTISON, Assistant Adjutant General,
Military Division West Mississippi, New Orleans, La.
Official copy:

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 18, 1865.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
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General Banks's Report qf the Red Ri·ver Campaign.
SIR: While engaged in earnest efforts to effect the capture of Galveston, with
a view to those general operations contemplated for the winter campaign, I was
informed by a despatch received January 23, and dated January 4, that "it was
proposed that General Steele should advance to Red river if he could rely upon
your (my) co-operation, and be certain of receiving supplies on that line," and
that "the best military opinions of the generals of the west seemed to favor
operations on Red river, provided the stag·e of the water would enable the gunboats to. co·operate ;" that "this would open a better theatre of operations than
any other for such troops as 'General Grant could spare during the winter." I
was also informed that Major General Grant and Major General Steele had been
written to, and I was instructed to communicate with them upon this subject.
Having made known my plan of operations on the coast, and fully stated at
different times the difficulties to be encountered in movements by land in the
direction of Alexandria and Shreveport, I did not feel at liberty to decline par-
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ticipation in the campaign which had been pressed upon my attention from the
time I was assigned to the command of this department, and which was now
supported by the concurrent opinions of the general officers in the west, on ac·
count of difficulties which might be obviated by personal conference with com·
manders, or by orders from the general·in-chief. It was not, however, withou~
well-founded apprehensions of the result of the campaign and a clear view of
the measures (which I suggested) indispensable to success, that I entered upon
this new camJ?aign.
'rhe necessity of a perfect unity of command and of purpose, as well as of
constant communication between the forces assigned to this dnty and then separated by hundreds of miles, was too apparent to admit of question.
I replied to this despatch on the 23d of January, stating that "with the forces
proposed," to wit, General Sherman's and General Steele's and my own disposable force, I concurred in the opinion that the Red river was the shortest and
best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations
against Texas, and that with my own forces and those of General Steele and
the assistance of General Sherman, the success of the movements on that line
might be made certain and important, and that I should cordially co-operate with
them in executing the orders of the government.
In order that the inherent difficulties attending the proposed combined move·
ment, which had been thoroughly tested in the campaign of 1863 and 1864, and
which I bad represented with as much earnestness as seemed to be proper, might
be presented in a. manner most likely to gain attention, I directed Major D. C.
Houston, chief engineer of the department, w4o possessed the highest claims to
favorable consideration from professional qualifications and experience and his
acquaintance with the route, to prepare a memorial upon operations on Red river,
which had been long under consideration.
This was transmitted to the headquarters of the army, and appeared to have
received the attention and approval of the general-in-chief. It stated with precision the obstacles to be encountered and the measures necessary to accom·
plish the object in view. No change would be required in this statement if it
had been written in review, rather than in anticipation, of the campaign. It
recommended, as a condition indispensable to success, 1st, such complete pre·
liminary org·anization as would avoid the least delay in aur movements after
the campaign had opened; 2d, that a line of supply be established from the
Mississippi, independent of water-courses ; 3d, the concentration of the .forces
west of the Mississippi, and such other force as should be assigned to this duty
from General Sherman's command, in such a JUanner as to expel the enemy
from northern Louisiana and Arkansas ; 4th, such preparation and concert of
action among the different corps employed as to prevent the enemy, by keep·
ing him constantly employed, from operating against our positions or forces
elsewhere ; and, 5th, that the entire force should be placed under the command
of a single gAneral. Preparations for a long campaign were advised, and the
month of May indicated as the point of time when the occupation of Shreveport might be anticipated. Not one of these suggestions, so necessary in con·
quering the inherent difficulties of the expedition, were carried into execution,
nor was it in my power to establish them. The troops under the command or
General Steele were acting independently of my command, under orders not
communicated to me, and at such distance that it was impossible to ascertain
his movements or to inform him of my own, so that we might co· operate with
or support each other. The detachment of troops from the command of Major
General Sherman, though operating upon the same line with my own, were
under special orders, having ulterior objects in view, and afforded an earnest
but only a partial co-operation in the expedition. r.l'he distance which separated the different commands, the impossibility of establishing necessary com·
munications between them, the absence of a general authority to command
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them, the time that was required for the transmission of orders from Washington, and the necessity of immediate action, on account of the condition of the
rivers and operations contemplated for the armies elsewhere, gave rise to embarrassments in the organization of forces and in the execution of orders which
could not be overcome.
In the instructions I received fro~ the government it was left to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition; but I was directed to
communicate with General Sherman and General Steele and Admiral Porter
upon the subject. I expressed the satisfaction I should find in• co-operating
with them in a movement deemed of so much importance by the government,
to which my own command was unequal, and my belief that, witk the forces
designated, it would be entirely successful. Having received from them similar assurances, both my discretion and my authority. so far as the organizatfon
of the expedition was concerned, were at an end. The disposition of the enemy's forces at that time, aceording to the best information that could be
obtained, was as follows: Magruder had about 20,000 men, of all arms, of
which 15,000 were serviceable. 'The main body covered Galveston and Houston from an. anticipated movement from Matagorda peninsula, still held by our
troops. Walker's division, numbering 7,000 men, were upon the Atchafalaya
and Red rivers, from Opelousas to :E'ort De Russy; Mouton's division, between
the Black and Wash ita rivers, from Red river to Monroe, numbering 6,000
men; while Price, with two heavy divisions of infantry, estimated at 5,000,
and a large cavalry force, estimated at from 7,000 to 10,000, held the country
from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia, confronting Steele. Magruder
could spare 10,000 of his force to resist an attack from the east, leaving his
fortifications well garrisoned on the coast, while Price could furnish, at least, an
additional 5,000 from the north, making a formidable army of from 25,000 to
30,000 men, equal to any forces that could be brought against them, even with
the most perfect unity and co-operation of commands. This estimate of the
strength of the enemy was given in my despatch of February 2, but was
thought, upon information received by the government, to be exaggerated.
The defences of the enemy consisted of a series of works covering the approaches to Galveston and Houston from the south, the defences of Galveston
bay, Sabine Pass, and Sabine river, Fort De Russy, a formidable work located
three miles from Marksville for the defence of the Red river, and extensive and
formidable works at Trinity, the junction of the Tensas and Washita at Camden, commanding approaches from the north.
To meet these forces of the enemy, it was proposed to concentrate, in some
general plan of operations, 15,000 of the troope, under command of Geueral
Steele, a detachment of 10,000 from the command of General Sherman, and a
force from 15,000 to 17,000 men from the army of the Gulf, making au army
of 35,000 to 37,000 men of all arms, with such gunboats as the Navy Department should order. Orders were given to my command at once to suspend operations at Galveston, and vigorous preparations were made for the new campaign. Having been charged by the President with duties not immediately
connected with military operations, but which were deemed important, and required my person'al attention at New Orleans, the organization of the troops of
my command assigned to the expedition was intrusted to Major General W. B.
l!..,ranklin. The main body of his command, consisting of the 19th corps, (except Grover's division, at Madisonville, which was to join him,) and one division
of the 13th corps, under General Ransom, were at this time on Berwick's bay,
between Berwick City and Franklin, on the Bayou '.reche, directly on the line
of march for Alexandria and Shreveport. Small garrisons were left at Brownsville and Matagorda bay, in Texas, (positions which, under instructions from
the President, and subsequently from Lieutenant General Grant, were not to be
abandoned,) at New Orleans and at Port Hudson, which was threatened .b y _::t
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vigorous and active enemy. Smaller garrisons at Baton Rouge and Donaldsonville. on the river, and at Pensacola and Key West, on the coast, constituted the
balance of forces under my command.
It had been arranged that the troops concentrated at Franklin should move
for the Red river on the 7th of March to meet the forces of General Sherman at
Alexandria on the 17th, but, for causes stated by General Franklin, the march
was delayed until the 13th, at which time the advance, under General A. L. Lee,
left Franklin, the whole column following soon after and arriving at Alexandria,
the cavalry· on the 19th and the infantry on the 25th. On the 13th of March,
1864, one division of the 16th corps, under Brigadier General Mower, and one
division of the 17th corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith-the whole
under command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith-landed at Simmsport, on the
Atchafalaya., and proceeded at once towards Fort De Russy, carrying it by assault at 4.30 p. m., on the afternoon of the 14th. Two hundred and sixty prisoners and ten heavy guns were captured. Onr loss was slight. The troops
and transports under General A. J. Smith, and the marine brigade under General Ellet, with the gunboats, moved to Alexandria, which was occupied without opposition ou the 16th 'of the same month. General Lee, of my command,
aiTived at Alexandria on the morning of the 19th. The enemy, in the mean
time, continued his retreat through Cheneyville, in the direction of Shreveport.
Offic~rs of my staff were at Alexandria on the 19th, and I made my headquarters there on the 24th, the forces under General Franklin arriving on the 25th
and 26th of March; but as the stage of the water in Red river was too low to
admit the passage of the gunboats or transports over the falls, the troops en:camped near Alexandria, General Smith and his command moving forward
twenty-one miles to Bayou Rapides, above Alexandria. There was but six feet
of water in the channel, while seven and a half was necessary for the secondclass, and ten feet for the first-class gunboats. The river is narrow, the channel
tortuous, changing with every rise, making its navigation more difficult an.d dangerous, probably, than any of the western rivers, while pilots for the transports
were reluctant to enter government service for this campaign. The first gunboat was unable to cross the rapids until the 26th; others crossed on e 28th
with some transports, and .others still on the 2d and 3d of April, the passage
having been made with difficulty and danger, occupying several days. Several
gunboats and transports, being unable then to ascend the river, remained at
Alexandria or returned to the ·Mississippi.
While at .Alexandria Major General McPherson, commanding at Vicksburg,
called for the immediate return of the marine brigade-a part of General :::lmith's
command-to protect the Mississippi, for which service it had been especially
organized. The transports of this brigade were unable to pass above Alexandria. The hospital boat, Woodford, had been wrecked on the rapids in attempting the passage up. The troops were suffering from smallpox, which pervaded all the transports, and they were reported in condition of partial mutiny.
It was not supposed at that time that a depot or garrison at Alexandria would
be required, and this command being without available land or water transportation, was permitted to return to the Mississippi in compliance with the demands
of General McPherson. This reduced the strength of the advancing column
about 3,000 men.
The condition of the river and the inability of the transports to pass the falls
made it necessary to establish a depot of supplies at Alexandria, and a line of
wagon transportation from the steamers below to those above the falls. This
was a departu!e from the plan of the campaign, which did not contemplate a
post or depot at any point on Red river, and involved the necessity of leaving
a division at Alexandria for the purpose of protecting the depot, transports, and
supplies. Brigadier General C. Grover was placed in command of the post, and
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his division left for its defence. This reduced the force of the advancing column
about 3,000 men.
While at Alexandria, on the 21st instant, a movement was organized against
the enemy posted at Henderson's Hill, twenty-five miles in advance. The expedition consisted of three brigades of General A. J. Smith's command and a
brigade of cavalry of the 19th corps, under command of Colonel Lucas, of the
16th Indiana volunteers-the whole under command of Brigadier General
Mower, of the 16th corps. The enemy were surprised, losing two hundred
and fifty prisoners, two hundred horses, and four guns with their caissons. Colonel H. B. Sargent, of my staff, was severely wounded in this action, and disabled from service during the campaign. This affair reflected the highest credit
upon the officers and men engaged. Anticipating by a few days the passage
of the gunboats, the army marched from Alexandria for Natchitoches, eighty
miles distant by land, reaching that point on the 2d and 3d of April. The
enemy continued his retreat, skirmishing sharply with the advance guard, but
offering no serious resistance to our advance.
The shortest and only practicable road from . Natchitoches to Shreveport was
the stage road through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, distance 100 miles, through
a barren, sandy country, with little water and less forage, the greater portion
an unbroken pine forest.
A reconnaissance from Natchitoches on the 2d April, under command of General Lee, discovered the enemy in force at Pleasant Hill, thirty-six mile:.; distant,
and established the fact that a portion of Greene's command bad arrived from
Texas and were then confronting us. Prisoners captured from Price's command
indicated what had been feared from the loss of time at Alexandria, a concentration of the entire available force of the enemy, numbering, according to the
statements of prisoners and intercepted letters, about 25,000 men, with 76
guns.
·
rl'be river Waf\ perceptibly falling, and the larger gunboats were unable to
pass Grand Ecore. The troops under command of General A. J. Smith, which bad
hithert moved in transports by the river, now marched by land from Natchitoches, with the exception of one division of the 17th corps, 2,500 men, under
Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith, which, by order of General A. J. Smith, continued its movements by the river in company with the fleet, for the protection
of the transports. The arrangement of land transportation for this portion of
the column, the replenishing of supply trains from the transports, and the distribution of rations to the troops, were made at this point, but the fleet was unable to ascend the river until the 7th of April. The condition of the river
would have justified the suspension of the movement altogether at either point,
except for the anticipation of such change as to render it navigable. Upon this
subject the counsel of the naval officers was implicitly followed. On the 4th of
April, Colonel 0. P. Gooding commanding a brigade of cavalry, engaged upon a
reconnaissance north of Red river, encountered Harrison's command, 1,500 strong,
in which the enemy was defeated with considerable loss. Our loss was about
·forty in killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy's repulse was decisive. The
army was put in motion for Shreveport via Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, April
6. General Lee with the cavalry division led the advance, followed by a detachment of two divisions of the 13th corps, under General Ransom, first division 19th corps, under General Emory, and a brigade of colored troops under
command of Colonel Dickie, the whole under the immediate command of Major
General Franklin. The detachments of the 16th army corps under command
of Brigadier General A. J. Smith followed on the 7th, and a division of the 17th
army corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith, accompanied Admiral
Porter on the river as a guard for the transports.
The fleet was directed to Loggy bayou, opposite Springfield, where it was
expected communications would be established with the land forces at Sabine
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Crossroat1s, a distance of fifty-four miles by land from Grand Ecore an'd one
hundred miles by water. I remained with a portion of my staff to superintend
the departure of the river and land fcrces from Grand Ecore until the morning of
the 7th, and then rode rapidly forward, reaching the head of the column at
Pleasant Hill the same evening, where the main body encamped. General Smith's
command was at the rear of the column on the march, but passed the negro
brigade on the route to Pleasant Hill. A very heavy rain fell all day on the
7th, which greatly impeded the movement of the rear of the column, making
the road almost impassable for troops, trains, or artillery. 'rhe storm did not
reach the head of the column. In passing the troops from Natchitoches to
Pleasant Bill I endeavored, as much as possible, to accelerate their movements.
The enemy offered no opposition to their march on the 6th. On the 7th the
advance drove a small force to Pleasant Hill, and from there to Wilson's farm,
three miles beyond, where a sharp fight occurred with the enemy posted in a
very strong position, from which they were driven with serious loss and pursued to St. Patrick's bayou near Carroll's mill, about nine miles from Pleasant
Hill, where our forces bivouacked for the night. We sustained in this action a
loss of fourteen men killed, thirty-nine wounded, and nine missing. We captured many prisoners, and the enemy sustained severe los~es in killed and
wounded. During the action General Lee sent to General Franklin for reenforcements, and a brigade of infantry was sent forward, but the £ring having
ceased it was withdrawn. The officers and men fought with great spirit in this
affair. At daybreak on the 8th Gene1al Lee, to whose support a brigade of the
13th corps, under Colonel Landrum, had been sent by my orde;.·, advanced upon
the enemy, drove him from his position on the opposite side of St. Patrick's
bayou and pursued him to Sabine Crossroads, about three miles from Mansfield.
The advance was steady, but slow, and the resistance of the enemy stubborn.
He was only driven from his defensive positions on the road by artillery. At
noon, on the 8th, another brigade of the 13th corps arrived at the Crossroads,
under Brigadier General Ransom, to relieve the first brigade. The infantry
moved from Pleasant Hill at daybreak on the 8th, the head of the column halting
at St. Patrick's bayou, in order that the rear might come up. I passed General
Franklin's headquarters at 10 a. m., giving directions to close up the columns
as speedily as possible, and rode forward to ascertain the condition of affairs at
the front, where I arrived between one and two o'clock. General Ransom arrived nearly at the same time with the second brigade, 13th .corps, which was
under his command in the action at the Crossroads.
I found the troops in line of battle, the skirmishers sharply engaged, the
main body of the enemy posted on the crest of a hill in thick woods on both
sides of a road leading over the hill to Mansfield on our line of march. It was
apparent that the enemy was in much stronger force than at any previous point
on the march, and being confirmed in this opinion by General Lee, I sent to
General Franklin, immediately upon my arrival, a statement of the facts, and
orders to hurry forward the infantry with all possible despatch, directing General
Lee, at the same time, to hold his ground steadily, but not ad vance until reenforcements should arrive. Our forces were for a long time stationary, with
some skirmishing on the flanks. It soon became apparent that the entire force
of the enemy was in our front. Several officers were sent to General Franklin
to hurry forward the column. Skirmishing was incessant during the afternoon.
At 4.30 p.m. the enemy made a general attack all along the lines, but with great
vigor upon our right flank. It was resisted with resolute determination by our
troops, but overpowering numbers compelled them, after resisting the successive
charges of the enemy in front and on the flank, to fall back from their position to
the woods in rear of the open field, which they occupied, retreating in good order.
The enemy pressed with great vigor upon the flanks, as well as in front, for the
purpose of getting to the rear, but were repulsed in this attempt by our cavalry.
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At the line of woods a. new position was assumed, supported by the third
division of the 13th army corps, under General Cameron, whi~h reached this
point about 5 p.m., and formed in line of battle under the direction of Major
General Franklin, who accompanied its advance. The enemy attacked this
second line with great impetuosity and overpowering numbers, turning both
flanks and advancing heavily upon the centre. The assault was resisted with
gallantry, but the troops finding the enemy in the rear, were compelled to yield
the ground and fall steadily back. The road was badly obstructed by the sup~
ply train of the cavalry division, which prevented the retreat of both men and
artillery. We lost ten of the guns of Ransom's division in consequence of the
position of the train, which prevented their withdrawal. Repeated efforts were
made to reform the troops and resist the ad vance of the enemy; but though
their progress was checked, it was without permanent success.
Brigadier General W. H. Emory, commanding first division 19th corps, had
been early notified of the condition of affairs and directed to advance as rapidly
as possible, and form a line of battle in the strongest position he could select, to
support the tl'oops in retreat and check the advance of the enemy. The order
to advance found him seven miles to the rear of the first battle·ground. He
assumed a position at Pleasant Grove, about three miles from the crossroads,
on the edge of the woods commanding an open field sloping to the front. r.rhe
161st New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Kinsey commanding, were deployed as skirmishers and. ordered to the foot of the hill, upon the crest of
which the line was formed to cover the rear of the retreating forces, to check
the pursuit of the enemy and give time for the formation of the troops.
General Dwiglit, commanding first brigade, formed his troops across the road
upon which the enemy was moving, commanding the open field in front, the
third brigade, Colonel Benedict commanding, formed to the left, and the second
brigade, General McMillan, in reserve. The line was scarcely formed when the
161st New York volunteers were attacked and driven in. The right being
threatened, a portion of McMillan's brigade formed on the right of General
Dwight. The fire of our troops was reserved until the enemy was at close
quarters, when the whole line opened upon them with most destructive volleys
of musketry. The action lasted an hour and a half. The enemy was repulsed
with very great slaughter. During the fight a determined effort was made to
turn our left flank, which was defeated. Prisoners reported the lo~ts of the
enemy in officers and men to be very great. General Mouton was killed in the
first onset. Their attack was made with great desperation, apparently with the
idea that the dispersion of our forces at this point would end the campaign, and
with the aid of the steadily falling river leave the fleet of transports and gunboats in their hands or compel their destruction. Nothing could surpass in
impetuosity the assault of the enemy but the inflexible steadiness and valor of
our troops. The first division of the 19th corps, by its great bravery in this
action, saved the army and navy. But for this successful resistance to the attack of the enemy at Pleasant Grove, the renewed attack of the enemy with
increased force could not have been successfully resisted at Pleasant Hill on
the 9th of April. We occupied both battle-grounds at night.
From Pleasant Gro""e, where thid action occurred, to Pleasant Hill, was
fifteen miles. It was certain that the enemy, who was within the reach ofre-en:forcements, would renew the attack in the morning, and it was wholly uncertain
whether the command of General Smith could reach the position we held in
season for a second engagement. For this reason the army, towards morning,
fell baek to Pleasant Rill, General Emory covering the rear, burying the dead,
bringing off the wounded, and all the material of the army. It arrived there
at 8.30 on the morning of the 9th, effecting a junction with ihe forces of General
Smith, and the colored brigade, unde1 Colonel Dickey, which had reached that
point the evening previous. Early on the 9th the troops were prepared for
1
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action, the movements of the enemy indicating that he was on our rear. A line
of battle was formed in the following order: first brigade, 19th corps, from the
right resting on a ravine; second brigade in the centre, and third brigade on the
left. The centre was strengthened by a brigade of General Smith's forces, whose
main force was held in reserve . . The enemy moved towards our right flank.
The second brigade withdrew from the centre to the support of the first brigade.
'rhe brigade in support of the centre moved up into position, and another of
• General Smith's brigades was posted to the extreme left position on the hill, in
echelon, to the rear of the left main line. Light skirmishing occurred during
the afternoon. Between 4 and 5 o'clock it increased in vigor, and about 5 p.
m., when it appeared to have nearly ceased, the enemy drove in our skirmishers
and attacked in force, his first onset being against the left. He advanced in
two oblique lines, extending well over towards the right of the third brigade, 19th
corps. After a determined resistance this part of the line gave way and went
slowly back to the reserves. The first and second brigades were soon enveloped
front, right, and rear. By skilful movements of General Emory the flanks of
the two brigades now bearing the brunt of the battle were covered. The enemy
pursued the brigades, passing the left and centre, until he approached the reserves under General Smith, when he was met by a charge led by General
Mower, and checked. The whole of the reserves were now ordered up, and in
turn we drove the enemy, continuing the pursuit until night compelled us to
halt.
The battle of the 9th was desperate and sanguinary. The defeat of the
enemy was complete, and his loss in officers and men more than double that
sustained by our forces. There was nothing in the immediate positiun or condition of the two armies to prevent a forward movement the next morning, and
orders were given to prepare for an advance. 'The train which had been turned
to the rear on the day of the battle was ordered to re-form and advance at daybreak. I communicated this purpose at the close of the day to General A. J.
Smith, who expressed his concurrence therein ; but representations, subsequently received from General Franklin and all the general officers of the 19th
corps, as to the condition of their respective commands for immediate active
operations against the enemy, caused a suspension of this order, and a conference
of the general officers was held in the evening, in which it was determined, upon
the urgent recommendation of all the general officers above named, and with the
acquiescence of General Smith, to retire upon Grand Ecore the following day.
The reasons urged for this <.;ourse by the officers commanding the 19th and 13th
corps wereFirst, t hat the absence of water made it absolutely necessary to advance or
retire without delay. General Emory's command had been without rations for
two days, and the train which had been turned to the rear during the battle
could not be put in condition to move forward Hpon the single r oad through
dense woods, in which it stood, without difficulty and loss of time. It was for
the purpose of communicating with the fleet at Springfield landing from the
Sabine Crossroads to the river, a8 well as to prevent the concentration of the
Texan troops with the enen1y at Mansfield, that we had pushed for the early
occupation of that point. Considering the difficulty with which the gunboats
passed Alexandria and Grand Ecore, there was every reason to believe that the
navigation of the river would be found impracticable.
A squadron of cavalry, under direction of Mr. Young, who had formerly been
employed in the surveys of this country and was now connected with the engineer department, which had been sent upon a reconnaissance to the river, returned to Pleasant Hill, on the day of the battle, with the report that they had
not been able to discover the fleet, nor learn from the people its passage up the
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river.• This led to the belief that the low water had prevented the advance of
the fleet. '.rhe condition of the river, which had been steadily falling since our
march from Alexandria, rendered it very doubtful, if the fleet ascended the river,
whether it could return from any intermediate point; and probably, if· not certain, that if it reached Shreveport it would never escape without a rise of the
river, of which all hopes began to fail. '.rhe forces designated for this campaign
numbered 42,000 men; less than half that number was actually available for
s~rvice against the enemy during its progress. The distance which separated.
General Steele's command from the line of our operations (nearly two hundred
miles) rendered his movements of little moment to us, or to the enemy, and reduced the strength of the fighting column to the extent of his force, which was
expected to be from 10,000 to 15,000 men. The depot at Alexandria, made
necessary by the impracticable navigation, withdrew from our forces 3,000 men,
under General Grover. The return of the marine brigade to the defence of the
Mississippi, upon the demand of Major General McPherson, and which could
not pass Alexandria without its steamers, nor move by land for want of land
transportation, made a further reduction of 3,000 men.
The protection of the fleet of transports, against the enemy on both sides of
the river, made it necessary for General .A.. J. Smith to detach General T. Kilby
Smith's division of 2,500 men from the main body, for that duty. The army
train required a guard of 500 men. These several detachments, which it was
impossible to avoid, and the distance of General Steele's command, which it was
not in my power to correct, reduced the number of troops that we were able at
any point to bring into action, from 42,000 men to about 20,000. The losses
sustained in the very severe battles of the 7th, 8th, and 9th of April amounted
to about 3,969 men, and necessarily reduced our active forces to that extent.
'rhe enemy, superior to us in numb~rs in the outset, by falling back, was able
to recover from his great losses by means of re-enforcements, which were within
his reach as he approached his base of operations, while we were growing weaker
as we departed from ours. We had fought the battle at Pleasant Hill with
about 15,000 against 22,000 men and won a victory, which, for these reasons,
we were unable to follow up. Other considerations connected with the actual
military condition of affairs afforded additional reasons for the course recommended.
Between the commencement of the expedition and the battle of Pleasant Hill,
a change had occurred in the general command of the army, which caused a
modification of my instructions in regard to this expedition.
Lieutenant General Grant in a despatch, dated the 15th March, which I received on the 27th March, at Alexandria, eight days before we reached Grand
Ecore, by special messenger, gave me the following instructions: "Should you
find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten or fifteen days more time
than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you
will send them back at the time specified in his note of (blank date) March,
even if it should lead to tlw abandonment of tlw main object of the expedition.
Should it prove successful, hold Shreveport and Red river with such force as
you deem necssary, and return the balance of your troops to the neighborhood
of New Orleans." 'rhese instructions, I was informed, were given for the purpose of having "" all parts of the army, or rather all armies, act as much in concert as possible," and with a view to a movement in the spring campaign against
Mobile, which was certainly to be made "if troops enough could be obtained
without embarrassing other movements, in which event New Orleans would be
the point of departure for such an expedition."
"'The report of General T. Kilby Smith, commanding the riverforces, states that the fleet
did not arrive at Loggy bayou until2 o'clock p.m., on the lOth of April, two days after the
·
battle at Sabine Crossroads.
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A subsequent despatch, though it did not control, fu1ly justified my action,
repeated these general views, and stated that the commanding general "would
much rather the Red river expedition had never been begun than that you
should be detained one day beyond the 1st of May in commencing the movement east of the Mississippi."
'
The limitation of time referred to in these despatches was based upon an
opinion which I had verbally expressed to General Sherman, at N ew Orleans,
• that General Smith could be spared in thirty days after we reached Alexandria;
but it was predicated upon the expectation that the navigation of the river
would be unobstructed, that we should advance, without delay, at Alexandria,
Grand Ecore, or elsewhere, on account of low water, and that the forces of General Steele were to co-operate with us effectively at some point on Red river,
near Natchitoches or Monroe. It w-as never understood that an expedition that
involved on the part of my command a land march of nearly four hundred miles
into the enemy's country, and which terminated at a point which we might not
be able to hold, either on account of the strength of the enemy or the difficulties
of obtaining supplies, was to be limited to thirty days. The condition of our
forces, and the distance and diffic1;tlties attending the further advance into the
enemy's country, after the battles of the 8th and 9th, against an enemy superior
in numbers to our own, rendered it probable that we could not occupy Shreveport within the time specified; and certain that, without a rise in the river, the
troops necessary to hold it against the enemy would be compelled· to eva(!uate
it for the want of supplies, and impossible that the expedition should return, in
any event, to New Orleans in time to co-operate in the general movements of
the army, contemplated for the spring campaign. It was known at this time
that the fleet could not re-pass the rapids at Alexandria, and it was doubtful, if
the fleet reached any point above Grand Ecore, whether it would be able to return. By falling back to Grand Ecore, we should be able to ascertain the condition of the ~eet, the practicability of continuing the movement by the river;
reorganize a part of the forces that had been shattered in the battles of the 7th,
8th, and 9th, possibly ascertain the position of General Steele, and obtain from
him the assistance expected for a new advance north of the river or upon its
southern bank, and, perhaps, obtain definite instructions from the government
as to the course to be pursued. Upon these general considerations, and without reference to the actual condition of the respective armies, at 12 o'clock, midnight, on the 9th, I countermanded the order for the return of the train, and directed preparations to be made for the return of the army to Grand Ecore. The
dead were buried, and the wounded brought in from the field of battle and
placed in the most comfortable hospitals that could be provided, and surgeons
and supplies furnished for them. A second squadron of cavalry was sent, under direction of Mr. Young, of the engineer d~partment, to inform the fleet of
our retrograde movement, and to direct its return, if it had ascended tht river,
and on the morning of the lOth~ .the army leisurely returned to Grand Ecore.
The wounded were immediately visited by Dr. Sanger, who took with him
clothing, rations, medicines, and other supplies, and reported them in comfortable
condition.
The fleet sailed from Grand Ecore on the 7th, and reached its destination, at
Loggy bayou, on the morning of the lOth, one day after the battle at Pleasant
Hill, and two days after the engagement at Sabine Crossroads. General T.
Kilby Smith received a verbal message the evening of the lOth, and on the
morning of the 11th written orders to return. The transports were in a crippled condition, rudders unshipped, and wheels broken. The enemy attacked
the fleet, on its return, near Pleasant Hill landing, on the 12th, with a force
of 2,500 cavalry, a strong reserve infantry, and a battery of six guns, under
General Greene; but the troops, protected by cotton bales and bales of hay,
with the gunboats, kept up a deadly fire and drove the enemy from the river.
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For two miles the bank was strewn with the wounded and dead. Among other
rebel officers killed was General Greene, who was left dead upon the field. The
troop& of the transports saw him fall, and claim that his death was the work of
their artillery-the gunboats and transports all firing at the same time. r:I.'he
enemy, under Liddell, who had occupied the north bank of the river with 2,500
men, attacked the fleet on the 13th, but was driven back with loss. The navigation up and down the river was intricate and difficult, and the steamers were
frequently aground.
Several of the boats were laden with ammunition and ordnance stores, but the
energy of the officers and men brought off every boat. The only loss in stores
was a hundred sacks of oats, thrown overboard for the relief of a steamer
aground. They reached Compte on the 14th, with the loss of one man killed
and eighteen wounded, where they met a force from the army, sent to their as·
sistance, and reached Grand Ecore on the 15th without further obstruction.
General r_r. Kirby Smith, to whose courtesy I am indebted for all the official
information I have received of this part of the expedition, mentions with commendation Major D. C. Houston, of the engineers, who had in charge the ordnance stores, and Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Abert, officers of my staff, who
accompanied him, and also officers and men of his own command and the masters of transport steamers.
General Smith, who commanded the land forces and transports, is entitled to
the highest commendation for the energy, skill, and success with which he managed this most difficult affair. Lines of defence were established at Grand
Ecore the 12th of April, and orders given to attack the enemy if he approached.
A pontoon bridge was thrown across the river during the night. Our pickets
were driven in on the 13th, but the enemy appeared, upon a reconnaissance
made in force, to have gone below for the purpose either of attacking our troops
at Alexandria, or occupying Mowet's blufl', on Cane river. On the same day
General Smith crossed the river with two brigades, two batteries, and a strong
cavalry force, to aid the fleet stU! above Grand Ecore. Despatches were sent
to General Steele, informing him of the condition of affairs and requesting him
to join us at some point on the river. Orders were sent to New Orleans for
re-enforcements, and the Lieutenant General commanding the army was informed
of the condition of affairs by telegraph, and of my intention to advance upon
Shreveport, if General Steele could come to our assistance, and my determination not to withdraw without orders. The fleet returned on the 15th in safety,
without loss of vessels or materiel of war. Admiral Porter, with whom I had
a conference on his arrival at Grand Ecore, advised against any further attempt
to advance without a rise of the river, and his counsel was followed. The river
had been steadily falling. Supplies were brought up to Grand Ecore with very
great difficulty. It was found that two of the gunboats could not go below
Grand Ecore, and it was now certain that the fleet could not pass the falls at
Alexandt ia. Lieutenant Commander Selfredge, left in command of the fleet by
the admiral, who had gone to Alexandria, addressed to me a despatch, dated
17th of April, stating that he had been informed the army was to withdraw immediately, and that it would he impossible in that case to get the gunboats
down the river. I informed him at once that the army had no intention of
withdrawing from that position; that I had sent to New Orleans for troops,
and by special messenger to General Steele urging his direct co-operation, and
that until it was definitely ascertained that his assistance would fail us, and
that my force would be insufficient to advance further upon this line against the
enemy, who appeared to be in full force, l should entertain no thought of a ·retrograde movement, and never if it left the navy in any danger. No such purpose
was then entertained, and until I received information in reply to my despatches
it was my purpose to maintain my position. A copy of this letter is appended
to this repurt.
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The next day I received instructions from Lieutenant General Grant (to
which I have referred) that if my return to New Orleans was delayed one day
beyond the 1st of May, when it would be necessary for my command to co-operate with other armies in the spring campaign, it would have been better that
the expedition had never been attempted. These instructions, with the fact that
the river was not likely to rise; the report received by Captain R. T. Dunham,
that General Steele could not co-·operate with us, and that the difficulty of passing the falls at Alexandria was hourly increasing, if the passage was not even
then impossible, led me to change my determination. It was not, however,
until the entire fleet was free, transports and gunboats, and that Admiral Porter,
in charge of the Eastport, which had been aground several miles below Grand
Ecore for several days, sent me word by Colonel W. S. Abert (whose statement
is hereto appended) that she was clear and further protection unnecessary, that
orders were given the 21st of April to return the supply teams in the direction
of Alexandria. The army moved on the morning of the 22d of April, every
vessel having preceded both the marching orders and the movements of the
army. Any statement, from whatever source, that the army contemplated moving from Grand Ecore towards Alexandria against the advice or without the
approval of the naval officers in command, or until after the departure of every
vessel on the river, is without the slightest color of truth. In my interview with
Admiral Porter, on the 15th of April, he expressed the utmost confidence that
the river would rise, and gave me no intimation of his leaving Grand Ecore, nor
of the purpose of the withdrawal of his vessels, or of his apprehensions of the
retreat of the army. I gave him at that time distinct information of my plans,
which were to advance. 'rhis fact was communicated to Lieutenant Commander Selfredge in my letter of the 17th of April. The admiral expressed the
same confidence in the rise of the river to officers of the army, who, from long
experience in the Red river country, were equally confident that it would not
rise.
'rhe difficulties attending the voyage of the Eastport were incident to the
condition of the river, for which the army was in nowise responsible. I had
offered every assistance possible, and did not leave this position while any aid
was suggested or required.
Colonel Bailey, after consultation with the general officers of the army, offered
to float the Eastport over the bars by the con::;truction of wing-dams, similar to
those afterwards built at Alexandria, but the assistance was declined. No
counsel from any officers was regarded in nautical affairs.
The army marched from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 22d of April, llaving been detained there by the condition of the navy ten days. To prevent the
occupation of Mowet's blufi~ on Cane river, a strong position, commanding the
only road leading across the river to Alexandria, or to prevent the concentration
of the enemy's forces at that point, if it was in his possession, it became necessary to accomplish the evacuation without his knowledge, and to prevent his
strengthening the natural defences of the position by the rapidity of our march.
The conflagration of a portion of the town at the hour appointed for marching
partially frustrated the first object, but the second was fulty accomplished. The
army marched from Grand Ecore to Cane river on the 20th of April, a . distance
of forty miles, and moved upon the position held by the enemy the 23d of April,
before daybreak. About 8,000 men and 16 guns, under command of General
Bee, were found in possession of the bluff, on the opposite side of the river, who
were evidently surprised at the unexpected presence of our army, but ready to
dispute our only passage towards Alexandria. At daybreak, one division of the
19th and 13th corps each, the cavalry commanded by General Arnold, and \he
artillery commanded by Captain Classon, the whole under command of General
W. H. Emory, were ordered forward to the river for the purpose of forcing this
.position. 'rhe pickets of the enemy were encountered on the west side of the
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river and quickly driven across, but the main position was found to be too strong
to be carried by direct attack. A reconnoitring party under Colonel Bailey,
4th vVisconsin volunteers, sent to ascertain the practicability of crossing the
river below the ferry towards Red river on the morning of the 23d, reported that
the river was not fordable below the ferry, and that, owing to the impassable swamps
on one side and the high bluffs on the other, it would not be possible to cross Cane
river at any point below the ferry. If we failed to dislodge the enemy at the ferry,
the only alternative open to us was to attempt a crossing to the north side of Red
river, an exceedingly difficult and dangerous movement. At the same time a force
under command of General H. W. Birge, consisting of his own command, the third
brigade of the first division, 19th army corps, Colonel Fessenden commanding, and
General Cameron's division, 13th corps, were ordered to cross the river three miles
above the ferry, and turning the left flank of the enemy, carry the heights in reverse,
if possible. Upon the success of this movement depended the passage of the river
by the army. The route traversed by General Birge's command was intersected
by bayous, swamps, and almost impenetrable woods. This force reached its
position late in the afternoon. To accomplish the purpose in view, it became
necessary to carry two strong positions held by pickets and skirmishers before the
enemy was encountered in force on the crest of a hill, commanding an open field,
over which our troops were compelled to cross in making the attack. The third
brigade, 19th corps, Colonel Fessenden commanding, carried this position, which
was defended with vigor, by assault. Its occupation compelled the retreat of
the enemy from the bluffs commanding the ferry and ford. Our loss in this
most brilliant and successful affair was about two hundred killed and wounded.
Colonel :E'essenden, who led his command with great gallantry, was severely
wounded. General Birge, as in all actions in which he has been engaged, dE'served
and received the highest commendation. Lieutenant William Beebe, of the
ordnance department, and Mr. Young, of the engineer department, both volunteers, were conspicuous in the fight. Mr. Young was twice wounded, and died
in New Orleans, in July, of the injuries received in this battle. The attack on
the rear of the enemy's position, covering the line of the enemy's retreat, failed
in consequence of the difficulties encounterE'd on the march and the late hour at
which our troops gained their position. The enemy was thus enabled to escape
with his artillery by the Fort Jesup road to Texas.
The main body of the army had moved from Cloutreville at 4.30 a. m. on
the 23d to the river. They drove in the enemy's pickets three miles in advance
of the river, and formed a line of battle in front of the enemy's position, while
General Birge was moving upon the enemy's left flank. The enemy opened
with a heavy cannonade from his batteries, which was returned by our artillery
with spirit and effect. The fire was continued at intervals during the morning,
but the troops were held in reserve for the purpose of forcing the passage of
the river at the moment that General Birge commenced his attack on the right.
'The action lasted till dark, whE'n the enemy retreated, and the heights were
occupied by our forces. General A. J. Smith's command had sharp skirmishing
with the advance of the enemy in our rear on the 23d.
At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21th six guns were fired from the camp
of the enemy in the rear. It was interpreted as a signal that they were ready
for a combined attack ; but the enemy in front had then been driven from the
river, and the contemplated movement upon our front and rear failed. During
the morning of the 23d an effort had been made by a portion of the cavalry
under Colonel E. J. Davis to turn the right flank of the enemy's position, by
crossing the river below the ferry in the direction of Red river, which proved
impracticable on account of impassable swamps. A sharp engagement occurred
on the morning of the 24th between the troops of General T. Kilby Smith and
the enemy in the rear, which resulted in the repulse of the latter. Our loss
was about fifty in this affair. Had the enemy concentrated his forces and forti-
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fied his position at :Monet's bluff, we could not have forced him from it, and
should have been compelled to accept the chances of crossing Red river above
Cane river in the presence of the enemy on both sides of the river. .Orders
had been sent to General Grover to move with all his force upon Monet's bluff
in the event of its being occupied by the enemy or our march seriously obstructed, and his troops were in readiness for this movement.
The army marched from Monet's bluff on the afternoon of the 24th of April,
and established lines of defence at Alexandria on the 2fith and 26th of April.
In the twenty-four days intervening between the departure of the army from
Alexandria and its return the battles of Wilson's farm, Sabine Crossroads,
Pleasant Grove, Pleasant Hill, Compte, Monet's bluff, and several combats in
the neighborhood of Grand Ecore while we were in occupation of that point,
had been fought. In every one of these engagements, except that of Sabine
Crossroads, we had been successful. The failure to accomplish the main object
of the expedition was due to other considerations than the actual superiority of
the enemy in the field. In these operations, in which my own command had
marched by land nearly four hundred miles, the total loss sustained was 3,980
men, of whom 289 were killed, 1,541 wounded, and 2,150 missing. A large
portion of the latter were captured and have been si.nce exchanged, but a considerable portion returned to t.he army during its operations on Red river. No
loss of artillery or of trains or any army material whatever was sustained, except that which occurred at Sabine Crossroadt~. We lost there Nim's battery
and a section of the Missouri howitzer battery, 150 wagons and 800 mules,
captured by the enemy on account of the position of the train near the field of
battle. All the ammunition wagons were saved. 'rhe army had captured up
to this time from the enemy ~3 guns and 1,500 prisoners. His losses in killed,
wounded, and prisoners-officers and men -were much greater than ours.
Among the former were some of the most efficient rebel commanders, whose
loss can never be made good. Up to this time no other loss of men or material
had been sustained by our army.
As soon as the lines of defence were completed, preparations were made for
the release of the fleet, which was then unable to pass below the falls. From
the difficulty which the supply transports had encountered in passing the falls,
it was known at Grand Ecore as early as the 15th of April that the navy could
not go below, and the means for its release were freely discussed among officers
of the army. During the campaign at Port Hudson the steamers Starlight and
Red Chief were captured by Grierson'::; Illinois cavalry, under command of
Colonel Prince, jn rnwmpson's creek. 'rhe bed of the creek was nearly dt-y,
and the steamers were sunk several feet in the sand. After the capture of Port
Hudson, Oolonel Bailey constructed wing-dams, which, by raising the water,
lifted the steamers from the sand, and floated them out of the creek into the
Mississippi. This incident naturally suggested the same works at Alexandria
for the relief of the fleet. A survey was ordered for the purpose of determining what measures could be best undertaken. 'rhe engineers of the army had
complete surveys of the falls, captured from the enemy during our occupation
of Alexandria in 1863, at the commencement of the Port Hndson campaign.
It was found, upon examining these charts and upon a survey of the river, that
the channel was narrow and crooked, formed in solid rock, and that it would be
wholly impractical,le to deepen its bed. It was therefore determined to commence the construction of a dam to raise the river to such a height as to enable
the vessels to float over the falls. ri'his project was freely discussed by the
engineers and officers of the army, and was generally believed to be practicable. Captain J. C. Palfrey, who had made the survey, reported that in his
judgment it was entirely feasible, and the only question made related to the
time that might be required for so great a work.
1'he management of this enterprise was naturally intrusted to Lieutenant
82 w
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Colonel Joseph Bailey, 4th Wiscousin volunteers, who was by profession a
civil engiucer, familiar with works of that kind, common to slack-water navigation upon all the western rivers, and had successfully released the steamers
from Thompson's creek, on the Mississippi. Colonel Bailey had suggested the
practicability of the dam while we were at Grand Ecore, and had offered to
release the Eastport, when aground below Grand Ecore, by the same means,
which offer was declined. 1\Iaterial was collected during these preparations,
and work commenced upon the dam on Sunday, May 1. Nearly the whole
army was engaged at different times upon this work. The dam was completed
on Sunday, May 8, and the gunboats Osage, Ilindman, and two others came
over the rapids about four o'clock in the afternoon.
The water had been raised upon the dam for a mile and a quarter about seven
feet, with a fall below the dam of about six feet, making in all a fall of about
thirteen feet, above and below the falls. The pressure of the water at its completion was terrific. I went over the work at eleven o'clock on the evening of
the 8th, with one of my staff officers, and felt that the pressure of the water
was so great that it could not stand. I rode immediately to the point above
where the fleet was anchored, to ascertain if they were ready to follow the four
boats that had already passed the rapids. I reached the fleet about twelve
o'clock midnight. Scarcely a man or a light was to be seen. It was perfectly
apparent that the boats were not in condition to take advantage~ of the completion of the dam, and feeling that it could not stand another day, I wrote a
note to Admiral Porter at one o'clock on the morning of the 9th, which waA
delivered in person at two o'clock a. m. by Colonel ,J. G. Wilson, stating my
belief as to the condition of the dam and fleet, and asking that measures should
be taken to put the boats in condition to move over the rapids at the earliest
possible moment in the morning. A little after five o'clock on the morning of
the 9th I saw a part of the dam swept away. The four boats that had passed
the rapids the afternoon before were able to pass below through the opening
which the waters bad made. Only one of the vessels above the falls, the Lexington, was ready to move when the dam gave way, and that came down after
the break and passed the dam safely with all the vessels that were below the
rapids. Had the others been ready to move, all would have passed the rapids
and the dam safely on Mouday.
Until after the dam had been carried away no effort had been made to lessen
the draught of the imprisoned vessels by lightening them of cargo, armament,
or plating. Before the second series of dams was completed, a portion of the
armament and the plating, materially lessening their draught and the depth of
water required to float them, was removed. Lieutenant \Villiam S. Beebe, of
the ordnance department, United States army, superintended the removal of
the heavy naval guns from above the rapids to a point below the dam by land,
aseisted by officers and soldiers of the army.
The army immediately commenced the reconstruction of the dam. Finding
it impossible to resist the current of the river entirely, the opening made by
the flood was only partially closed, and eight or ten wing-dams were constructed
on the right and left banks of the river in accordance with the original plan,
turning the current of water directly upon the channel, and raising· it at the
different points sufficiently to allow the vessels to pass. 1'hjs new work was
completed on the 12th of .1\Iay, and on the afternoon of that day all the boats
passed below the rapids to the dam. At six o'clock in the cYening the Mound
City and Carondelet passed the dam. 'rhe other boats remained above until
the morning of the 13th. The water upon the dam was steauily falling, but at
.
nine o'clock on the 13th all the boats had safely passed.
Preparations had been made for the movement of the army the evening after
the passage of the boats below the dam on the 12th, and after all were below,
on the 13th orders were given for the march.
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The construction of the dam was exclusively the work of the army. But
little aid or encouragement was rendered by officers of the navy, except by
Lieutenant A. R. Langlhorne, commanding the Mound City, who assisted in
setting the cribs, and was always ready to answer the call of the officers charged
with the construction of the work. ':rhe soldiers labored sedulously and zealously night and day, in and out of water, from the 1st to the 13th of May,
inclusive, when the passage of the boats was completed.
Upon my arrival at Alexandria, on the 25th of April, I found Major General
Hunter, with despatches from the Lieutenant General commanding the armies,
reaffirming instructions which I had received at Grand Ecore relating to the
operations of the army elsewhere, and to the necessity of bringing the Shreveport campaign to an end without delay. 'rhe only possible means of executing
these peremptory orders had already been taken. General Hunter left on the
30th of April with despatches to the Lieutenant General, giving a report of the
condition of affairs-that the fleet could not pass the rapids, that there was no
course for the army but to remain for its protection, that the enemy would concentrate all his forces at that point for the destruction of the army and the fleet,
and that it was necessary to concentrate our troops west of the Mississippi at
the same point by which the army and navy could be relieved ana the forces of
the enemy aestroyed.
JYfajor General McClernand, with the larger part of the forces recently at
Matagorda bay-which had been evacuated by order of Lieutenant General
Grant, dated March 31-arrived at Alexandria on the evening of the 29th of
April. Brigadier Generall!-,itz Henry W an·en, left in command at Matagoraa
bay, followed with the rest of the forces in Texas, except those on the Rio
Grande, when the batteries of the enemy on the 1·iver near Marksville obstructed
his passage. Not having sufficient force to dislodge the enemy, he seized Fort
De Russy, below the batteries, which he held until the passage of the fleet and
army.
'Vhile engaged in the construction of the dam a despatch was received from
Major General Halleck, dated April 30, as follows:
"Lieutenant General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified
that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red
river, and that operations there be continued, under the officer in command,
until further orders."
This despatch was not received until it was impossible to move either up or
down the river from Alexanaria. It was, of course, "impracticable to execute
these instructions.
Until the 4th of May communication with the Mississippi by the river was
unobstr cted. Lieutenant William Simpson, of my staff, left by the gunboat
Signal, with despatches for Lieutenant General Grant, Admiral Farragut, General
Sherman, and General Rosecrans. 'rhe gunboat Covington, having in convoy
the transport Warner, accompaniea the Signal. We received news on the
morning of the 6th of the destruction of the gunboats ana the transport. The
enemy had established a battery near Marksville, supported by a large infantry
force. Communication with the Mississippi was closed from this date. About
four hundred. men of the 56th Ohio volunteers were on board the Warner. A
part of them joined our troops below, and a portion of them pierced the lines of
the enemy and returned to Alexandria. About one hundred and fifty were captured. Lieutenant Simpson was captured, but destroyed his despatches. The
City Belle, on her way to Alexandria with four hundred and twenty-five men of
the 120th Ohio volunteers, was captured by the enemy. Two hundred of the
troops escaped.
'rhe fleet passed below Alexandria on the 13th of May. The army, on its
march from Alexandria, did not encounter the enemy in force until near the
town of Mansura. He was driven through the town on the evening of the 14th
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of May, and at daybreak next morning our advance encountered his cavalry on
the prairie east of the town. He fell back, with steady and sharp skirmishing
across the prairie, to a belt of woods, which he occupied'. The evening's position covered three roads diverging from Mansura to the edge of Atchafalaya.
He manifested a determination here to obstinately resist our passage. The engagement, which lasted several hours, was confined chiefly to the artillery until
our troops got possession of the edge of the woods-first upon our left, by
General Emory; subsequently on our right, by General Smith, when he was
driven from the field, after a sharp and decisive fight, with considerable loss.
The 16th of May we reached Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya. Being entirely destitute of any ordinary bridge material for the passage of this riverabout six hundred yards wide-a bridge was constructed of the steamers, under
direction of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. This work was not of the eame magnitude, but was as important to the army as the dam at Alexandria wai3 to the
navy. It had the merit of being an entirely novel construction, no bridge of
such magnitude haviug been constructed of similar materials. The bridge was
completed at one o'clock on the 19th of May. The wagon train passed in the
afternoon, and the troops the next morning, in better spirit and condition, as
able and eager to meet the enemy as at any period of the campaign. The
command of General A. J. Smith, which covered the rear of the army during
the construction of the bridge and the passage of the army, had a severe engagement with the enemy, under Polignac, on the afternoon of the 19th, at Yellow
Bayou, which lasted several hours. Our loss was about one hundred and fifty
in killed and wounded; that of the enemy much greater, besides many prisoners
who were taken by our troops. Major General E. R. S. Canby arrived at
Simmsport on the 19th of May, and the next day assumed command of the
troops, as a portion of the forces of the military division of theW est Mississippi,
to the command of which he had been assigned.
Rumors were circulated freely throughout the camp at Alexandria that upon
the evacuation of the town it would be burned. rro prevent this destruction of
property-part of which belonged to loyal citizens-General Grover, commanding the post, was instructed to organize a thorough police and to provide for its
occupation by an armed force until the army had marched for Simms port. The
measures taken were sufficient to prevent a conflagration in the manner in which
it had been anticipated. But on the morning of the evacuation, while the army
was in full possession of the town, a fire broke out in a building on the levee,
which had been occupied by refugees or soldiers, in such a manner as to make
it impossible to prevent a general conflagTation . I saw the fire when it was
first discovered. The ammunition and ordnance transports and the depot of
ammunition on the levee were within a few yards of the fire. The b ats were
floated into the river and the ammunition moved from the levee with all possible
despatch. The troops labored with alacrity and vigor to suppress the conflagration, but owing to a high wind and the combustible materials of the buildings it was found impossible to limit its progress, and a considerable portion of
the town was destroyed.
On the 1st of April, two or three days before the army moved from Alexandria to Natchitoches, an election of delegates to the constitutional convention
was held at Alexandria by request of citizens of the parish of Rapides. No
officer or soldier interfered with or had any part whatever in this matter; it was
left exclusively to the loyal citizens of the place. Three hundred votes were
given in this election, which was a large majority of all the voting population
in that parish. .Fifteen hundred votes were a full representation of the people
before the war. Nearly five hundred men from this and neighboring parishes
enlisted in the army as mounted scouts, and rendered efficient and valuable services during the campaign.
Under the general prize law the naval authorities upon their arrival at Alex-
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anuria commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river, extending
their opemtions from six to ten miles into the interior. vV agon trains were organized, cotton-gins put in operation, and the business followed up with great
vigor while the fleet lay at Alexandria. Some difficulty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their Tight to pass the lines of the aTmy, which was
terminated by the advance of the army and navy to Grand Ecore. I was informed by parties claiming property which had been taken by the naval authorities to whom I referred them, that upon application for relief their propeTty had
been released to them by the commander of the fleet. The army did not enter
into competition with the navy in the capture of this property.
· In order to remove all the products of the country which might, under any
circumstances, be used to aid the rebellion against the government, General Grover, in command of the post of Alexandria, and the quartermaster of that post,
upon the departure of the army from Alexandria, were directed to collect such
property as should remain there after its departure and transmit it to the qua~·
termaster at New Orleans, who was instructed to turn it over to the officefl ·of
the treasury, to be disposed of according t o the orders of the government and
the Jaws of Congress. Notice was also given to the supervising agent of the
treasury at New Orleans that no trade would be allowed with that portion of
the State until it should be completely and permanently occupied by the army.
No person was allowed to accompany the army upon this expedition as reporter,
or for any other purpose, without a distinct and written declaration that no
trade by private parties or for personal purposes would be permitted under any
circumstances, and that no property or private account would be transported
by public or private vessels to New Orleans; but that all property sent to New
Orleans would be consigned to the chief quartermaster, and by him turned over
to the treasury agent and held subject to such claims and orders as should be
approved by the government at Washington.
Previous to my departure from New Orleans the chief quartermaster, Colonel
S. B. Holabird, had been instructed that no privileges would be given to any
party whatever, under any circumstances, to trade in, to diflpose of, or to transport private property; that all the property that came down from that country,
so far as the army was concerned, would be tnrncrl over to him, and by him. to
the proper treasury officers .. r_rhe same information was given to the treasury
ag~nt.
No pcrmi~sion was given to any person to accompany the army, except
upon these express conditions, and then only to snch persons whose public positions seemed to be a full guarantee against abuse of the privilege, and whose
requests could not be properly refused. They were given to reporters of the
public press and to prominent officers of States whose troops were in the field.
Upon representations made by officers of the Treasury Department at Alexandria that there would be difficulty in receiving such property except under
the treasury regulations of the 26th of January, 1864, those regulations were
officially promulgated for that purpoEe at Alexandria and at New Orleans.
1'hese orders were strictly enforced by all officers connected with or representing the army. There was no permission whatever given to any person to trade,
to dispose of, or transport private property; no privilege of this kind was
recognized under any circumstances. Every dollar's worth of property that
came into the hands of the army during this campaign was either appropriated
to its use in kind by the proper officers of the commissary and quartermaster's
departments, receipts being given therefor, or transmitted to the chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and by him turned over to the treasury agents to be
disposed of according to the laws of Congress and the orders of the government.
When cotton or other property interfered with the transportation of any
material of the a:rmy, or of refugees, negroes, or troops, upon the evacuation of
the country, it 'vas thrown from the boats and abandoned upon the river leyee to
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the enemy. I intend this statement to be as comprehensive upon the subject
as language can make it, and to cover all possible methods, direct or indirect, by
which officers or citizens, public or private parties, or any persons whatever, could
evade or violate these orders on the river or ut New Orleans, or appropriate by
any means public or private property to private uses or personal advantage, or
deprive the government or individuals of any property which, by any interpretation of military orders or public laws, could be considered us belonging justly and
properly to them. General Grover, commanding the post, Colonel S. B. Holabird,
chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and Honorable B.]'. Flanders, supervising
special agent '.rreasury Department, will be able to account to the government
for public or private property coming into their bands during this campaign.
I was engaged upon the Gulf coast, hoping, by the capture of Galveston and
Mobile, to put my command in readiness for an effective co-op eration, by Mo·
bile and the Alabama river, with General Sherman, precisely in accordance with
the 1:ampaign suggested by the Lieutenant General commanding the armies in
his iespatches of the 15th and 31st of :March, when I received instructions to
communicate with the admiral and the general officers commanding the fleet and
forces of the upper Mississippi upon the subject of the campaign against Shreveport. I immediately complied with these orders. They had received similar
instruction:::, and, in answer to my communications, expressed their readiness
and desire to enter upou the campaign. vVith the forces proposed, and the cooperation of the fleet, its success was reasonably certain. Under such circumstances, I could not decline co-operation with them.
I at once abandoned all other enterprises and gave my whole attention to this
service
The first difficulty encountered was in the navigation of the river. Sixteen
days' delay, caused by the inability of the fleet to pass the rapids at Alexandria, and three days' delay at Grand Ecorc in waiting the rise of the 'river,
enabled the enemy to concentrate his forces, and rendered impossible that celerity
of movement by the army which the success of the expedition demanded. Eight
days of the delay at Alexandria would have been attributable to the tardy organization and movements of Franklin'.:; command, but the fleet was unable to pass
thfi falls until eight days after his arrival at Alexandria. 'l'his delay was doubtless owing to the impracticable navigation of the river; but it is not improper
to say that the forecast and diligence which are enforced upon all men in the
daily affairs of life would have forbidden an attempt to force a fleet of so much
importance to the free navigation of the Mississippi to a point from which it
could never hope to escape, except upon the theory that the river ought to or
might rise. The movem ent of the navy, in a despatch of Rear-Admiral D. D.
Porter, to which the Secretary of the Navy has given official publication and
sanction, is attributed to the request of General Banks, who '• deemed the cooperation of the gunboats so essential to suceess that be (Porter) had to run
some risks and make unusual exertions to get them over the falls."
This implies that the responsibility of his action rests upon the army; but it
is 11ot consistent with the facts. 'The co-operation of the navy was an indispensable condition and basis of the expedition. Major General Halleck informed
me, January 11, that he had been assured by the Navy Department that
Admiral Porter would be prepared to co-operate with the army in its movements; and the admiral himself informed me, February 26, that he was "prepared to ascend Red river with a large fleet of gunboats," and to co-operate with
the army, at any time when the water was high enough. The fleet was as necessary to the campaign as the army. Had it been left to my discretion I should
have reluctantly undertaken, in a campaign requiring but eight or ten light-draught
gun-boats, to force twenty heavy iron-clads four hundred and ninety miles upon
a river proverbially as treacherous as the rebels who defended it, and which had
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given notice of its character by steadily falling when, as the admiral reports,
''all other rivers were booming."
There is a better reason for the disregard of the palpable difficulties of naviga·
tion than the overzealous counsel of army officers in nautical affairs. In a subsequent despatch Admiral Porter says that "all my vessels navigated the river to
Grand Ecore with ease, and wHh some of them I reached Spl'inD'iield landing, tbe place designated for the gllnboats .to meet the army. 11£} part was
successfully accomplished; the failure of the army to proceed, and the retreat to Grand Ecore, left me almost at the mercy of the enemy." The records
of the campaign do not at all support the reckless and fiery ardor of this statement.
The fleet did not reach the "place appointed" until two full days after the
first decisive battle with the enemy. The admiral occupied four days in moving 104 miles on what he calls "a rising river" with " good water" to the place
appointed. General T. Kilby Smith states that the fleet made twenty miles on
the 7th, fifty-seven miles on the 8th, eighteen miles on the 9th, and nine miles
on the lOth of April-total, 104 miles. The failure of the fleet to move up the
river with ordinary expedition, together with the fact that the gunboats were
unable to pass Grand Ecore uutil the 7th, justified the belief that its advance had
been prevented by the low stage of water, and governed the army exclusively
in its retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, as it did in every important
operation of the campaign. The admiral's despatch does not mention the fact
that, in addition to the ''mercy" of the enemy, he had the support of General
T. Kilby Smith's division of 2,500 men, whose most gallant and honorable part
in the preservation of the fleet of gunboats and transport:;; is not referred to in
what the admiral calls " this curious affair between (the enemy's) infantry and
gunboats." In view of the published despatches of Admiral Porter, it is proper for me to say that every position of difficulty in which the army was placed
in this campaign was the immediate and direct consequence of delay in the
operations of the navy. 'rhis may have been inevitable and entirely justifiable
from the condition of the river. It is not my province to pass judgment upon
its operations ; but the fact remains nevertheless. During my term of service
it has been an invariable rule of conduct, from which I have never departed, to
forbear the expression of opinion or complaint upon the official action of others;
but I feel it to be a solemn duty to say, in this official and formal manner, that
Admiral Porter's published official statement.;;, relating to the Red river campaign,
are at variance with the truth, of which there are many thousand living witnesses, and do foul injustice to the officers and soldiers of the army, living and
dead, to whom the Navy Department owes exclusively the preservation and
houor of its fleet.
'l'he partial disintegration of the several commands assigned to this expedition was a cause of embarrassment, though not entirely of failure. r_rhe command of Major General Steele, which I was informed by Major General Sherman
would be about 15,000 men, was in fact but 7,000, and operating upon a line
several hundred miles distant, with purposes and results entirely unknown to
me. February 5 I was informed by General Steele that if any advance was
to be made it must be by the Washita and Red rivers, and that he might be
able to move his command by the way of Pine Bluff to Monroe for this purpose. This would have united our forces on Red river, and insured the success
()f the campaign. 'l'he 28th of February be informed me that he could not
move by the way of Monroe, and on the 4th of March, the day before my command was ordered to move, I was informed by General Sherman that he bad
written to General Steele to " push straight to Shreveport." March 5 I was
informed by General Halleck that be had no information of General Steele's
plans, further than that he would be directed to facilitate my operations towards
Shreveport. The lOth of March General Steele informed me that the objections to the route I wished him to take (by the way of Red river) were stronger
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than ever, and that he "would. move with all his available force, (about 7,000,)
to Washington, and thence to Shreveport." I received information the 26th of
March, dated the 5th of March, from Major General Halleck, that he had
"directed General Steele to make a real move, as suggested by you, (Banks,)
instead of a demonstration, as he (Steele) thought advisable." In April General Halleck informed me that he had tclegrnphed General Steele "to cooperate with you (Banks) on Red river, with all his available forces." April
16th I was informed, under date of the lOth, by General Shermau, that General
Steele's entire force would co· operate with me and the navy. In May I received information from General Steele, under date of the 28th of April, that
he could not leave Camden unless supplies were sent to him, as those of the
country were exhauFJted; that we "could not help each other operating our
lines so wide apart;" that he could not say definitely that he could join me
''at any point on Red river at any given time;" and, from the distance that
separated us, that I could render no assistance to him, an opinion in which I
entirely concurred. I never received authority to give orders to General Steele;
my instructions limited me to communication with him upon the subject of the
expedition. His orders he received from other sources. I have no doubt that
General Steele did all in his power to insure success, but as communication
with him was necessarily by special messenger, and occupied from fifteen to
twenty days at each communication, it was impossible for either of us fully to
comprehend the relative positions of the two armies, or to assist or to support
each other.
The column of General A. J. Smith was a partially independent command.
General Sherman, in his despatch of the lOth of April, received the 16th, informed me that "the thirty days for which he had loaned me General Smith's
command would expire on the lOth of April," the day after the battle of Pleasant Hill. General Smith's instructions, which he showed me, required him to
confer constantly with Admiral Porter, the approved friend of the army of the
Tennessee. His orders were dated "Headquarten Red River Expedition,
steamer Clm·a Bell." He never declined co-operation with me, nor did he
receive orders from me. He made no official reports of his forces or their operations. He was in no wise responsible for the result of the expedition, and may,
perhq,ps, be said to have gained as much by its failure as he would from its
success. V\Then his thi1 1y days were up he claimed the right, at Grand Ecore,
to return to Vicksburg, irrespective of the condition of the army, or the fleet,
and did not consider himself at all responsible for the inevitable· consequences
of his withdrawal to the army or navy, nor for that detention which their preservation demanded. '1'hat responsibility I was called upon to assume in written
orders. I entertain no doubt that his official course was entirely consistent
with his orders, and I cheerfully acknowledge the generous and earnest efforts
of General Mower, of the 16th, and General T. Kilby Smith, of the 17th corps,
to infuse into the different corps that unity of spirit which is as essential to
victory as the valor of the soldiers in actual battle. I gladly accord to the men
of their commands the honor of having fought a desperate enemy, superior in
numbers, with as much gallantry and success as that which distinguished the
troops of my immediate command. No higher praise than this can be given to
any soldier. Alexander's troo1)s never fought better.
'£he results of the position of the cavalry train, aud the loose order of march
by the leading column of troops, under Major General Franklin, on the 8th of
April, before the battle of Sabine Crossroads, have been stated. A commanding officer is, of course, responsible for all that occurs to his command, whatever
may have been the cause. I do not shrink from that responsibility. But, while
it was both proper and necessary for me to give personal attention to the prompt
advance of all the troops, and fleet, from Grand Ecore, on the morning of the
7th, it was supposed that the movement of a single column of 13,000 men~

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

1305

moving in advance on one road, for a distance of less than fifty miles, in such
manner as to be able to encounter the enemy if he offered resistance, might
safely be intrusted to an officer of the reputation and experience of Major General
F ranklin, whose rank, except in one instance, was superior to that of any officer
of the expedition or of the department of the Gulf.
I make no complaint of the navy; but, in view of its prolific deEtpatches long
since published on this campaign, I may properly repeat a few facts already
stated. The success of the expedition depended solely upon celerity of movement. The navy delayed the advance of the army at Alexandria sixteen days,
and at Grand Ecore three days. It occupied four days in moving from Grand
E core to Springfield Landing, a distance of 104 miles, upon what the despatches
call "a rising river with good water," where it arrived two days after the first
battle and one day after the decisive battle of the campaign at Pleasant Hill.
I t detained ·the army ten days at Grand Ecore and eighteen days at Alexandria on its return. These are not opinions; they are events. To the army
they were pregnant and bloody events.
'l'he difficulties of navigation, the imperfect concentration of forces, the incautious march of the 8th of April, and the limited time allotted to the expedition,
were the causes of its failure. We owe nothing to the enemy, not even our
defeat. Could any one of these difficulties have been avoided, the object of the
campaign would have been accomplished.
But the occupation of Shreveport could not have been maintained. The presence of the enemy would have required such a force for its defence as could not
have been supplied by the river, and for which no other arrangement had been
made, as suggested in my despatch of the 30th of .March. The only possible
method of maintaining this position would have been to concentrate at this
point a force superior in numben to the enemy, with sufficient time to pursue
him wherever he should move, even if it took us to Galveston, on the Gulf
coast. This was suggested as a possible result of the campaign, but it was not
embraced within the original plan, and was specially precluded by orders received from the Lieutenant General commanding the armies.
I remain, sir, your obedient servant,
N. P. BANKS,
Major General Volunteers.
T he SEcRETARY OF WAR.
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